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This thesis critically examines the rules and principles which govern the enforcement of 
confiscation orders in the magistrates’ court. 
Although confiscation orders are made in the Crown Court using the confiscation 
legislation, the rules for the magistrates’ court enforcing them are based on the legislation 
developed for enforcing other financial penalties, for example fines; and confiscation 
orders have characteristics which are different to other financial penalties. As a result, the 
rules are complicated and some of the principles for enforcing confiscation orders have 
been developed by the judiciary interpreting the fines based legislation to fit the 
enforcement of confiscation orders.  This has resulted in difficulties with enforcement.  
This thesis asks and answers two questions.  Firstly, how has the confiscation legislation 
developed in relation to the enforcement of confiscation orders in the magistrates’ court? 
Secondly, what future legislative amendments might assist the enforcement of 
confiscation orders by the magistrates’ court and create an alternative to restraint? 
In answering the first question, this thesis collates, explains and critically analyses the 
development of the rules and principles of the powers of enforcement in the magistrates’ 
court; and the issues about enforcement which have arisen since the introduction of the 
confiscation regime, an area that has received little academic attention.  As such it adds to 
the academic research in this area of law.  
This thesis will show that the confiscation legislation provides some specific powers for 
the magistrates’ court, but in the main the application of the fines based powers are the 
ones that apply. Changes could be made to improve their application.   It reviews the law 
in relation to payment orders, and the use of charging orders by HMCTS to enforce 
confiscation orders.  It shows that the powers to enforce a confiscation where the asset is 
a house are cumbersome and despite the introduction of payment orders in relation to 
bank accounts, further improvements could be made.   
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In answering the second question this thesis critically analyses the development of the 
rules and principles of restraint orders; and charging orders made under the pre-Proceeds 
of Crime Act 2002 legislation.  It examines the issues which have arisen in both areas and 
demonstrates that the changes recommended will also improve this area of law.    
This thesis makes a unique contribution to the academic discussion of the enforcement of 
confiscation orders by examining the law and issues created by the legislation before and 
after the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.  It also analyses the law relating to the enforcement 
of confiscation orders in the magistrates’ court about which little has been written 
academically. 
Finally, this thesis recommends alternatives to restraint, namely the re-introduction of 
charging orders as a power available to the Crown Court, and for the Crown Court to have 
the power to make payment orders.  It is suggested that this will assist the magistrates’ 
court enforcing confiscation orders; and could also provide a less draconian and more 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 An introduction to the research 
A confiscation order is a financial order made at the Crown Court which is ancillary to 
sentence.  It is sent to a named magistrates’ court for enforcement in the same way as a 
fine but with some differences and there are complications because of this.  For 
consistency reference is made to the powers of ‘the magistrates’ court’ in this research 
because an individual court is always responsible for the enforcement of the confiscation 
order.  This thesis critically analyses the fines based and other enforcement provisions as 
they apply to the magistrates’ court along with the rules relating to restraint orders. It 
makes recommendations for improvement and identifies areas suitable for future 
research.   
The research author is employed by Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service 
(HMCTS) and has had a particular interest in the enforcement of confiscation orders in the 
magistrates’ court since 2003.  She is writing in her personal capacity,1 however, her 
practical experience adds a unique perspective to the research and is of use even in the 
reflection of issues that were not within her knowledge before undertaking this academic 
research.   
1.2 Putting the research into context   
Wood states that when explaining the confiscation regime the first thing to be aware of is 
that a confiscation order is a misnomer.2 This thesis considers that the issues which exist 
in the regime stem in part from a disconnect between what the name suggests, that is the 
taking away of assets, and the reality of a confiscation order, which is a monetary order.  
 
1 The research author is a solicitor employed within Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service 
(HMCTS).  The work is her own and the views contained in this thesis are that of the research 
author and do not necessarily represent the views of HMCTS, the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) or any 
of its employees. 
2 Helena Wood, Enforcing Criminal Confiscation Orders From Policy to Practice (Royal United 
Services Institute, 2016) (‘Enforcing Criminal Confiscation Orders’) 4. 
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Although assets may have been identified as part of the confiscation order process, they 
may not be, and although the assets identified may be sold to satisfy an order, there is no 
necessity for that if the defendant can satisfy the order in some other way.    
There have been a number of attempts to explain a confiscation order to make it clear that 
the order is for a sum of money and assets are not taken from the defendant, nor do they 
have to sell any assets identified at the Crown Court to satisfy the order.3   The definition 
relevant in the context of this thesis is that given by the Home Office in 1997: 
A confiscation order...is an order to pay a sum of money, expressed in sterling.  It 
is not an order transferring the title of property.4    
The confiscation regime was introduced because the forfeiture powers in section 27 of the 
Misuse of Drugs Act (MDA) 1971 could not be used to take the profits of crime from 
defendants convicted of drugs offences, despite attempts by the judiciary to interpret the 
provisions to allow that to happen. The inability of the court to forfeit the proceeds of drug 
trafficking in R v Cuthbertson5 led directly to the introduction of confiscation orders in the 
Drug Trafficking Offences Act (DTOA)1986 in relation to offenders convicted of drug 
trafficking offences as the name suggests.  This Act was amended and then replaced by 
the Drug Trafficking Act (DTA)1994.  Confiscation orders for offenders convicted of other 
offences were introduced by the Criminal Justice Act (CJA)1988, and this Act was also 
amended. For all offences committed on or after 24th March 2003, the power to make a 
confiscation order is contained in the Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) 2002.  
The CJA 1988 and the DTA 1994 changed the regime but the provisions were not 
identical and when introduced the POCA 2002 was said to have ’change[d] the 
 
3 See for example, the Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, Joint Thematic Review of Asset Recovery: 
Restraint and Confiscation Casework (2010) (‘Joint Thematic Review’) 36; Re Norris [2001] UKHL 
34, [2001] 1 WLR 1388 [12]; Kennedy Talbot and Martin Hinton, ’Confiscation orders: a guide to 
their making and enforcement’ [1991] (55) J Crim L 504, 515. 
4 Home Office, Confiscation and Money Laundering: Law and Practice A Guide for Enforcement 
Authorities (TSO 1997) (‘Home Office Guide’) 5. 
5 R v Cuthbertson [1981] AC 470 (HL). 
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landscape’6  as the same statutory provisions applied for all defendants convicted of 
criminal offences. However, POCA 2002 has already required amendment, including 
recently by the Policing and Crime Act 2009, the Crime and Courts Act 2013, the Serious 
Crime Act (SCA) 2015, the Modern Slavery Act 20157 and the Criminal Finances Act 
(CFA) 2017. This research highlights the complexities in key areas of the regime and 
concludes that despite numerous amendments to POCA 2002, further legislative 
amendments are required. 
POCA 2002 is a large Act8 and contains other provisions which impact on the magistrates’ 
court but are not relevant to this thesis, for example, it allows for the civil detention and 
forfeiture of cash,9 and contains offences of money laundering.10  The confiscation order 
provisions are contained in Part 2 of the Act11 and this thesis focuses on the enforcement 
provisions of the Act and the powers of the magistrates’ court to enforce once a 
confiscation order has been made. It is not within the scope of this thesis to address all 
the problems with the regime, or all of the issues faced by the magistrates’ court. Instead 
it identifies issues where the asset is a bank account or a house, and the use of fines 
based and confiscation specific powers of enforcement in the magistrates’ court.  It also 
considers whether changes to the legislation in relation to charging orders and payment 
orders could address some of the problems experienced by the magistrates’ court; and at 
the same time meet some of the concerns raised with the use of restraint orders.  
This research only considers the regime as it applies in England and Wales as the law is 
different in the rest of the UK.  It also only considers the law as it applies to defendants 
 
6 Woolf, LCJ, in the forward to Ian Smith and Tim Owen, (eds), Asset Recovery: Criminal 
Confiscation and Civil Recovery (Butterworths 2003).  
7 The changes brought about by the Modern Slavery Act 2015 fall outside the scope of this thesis. 
8 It contains 12 Parts and 12 schedules. 
9 Contained in POCA 2002, Pt 5. 
10 Contained in POCA 2002, Pt 7. 
11 Confiscation is a narrower concept than ‘asset recovery’, a point identified by Colin King and 
Clive Walker, ‘Emerging Issues in the Regulation of Criminal and Terrorist Assets’ in Colin King and 
Clive Walker, (eds), Dirty Assets: Emerging Issues in the Regulation of Criminal and Terrorist Assets 
(Routledge 2014) 7-8.  For the purposes of this research and the review documents in chapter 2, 
‘Asset Recovery’ includes the other powers in POCA 2002 for example civil recovery, whereas this 
thesis concentrates on ‘confiscation’ in Part 2 of the Act.  
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aged 18 or over as the enforcement powers of the magistrates’ court differ for youth 
defendants.  This does not impact on the recommendations of this thesis and would add a 
further layer of complexity which would not be relevant or helpful. 
Although there are some differences in the wording of the relevant provisions of POCA 
2002 to its predecessors which will be examined where relevant in this thesis, the 
principles which apply to the making of a confiscation order have in essence remained the 
same, as has been confirmed by the case law.12  As a result, this thesis concentrates on 
the procedures in POCA 2002, especially in relation to the imposition of confiscation 
orders, except where the provisions of the earlier legislation are relevant to the issues 
relating to the enforcement of confiscation orders. The development of the legislation is 
considered in more detail in chapter 3.  
1.2.1 The Imposition of a confiscation order 
A confiscation order can only be made by the Crown Court if a defendant has been 
convicted of a criminal offence and they have benefited financially from their crime and it 
is an order ancillary to sentence. The Crown Court will identify assets available to the 
defendant to pay the order; or determine that there are assets which cannot be found, a 
‘hidden assets’ order; and then make a financial order which the magistrates’ court will 
 
12 See for example R v Islam [2009] UKHL 30, [2009] 1 AC 1076 in which it was said that although 
the current provisions had become more complicated, the concepts on which the confiscation 
provisions in POCA 2002 were based have been part of the law for several decades. In R v Modjiri 
[2010] EWCA Crim 829, [2010] 1 WLR 2096 the court took into account that there was no material 
difference between the provisions in POCA 2002, and the DTOA 1986.  In R v Ahmad and Ahmed 
[2014] UKSC 36, [2015] 1 AC 299 the court considered two joint appeals, one against orders made 
under the CJA 1988, the other against orders made under POCA 2002. The Court considered the 
different language in relation to confiscation orders made under POCA 2002 and the CJA 1988 and 
held that for these purposes there were no material differences between the language used and 
therefore the provisions of POCA 2002 should be considered.  In R (on the application of Gibson) v 
Secretary of State for Justice [2018] UKSC 2, [2018] 1 WLR 629 the court considered an appeal 
against a confiscation order made under the DTA 1994 and said that case law on enforcing pre-
POCA 2002 is not just of historical interest because even though the law has been repealed and 
replaced, POCA 2002 contains similar issues even if the wording is not identical. 
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collect and enforce as a fine, though with some differences. As has been noted, the name 
of the order is a misnomer because nothing is in fact confiscated. 
This is considered in chapter 3 which also explains that the Crown Court will set time for 
the defendant to pay the order and if the defendant does not pay within that time interest 
will accrue.  The rate of interest is the same as that for the time being specified in section 
17 of the Judgments Act 1838 which is currently 8% per annum. In addition, the court will 
also impose a term of imprisonment in default of payment which must run consecutively to 
any period of imprisonment imposed as a sentence for the substantive offence. It is the 
magistrates’ court which decides whether or not to activate the default term, but even if 
the defendant serves the default term it does not wipe out the debt.   Both the interest 
provisions and the default term are enforcement sanctions designed to encourage the 
defendant to pay voluntarily13 but their effectiveness has been called into question.14 As 
well as being described as a misnomer, the confiscation regime is acknowledged as 
draconian. However, overall the regime has been held to be compliant with the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).15  
Therefore, a confiscation order is an order in personam not in rem16 but, if possible, the 
Crown Court will identify assets as suitable for satisfying the confiscation order when it is 
made. There can be a delay of up to 2 years after sentencing before a confiscation order 
is made and there is no requirement for the defendant to use those assets to satisfy the 
order; he could satisfy it by some other means. If the assets are sold and they fail to make 
enough money to pay the confiscation order in full, then an application can be made to 
have the order reduced but, unless there is a restraint order, there is nothing to stop the 
defendant from dissipating the assets.  The confiscation order is made by the Crown 
Court and then registered in a magistrates’ court for enforcement.  Clearly the 
magistrates’ court comes at the end of the enforcement process and this in itself causes 
 
13 R v Lyons [2014] EWCA Crim 1306 [13]. 
14 This is discussed in Chapter 5.  For interest, n 1053; for the default term, n 1173. 
15 These points are analysed in chapter 3, text to n 497-n 515. 
16 See for example R v Johnson [2016] EWCA Crim 10, [2016] 4 WLR 57.  
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issues which are analysed in chapters 5 to 7.  This thesis concentrates on the 
enforcement of orders, and therefore does not seek to add to the analysis of the 
imposition of confiscation orders.  
1.2.2 Restraint orders 
Restraint orders are the main method by which assets are secured to ensure that they are 
available to satisfy the confiscation order.  They, along with the power to make a charging 
order in the pre-POCA 2002 legislation, were introduced to be used in complex and high 
value cases leaving the enforcement of other cases to the magistrates’ court using its 
fines based powers.17 This thesis shows that restraint orders can be effective in 
preventing the dissipation of assets, but demonstrates in chapter 4 that a perceived 
reluctance to use them and issues to do with costs mean that they are not used as widely 
as they can be.  After critically analysing these orders, this thesis begins to make 
recommendations which would provide the Crown Court with the power to make other 
orders to prevent dissipation without the disadvantages of restraint.  This chapter also 
explores the power the Crown Court had in the pre-POCA 2002 legislation to make a 
charging order as an alternative to a restraint order and recommends the introduction of a 
similar provision in POCA 2002.  
1.2.3 Enforcement of confiscation orders in the magistrates’ court 
Despite the fact that the imposition of the confiscation order is made by the Crown Court 
using POCA 2002, the enforcement powers of the magistrates’ court are based on the 
Magistrates’ Courts Act (MCA) 1980 which was designed for the enforcement of other 
financial penalties, for example fines, not confiscation orders.  In order to follow the 
legislative path to the enforcement provisions in the magistrates’ court, there is a need to 
consider the provisions of POCA 2002,18 the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 
 
17 'The UK Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986' (1987) 13 Commw L Bull 1628, 1632. 
18 POCA 2002, s 35.  Similar provisions were contained in the pre-POCA 2002 legislation and are 
explored in chapters 5 and 6. 
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(PCC(S)A) 2000 and MCA 1980 as modified by section 35 POCA 2002.  This is examined 
in more detail in chapters 5 and 6 but judiciary hearing appeals from the magistrates’ court 
have found the process far from straightforward, describing the statutory provisions in 
different Acts as a ‘labyrinth’,19 struggling to obtain a clear grasp even with the help of 
counsel, and acknowledging that to use the provisions involves following a ‘formidable 
trail’ through the relevant legislation.20  Even after following this trail through the legislation 
the Supreme Court acknowledged that the powers of enforcement in MCA 1980 were not 
designed for magistrates’ courts to enforce confiscation orders, and that this causes 
difficulties with the enforcement of them.21 
This thesis explains that the confiscation legislation has been amended many times since 
the DTOA 1986 in order to address a number of issues including issues with the collection 
and enforcement of confiscation orders.  Despite this, very few legislative changes have 
been made to the enforcement powers of the magistrates’ court and some of the case law 
has placed additional burdens on the court.    
The ultimate sanction that the magistrates’ court has is the activation of the default term 
set by the Crown Court.  However, this is not always straightforward.  Serving the default 
term does not wipe out the debt and interest continues to accrue, and there is a need for 
effective non-custodial alternatives to the activation of the default term.  One of the 
enforcement actions available to the magistrates’ court is the power for the designated 
officer for the magistrates’ court to apply for enforcement in the High Court or county 
court.  However, there are issues with this process which are critically analysed in 
chapters 5 and 7.  Like restraint orders, this can be effective, but the process is 
complicated and not used in practice.  Therefore, this thesis makes recommendations for 
alternatives.   
 
19 North Kent Magistrates’ Court v Reid (Ch, 4 April 2001) (Park J). 
20 R v Hastings and Rother Magistrates’ Court ex parte Anscombe (1998) 162 JP 340 (QB) 
(Schiemann LJ). 
21 Gibson (n 12) [12]. 
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1.2.4 Lead agencies 
The management of confiscation orders is not straightforward.  The magistrates’ court is 
responsible for the collection and enforcement of all confiscation orders, and a post holder 
called the designated officer undertakes some enforcement action on behalf of the 
magistrates’ court.22  These actions include applications for enforcement in the High Court 
and county court for third party debt orders and charging orders.  As the applications are 
made by the designated officer, his role is important to this research.   
Prior to the creation of Her Majesty’s Courts Service (HMCS) on 1 April 2005 magistrates’ 
courts were governed by magistrates’ courts committees led by justices’ clerks.  From 1 
April 2011, HMCS integrated with the Tribunals Service and became Her Majesty’s Courts 
and Tribunals Service (HMCTS).  As a result, any references in the review documents to 
the role of the justices’ clerk and their functions, or HMCS in relation to confiscation, apply 
to the designated officer and HMCTS unless mentioned.  
HMCTS, which is an executive agency sponsored by the MOJ, is the agency accountable 
for the debt.23  It is responsible for the administration of the criminal, civil and family courts 
and tribunals in England and Wales24 and as such HMCTS is accountable for the 
enforcement of confiscation orders in England and Wales.  It has set up Regional 
Confiscation Units (RCUs) to carry out this administration and publishes the details about 
 
22 During the period of the confiscation legislation the organisation of the Courts Service has 
changed.  At the time of the introduction of the DTOA 1986 the justices’ clerk was responsible for 
collecting and applying payments received and taking enforcement action in the High Court and 
county court.  This role was taken over by the justices’ chief executive with effect from 1 April 
2001 as the post was created by the Access to Justice Act 1999.  It was then taken over by the 
designated officer for the magistrates’ court on 1 April 2005. The post was created by the Courts 
Act 2003. The justices’ clerk retains other functions including judicial functions as contained in 
sections 27-29 of the Courts Act 2003.   
23 Although the Chief Executive of HMCTS is responsible for the collection of confiscation orders 
and is the accounting officer, there are areas within the system of controls and reporting for 
which she has no responsibility and the Trust Statement makes it clear that the Home Office bears 
overall responsibility for policy.  Her Majesty’s Courts & Tribunals Service, HM Courts & Tribunals 
Service Trust Statement 2017-18 (HC 2017-18,1332). (‘HMCTS Trust Statement 2017-18’) 27. 
24 ‘What the HM Courts & Tribunals Service does’ 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/hm-courts-and-tribunals-service> accessed 31 
December 2018.  
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collection and enforcement in its annual Trust Statement.  However, the MOJ has the 
ultimate responsibility for all confiscation orders25 and the Home Office is responsible for 
the policy and legislation surrounding the orders.26 
Even though HMCTS is the agency with the accountability for confiscation orders, other 
agencies will take the lead for enforcement in certain circumstances and become known 
as the lead agency.  For example, the prosecution, often the Crown Prosecution Service 
(CPS), will be the lead agency if they have obtained a restraint order but HMCTS will be 
the lead agency if no other agency has taken the lead, or if another agency cannot take 
any further steps to assist with the enforcement of an order. However, the amount of the 
order does not in itself determine who is responsible for enforcing the order, this will 
depend on a number of factors.  
To assist agencies the Joint Asset Recovery Database (JARD) was introduced in 2006.  
JARD is a shared IT resource used by criminal justice agencies to record and track 
confiscation orders and other methods of asset recovery.  It should be updated at the 
restraint, confiscation and enforcement stages27 and it is dependent on law enforcement 
agencies updating results. JARD is managed by the NCA and the data is subject to 
change on a daily basis as cases proceed and new cases are added and resolved.28 It 
provides statistics which have been relied upon in the review documents in chapter 2 and 
other research.29 
 
25 Ministry of Justice and HM Courts and Tribunals Service, Written Evidence to the Home Affairs 
Committee, Proceeds of Crime (HC 2016-2017, 25) para 21 
<http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/home-
affairs-committee/proceeds-of-crime/written/29577.html> accessed 16 August 2016.  
26 Home Affairs Committee, Proceeds of Crime (HC 2016-2017, 25) (‘HAC 2016 Report’) 31. 
27 The Joint Thematic Review found it was almost always kept up to date (n 3) 47. 
28 Asset Recovery Statistical Bulletin 2011/12-2016/17 (Statistical Bulletin 15/17, Home Office 
2017) 3, 11. 
29 For example, Karen Bullock and others, Examining attrition in confiscating the proceeds of crime 
(Home Office 2009); Jackie Harvey, Asset Recovery: Substantive or Symbolic?’ in Colin King and 
Clive Walker, (eds), Dirty Assets: Emerging Issues in the Regulation of Criminal and Terrorist Assets 
(Routledge 2014); Peter Sproat, ‘A critique of the official discourse on drug and sex trafficking by 
organised crime using data on asset recovery’ (2012) 19(2) Journal of Financial Crime 149. 
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The need to improve the collection and enforcement of HMCTS led cases is the focus of 
this research, but issues where other agencies are the lead have also been included 
where relevant.  This is because even if another agency is the lead agency HMCTS (and 
therefore magistrates’ courts) have been criticised for the failure to realise the amount 
ordered in a confiscation order. In addition, once another lead agency has done as much 
work as possible to enforce a confiscation order, it will be passed to HMCTS who will take 
over the lead role.  As a result, the importance of agencies working together has also 
been recognised as a factor in improving the collection and enforcement of confiscation 
orders.30  
1.3 The research questions 
This thesis asks and answers two questions.  Firstly, how has the confiscation legislation 
developed in relation to the enforcement of confiscation orders in the magistrates’ court? 
Secondly, what future legislative amendments might assist the enforcement of 
confiscation orders by the magistrates’ court and create an alternative to restraint? 
In order to answer the two research questions, and to make recommendations, this thesis 
will first analyse the relevant issues which have been identified in the government 
research, and the legislative changes which have been introduced as a result.  This is 
done in chapters 2 and 3. It is also necessary to understand what would be a successful 
change which is why chapter 3 considers the purpose of the confiscation regime and 
starts to review the purpose of the enforcement powers currently available.  It shows that 
the lack of clarity in various aspects of the regime has hindered the measurement of 
successful enforcement and  demonstrates a move away from the amount of cash being 
collected as the definition of success, towards a measurement of disruption as an 
alternative measure of success.  
 
30 This is considered in chapter 6, text to n 1264-n 1269. 
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It is suggested that the recommendations in this thesis should be measured against the 
main purposes of the regime but also a specific purpose of POCA 2002.  The Proceeds of 
Crime Bill-Publication of Draft Clauses Consultation Paper described the changes in what 
would become POCA 2002 as the creation of a ‘one stop shop’ in relation to confiscation 
orders at the Crown Court.31  
Before critically analysing the fines based powers and looking for alternatives it is also 
necessary to consider the effectiveness of the law in relation to restraint.  This is done in 
chapter 4 which will show that restraint orders have been the subject of criticism and, 
despite legislative amendment, issues with restraint orders remain. This chapter also 
considers the pre-POCA 2002 powers for the Crown Court to make a charging order and 
starts to explain how the recommendations in this thesis will address those difficulties.  It 
will lead to recommendations for changes to the legislation to allow the Crown Court to 
make charging orders and payment orders in all confiscation order cases as an alternative 
to restraint. 
The development of the powers of the magistrates’ court to enforce confiscation orders is 
critically analysed in chapters 5 to 7 and shows a need for magistrates’ courts to have 
effective non-custodial powers.  In chapter 5, the current rules where the asset is money 
in a bank account are critically analysed and recommendations made for improvement. 
One of the changes in POCA 2002 was the introduction of payment orders in POCA 2002 
which allow a magistrates’ court to make an order requiring a bank or building society to 
pay over money belonging to a defendant to satisfy a confiscation order.  These are 
analysed in this chapter along with the changes to the provisions which leaves cash in an 
account at increased risk of dissipation.  The power for the designated officer for the 
magistrates’ court to apply to the county court for a third party debt order where the asset 
is money in a bank account is also analysed and then compared with the power to make a 
payment order.  An analysis of the powers of the designated officer to apply for a charging 
 
31 Secretary of State for the Home Department, Proceeds of Crime Bill: Publication of Draft Clauses 
(CM 5066, 2001) paras 2.7, 50, 57, 66 and 70. 
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order using the fines-based legislation where the asset is a house is undertaken in 
chapter 7 along with a comparison with the charging order provisions of the pre-POCA 
2002 legislation.   
In considering these sanctions and the rules which govern the powers of the magistrates’ 
court, the complexity of the powers has become apparent.  Therefore, as a secondary 
recommendation it is recommended that further research should be undertaken to 
consider further amendments to section 35 POCA 2002.32 
This thesis will not address all the issues in relation to the enforcement of confiscation 
orders as this would be too great a task for one thesis. Instead it analyses the options 
available to the magistrates’ court and the rules which the court must comply with in the 
enforcement hearing before activating the default term.  It considers in detail options 
where the asset is cash in a bank account or a house, making recommendations in 
respect of those.  It also identifies other areas suitable for further research. 
1.4 The need for the research 
The fact that the enforcement of confiscation orders is difficult is acknowledged by Bullock 
and Lister.33  Chapter 2 of this thesis begins to explain some of the difficulties with their 
enforcement, which is expanded upon in chapters 4 to 7.  There have also been specific 
criticisms about the amount of orders outstanding which are reproduced with the latest 
imposition and collection rates in Appendix 1.  Despite the criticism in some ways the 




32 This section dictates which of the fines based enforcement powers are available to the 
magistrates’ court when dealing with confiscation orders. 
33 Karen Bullock and Stuart Lister, ‘Post-Conviction Confiscation of Assets in England and Wales: 
Rhetoric and Reality’ in Colin King and Clive Walker, (eds), Dirty Assets: Emerging Issues in the 
Regulation of Criminal and Terrorist Assets, (Routledge 2014) 67. 
34 This is considered in the next chapter, text to n 336, n 351 and n 355. 
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1.4.1 Previous literature 
A traditional literature review has not been attempted in this thesis for two reasons.  
Firstly, it will be shown there is limited literature on the collection or enforcement of 
confiscation orders, particularly into the powers of the magistrates’ court.  Secondly, the 
literature that is applicable will be engaged with in the relevant chapters.  However, it Is 
important to put this research into context.     
In 2009 Bullock et al conducted research on behalf of the Home Office35 which is analysed 
in chapter 2 and has provided rich material on the practical use of restraint in chapter 4.  
The authors concluded that there is no extensive body of research into asset recovery in 
the UK36 but this is not the first or last time that the point has been made.  When Levi was 
writing in 1997 and comparing the principles of taking the profit out of crime in the US and 
the UK, he noted an ‘almost complete absence of interest among British academics’.37   
However, it would be wrong to say that nothing has been written about asset recovery or 
confiscation.  Levi has written continuously about various aspects of asset recovery, the 
last article of Levi’s included in this research was written in 2018.38  Although his work 
often relates to areas outside of this research, it has been included where relevant.  Levi 
first interested Alldridge in the proceeds of crime39 and he is another academic who has 
been writing on the topic for some time.  Alldridge’s work also often concentrates on areas 
other than the enforcement of confiscation orders, for example on whether the law on the 
imposition of confiscation orders complies with the European Convention on Human 
 
35 Bullock and others (n29). 
36 Ibid 3. 
37 Michael Levi, 'Taking the Profit out of Crime: The UK Experience' (1997) 5 Eur J Crime Crim L & 
Crim Just 228, 229. 
38 Michael Levi, ‘Reflections on Proceeds of Crime: A New Code for Confiscation?’ in JJ Child and 
RA Duff, (eds), Criminal Law Reform Now Proposals & Critique (Hart 2018). 
39 Peter Alldridge, Money Laundering Law Forfeiture, Confiscation, Civil Recovery, Criminal 
Laundering and Taxation of the Proceeds of Crime (Hart, 2003) vi. 
25 
 
Rights (ECHR) and civil recovery40 or tax evasion.41 However, his insights, along with 
those of other academics can cross over to enforcement and have been included where 
they meet.   
In 2014 King and Walker identified that there has been a lot written about ‘follow the 
money’ techniques, especially with regard to money laundering,42 and identified that a 
newer field of academics have considered the regime.43  These newer academics include 
Bullock who followed her research for the Home Office in 2009 with an article drawing on 
the data from that research and examined the processes for enforcing confiscation 
orders44  describing them as a ‘relatively poorly understood financial penalty.’45  Whilst 
understanding of confiscation orders has developed since Bullock’s work, this research 
will show that her statement is still applicable and there are difficulties understanding the 
complicated enforcement provisions.  As noted, members of the judiciary have expressed 
difficulties when trying to understand the legislative provisions that apply to the 
enforcement of confiscation orders in the magistrates’ court, and Wood’s findings are that 
restraint is a poorly understood area.46  
Vettori’s findings in 2006 where that there is an almost complete lack of a review of the 
provisions to enforce confiscation orders from beginning to end,47 and in spite of the more 
recent literature, her conclusions still resonate today.  Her research covered 15 countries 
in the European Union and included a review of the UK provisions.  Although the UK was 
the country which paid the closest attention to confiscation,48 she identified that the 
 
40 See for example Peter Alldridge, ‘Proceeds of Crime Law since 2003-Two Key Areas’ [2014] (3) 
Crim LR 171. 
41 See for example Peter Alldridge and Ann Mumford, 'Tax Evasion and the Proceeds of Crime Act 
2002' (2005) 25 Legal Stud 353. 
42 King and Walker (n 11) 5. 
43 ibid 6. 
44 Karen Bullock, ‘Enforcing Financial Penalties: The Case of Confiscation Orders’ (2010) 49(4) 
Howard Journal 328. 
45 ibid 328. 
46 Helena Wood, The Big Payback Examining Changes in the Criminal Confiscation Orders 
Enforcement Landscape (Royal United Services Institute, 2016) (‘The Big Payback’) 5. 
47 Barbara Vettori, Tough on Criminal Wealth Exploring the Practice of Proceeds from Crime 
Confiscation in the EU (Springer 2006) 20. 
48 ibid 19. 
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existing literature deals mainly with the investigation phase and the judicial phase, but that 
the disposal phase is ‘almost totally neglected’.49  This thesis focuses on the enforcement 
powers of the magistrates’ court in England and Wales and so differs from Vettori’s yet 
she is convincing in arguing that this is a ‘neglected and low profile subject’.50  This is so 
even though she highlights the importance of the enforcement of confiscation orders to 
the overall effectiveness of the regime.51 
In keeping with Vettori’s findings, as well as co-authoring a report on restraint, Bullock has 
published research on the investigation phase52 and how benefit is calculated in practice 
at the Crown Court concentrating on POCA 2002.53 Her research is not only relevant 
because it has been engaged with when apposite, but because her work on attrition and 
the practicalities of the process on imposition has been continued by Kruisbergen et al.54 
They define attrition as the gap between estimated criminal profits and the amount 
actually recovered.55  Their research differs from this thesis in that they consider 
organised crime cases in the Netherlands, and attrition from before a confiscation order is 
made, namely from the estimate of benefit, whereas the focus of this research is in 
England and Wales and the difficulties with enforcement after a confiscation order is 
made.  Nonetheless Kruisbergen et al consider the previous research which they show is 
limited, especially in relation to collection rates.56 They explain that their work is one of the 
few studies that includes the collection of confiscation orders and call for more insight into 
the decision making and problems during the collection stage to enhance the 
understanding of and ‘point to possibilities’ to improve them.57   
 
49 ibid 20. 
50 ibid 119. 
51 ibid 20. 
52 Karen Bullock, ‘The Confiscation Investigation: Investigating the Financial Benefit Made from 
Crime’ (2010) 4(1) Policing 7. 
53 Karen Bullock, ‘Criminal Benefit, the confiscation order and the post-conviction confiscation 
regime’ (2014) 62 Crime Law Soc Change 45. 
54 Edwin W Kruisbergen, Edward R Kleemans and Ruud F Kouwenberg, ‘Explaining attrition: 
Investigating and confiscating the profits of organized crime’ (2016) 13(6) Eur J Criminol 677.  
55 ibid 677.  
56 ibid 679. 
57 ibid 692. 
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Although research has been conducted on the working of confiscation orders for many 
years, and there has been research into the enforcement of confiscation orders in the UK 
since Vettori, there is little into the powers of the magistrates’ court.  This thesis will show 
that even though there has now been more research into the enforcement of orders, it has 
often concentrated on restraint orders as the main method of enforcement, or the 
workings of POCA 2002. Yet magistrates’ courts are responsible for enforcing all orders 
and are still enforcing confiscation orders made under the pre-POCA 2002 legislation.  
Other academics have been included in this research because of their application to the 
research topic and their work engaged with in the relevant chapters. The author is also 
fortunate in that practitioners in the field have edited textbooks on the subject58 or 
commented on aspects of the regime,59 amendments to the legislation,60 and case law 
pertinent to this research61 complementing the author’s personal knowledge of the 
practices and procedures of the magistrates’ court and HMCTS.  These too have been 
included where applicable. 
However, this thesis attempts to answer the call by Kruisbergen et al for more insight into 
the problems on enforcement, concentrating on the powers of the magistrates’ court, to 
make recommendations for improvement.  It also considers confiscation orders made 
under the pre-POCA 2002 legislation as well as POCA 2002, as these orders are still 
being made and enforced. 
Instead of just relying on the available academic literature, chapter 2 analyses various 
reviews of the confiscation regime, including that conducted by academics, some of whom 
have also included the relevant law at the time. In addition, policy documents and reviews 
 
58 For example Mark Sutherland Williams, Michael Hopmeier and Rupert Jones, (eds), Millington 
and Sutherland Williams on the Proceeds of Crime (5th rev edn, Oxford University Press 2018); 
Mitchell Taylor and Talbot on Confiscation and the Proceeds of Crime. 
59 For example, Peter Brunning, ‘Payment Orders in Confiscation Order Enforcement’ (2012) 176 
JPN (47) 684. 
60 For example, Jonathan Fisher, ‘Part 1 of the Serious Crime Act 2015: Strengthening the Restraint 
and Confiscation Regime’ [2015] (10) Crim LR 754. 
61 For example, Fortson R ‘R. v Dad (Amer Hussain); R. v Dad (Nadeem); R. v Dad (Munsif): 
confiscation-confiscation proceedings jointly obtained benefit’ [2015] (5) Crim LR 357. 
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undertaken on behalf of the government which have raised issues about the enforcement 
of confiscation orders and have led to changes in the legislation, have also been 
researched. These are referred to in this thesis as the ‘review documents’ and include 
official publications. Their inclusion and the analysis of them adds a unique contribution to 
the academic research in this area of law. 
1.4.2 The practical need for the research 
For the confiscation order regime to be effective, recovery must also be effective,62 and 
any issues addressed.63 Bullock concludes that a failure to enforce can remove any 
deterrence effect, reducing the amount of sums recovered and undermining public 
confidence in the criminal justice system.64  
This thesis shows a practical need for the research.  The analysis of the review 
documents show that issues have existed with the confiscation regime since its inception, 
including with enforcement.  Although improvements have been made with changes to the 
law and practical changes implemented, difficulties remain, and some of those identified 
at the start of the regime have not been addressed.  In chapter 2 the analysis of the 
review documents considering the powers of magistrates’ courts show there have been 
few recommendations for change.   
The analysis of the powers of enforcement in the magistrates’ court shows the complexity 
in the regime and the limitations if restraint is not used.  The analysis of the use of 
restraint orders shows there is clearly a need for effective restraint65 and it would be 
difficult to argue with Levi’s view that the elapsed time between the offence or obtaining 
 
62 Secretary of State for the Home Department, Serious and Organised Crime Strategy (CM 8715, 
2013) (‘2013 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy’) 35; Vettori (n 47) 20. 
63 Home Affairs Committee, Third Report: Organised Crime (HC 1994-95, 18) (‘HAC Organised Crime 
Report’) xlix. 
64 Bullock, ‘Enforcing Financial Penalties’ (n 44) 337. 
65 The analysis is contained in chapter 4, n 913-n 934. 
29 
 
profits, to funds being stopped by pre-conviction restraint or post-conviction orders, is 
critical for recovery.66   
However, there are issues with the use of restraint which means they are not always used 
even when the order would be available. The Crown Court has a discretion in relation to 
restraint, but that discretion is whether to make a restraint order or not.  This is a stark 
choice and there is no discretion for the Crown Court to make an order which is an 
alternative to a restraint order.67   Without a restraint order, assets are at an increased risk 
of dissipation and being unavailable to the magistrates’ court to satisfy the confiscation 
order.  This thesis posits that the Crown Court should have a discretion to make an 
alternative order which has the same effect as a restraint order namely of preserving the 
asset where it is a house or cash in a bank account, to keep them available to satisfy the 
confiscation order.  The recommendations are that the Crown Court should have the 
power to make a charging order and payment order, powers which are considered in 
chapters 5 and 7 respectively. 
The topicality of this research is highlighted by the fact that the Law Commission has a 
project which it announced on 7th November 2018.  This is to review the existing 
conviction based confiscation regime and the Commission will publish a consultation in 
2019.68  The Law Commission attracted a reference from the Home Office on confiscation 
under POCA 2002 and although this does not form part of the 13th Programme of Law 
Reform for the Law Commission, the details are included in that document.69  
The project will consider Part 2 of POCA 2002 and is seen as a necessary project by the 
Commission because the confiscation rules on imposition are seen as excessively 
complex with judges not having all of the necessary expertise and confidence.  Issues 
 
66 Levi ‘Reflections on Proceeds of Crime’ (n 38) 5. 
67 The Crown Court can make a compliance order, but it does not preserve the asset to make it 
available to the magistrates’ court.   
68 Law Commission, ‘Confiscation regime review to ensure crime doesn’t pay’ (Law Commission, 7 
November 2018) < https://www.lawcom.gov.uk/confiscation-regime-review-to-ensure-crime-
doesnt-pay/> accessed 24 November 2018. 
69 Law Commission, Thirteenth Programme of Law Reform (Law Com No 377, 2017). 
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have been identified because the proceedings are time consuming, and there are errors, 
appeals, injustices, and a limitation on the number of confiscation orders made.  In 
addition, directly relevant to this research the Commission has referenced the limitations 
on enforcing confiscation orders, which results in problems with recovery, and undermines 
public confidence and the principle that ‘crime does not pay.’ In particular the Commission 
noted that the interest provisions and default terms are ineffective as in 2012 only 2% of 
orders were paid in full after the activation of default; and that the magistrates’ court lacks 
‘sufficient or adequate powers to enforce confiscation orders effectively’.70  
Since POCA 2002 was enacted, the government reports and other reviews have 
concentrated on the operation of that Act.  In this research all the issues relevant to this 
thesis that have arisen since Cuthbertson and the regime was created have been 
reviewed. As well as identifying those issues, recommendations have been made to 
address them through changes to the legislation in relation to charging orders and 
payment orders. 
1.5 Conclusions and Recommendations 
Chapter 8 contains the conclusions and recommendations of this thesis. Part of the 
problem is the nature of a confiscation order, and the way the regime has developed.  In 
2013 the NAO acknowledged that the confiscation of criminal assets has always been 
difficult to achieve despite changes in the legislation.71  This has also been acknowledged 
by the judiciary, and in R v Soneji72 Lord Steyn stated: 
Given the almost year by year amendment over the last 20 years of sometimes 
overhasty criminal legislation, and the great difficulties created for the courts by 
 
70 ibid 23-24. 
71 National Audit Office, Confiscation Orders (HC 2013-14 738) (‘NAO Report’) 12. 
72 [2005] UKHL 49, [2006] 1 AC 340. 
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much of this flood of legislation, it would be innocent to predict that the 2002 Act 
has solved the problems involved in the criminal process of confiscation.73 
In fact, this thesis shows that Lord Steyn was right and POCA 2002 has not solved all the 
problems with confiscation orders, although some have been addressed.  
This thesis answers the research questions by making recommendations for changes in 
the legislation. After reviewing the practical experiences of the magistrates’ court 
enforcement provisions, it shows that the limitations of the powers of the magistrates’ 
court can be met by the re-introduction of confiscation charging orders but with further 
amendments.  This would create a less draconian alternative to restraint to improve the 
preservation of property early in the process and enable confiscation orders to be 
satisfied, thereby improving the collection and enforcement powers of the magistrates’ 
court.  It also recommends changes to the payment order provisions as a further 
alternative to restraint and makes secondary recommendations for further research. The 
conclusions to this thesis also show how the recommendations will fit in with the purpose 
and aims of the legislation. 
1.6 Research Methodology and Theoretical Background 
1.6.1 Doctrinal and Critical Analysis 
This thesis collates, and critically analyses the rules and principles in the enforcement of 
confiscation orders by magistrates’ courts in England and Wales, supplemented by a 
critical analysis of the rules in relation to the use of restraint orders, charging orders and 
payment orders.  Given the development of the regime, it includes an examination of the 
history and the purpose of confiscation orders.  Twining explains that terms such as ‘rule’ 
can have a broad meaning and can encompass a more general prescription, including for 
example, principles, guidelines and standards and material such as history, statistics ‘and 
much else besides’ to provide at the very least some necessary background to legal 
 
73 ibid [3]. 
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rules.74  This broad definition has been adopted in relation to this research.  As a result, 
the analysis examines the attempts at consistency in the legislation and whether the 
enforcement provisions achieve the stated aim of the legislation and allow the judiciary to 
easily interpret the legislation. 
Although this thesis uses this approach of critically examining the law in relation to the 
imposition of confiscation orders, a detailed review of the law of imposition falls outside 
the scope of this research.  Instead it concentrates on the development of the law in 
relation to the enforcement of confiscation orders in the magistrates’ court and identifies 
the current rules.  This has been a challenge given the changes in both the legislation and 
the principles of enforcement brought about by the case law, but it includes the law up to 
and including 31 December 2018. 
The analysis of the policy behind the confiscation laws show that there is still a lack of 
clarity in some quarters about the overall aim and this, and the examination of the history 
of the legislation, shows where gaps in the rules led to changes in the legislation and 
where further changes are required in relation to the enforcement of confiscation orders.  
In summary this research focuses on the rules in order to examine if the purpose of the 
law is being fulfilled and makes recommendations for legislative amendment.  
Doctrinal research has been defined as asking what the law is in a particular area which 
involves a review of case law and legislation.  It can include a review of journal articles 
and is often done from an historical perspective. Even if there is no empirical research, 
inferences can be drawn,75 and this thesis uses doctrinal analysis to ‘give sense and 
order’76 to the rules.   
 
74 William Twining, Blackstone’s Tower: The English Law School (Sweet & Maxwell, 1994) 174-175. 
75 Ian Dobinson and Francis Johns, ‘Qualitative Legal Research’ in Mike McConville and Wing Hong 
Chui, (eds), Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University Press, 2007) 18-19. 
76 Pauline C. Westerman, ‘Open or Autonomous? The Debate on Legal Methodology as a 
Reflection of the Debate on Law’ in Mark van Hoecke, (ed), Methodologies of Legal Research 
Which Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline? (Hart 2013) 91.  
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This doctrinal analysis reviews the law of enforcing confiscation orders in the magistrates’ 
court and the law of restraint from its inception, and texts authored by practitioners have 
also been used to outline the past and current practice.77 Although this has an element of 
an historical analysis it should not be considered as legal history.  HMCTS is still 
responsible for enforcing confiscation orders made under the pre-POCA 2002 
legislation;78 and the rules, especially in relation to orders made under the CJA 1988 and 
the DTA 1994, are still being considered in case law.79  Judges have said that case law on 
enforcing pre-POCA 2002 is not just of historical interest because even though the law 
has been repealed and replaced, POCA 2002 contains similar issues even if the wording 
is not identical.80 
Research conducted by others has been critically analysed in this thesis. This has 
included the secondary analysis of data in that research which has supplemented the 
review of the rules and issues in this thesis.  This secondary analysis has been used in 
this research because of the advantages in the fact that it has been gathered over a long 
period of time, conducted by different researchers, some conducted on behalf of the 
government, and in addition it all relates directly to the confiscation order regime.   
There have been criticisms of doctrinal analysis.  It has been said that doctrinal research 
risks being sterile with nothing new to offer,81 or conservative,82 or too descriptive.83  
However, this thesis is not just descriptive, and the research does offer ‘something new’. 
 
77 n 58.   
78 The aged debt figures per agency are reproduced in Appendix 1 which include orders made 
under the pre-POCA 2002 legislation.  This is also within the experience of the research author. 
79 See for example the key cases in this thesis, Ahmad and Ahmed (n 12); Gibson (n 12); R v May 
[2008] UKHL 28, [2008] 1 AC 1028; and R (on the application of O’Connell) v Westminster 
Magistrates’ Court [2017] EWHC 3120 (Admin).   
80 Gibson (n 12). 
81 Michael Pendleton, ‘Non-empirical Discovery in Legal Scholarship-Choosing, Researching and 
Writing a Traditional Scholarly Article’ in Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui, (eds), Research 
Methods for Law (Edinburgh University Press, 2007) 163. 
82 Michael Salter and Julie Mason, Writing Law Dissertations An Introduction and Guide to the 
Conduct of Legal Research (Pearson Education Limited, 2007) 100. 
83 Mark van Hoecke, ‘Legal Doctrine: Which Method(s) for What Kind of Discipline?’ in Mark van 
Hoecke, (ed), Methodologies of Legal Research Which Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline? 
(Hart 2013) 3.  
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The review documents are critically analysed and in the main are split into two camps, 
those that review the law pre-POCA 2002; and those that review POCA 2002.  This 
research takes a different view and considers all the relevant legislation before and since 
POCA 2002.  It is therefore able to provide an insight that previous research has not and 
that along with the analysis has led to the recommendations in chapter 8. This shows the 
advantages to the traditional doctrinal analysis, the critical analysis, the analysis of the 
secondary data in this thesis and the unique contribution this research makes.   
The review of the rules including the review documents have highlighted problems for the 
magistrates’ court when enforcing confiscation orders. This has led to an analysis of the 
rules and issues in relation to restraint orders, another method seen as an important way 
of enforcing confiscation orders.   
McConville states that ‘research is very often about chance or serendipity.’84  As regards 
this research, in the course of her employment the research author became aware of the 
fact that HMCTS had applied for a number of charging orders to enforce confiscation 
orders.  As a result, she was able to obtain permission to use the data from those 
applications85  and was able to ask a number of questions to elicit the secondary data 
about the applications.  This is equivalent to a Freedom of Information request and has 
resulted in the secondary data used in chapter 7. 
1.6.2 The use of ‘insider research’  
The knowledge of the charging order applications is not the only relevance of the research 
author’s experience of working for HMCTS.  One of the reasons for conducting the 
research was the practical experience of the research author and a desire to undertake 
research in this area.  The intention was to provide a detailed insight into the issues for 
the magistrates’ court enforcing confiscation orders and make recommendations for 
 
84 Mike McConville ‘Development of Empirical Techniques and Theory’ in Mike McConville and 
Wing Hong Chui, (eds), Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University Press, 2007) 209. 
85 HMCTS, the Home Office and the National Crime Agency have given permission for the 
information to be used. 
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practical improvements in this area of law.  She expected to find a lot of previous research 
into the enforcement of confiscation orders in the magistrates’ court but did not.  Her 
employment gave her an opportunity to bring a novel perspective to the research, as an 
‘insider’, and if that viewpoint had not been taken into account the scope and findings of 
the research would have been poorer as a result. 
The advantages of being an ‘insider’ in this research are twofold.86  Firstly, being an 
‘insider’ means that the researcher can comment on the provisions from a subjective or 
practical viewpoint, as well as from an objective researcher point of view after the doctrinal 
analysis.  This has resulted in the addition of a unique voice when critically analysing the 
changes in the legislation and case law directly impacting on the powers of the 
magistrates’ court to enforce confiscation orders in chapters 5 to 7.  This has enabled her 
to comment on the workings of the legislation in practice in a number of areas including, 
for example, the time for payment provisions and the use of attachment of earnings 
orders.    
Secondly, because of the background of the researcher, aspects were identified as 
important which may not have been as easily identified by someone who did not have her 
practical experience.  This means that the significance of the pre-POCA 2002 law and 
‘review documents’ were immediately apparent and led to the analysis of the review 
documents in chapter 2 of this thesis.  It also meant that she could see the relevance of 
the charging order provisions in the pre-POCA 2002 legislation which have been reviewed 
in chapter 4 and compared with the powers of the magistrates’ court to apply for charging 
orders in chapter 7.  As her starting point was the powers of enforcement available to the 
 
86 For wider consideration of insider research, see Robert K Merton, ‘Insiders and Outsiders: A 
Chapter in the Sociology of Knowledge’ (1972) 78(1) American Journal of Sociology 9; Justine 
Mercer, ‘The challenges of insider research in educational institutions: wielding a double-edged 
sword and resolving delicate dilemmas’ (2007) 33(1) Oxford Review of Education 1; Sonia Corbin 
Dwyer and Jennifer Buckle, ‘The Space Between: On Being an Insider-Outsider in Qualitative 
Research’ (2009) 8(1) Int J Qual Methods 54.  
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magistrates’ court, it led to the desire to find an alternative to restraint, rather than to 
recommend improvements to restraint, as other researchers have done.87 
Insider research is where a researcher studies themselves, or communities of which they 
are a member.88 It has been widely used in many contexts, for example when conducting 
interviews or in ethnographic research. Here, though, the research author is in a 
somewhat different position in that she has conducted doctrinal and critical research and 
has not researched her own community.  Despite the different methodology there have 
been similarities.  Like Earle, the research author could not avoid reflecting on her 
personal experience as a qualitative researcher.89 As such her experience has become an 
instrument in the research90 which has allowed her to reflect on the issues with her own 
viewpoint where relevant, even on issues she was not previously aware of before her 
research began.  This practical experience does not make her a better or worse 
researcher, just different91 and although there is no ‘exclusive access to such 
understanding’, she has valuable additional resources in the strength of perspective at her 
disposal.92  
The initial purely objective standpoint attempted in this thesis constrained the research, 
and the use of insider research allows the author’s voice to be heard.  There have been 
previous authors who have attempted to ‘push the boundaries of what it means to “give 
 
87 For example, Bullock and others (n 29). 
88 Valli Kalei Kanuha, ‘“Being” Native versus “Going Native”: Conducting Social Work Research as 
an Insider’ (2000) 45(5) Social Work 439; Sue Wilkinson and Celia Kitzinger, ‘Representing Our 
Own Experience: Issues in “Insider” Research’ (2013) 37(2) Psychol Women Q 251. 
89 Earle could not avoid reflecting on his time as a prisoner when he returned to prison 
environments as a qualitative researcher.  Rod Earle, ‘Insider and Out: Making Sense of a Prison 
Experience and a Research Experience’ (2014), 20(4) QI 429, 432. 
90 Kim V L England, ‘Getting Personal: Reflexivity, Positionality and Feminist Research’ (1994) 46(1) 
Professional Geographer 80, 84. 
91 Corbin Dwyer and Buckle, (n 86), 56. 
92 Paul Hodkinson, ‘’Insider Research’ in the Study of Youth Cultures’ (2005) 8(2) Journal of Youth 
Studies 131, 142. 
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voice” in academic work’93 and a move away from limiting what counts as ‘voice’.94 This 
research adds to the use of voice in academic research. 
1.6.3 Legal Positivism 
This thesis does not attempt to add to the debate about legal positivism about which much 
has been written. For a number of reasons this thesis has adopted principles of legal 
positivism, particularly those outlined by Hart.95   
Despite criticisms of legal positivism,96 it is an established theoretical background and has 
been accepted as a theoretical basis for doctrinal analysis.97 It is therefore the appropriate 
theoretical background for this research in which legal positivism is defined as being 
concerned with the study of legal rules, principles, or concepts in relation to the 
enforcement of confiscation orders,98 especially given the broad definition of rule adopted 
here.99 
Although Hart’s views have been criticised, his The Concept of Law has been described 
as one of the most important books on jurisprudence.100   He explains that the study or 
analysis of legal concepts (or rules) is important in itself101 and describes the rule of 
recognition, or the criteria for identifying the law, as including legislation and judicial 
 
93 See Justin Piché, Bob Gaucher, and Kevin Walby, ‘Facilitating Prisoner Ethnography: An 
Alternative Approach to “Doing Prison Research Differently”’ (2014) 20(4) QI 449, 450.  Followed 
in Shoshana Pollack and Tiina Eldridge, ‘Complicity and Redemption: Beyond the Insider/Outsider 
Research Dichotomy’ (2015) 42(2) Social Justice 132, 133. 
94 Alecia Y Jackson and Lisa A Mazzei, (eds), Voice in Qualitative Inquiry Challenging conventional, 
interpretive, and critical conceptions in qualitative research (Routledge 2009).  
95 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (3rd edn, Oxford University Press, 2012).  
96 Ronald Dworkin has been described as ‘Positivism’s most significant critic’ Leslie Green, ‘Legal 
Positivism’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed) 
section 3, <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/legal-positivism/> accessed 
18.02.2018.  See for example Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Hart 1986).  
97 See for example, Twining (n 74) 155; Salter and Mason (n 82) 48. 
98 Hart’s description of criminal law is of rules which are either obeyed or disobeyed and 
individuals are said to ‘break’ the law; with punishment or ‘sanction’ for breaching the law, Hart, 
(n 95) 27. 
99 Twining (n 74). 
100 Jules Coleman, (ed), Hart’s Postscript: Essays on the Postscript to the ‘Concept of Law’ (Oxford 
University Press 2001) v. 
101 Hart (n 95) see for example, chapter I and Postscript 242. 
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precedent; explaining that they are ranked so that the common law is subordinate to 
legislation.102 His legal positivism does not require the separability of law and morality,103 
he explains that there may be a connection between laws and morality, although there is 
no necessity for there to be a connection.104  
Hart was not of the view that legal positivism meant rules based in legislation only.  He 
described the ‘characteristic technique’ of criminal law is to have rules (legislation) to set 
the standards for society to comply with without the aid of individuals to interpret them; 
and then only when the law is broken do officials identify the breach and impose the 
sanction (case law)105 and he has been credited with beginning the rehabilitation of the 
judicial role in legal positivism.106 In acknowledging the role of the judiciary to interpret 
statutes and precedents, he explains that judges are not confined to arbitrary or 
mechanical choices but display judicial virtues and are often guided by an assumption that 
the purpose of the rules they are interpreting is reasonable, so the rules are not intended 
to be unjust or offend moral principles.107 However, positivists do not claim that the rule of 
recognition instructs how to interpret cases, but acknowledge that many considerations 
are taken into account including moral, political, economic, linguistic and logical 
considerations.108  Hart explains that a descriptive legal theorist may understand and 
describe the internal view but not necessarily agree with it so rejecting any criticism of the 
descriptive theory.109 
For these reasons Hart’s legal positivism has been adopted as the theoretical background 
to examine the rules in relation to the enforcement of confiscation orders in the 
magistrates’ court, the use of restraint orders and charging orders.  These rules include 
 
102 ibid 100-101. 
103 Green explains that any idea that there must be separability is mistaken. Green (n 96) section 
4.2. 
104 Hart (n 95) 185-186. 
105 ibid 38-39. 
106 Jeremy Horder, ‘Criminal Law and Legal Positivism’ (2002) 8 LEG 221, 238. 
107 Hart (n 95) 204-205. 
108 Green (n 96) section 3. 
109 Hart (n 95) 242-243. 
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the legislation and case law.  They include the reasons why the introduction of the 
confiscation legislation and further amendment was necessary, and the way the judiciary 
have interpreted those rules.  But this research also uses the term ‘rule’ in its broadest 
sense by including the analysis of the review documents to explain the rules and identify 
the issues.110      
  
 
110 Twining (n 74) 174-175; text to n 74. 
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Chapter 2 The Use of the Review Documents  
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses documents referred to in this thesis as ‘review documents’ and 
forms the basis of one of the areas of critical analysis undertaken. The documents have 
been included because of their relevance to this research and give a complete picture of 
the regime since the introduction of the DTOA 1986, although some consider the wider 
asset recovery regime rather than just confiscation.111  They include official documents as 
well as government strategies, either those which see confiscation as a tool in its armour, 
for example drugs strategies and serious crime strategies; or are government strategies 
directly reviewing confiscation orders at their heart.  Other review documents concern the 
use of confiscation orders by government agencies, or are documents published by 
bodies which hold the government to account and there is a category of research carried 
out by academics to assess various aspects of the regime. Some of the review documents 
therefore require more careful analysis than others, especially if they have been written 
specifically to review the effectiveness of the enforcement of confiscation orders; or have 
reviewed the legislation at the time and led to changes to the legislation.112  
This thesis concentrates on those parts of the review documents relevant to this research 
and some of the documents are more relevant than others.  Those that specifically review 
the efficacy of the confiscation regime provide more detail directly relevant to the 
recommendations made.  Others provide the background information to show how 
government policy in relation to the confiscation regime has changed.113  Documents 
which provide statistical analysis of the regime have also been included although some of 
the statistics or information reviewed relate to the wider asset recovery powers.  Although 
statistics are useful to show the importance of the confiscation regime, and in explaining 
 
111 The fact that asset recovery is wider than confiscation has been identified King and Walker (n 
11). 
112 A complete list of the review documents considered in this chapter is shown in Appendix 2. 




how previous conclusions have been reached, to some extent the number of confiscation 
orders and restraint orders are of secondary importance to this research.  For example, 
although the fact that a certain number of restraint orders have been made in any given 
year may be worthy of note, what is important to this research is the nature of restraint, 
the fact that there is a reluctance to apply for the orders114 and the conclusions in this 
thesis that alternatives are needed. 
This approach is justified for a number of reasons. There is a lack of previous literature 
about the enforcement of confiscation orders, including the powers of the magistrates’ 
court,115 and some of the review documents include details about the enforcement powers 
of the magistrates’ court.  They are a rich source of information and some have the 
advantage of including data gathered from interviewing members of the various criminal 
justice agencies involved in the regime.  They begin to examine the themes which are 
developed in later chapters and show a pattern of issues which began with the DTOA 
1986.   This will also explain how the law has changed and will add to the context of that 
development explaining in some detail how the issues and changes to the legislation have 
arisen before examining them and to what extent they still exist.  Finally, the review 
documents support the recommendations for amendments to the payment order 
provisions, and the introduction of confiscation charging orders as a power of the Crown 
Court, to address some of the issues raised and meet the need to improve the 
enforcement of confiscation orders in the magistrates’ court. 
By adopting this methodology an analysis of policies and issues over more than 30 years 
has been undertaken.  This is not just of historical interest and allows a wider perspective 
than individual review documents have allowed.  It also shows where the issues in relation 
to the enforcement of confiscation orders in the magistrates’ court have figured in the 
regime and that issues with enforcement can begin with the imposition of the confiscation 
order or earlier investigation.  This coupled with the rules that exist in the regime analysed 
 
114 n 937, n 943-n 950 in chapter 4. 
115 n 47-n 57 in chapter 1. 
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in later chapters116 provide a bigger picture view of enforcement which will be of interest to 
lawyers, policy makers, criminal justice agencies and legislators.   
There are markers in time identified by the reports.  The PIU report117 contained accepted 
government policy and led directly to POCA 2002.  A consequence is that subsequent 
reviews have started with that report.  It is argued that any review of the regime should 
also include reviews and issues for the enforcement of confiscation orders in the 
magistrates’ court identified before the PIU report.  The second marker in time is the NAO 
Report118 which led to other reviews in this chapter and has also been identified as leading 
to ‘a fundamental shake-up’ in enforcement.119 However, the chronological review shows 
that the government had already identified a need to improve the enforcement of 
confiscation orders as improvements were planned in the 2013 Serious and Organised 
Crime Strategy.120  
The confiscation regime began as a result of the decision in Cuthbertson121 when the 
House of Lords held that the MDA 1971 could not be used to confiscate the proceeds of 
drugs offences.  As will be shown in later chapters the confiscation legislation has been 
amended many times since imposition of the DTOA 1986.122  The Hodgson Report123 led 
directly to the creation of that Act and that report has been analysed in the next chapter.  
Since the introduction of the confiscation order regime the decisions in two cases have led 
directly to a change in legislation.  Because of R v Dickens124 there was a change in the 
burden of proof when imposing a confiscation order in the pre-POCA 2002 legislation; and 
 
116 Chapter 4 considers the rules in relation to restraint, chapter 5 the confiscation based powers 
of the magistrates’ court, with the fines based powers analysed in chapters 6 and 7. 
117 Cabinet Office Performance and Innovation Unit, Recovering the Proceeds of Crime (Cabinet 
Office 2000) (‘PIU Report’).  
118 NAO Report (n 71). 
119 Wood, Enforcing Criminal Confiscation Orders (n 2) 2. 
120 2013 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy (n 62) 34-36. 
121 Cuthbertson (n 5).  This is considered in more detail in chapter 3 n 600-n 608. 
122 n 619-n 649 in chapter 3.  
123 The Profits of Crime and Their Recovery: Report of a Committee chaired by Sir Derek Hodgson 
(Heinemann 1984) (‘Hodgson Report’). 
124 [1990] EWCA Crim 4, [1990] 2 QB 102. 
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because of R v Waya125 a change to section 6 of POCA 2002 was introduced enshrining 
the consideration of proportionality when imposing a confiscation order. However, the 
majority of the legislative changes in the confiscation regime have come about because of 
research and concerns raised in government papers including various drug strategies and 
criminal justice strategy plans.  
2.2 1989-1998: The DTOA 1986 to the Home Office Working Group Third Report 
The Home Office Working Group on Confiscation produced three reports.  It was set up in 
1990 to review, amongst other things, the operation of the existing legislation to restrain 
and confiscate the proceeds of crime and identify areas of law which required 
amendment, including proposals if it found there was a need for urgent primary legislation.  
The remit included a need to take into account the needs of practitioners and the key role 
of confiscation orders to the government strategy to ‘fight …drug trafficking and other 
serious crime’.126  The Working Party was made up of representatives of Agencies 
including the Home Office, the Association of Chief Police Officers and the Crown 
Prosecution Service, and by the Third Report included a member of the Justices’ Clerks 
Society.127 Of particular relevance to this research it was able to consider the difficulties 
experienced by the magistrates’ court by considering statistics and considering the 
responses to a questionnaire sent to justices’ clerks responsible for court areas dealing 
with confiscation orders.128 
The Home Office Working Group came about in part because of issues raised in a Home 
Affairs Committee Report (‘HAC Seventh Report’).129 The Home Affairs Committee is 
appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and 
 
125 [2012] UKSC 51, [2013] 1 AC 294. 
126 Home Office, Working Group on Confiscation Third Report: Criminal Assets (1998) (‘Working 
Group Third Report’) Annex A. 
127 ibid Annex B.  This means the views of magistrates’ courts were taken into account through the 
justices’ clerks. 
128 ibid para 2.1. 
129 Home Affairs Committee, Seventh Report Drug Trafficking and Related Serious Crime (HC 1988-
89, 370 I) (‘HAC Seventh Report’). 
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policy of the Home Office and its associated public bodies.130 The HAC Seventh Report 
accepted that the problems that had emerged with the DTOA 1986 might be teething 
problems131 and found that there was a consensus among those who had given evidence 
that overall the 1986 Act had been a success.132 However, it identified issues with the 
apparent lack of communication between the parties and recommended the setting up of 
the Working Group.133 It also concluded that improvements could be made to the powers 
of restraint to allow applications to be made to District Registries of the High Court.134  
There were no figures available about the amount of monies recovered against the 
approximately £11 million of confiscation orders made between January 1987 and May 
1989, but the Committee accepted that there were shortfalls.135  It also recommended that 
the DTOA 1986 should be amended to cover interest or appreciation in value after a 
confiscation order was made.136  This is the first review document to suggest 
improvements to restraint and the Report’s concerns about the lack of statistics, and 
shortfalls in collections, along with the need for parties to work together, are still relevant 
today. 
The Home Office Working Group was duly established.  The First Report was published in 
May 1991137 and it also reviewed the DTOA 1986, concluding that it should concentrate 
initially on those areas which might require legislative change. Although the confiscation 
provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 were in force, the Group did not report on the 
effectiveness of that Act until their second report in 1992.138 Both reports made 
recommendations for improvements to the confiscation system and led to amendments of 
the DTOA 1986 and the CJA 1988 and the enactment of the DTA 1994. In addition, the 
 
130 See for example the HAC 2016 Report (n 26). 
131 HAC Seventh Report (n 129) xx. 
132 ibid xvi. 
133 ibid xx. 
134 ibid xviii. 
135 ibid xviii. 
136 ibid xix. 
137 Home Office, Working Group on Confiscation Report on the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986 
(1991) (‘Working Group First Report’). 
138 Home Office, Working Group on Confiscation Report on Part VI of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 
(1992) (‘Working Group Second Report’). 
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recommendations in the second report led to the changes in POCA 1995 which brought 
the confiscation provisions in the CJA 1998 more in line with the DTA 1994.  Whereas the 
first two reports considered improvements to the legislation, the third report published in 
1998 undertook a more radical view.  It considered the extension of the regime to non-
criminal confiscation and the establishing of a national agency.139  
As would be expected the First Report considered issues outside the focus of this thesis 
including the fact that in practice courts had difficulty in interpreting the conditions for 
making confiscation orders, and the confiscation hearing was more time-consuming than 
expected.140  The report echoed the recommendations of the HAC Seventh Report and 
recommended that confiscation orders should be capable of variation upwards141 but there 
were no recommendations in relation to the accrual of interest.  It also noted that 
members of the judiciary had expressed concerns about the inability to inquire into the 
interests of third parties at the Crown Court but did not come to any firm conclusions.142  
Directly relevant to the main recommendations in this thesis, issues were identified with 
the enforcement of confiscation orders which were contained in their own chapter in the 
report.   This began a history of detailed reviews of some of the difficulties in the 
enforcement of confiscation orders and it outlined the fact that the order was passed to 
the magistrates’ court to be enforced as a fine which causes problems.  Collection rates 
were relatively low and the report identified that justices’ clerks were not finding it easy to 
enforce confiscation orders.  It found that initial efforts, including getting the defendant to 
pay voluntarily was time-consuming and unsuccessful and that the magistrates’ court had 
encountered difficulties in obtaining the necessary information to locate and take action 
 
139 Working Group Third Report (n 126) para 1.3. 
140 It also reviewed the decision of the Court of Appeal in Dickens (n 124) when it was held that 
the prosecution should meet the criminal standard of proof in satisfying the court of the matters 
to be determined in making a confiscation order, even if the assumptions were applied, Working 
Group First Report (n 137) 3.  In chapter 5 of the Report miscellaneous recommendations were 
made in relation to the regime. 
141 Working Group First Report ibid 11. 
142 Ibid 6-7. 
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against the defendant's assets.143 It described the process for the magistrates’ court 
applying for enforcement in the county court as ‘a tortuous process’ which resulted in a 
reluctance by justices’ clerks to apply.144 Closer contact between the justices’ clerks and a 
receiver was also identified as a need.145   
As a result, there were proposals that the Crown Court should become more involved in 
the enforcement process by stating at the time of making the confiscation order the 
method by which the order would be enforced. It suggested three options should be 
available to the Crown Court. The first would be an order directed at any person holding 
money belonging to the defendant and sent from the Crown Court to the magistrates’ 
court to be enforced, similar to a garnishee order. The second method would be directed 
to any person in possession of the defendant's goods in a similar way to a distress 
warrant and again the magistrates’ court would be informed. The third method of 
enforcement would involve authorising the prosecutor to apply for the immediate 
appointment of a receiver in relation to realisable property as soon as the appeal period 
has expired.146  
The First Report concluded that the provisions of the Act were still relatively new but that 
they were central to the government crime strategy and it was therefore vital that any 
defects were identified and rectified at the first opportunity.147  However, it took until POCA 
2002 for the legislation to allow for a payment order to be made which gives the 
magistrates’ court power to make a payment order for money in a bank account.  It is 
suggested that those powers, even though subsequently amended, do not go far enough 
and require further amendment.148 The tortuous process described for the designated 
officer who has to apply for enforcement in the county court or High Court still exists as 
 
143 Ibid 8. 
144 Ibid 8. 
145 Ibid 8. 
146 Ibid 8-9. 
147 ibid 1. 
148 These powers are examined in chapter 5, text to n 1099-n 1112. 
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shown when considering the power for the designated officer for the magistrates’ court to 
apply for a third party debt order149 or charging order.150   
There were other proposals.  It was proposed that a receiver should be able to apply for a 
downward variation of a confiscation order if there is a shortfall after the realisation of 
assets;151 that serving the term in default should not expunge the debt; and that the 
existing link between the default periods for fine and confiscation orders should be 
broken.152  These changes were eventually made153 although breaking the link in the 
default periods was not achieved until the amendments to POCA 2002 by the SCA 
2015.154  
When the Home Office Working Group Second Report was written recommendations from 
the First Report to amend the DTOA 1986 were being taken forward in the Criminal 
Justice Bill.155  The Report concluded that the differences in the drugs and general crime 
provisions meant that the CJA 1988 was difficult to apply in practice, noting that only four 
confiscation orders were made under the CJA 1988.156  Recommendations were made to 
align the confiscation order provisions of the CJA 1988 in some way with those of the 
DTOA 1986 as it was intended to be amended. Even at that stage there was 
disagreement amongst members of the Working Group. Some felt there should be full 
alignment with DTOA 1986 as amended, others argued that drug trafficking is almost 
invariably a lifestyle offence, and that although the crimes in the category of Part VI of the 
CJA 1988 might be considered as reprehensible as drug trafficking, others might be 
 
149 As shown in chapter 5, text to n 1113-n 1139. 
150 As shown in chapter 7, text to n 1432-n 1452. 
151 Working Group First Report (n 137) 9.  
152 ibid 10. 
153 The changes to the default terms expunging the debt are explained in chapter 3, text to n 610-
n 637. The powers of variation are considered in chapter 5, text to n 1161. 
154 Text to n 1189-n 1194 in chapter 5. 
155 Working Group Second Report (n 138) 6. These include the Group’s recommendation to be 
able to defer or postpone the making of a confiscation order for six months, or longer in 
exceptional circumstances, and in the meantime sentence the offender, ibid 16. Criminal Justice 
HL Bill (1986-87) 15. 
156 ibid 2. 
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thought insufficiently grave to attract the full weight of the confiscation arrangements 
appropriate to drug trafficking.157  
It sought views about whether the regimes should be fully aligned but recommended that 
the £10,000 limit in the CJA 1988, which must exist before a confiscation order could be 
made, should be abolished. The Working Group felt this would meet the problem of 
calculating benefits in cases where defendants were charged jointly. They also felt the 
logic of the proposition is that which lies at the heart of the confiscation scheme itself: that 
crime should not pay and a criminal should not benefit from their crimes, a principle which 
applies whatever the amount of benefit.158 
The Working Group discussed whether the service of a term of imprisonment in default for 
a confiscation order under the CJA 1988 should expunge the liability to pay, but felt it was 
a sensitive issue and did not make any recommendation.159  It noted a ‘marked increase’ 
in the amounts of confiscation orders realised, putting that down to the need for the courts 
and prosecutors to familiarise themselves to the procedures and the increasing use of 
receivers, and that some of the changes recommended in the First Report had been 
included in the Criminal Justice Bill.160  As a result it concluded that the recommendation 
in the First Report that orders similar to a garnishee order or distress warrant should be 
available to the Crown Court would no longer be required.161 Given the continued 
recommendations for improvement, the assessment that powers were sufficient was 
premature and there are still concerns about collection rates.  Similarly, the fact that 
POCA 2002 introduced the power for the magistrates’ court to make a payment order 
shows that there was an ongoing need for an order similar to a garnishee order.  
 
157 ibid 6-7. 
158 ibid 8. 
159 ibid 17-18. 
160 ibid 17.  The changes commented on were that serving the default term should not expunge 
the debt and that the existing link between fines and confiscation order defaulters should be 
broken for confiscation orders made under the DTOA 1986.  
161 Working Group Second Report (n 138) 17. 
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Before the Working Group Third Report two documents were published in 1995.  An 
academic review of the confiscation regime was commissioned by the Home Office Police 
Research Group and Levi and Osofsky reviewed the law relating to the investigation, 
seizing and confiscating the proceeds of crime.162  It was timely as the DTOA 1986 and 
the CJA 1988 had been in force for some time, amendments had been introduced by the 
CJA 1993, and the DTA 1994 had recently been enacted.  Their report outlined the history 
of the confiscation legislation; it also considered the imposition of orders, which is outside 
the scope of this thesis.   
The Foreword to the Levi and Osofsky paper by I M Burns, the Deputy Under Secretary of 
State for the Home Office Police Department acknowledged that the authors had identified 
factors that prevented the effective use of the legislation but anticipated that the new 
legislation would assist in this regard.  He also noted that they had made practical 
suggestions for improvement in this area of law.163 
The objectives of the research included a review of the effectiveness of the legislation on 
the tackling of organised crime, in particular drug related organised crime. In addition, it 
considered whether any improvements could be made by changing police strategies or 
from changes to the legislation, but also reviewed good practice.164  The research was 
undertaken using interview and observational techniques and examining case files165 and 
issues with the enforcement of confiscation orders were considered.  The report reviewed 
the enforcement of orders by the use of charging orders, restraint orders and receivers.166   
A proposal was made to remove the enforcement of confiscation orders from the 
magistrates’ court and leave enforcement to the police who would be properly funded.167 
This is the only time that a proposal to remove enforcement from the magistrates’ court 
 
162 Michael Levi and Lisa Osofsky, Investigating, seizing and confiscating the proceeds of crime 
(Police Research Group Crime Detection and Prevention Series Paper 61, Home Office 1995).    
163 ibid iii. 
164 Ibid 1-2. 
165 ibid 2.  Staff from magistrates’ courts were interviewed. 
166 ibid 18-22.  
167 ibid 59. 
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has been made, however, in doing so it reviewed some of the difficulties experienced by 
the magistrates’ court.   The recommendation was based on a number of factors, the 
perceived need for a ‘cradle to grave’ approach168 and a call by some police officers to 
confiscate assets alongside the ‘in personam’ nature of confiscation;169 and their 
conclusion that there is little incentive for prosecutors and the courts to spend money on 
enforcing confiscation orders unless the amounts recovered are likely to exceed the costs 
of enforcement.170  Arguably the need to confiscate assets has now been met in part by 
the changes to POCA 2002 made by the Policing and Crime Act 2009 which allows some 
assets to be seized and sold to satisfy a confiscation order.171  In fact HMCTS and the 
magistrates’ court is responsible for enforcing all orders regardless of the amount 
outstanding, although it is accepted that cases may be prioritised.172  However, there is 
still a need for an improvement in the enforcement of confiscation orders, and the need for 
a ‘cradle to grave’ approach has been emphasised by later review documents.173  The 
recommendations in this thesis to give the Crown Court powers to make more orders on 
imposition would go some way to meet these needs.    
Levi and Osofsky concluded that no-one who reviewed the confiscation regime ‘would 
judge it a success’.174 This is at odds with the findings of other reports.  The HAC Seventh 
report considered the DTOA 1986 a success, basing its conclusion on evidence from the 
Home Office, the Association of Chief Police Officers and HM Customs and Excise,175   
although it did highlight issues with restraint.  Similarly the Working Group Second Report 
reported an increase in collections and concluded that some of the additional enforcement 
 
168 Ibid 59. 
169 ibid 28. 
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171 Text to n 953-n 958 in chapter 4.  
172 MOJ and HMCTS, Written evidence to the HAC 2016 (n 26) para 22. Text to n 537-n 538 in 
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173 Rick Brown and others, The Contribution of Financial Investigation to Tackling Organised Crime: 
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an ‘end-to-end’ approach has been identified, Payback Time: Joint Review of Asset Recovery Since 
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powers recommended in the First Report were no longer required which shows why its 
participants felt at that stage that the CJA 1988 was working, albeit that improvements in 
appointing receivers were needed.176  This chapter shows that other improvements were 
needed as well. 
The second publication in 1995 was HAC Organised Crime Report which commended the 
extension of the regime to other serious crime177 which is unlikely if it considered the 
regime a failure.  The review documents show that the reality was somewhere between 
the two divergent views.  It seems harsh of Levi and Osofsky to conclude that the regime 
was not a success, but there were clearly issues with it. Improvements were being made 
to the regime, and this chapter shows that even to this day more are needed.  It also 
shows the need for a more balanced debate of the regime which was still being called for 
in 2016.178  
As well as welcoming the extension of the drugs confiscation provisions to other serious 
crime the HAC Organised Crime Report recommended that the legislation should be kept 
under review by the Home Office Working Group on Confiscation.179 It identified that if the 
proceeds of crime are confiscated, crime becomes less attractive,180 but concluded that 
the recovery of amounts ordered to be confiscated was still an issue and recommended 
that a full study should be carried out on the reasons for low collection rates, which were 
still being seen as the means of measuring success. The reasons given by the Home 
Office relevant to this thesis were that there is a significant time lag between imposition 
and recovery, unrealistic orders due to the overvaluation of property, and the fact that the 
amounts received were net of receivers’ costs, although there were no figures available 
for the HAC to consider.181  
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In 1998, which is the same year as the third and final Working Group Report, the 
government’s ten-year drug strategy was published.  It lamented the lack of success in 
realising substantial assets from confiscation orders for drug related activity and asserted 
that the strategy would increase confiscation orders and their collection.182  This shows 
the importance of the effective enforcement of confiscation orders to the government 
strategy for dealing with drugs offences, which is confirmed by later strategies dealing with 
drug crime.   
When the Working Group Third Report was published it looked at the confiscation regime 
more widely than previous Working Group Reports and addressed the enforcement of 
confiscation orders, which it saw as a key issue.183  It had a large chapter on enforcement 
including the powers of the magistrates’ court and so is relevant to this thesis, not least 
because a number of the issues have not been addressed.  It identified that the annual 
return of collection rates does not give the whole picture accepting the anecdotal evidence 
that receivers’ costs could be considerable,184 and there could be a shortfall in the value of 
assets when they are realised.185  It acknowledged the issues caused by third parties,186 
and the importance of agencies working together.187   
This was an influential report in the development of the legislation as it was followed by 
the PIU report which in turn led to the introduction of POCA 2002.  Some of the 
recommendations have been introduced, for example it recommended the use of a form 
for the Crown Court to complete listing the assets identified at the confiscation hearing, to 
assist the magistrates’ court with enforcement.188  Recommendations were made to 
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reduce the time allowed to pay a confiscation order189 which POCA 2002 did.190  Although 
changes have been made, they have not solved all the problems in the regime. 
After reviewing the problems being experienced by the magistrates’ court, 
recommendations were made about the powers of the justices’ clerk to make applications 
to the High Court and county court;191 and about cash seized from the defendant, a 
recommendation which became a payment order in POCA 2002.192 The Report also 
recommended that the magistrates’ court should be able to apply to the Crown Court for a 
review of the amount to be paid under a confiscation order that was obviously 
unenforceable and be able to apply to remit confiscation orders in the case of fluctuations 
in exchange rates where the offender was subsequently deported.193  These powers were 
introduced in POCA 2002 and further amended in the SCA 2015 and CFA 2017.194  
There was criticism of the Third Report as its approach ‘sometimes ignores the broader 
picture’; and the figures could have been more useful if there had been more detail, for 
example, how many restraint orders were made.195 However, it is a useful report and its 
findings are still applicable today despite the passing of time.  It specifically considered the 
difficulties experienced by magistrates’ courts enforcing confiscation orders making 
specific recommendations for improvement. It also provides support for the 
recommendations in this thesis for the Crown Court to make payment orders196 and 
charging orders.197  Finally it led to some of the recommendations in the PIU Report, 
which is the next report to be considered in this chapter and in turn led to POCA 2002. 
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2.3 PIU to POCA 2002 
The PIU Report was published in June 2000 after a nine month study and reviewed the 
history of the legislation relating to the pre-POCA 2002 legislation.  It considered that its 
findings complemented the recommendations in the Home Office Working Group Third 
Report namely that the Crown Court judge should identify assets taken into account when 
the confiscation order is made, that orders should be paid forthwith, and enforcement 
powers should be strengthened.198     
The report included a comprehensive review of the confiscation law at that stage, but not 
in relation to the fines based powers of enforcement in the magistrates’ court. It concluded 
that the magistrates’ court held the most powers for enforcing confiscation orders, but was 
not best equipped to deal with the enforcement of confiscation orders made against more 
serious criminals because the enforcement powers are designed to deal with ‘modest 
fines’ and it is ‘ill-equipped’ to collect assets from more serious criminals.199  Despite this, 
there were limited recommendations for changes to the enforcement powers of the 
magistrates’ court which it is argued was a missed opportunity.  Up until this point the 
enforcement powers of the magistrates’ court had been a focus of reports and the PIU 
report marks the start of a focus on restraint as the enforcement power needing 
improvement, and a lack of focus on the difficulties experienced in the magistrates’ court.  
However, as it led directly to POCA 2002 it is a vital piece of research and led to major 
changes in the confiscation regime.    
The purpose of the PIU report was to look at wider asset recovery, but also covered the 
confiscation provisions in detail and concluded that making confiscation orders should 
become ‘the norm’.200  Echoing the purpose of the legislation the report found that most 
crime is motivated by profit and that the recovery of the proceeds of crime can reinforce 
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messages relevant to this thesis namely that crime does not pay, and removes the 
funding from further criminality.201 
The report represented agreed government policy and found that the UK powers to 
confiscate criminal assets were clear and wide-ranging but there were anomalies in the 
scheme as it had developed in a piecemeal fashion.202 It criticised the collection rate and 
felt it was failing to deliver the attempted attack on the proceeds of crime.203 At the time of 
the report, collection rates were running at an average of 40% or less despite the fact that 
the value of the confiscation order has been set taking into account the defendant’s 
realisable property or ‘ability to pay’. The report examined the reasons for the shortfall 
concluding that orders are sometimes made in an amount that is higher than the 
realisable amount although it concluded that at that stage it was less common. It also 
identified hidden assets as an issue affecting collection rates along with attempts by 
defendants to obstruct restraint and confiscation orders by methods which include 
damaging property.204 
It concluded that the system of confiscation was complex with the High Court, Crown 
Court and magistrates’ court involved.205 This had already been acknowledged by the 
Home Office in 1997 when it said:  
with so much legislation in such a short space of time it would be surprising if more 
than a few practitioners were fully aware of everything that can be done… to 
confiscate the proceeds of crime. An overview of the whole field, taking in 
confiscation … is much-needed.206 
An example of how confusing it had become is that confiscation orders could be made in 
certain circumstances in the magistrates’ court, the Crown Court and the High Court, with 
 
201 ibid 5. 
202 ibid 5, 7, 26, 63 and 64. 
203 ibid 30-31. 
204 ibid 70.  
205 ibid 7. 
206 Home Office Guide (n 4) v. 
56 
 
enforcement in the High Court and the magistrates’ court and applications for restraint and 
charging orders made to the High Court. 
To address the problem of low collection rates, the PIU report recommended a number of 
changes in the legislation relevant to this thesis. It recommended a single piece of 
legislation to provide an opportunity to create a uniform confiscation regime which would 
close any loopholes and make it easier to use and understand.207  This would be achieved 
by extending the provisions that apply to drug trafficking confiscation to all types of 
offence, encouraging training, and extending the time limit for making confiscation 
orders.208  Specific recommendations to improve the enforcement of confiscation orders 
were made, namely allowing courts to transfer the ownership of restrained assets to the 
State to pay towards the confiscation order, including bank accounts,209 allowing 
management receivers to deal with assets as necessary, seeking increased use of 
sanctions to enforce orders, and allowing Crown Courts to make restraint orders.210  It 
made recommendations for charging orders to continue but to become a power of the 
Crown Court alongside restraint orders.211 
The PIU report has been described as a ‘significant milestone’ in relation to the 
development of the contemporary regime,212 which is undoubtedly correct as the 
legislation which followed means amongst other things that all the powers in relation to 
confiscation, whether drugs offences or general crime are governed by the same rules, 
and that all associated orders are heard at the Crown Court.  However, it is submitted that 
it also represented a missed opportunity and this report starts a focus on the power of 
restraint rather than the fines based powers of the magistrates’ court, and a focus on 
orders made under POCA 2002.  This means that there has been little consideration of 
the fines based powers of the magistrates’ court and the difficulties it experiences using 
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those powers to enforce both POCA 2002 and pre-POCA confiscation orders, a situation 
which this thesis seeks to address. 
The recommendations in the PIU report led directly to the Proceeds of Crime Bill.213 As 
noted, the Proceeds of Crime Bill: Publication of Draft Clauses described the changes as 
creating a ‘one stop shop’ in the Crown Court in relation to confiscation214 building on the 
recommendations in the PIU report to make a change so that all hearings in relation to 
confiscation orders would be heard in the Crown Court including applications for restraint 
orders and charging orders.215  This is directly relevant to this thesis which considers to 
what extent a one stop shop has been achieved. Also important to this research is the 
proposal to abolish charging orders in the Publication of Draft Clauses,216 and it is 
suggested that this was another missed opportunity, this time to give the Crown Court an 
alternative to restraint which could actively assist the magistrates’ court where the 
defendant has an asset which is a house.217    
The House of Commons Library issued a Research Paper on the Proceeds of Crime 
Bill218 which summarised the existing law and the proposals for change in the Proceeds of 
Crime Bill which were wider than just confiscation.  By the time of the Research Paper, the 
clauses published in the Proceeds of Crime Bill: Publication of Draft Clauses had been 
updated and no longer contained clauses for charging orders to be made in relation to 
confiscation orders.  
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The Proceeds of Crime Bill219 was highlighted by the government in its criminal justice 
strategy in 2001, Criminal Justice: The Way Ahead,220 which saw the Bill as strengthening 
the confiscation and restraint provisions to support the government’s strategy to tackle 
general and drug related crime and modernise the criminal justice system.221 This built on 
previous strategies and although it did not consider the proposals in any detail, later 
reports made more detailed recommendations for change.  The Updated Drug Strategy in 
2002 also welcomed the Proceeds of Crime Bill as a way of strengthening the confiscation 
regime,222  and shows the importance of confiscation to the strategy to take assets of 
those who have committed drugs and other offences.  
The PIU report and the Bill also led to the establishing of an Asset Recovery Strategy and 
Committee223 although the PIU report made recommendations for the law in England and 
Wales and the strategy related to the law in the United Kingdom. The strategy followed 
many of the recommendations in the PIU report and set targets for the improvement of the 
recovery of the proceeds of crime. Targets continued for some time but were 
subsequently removed224 and the government’s position was updated in later strategies 
considered in this chapter. 
2.4 2004-2010: POCA 2002 The Early Years 
The confiscation provisions of POCA 2002 came into force on 24th March 2003.  The 
Review documents published post POCA 2002 show that the Act did not solve all the 
problems of the confiscation regime and there have been further amendments to the 
legislation and calls for further changes.  Government strategies have discussed the 
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importance of asset recovery including confiscation to their aims.  Initially these were split 
between drugs offences and other offences, however, there has been a move towards 
strategies focused on serious and organised crime. The reality is that any changes to 
confiscation orders made as a result of the strategies apply equally to all confiscation 
orders, whether in relation to serious and organised criminals or not, and so are relevant 
to this thesis.   
This chapter shows that the government has seen the asset recovery laws as a key part 
of its criminal justice strategy to cut crime and deliver justice.  The first ‘Cutting Crime’ 
strategy published a year after POCA 2002 was introduced showed the importance to the 
government of asset recovery to ensure that crime doesn’t pay225 and explained that the 
assets recovered had doubled in the past year showing the success of the ‘stringent’ new 
provisions of the Act.226   
The One Step Ahead strategy paper published in 2004227 was aimed at tackling organised 
crime and acknowledged the difficulties in measuring enforcement success228 but was 
positive about the POCA 2002, reporting that it was already providing a ‘robust framework 
for dealing with criminal assets.’229  This is despite issues being raised in the same year 
by a joint inspectorate report, Payback Time,230 which was the first Inspectorate Report to 
provide information about the workings of the courts dealing with confiscation orders.  This 
report by the HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary, HM Chief Inspector of the Crown 
Prosecution Service and HM Chief Inspector of the Magistrates’ Courts Service reviewed 
the asset recovery provisions of POCA 2002 including confiscation since its inception with 
a review of the legislative history and the PIU report. It concentrated on the operation of 
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the Act but did not make any recommendations for legislative reform which is not 
surprising as it was published only a year after POCA 2002 came into force.  
There was some positive feedback in the report about the amounts collected but it found 
the enforcement of confiscation orders was ‘tinged with some disappointment’231 and 
made recommendations for improvement in a number of areas.   It identified issues with 
assessing performance because of the lack of collated statistics by the criminal justice 
agencies232 and the confusion caused by dealing with confiscation cases in POCA and 
pre-POCA cases.233 It recommended efficient systems to ensure that POCA data can be 
collected and collated to support JARD and manage local performance234 explaining that it 
is difficult to reconcile confiscation orders made and amounts recovered because of the 
time delays between the order being made and payment.235  It also recommended that 
criminal justice agencies work more closely together to improve confiscation 
enforcement,236 which it noted was primarily the responsibility of the magistrates’ court.237  
Like Levi and Osofsky it identified a need for end-to-end working by the agencies for 
successful enforcement238 however unlike that review it recognised positive steps in this 
area.239  In fact it noted that specialist magistrates’ courts teams were starting to be 
established240 and recommended that good practice should be shared.241 
Having identified some reasons for optimism the Chief Inspectors thought it might be 
considered ‘churlish’ to criticise the implementation of POCA 2002 as the legislation was 
still new, but felt the issues were so important ‘that a warning bell needs to be sounded.’242 
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The concerns run counter to the positivity in One Step Ahead, however the Inspectorate 
Report focuses on the difficulties in the operation of the framework rather than the 
framework itself which could explain the difference.   
The next review document published in 2007 highlighted similar problems. The Asset 
Recovery Action Plan was in fact a Home Office consultation to seek views on the 
proposals in it to build on what it saw as the major successes of POCA 2002 in asset 
recovery including confiscation.243  Despite reference to the successes in the Act, the 
Asset Recovery Action Plan acknowledged that the biggest problem was with the 
enforcement of confiscation orders and identified areas where improvements could be 
made.244  
The successes identified in the Action Plan included agencies working together to improve 
enforcement, shorter time to pay and tougher sanctions for non-payment, and greater 
powers to restrain assets.245 It saw the introduction of the HMCTS Centres of Excellence 
as a positive move which would help with agencies working together and acknowledged 
the difficulties for magistrates’ courts but did not recommend any changes to the 
legislation to improve enforcement powers. However, it saw working together and the use 
of a task force to clear a backlog of confiscation orders made under the pre-POCA 2002 
legislation as sufficient to improve the enforcement of orders.246   
Although the Action Plan reported that the government had delivered an almost fivefold 
increase in asset recovery performance in five years it aimed to reach £250 million (for all 
asset recovery) by 2009-2010.247   To achieve this the government identified that changes 
were needed to improve confiscation order enforcement using the co-operation between 
criminal justice agencies, and with the use of increased powers of restraint.248  It also 
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recommended a power to allow law enforcement agencies to sell high value goods 
especially when the assets are already in the possession of the authorities which would 
save the expense of a receiver.249  
There was nothing specific about adding to the enforcement powers of the magistrates’ 
court in the Action Plan, perhaps because it again looked at the operation of the 
legislation rather than reviewing the provisions of the Act.  However, it is an example of 
the difficulties of magistrates’ courts being acknowledged in a post PIU report.     
The Plan identified a greater emphasis on targets250 but by 2011 the government felt that 
the asset recovery targets were unhelpful and had removed them.251 The Plan identified 
that measuring performance is complex and it is difficult to measure the value of orders 
collected against the value imposed.252 It stated that receipts to the exchequer should not 
be the sole sign of success.  The government was also keen for other improvements to 
ensure that defendants are deprived of their gain, including getting their assets restrained, 
or seized if overseas, and that recovery actions should be recognised.253     
The second ‘Cutting Crime’ strategy noted the aim of the government to double 
performance in asset recovery by 2009-2010 in order to use its deterrent effect to address 
serious and organised crime.254 It was followed later in the year by another strategy aimed 
at cutting crime and delivering justice in 2007,255 and it included the need for a robust 
asset recovery system, including confiscation and restraint, to take the profit out of crime 
and reduce harm.256  It reported the setting up of centres of excellence by HMCTS to 
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support better enforcement of confiscation orders257 and saw efficiencies in the system 
being achieved through the use of targets for each criminal justice agency.258 
The 2008 Drug Strategy259 gave a commitment to improve confiscation by implementing 
the recommendations in the Asset Recovery Action Plan. It too commented on the 
proposals to improve POCA 2002 to allow high-value goods to be seized at the time of 
arrest to prevent assets being removed, seeing the powers as key to better law 
enforcement.260  
These powers to seize assets to prevent them being hidden or disposed of before a 
confiscation order is made were announced in the follow up to the 2008-11 Cutting Crime 
Strategy261 which reported the recovery of more than £500 million since the introduction of 
POCA 2002 although this includes all asset recovery, not just confiscation orders.262  The 
provisions of the Policing and Crime Act 2009 which legislated for the change did not 
come into force until 2015 when POCA 2002 was amended by that Act.263 These powers 
allow the magistrates’ court to order detention and the sale of certain goods, but do not tie 
in with the idea of having a one stop shop at the Crown Court, nor do they apply to houses 
or cash in bank accounts and so do not address all of the issues with restraint orders.   
In Extending Our Reach: A Comprehensive Approach to Tackling Serious Organised 
Crime (‘Extending Our Reach’),264 the government identified the successes since the 
importance of tackling the finances of serious organised crime was identified in One Step 
Ahead, and also highlighted the importance of agencies working together.  The increased 
use of restraint at the start of an investigation was an aim.265 Again the figure of 
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recovering more than £500 million of criminal assets using POCA 2002 was quoted to 
show the success of the legislation.266 As in other strategies, the figures quoted applied to 
all asset recovery, not just confiscation but it was seen as part of ‘a strong record of 
success’.267 Recommendations for improvement included proposals to ensure that 
criminals have to account for assets such as houses.268  Whilst this was in relation to the 
use of civil powers of recovery in POCA 2002, it is a principle that supports the 
recommendations in this thesis.    
Further Home Office research was undertaken in 2009, this time into the operation of 
POCA 2002. Bullock et al’s research was commissioned to examine the attrition in 
confiscation orders, which was defined as the amount lost during different stages of the 
confiscation process, from the initial police assessment of the criminal benefit, through to 
the amount eventually recovered from the defendant.269 This was done by examining 
information from the period 2006/2007 on JARD, an examination of 155 specific 
confiscation orders, and interviews.270 The interviewees included financial investigators, 
prosecution and defence counsel, judiciary and HMCTS enforcement staff271 who were 
asked about issues including the enforcement of confiscation orders and how the process 
could be improved.272  
The research and interviews concentrated on attrition from the time the benefit was first 
assessed to payment.  The report included a number of issues relevant to the 
enforcement of confiscation orders, and to this thesis which considers the attrition 
between the making of the order and payment. The research considered the operation of 
POCA 2002 and reported that there is no extensive body of research in the UK on asset 
recovery but that common difficulties had been identified.  The difficulties relevant to this 
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thesis included the limited use of restraint orders, defendants and their representatives 
negotiating down the value of confiscation orders, and problems in the enforcement of 
confiscation orders.273  
It concluded that the landscape had changed since Levi and Osofsky’s report and there 
had been an increase in the amount recovered.274  However, it found that more could be 
done.  As a result it made recommendations about enforcement including the importance 
of agencies working together.275  Like other research before 2016, there was no detailed 
review of the enforcement powers of the magistrates’ court, although it commented 
favourably on the HMCTS Centres of Excellence276 and highlighted some of the issues 
which impact on the enforcement powers of the magistrates’ court including the fact that 
defendants cannot be forced to sell particular assets.277 However, the review of restraint 
orders is particularly relevant for this thesis. 
The 2010 Drug Strategy278 highlighted the importance of asset recovery to disrupt criminal 
finances and reported that in the previous two years over £90 million had been 
confiscated from drug traffickers. According to the strategy more could be done to enforce 
confiscation orders but there were no discussions about the powers of the magistrates’ 
court.279 
Also published in 2010, the Joint Thematic Review280 is the second Inspectorate report 
considered in this chapter. This time the criminal justice agencies included were the CPS, 
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HMCTS, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and Revenue and Customs 
Prosecutions Office (RCPO).  The report looked critically at the way criminal justice 
agencies handled asset recovery from investigation to enforcement, as there had been no 
detailed analysis of that work.281   Four criminal justice areas were visited, chosen by 
characteristics thought to make them representative, including size, location and 
performance, and the fact that they all had an HMCTS Regional Confiscation Unit 
(RCU).282 Eighty cases were reviewed although not all of these involved confiscation and 
key working hypotheses were established by interviewing the main agencies in advance 
of the review of the frontline work.  As such the Inspectors felt they had covered enough 
ground to test their hypotheses, even though it was not a full national picture.283   The 
report included the history of the legislation and concentrated on the effectiveness of 
POCA 2002 including confiscation orders and much of the report fell outside the scope of 
this thesis. However, the involvement of all the criminal justice agencies including HMCTS 
means it provides an analysis of the workings of restraint and the enforcement processes 
in the magistrates’ court directly relevant to this thesis. 
It called for a debate on whether cost effectiveness or confidence and other benefits of 
confiscation should determine whether applications are pursued284 and the authors 
suspected that the public confidence in the criminal justice system is based on an 
assumption that it represents value for money.  It found that value for money was not the 
sole driver for restraint and confiscation, concluding that it would not be right for 
enforcement agencies to hold back from ‘appropriate action’ because they believed they 
would not recover their costs.285 The report also concluded that resources removed from 
defendants who had flaunted wealth can boost public confidence.286   
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Its initial conclusion was that the restraint and confiscation regime is at least partially 
effective.287  However, it found delays in applying for restraint caused problems with 
enforcement later and that more effective use of restraint would increase the amount 
recovered significantly.288  It noted a lack of use of charging orders by HMCTS to enforce 
confiscation orders with cost identified as an issue.289  The findings in this report are still 
relevant today.  Some of the later review documents have focused on value for money,290 
an approach which has been criticised,291 and there is still a debate on the purpose of 
confiscation orders and what counts as success.292  There are still issues with restraint, 
and the issues with charging order applications remain.293  This Inspectorate report 
concentrates on how the agencies operate, yet even with its different emphasis it reported 
similar issues and made similar recommendations to other review documents.    
2.5 2011-2014: Home Office Research and other Strategies 
The rationale of the organised crime strategy, Local to Global294 was not about 
confiscation orders, and there was no detailed review of the POCA 2002, however it is 
useful as it shows the continued view of the government that it considered the confiscation 
provisions of POCA 2002 as ‘formidable’.295  It also maintained its position that the 
enforcement of orders had to improve, reporting that it takes on average 22 months to 
enforce a confiscation order and even longer in high value cases296 and undertook to 
remove blockages in the process by, for instance, denying criminals access to their 
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assets.297  Its themes were built on in the 2013 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy 
which started the path towards the changes in the SCA 2015.298   
However, before then research conducted by Brown et al was published by the Home 
Office in 2012.299 Its focus was the use of financial investigation techniques in organised 
crime and it concentrated on the operation of POCA 2002 including the wider asset 
recovery provisions as well as confiscation. It is relevant to this thesis as it discusses the 
uses of POCA 2002 to disrupt organised crime and covers restraint300 and the 
enforcement of confiscation orders including the use of charging orders.301  The research 
was based on semi-structured interviews with people involved in the investigation and 
prosecution of 60 organised crime cases and included interviews with investigators and 
member of the CPS302 but not HMCTS.   
When reporting on the effectiveness of confiscation it reported difficulties in the powers of 
the magistrates’ court to enforce a confiscation order after the default sentence had been 
imposed.303 This is another review which highlights the importance of agencies working 
together and having those involved in the enforcement of confiscation orders involved 
from the start 304 echoing Levi and Osofsky’s findings by calling for a ‘cradle to grave’ 
approach.305  The methodology used gives a good representation of the views of the 
prosecutors and financial investigators about the enforcement of orders, including the 
powers of the magistrates’ court and as such adds weight to the recommendations in this 
thesis about the use of charging orders. 
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Local to Global was followed in 2013 by the Serious and Organised Crime Strategy306 but 
the government’s thinking had developed since 2011.307 Its aim was ‘to substantially 
reduce the level of organised crime affecting the UK and the level of serious crime that 
requires a national response’308 and led to the changes to POCA 2002 introduced by the 
SCA 2015.  Four areas were identified, prosecuting and disrupting people engaged in 
serious and organised crime (Pursue); preventing people from engaging in this activity 
(Prevent); increasing protection against serious and organised crime (Protect); and 
reducing the impact of this criminality where it takes place (Prepare).309  The one that is 
relevant to this thesis is ‘Pursue’ which includes preventing the use of the proceeds of 
crime.310 
Like previous strategies the Serious and Organised Crime Strategy highlighted the 
positive use of POCA 2002, in this case to pursue criminals by recovering over £150 
million each year and denying access to £500 million in 2012/2013311 through confiscation 
orders, the civil recovery of cash and through taxation powers, the latter two falling outside 
the scope of this thesis. Again it identified the need to improve asset recovery which 
included a need to ensure that court orders are enforced,312 explaining that powers are 
only as effective as their enforcement.313 It explained that disruption is key to the 
strategy314 and identified that co-operation between the agencies was necessary to 
improve enforcement.315 Unlike previous strategies it specifically set out legislative 
changes to POCA 2002 it wanted to introduce and although there were suggested 
improvements to restraint orders, some of the proposed changes were also aimed at 
improving the enforcement powers of the magistrates’ court.  Those relevant to this thesis 
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are strengthening default terms because it identified that defendants can only serve the 
default term once and can refuse to pay the confiscation order after release, stronger 
powers for the restraint of assets, the reduction of the time to pay confiscation orders, an 
increased ability to apply for a payment order, and introducing travel restrictions after the 
confiscation order has been made.316   
The Strategy marked a change in focus on the enforcement of confiscation orders and is 
the first review since the Working Group Third Report that specifically considered 
enhancing the legislative powers of enforcement relevant to the magistrates’ court and 
HMCTS, although it only considered the enforcement of orders made under POCA 2002.   
The recommendations led to some of the changes to POCA 2002 in the SCA 2015317 and 
thus to improvements to the enforcement of confiscation orders in all cases including 
those led by HMCTS, not just orders made in respect of serious and organised crime. It 
also shows the importance of confiscation orders to other government strategies.  The 
Serious Crime Bill318 which led to the Act was seen as a key piece of legislation to improve 
the confiscation regime in POCA 2002 which would in turn assist the government with its 
Modern Slavery Strategy319 and Modern Crime Prevention Strategy.320 Its 
recommendations have also been considered in later review documents. 
The inclusion of the CPS Asset Recovery Strategy321 in this chapter is an opportunity to 
consider the aims of the main prosecuting agency in this area.  Its strategy was to improve 
the enforcement of confiscation orders, supporting the 2013 Serious and Organised Crime 
Strategy.322  It saw POCA 2002 as transformational as prior to the Act about £25 million 
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was recovered in criminal assets, and at the time of writing the figure had risen to over 
£150 million a year.323  By the time the CPS Strategy was published, the NAO had 
published its first report on confiscation orders which is examined in the next section. The 
Strategy acknowledged the finding in the NAO Report that agencies need to work together 
to achieve an improvement in asset recovery and saw it as essential to ensuring its 
success324 along with the need for a strategy to deal with the appointment of receivers.325 
It is also explained that there is a Service Level agreement with HMCTS and as part of 
that when the CPS cannot add anything to the enforcement of a confiscation order, it will 
hand the lead of that enforcement back to HMCTS,326 which is the experience of the 
research author. 
2.6 2011-2016 NAO and PAC reports 
The National Audit Office (NAO) report on Confiscation Orders was printed on 17th 
December 2013.327  It is particularly significant because it triggered the Public Accounts 
Committee and Home Affairs Committee reports and it focused debate on the 
enforcement of confiscation orders and triggered a further debate about how success 
should be measured.  The National Audit Office Reports and the subsequent Public 
Accounts Committee Reports, along with the Government Responses have been 
considered together.  
The reports in this section all started from the position that confiscation orders are the 
main way the government has of depriving defendants of the proceeds of their crime.328  
The role of the NAO includes scrutinising public spending and reporting on whether 
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departments and bodies funded by them have used resources ‘efficiently, effectively, and 
with economy.’329  In the introduction to the 2013 report, the NAO states that:  
Our vision is to help the nation spend wisely.  Our public audit perspective helps 
Parliament hold government to account and improve public services.330   
This gives an indication into the approach taken in the report which concentrated on 
POCA 2002.  It assessed whether confiscation orders present value for money, and 
considered the attrition rate. Interviewees included members of HMCTS and the judiciary 
and visits were made to HMCTS offices which deal with the administration of confiscation 
orders and so was able to report on the issues which are experienced.331 It concluded that 
the amounts confiscated were small and amongst other things considered the 
enforcement of orders to discover why.332   
It considered issues and made recommendations outside the scope of this thesis, for 
example whether more confiscation orders can and should be made but made findings 
relevant to this research.  It lamented the lack of data on the regime which means there is 
no information about what is collectable, or performance data,333 nor did it find any agreed 
success measures.334 The Report identified a weakness in that HMCTS reports all 
impositions, receipts and debts in its annual trust statement which means that ‘only HM 
Courts & Tribunals Service is being held accountable for all enforcement activity’335 even 
though it has no direct responsibility for the other agencies. Although it reported that 
HMCTS successfully collects 90 per cent of its orders under £1,000.336  
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The report was critical of the confiscation regime and the enforcement of orders and has 
been described as ‘scathing’.337 Its criticisms included the lack of use of restraint orders 
noting that there is a link between early action, for example, using a restraint order and 
successful enforcement which was not being used effectively338 and it reviewed the use of 
receivers.339  It concluded that the main sanctions available to the magistrates’ court, 
namely default sentences and interest, do not work.340 and considered some of the other 
powers of enforcement available to the magistrates’ court under both POCA 2002 and the 
pre-POCA 2002 legislation mentioning payment orders, treaties to seize overseas assets, 
and taking money from the defendant’s income or benefits and charging orders.341 In fact 
the NAO recommended that other sanctions should be introduced to improve the 
enforcement of confiscation orders, again specifically mentioning charging orders.342  The 
Report was written after the 2013 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy and welcomed 
the impetus on improving enforcement noting that the Home Office were going to make 
changes to POCA 2002.343   
The NAO Report concluded that the confiscation process was not working well enough344 
but this conclusion was based on a value for money test.  It has been credited with 
restarting the focus on the enforcement of confiscation orders,345 but this chapter shows 
that it had already begun with the 2013 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy.  What can 
be seen is a clear line from the NAO Report to many of the later reports considered in this 
chapter, although not all of them analyse the powers of the magistrates’ court.  It also 
supports the recommendations in this thesis that whilst early action is important 
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alternatives to restraint can be considered including charging orders.346  However, the 
focus on value for money has been controversial. 
As can be expected the NAO reports include a large amount of information which has 
been relied upon in other reports including two Public Accounts Committee (PAC) Reports 
on Confiscation, one in 2014 (‘The PAC Report’)347 followed by a progress report in 2016 
(‘PAC Progress Report’).348 However there were two PAC Reports on the Ministry of 
Justice Financial Management worthy of mention which pre-dated the NAO Report, one in 
2011349 and the other in 2012350 which covered all financial management but also included 
a review of the collection of financial penalties including confiscation orders.   
The enforcement of confiscation orders was not the focus of the earlier reports, but there 
were criticisms of the collection rates of confiscation orders.  In 2011 the PAC heard that 
HMC(T)S was only responsible for 16% or £150 million of the £2 billion of outstanding 
confiscation orders and their collection rate was around 60% compared to around 40% for 
other agencies.351  The PAC thought this could be attributed to the fact that the Service 
was responsible for lower value confiscation orders which were easier to collect, defined 
as up to £50,000.352  It concluded that agencies should work together more closely to 
improve performance.353 In 2012, the Committee concluded that there had been a 
‘dramatic increase’ in the amount of confiscation orders outstanding and again identified a 
need for agencies to work together at a high level to address that354 but it also heard 
evidence from the then chief executive of HMC(T)S that it was the most successful 
agency in the collection of confiscation orders, although he claimed that HMCTS has the 
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easy end of the business.355 It is the experience of the research author that the orders 
managed are not always easy and HMCTS have to manage all types of orders, not just 
low value ones, and as this research will show the use of fines based powers adds a 
complexity to the system which should be addressed.  However, it is the 2014 and 2016 
Confiscation reports which have been analysed in detail in this thesis. 
The Committee of Public Accounts is appointed by the House of Commons to examine: 
the accounts showing the appropriation of the sums granted to Parliament to meet 
the public expenditure, and of such other accounts laid before Parliament as the 
Committee may think fit (Standing Order No 148).356 
It scrutinises value for money but does not look at why public money has been spent or 
the merits of government policy.357 The 2013 PAC Report considered the effectiveness of 
POCA 2002 and its conclusions echo those of the NAO Report that weaknesses hamper 
its effectiveness.  This is not surprising as it relied on the data produced by the NAO and 
they are both concerned with value for money.  On the basis of the NAO report it heard 
evidence from witnesses from the criminal justice agencies including the then Chief 
Executive of HMCTS, Peter Handcock.   
The PAC was critical of the enforcement of confiscation orders which led to headlines 
such as ‘Criminals choosing jail rather than pay confiscation orders’358 and ‘Criminals 
profiting due to confiscation ‘shambles’, say MPs’.359 In particular the PAC stated that 
bodies responsible for confiscation work in silos and identified a lack of clarity in stated 
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objectives and success measures.360  It also noted the reduction in the use of restraint 
orders361 and that the government was planning to strengthen the default terms for non-
payment of confiscation orders.362  
It made a number of recommendations relevant to this thesis which were considered in 
the Government Response.363  The government agreed with the conclusion and 
recommendation that ‘Not enough is being done to enforce confiscation orders once they 
have been made, especially in relation to higher value cases’ and that agencies should 
work together to do more to use restraint orders more quickly and report on the 
enforcement of priority orders.364  It also agreed with the conclusion that ‘The bodies 
involved with confiscation orders do not have the information they need to manage the 
system effectively’.  It explained that the CPS was working on bespoke performance 
measures and was considering a cost analysis of some cases, and set a target to improve 
JARD.365  Finally, the government agreed that ‘The sanctions imposed on offenders for 
failing to pay confiscation orders do not work’ and undertook to strengthen the maximum 
default term for non-payment of a confiscation order as outlined in the 2013 Serious and 
Organised Crime Strategy.366 
There were updates from both the NAO and the PAC in 2016.  The NAO Progress 
Report367 helpfully compared the recommendations of its earlier report with the 
recommendations in the PAC Report and assessed whether they had been achieved.368 
The NAO did this by comparing data in its earlier report, conducting interviews, and 
assessing information held on JARD and the performance reports of agencies.  It also 
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reviewed the enforcement action on the top 10 priority orders and considered information 
in HMCTS Trust statements.369   
The evaluation of progress in the report was mixed, on the one hand the report showed 
improvements, but on the other it did not find that the regime had been ‘transformed’ as 
expected by the PAC,370 although the PAC did not use that word. It found that the early 
action, by which it meant the use of restraint was still lacking371 and that although the 
criminal justice agencies had made progress in most of the recommendations made by 
the PAC, it had met only one of them fully, namely to strengthen the sanctions for non-
payment of a confiscation order.372 It concluded more could be done to enforce orders.373 
A positive finding was the increase in collection rates from 41% in September 2013 to 
45% across all orders and a continuation of the increase in collection amounts year on 
year.374  The amount outstanding had also increased, however this was due to the accrual 
of interest.375 The improvements in enforcement included better co-operation376 and the 
identification of priority orders.377  When considering the changes in the SCA 2015, it 
found it was too soon to assess the impact of those changes378 although it reported that 
the decline in the number of restraint orders made had started to reverse which could 
possibly be attributed to the changes in the SCA 2015.379 When discussing the new power 
for the Crown Court to make determinations of benefit which are binding on third parties, 
the Report suggested that further legislative changes could be considered to ‘redress the 
balance in favour of the authorities’.380  The recommendations for legislative changes in 
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this thesis seek to do that in all cases where the asset is cash in a bank account or a 
house, not just where third parties are involved.   
The PAC Progress Report discussed the NAO Progress Report which it noted was ‘of 
interest’ to it because of its own report on confiscation orders, and because the Home 
Affairs Committee had at that stage an open inquiry on criminal assets.381 The PAC relied 
on the content of the NAO progress report although it came to its own conclusions.382  It 
took evidence from the Home Office, the CPS and the police,383 but not HMCTS, and was 
disappointed that more had not been done but acknowledged the complexities of the 
system.384 
It considered the six recommendations made by the PAC in 2014 which the Home Office 
had committed to implement by the end of 2015385 including improving restraint orders in 
high value cases, producing better performance information and strengthening the 
confiscation order sanctions regime.  The Committee did not accept that 5 out of the 6 
recommendations made by the PAC in its report in 2014 had been achieved.386  However, 
it acknowledged that improvements had been made and took written evidence from the 
Home Office that the amounts collected had increased from £133 million in 2012-13 to 
£175 million in 2015-16.  The amounts outstanding had also increased,387 and the 
Committee concluded that more could be done especially in relation to high value 
orders.388  This report discussed the purpose of the confiscation regime and the fact that 
there was a concentration on amounts collected rather than the disruptive effects of 
confiscation.389  
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The parts of the Government Response relevant to this thesis agreed with the PAC 
recommendations that there is a need to agree the objectives for confiscation orders and 
what constitutes success, and to develop a measure for the disruptive effect of 
confiscation.390  The government also agreed to publish statistics on the collection rates, 
what cannot be collected and what is being done to improve collection rates.391  As a 
result of this recommendation, the Home Office published statistics in 2017 and 2018.392  
The NAO and PAC Reports along with the Government Responses demonstrate the 
important need to improve the collection and enforcement of confiscation orders, and the 
fact that changes were being made.  The first NAO report focused very much on value for 
money, but by the PAC progress report there was already a consideration of disruption as 
an alternative measure of success.  These themes were picked up by the two other review 
documents published in 2016.  
2.7 2016: Wood’s Reports and Home Affairs Committee Report 
2.7.1 Wood’s Reports 
Wood authored two reports which were published in 2016,393 both of which concentrated 
on the enforcement of confiscation orders. Her reports were published prior to the 
progress reports by the NAO and PAC but she described the NAO Report of 2013 as 
‘scathing’ of the confiscation regime as a whole including the enforcement of orders.394   
In both of her reports Wood criticised the emphasis on ‘value for money’ as a success 
factor and she wanted to put a ‘counter-view’ to the ‘value for money’ focus of the NAO 
report.395  In Enforcing Criminal Confiscation Orders she thought that it could be argued 
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that this is an unfair measurement and that a better test would be the impact on the 
criminal economy and the perceptions of society given the fact that confiscation orders are 
a criminal justice process.  In particular Wood felt that the focus of the NAO report was 
limited and failed to highlight the disruptive effect of a confiscation order even if the ability 
to collect was limited, citing the ability of the court to impose a default sentence, and that 
the NAO report did not explain the difficulties for collection because of the nuanced and 
complex law.396  
Similarly, in The Big Payback, Wood felt that the NAO and some media could be criticised 
for concentrating on ‘value for money’ and argued that it is an unfair measure of success 
as it is a criminal justice system and is not commercial.397  She also raised concerns about 
the headline figure of £1.6 billion being the amount of confiscation orders outstanding 
when only £203 million of that could realistically be collected.398 
Some of Wood’s research is of direct relevance to this thesis.  In Enforcing Criminal 
Confiscation Orders the aims and scope of the report were to explain the legislation and 
the extent to which it can explain the high level of uncollected orders.  This was done by 
reviewing the legislation and literature, considering the statistics available and interviewing 
current and former practitioners.399  The report reviewed the history of the legislation 
including the imposition of confiscation orders and Wood concentrated on the criminal 
confiscation order regime because of the ‘lack of balanced debate in the field’.400  She 
specifically considered whether it is the law rather than the administration causing ‘the 
large value of uncollected orders’ and to what extent do ‘real assets’ exist to be used to 
satisfy the orders.401  Although a high proportion of outstanding confiscation orders were 
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attributed to the unintended consequences of the law, Wood concluded that this did not 
alone account for the total amount of uncollected orders.402 
In The Big Payback, she examined the changes to POCA 2002 made in the SCA 2015, 
and then analysed some of the ‘systemic enforcement developments’ to assess whether 
the changes impact on the enforcement process and to evaluate the ‘utility and durability’ 
of the changes, building on the analysis in Enforcing Criminal Confiscation Orders.403  The 
Big Payback was based on around twenty-five semi-structured interviews with current and 
former practitioners and found that in considering the drafting of the POCA 2002 the 
practicalities of enforcing confiscation orders based on the assumptions in the Act were ‘at 
best, an afterthought’.404  However, Wood concluded that the government had done more 
with the recent changes to POCA 2002 than any previous government to ensure that the 
enforcement of confiscation orders is given the priority needed but that those changes 
should be seen as the start and not an end405 and made recommendations for further 
research.406 
In addition, Wood reviewed domestic co-ordination highlighting the importance of 
agencies working together and repeated a phrase used in other review documents when 
calling for a need for a ‘cradle-to-grave’ approach to confiscation, meaning from 
investigation to enforcement which had been lacking.407  She identified improvements 
made in this area domestically and internationally408 but it is argued that more remains to 
be done.   
Although there are similarities with this thesis, Wood’s focus was different, and it only 
covered the impact of POCA 2002.  However, it covers some of the same ground and 
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provides useful information for this research including  restraint,409 receivers,410 and the 
changes made by the SCA 2015.411  Despite her criticisms of the NAO report, she did 
recognise that the report had led to a renewed focus on the enforcement of confiscation 
orders,412 although the government policy which led to the changes in the SCA 2015 were 
published in the 2013 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy.  This shows that the 
government had already made plans to try to improve the enforcement of confiscation 
orders before the spotlight placed on it in the NAO Report of 2013. 
One particular question posed by Wood’s balanced review of the enforcement process 
was if prosecutors and Financial Investigators cannot trace and enforce assets ‘what 
chance do HMCTS have with their more limited powers?’413 This thesis seeks to make 
recommendations which would give HMCTS more of a chance to enforce these court 
orders. 
2.7.2 Home Affairs Committee Report 2016 
The most recent HAC report analysed in detail in this research is the HAC 2016 Report414  
and it examined government policy on POCA 2002 including the changes brought in by 
the SCA 2015.  
The HAC undertook its inquiry because of concerns about the implementation of proceeds 
of crime provisions initially raised in the NAO report.  Also because of what it saw as a 
lack of progress since then given the fact that the NAO and PAC recommendations had 
been accepted by the government and their implementation had been promised by 2015.  
The HAC accepted the NAO Progress Report conclusion that five out of the six 
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recommendations had not been met and many of the fundamental weaknesses in the 
confiscation system remain.415 
The HAC announced its inquiry on 21 January 2016416 and invited written representations 
on a number of areas. Those relevant to this research are:  
• Whether additional measures are required to achieve the objective that criminals do 
not benefit from their crimes.  
• The steps needed to improve the performance of agencies.  
• What measures are needed to address the lack of awareness of confiscation orders 
and the associated enforcement process.  
• How to address weaknesses in IT systems and data-sharing which hampers 
effectiveness.  
• How to strengthen co-ordination across the agencies including whether one agency 
should be given lead responsibility.  
• How to increase accountability and make performance measures more meaningful.  
• Whether further steps including strengthening the sanctions available are needed to 
improve low collection rates.  
• Whether the complexity of the system has implications for the effectiveness of the 
system and what benefits an increased body of case law may bring.417 
 
The HAC published 22 written submissions and heard oral evidence on three different 
dates.418 Wood provided written evidence which summarised her reports analysed in this 
chapter.419  She also gave oral evidence and the HAC relied on her information to back up 
 
415 ibid 6.  
416 Home Affairs Committee, ‘Proceeds of Crime Inquiry Launched’.  
<http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/home-
affairs-committee/news-parliament-2015/160119-proceeds-of-crime/> accessed 16 August 2016. 
417 HAC 2016 Report (n 26) 7. 
418 ibid 7. 





its premise that confiscation orders are ineffective.420  Amongst others, written evidence 
was received from the MOJ and HMCTS.421  
The Committee reviewed the NAO and PAC reports considered earlier in this chapter and 
quoted the statistics used there. It quoted from the NAO progress report in 2016 that in 
2014-2015 1,203 restraint orders were used, the overall enforcement rate was 45% with 
96% of orders up to £1000 enforced and 22% of orders over £1 million enforced. It also 
quoted figures that £1.61 billion was outstanding in September 2015, up from £1.46 billion 
in September 2013422 and that interest made up nearly 30% of the outstanding debt at 
£470 million.423 
The Committee received evidence on a number of areas.  These included the view that 
action should be taken to protect assets from being hidden and accepted that there was 
often a concentration on getting a conviction rather than recovering the proceeds of 
crime.424  In addition it heard that early restraint and seizure should be adopted rather than 
it being an afterthought.425  A further recommendation was made that a performance 
measure should be whether assets are frozen and ready to be recovered as soon as a 
confiscation order is made.426 
The Committee considered the purpose of the regime in detail, considering that the 
measure of success should include both collection rates and disruption.427 Echoing the 
concerns that the PAC and Wood had considered, the HAC concluded that the 
outstanding debt figure of £1.61 billion is largely artificial and that using uncollectable 
 
<http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/home-
affairs-committee/proceeds-of-crime/written/28764.html> accessed 16 August 2016. 
420 ibid 5-6. 
421 MOJ and HMCTS Written Evidence to the HAC 2016 (n 25). 
422 HAC 2016 Report (n 26). 
423 ibid 3. The figures were taken from the Serious Fraud Office, Written Evidence to Home Affairs 
Committee, Proceeds of Crime (HC 2016-2017, 25) 
<http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/home-
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amounts and interest could be ‘unhelpful’ and recommended that collection rates should 
be reported as ‘collectable’ and uncollectable’ debts.428  However, the report made it clear 
that this is not a recommendation to ‘wipe the slate clean’ as judges have determined that 
the money is owed and should not be written off, and criminals will accrue interest on their 
‘debt to society’ ensuring that crime doesn’t pay, but the Committee wanted authorities to 
concentrate on debt that can be collected.429  The Committee made recommendations for 
improving the enforcement of confiscation orders including a greater co-ordination 
between criminal justice agencies430 and, like the PAC Progress Report, recommended 
that the Home Office should publish annual statistics on the wider performance.431   
The Government Response to the HAC 2016 Report agreed that assets should be frozen 
as early as possible where it is operationally appropriate to do so.432  It also agreed that 
more could be done but outlined the changes it had made to improve the regime with the 
SCA 2015 and the Criminal Finances Bill433 which it felt would meet the HAC’s 
recommendations to improve the use of restraint.434 It also felt that it had made changes 
to ensure that criminal justice agencies work together more effectively.435  
The government felt that the fines based provisions of the MCA 1980 gave the 
magistrates’ court sufficient powers to enforce confiscation orders and that the increased 
default terms brought into force by the SCA 2015 were designed to act as an incentive to 
payment of the order.436  It welcomed the finding that the figure for uncollected 
confiscation orders is ‘largely artificial’ and undertook to publish annual asset recovery 
statistics437 which it began in 2017.  Since the government response the fines based 
 
428 ibid 30. 
429 ibid 30-31. 
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432 Home Affairs Committee, Proceeds of Crime: Government Response to the Committee’s Fifth 
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powers have come under the scrutiny of the Supreme Court which held that the activation 
of the default term does not apply to accrued interest and if that is the intention then the 
legislation should be changed.438  The Court also identified that the application of these 
powers to the enforcement of confiscation orders is complex.439 It is suggested therefore 
that there is now a reason for the powers to be reviewed.   
2.8 2016 and beyond 
The 2013 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy continues to be of relevance to later 
review documents.  Further changes to POCA 2002 were introduced in 2017 by the 
Criminal Finances Act, and the policy background for that along with approval for the SCA 
2015 changes were contained in the Action Plan for anti-money laundering and counter 
terrorist finance.440   The 2017 Drugs Strategy441 also reflected on the SCA 2015 and the 
fact that it met the commitments in the 2013 Strategy.  It saw the changes to POCA 2002 
strengthening the powers available as helpful to money laundering offences442 but the 
changes apply to all confiscation orders.  These strategies have not been reviewed in any 
more detail as their scope fall outside the focus of this thesis, but they show the 
importance of the 2013 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy to the development of the 
legislation and provide more evidence of the importance of the confiscation regime to the 
government.  
The National Crime Agency (NCA) strategy followed in 2018 which marked its progress 
from the 2013 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy.443  The NCA is a non-governmental 
department but its Director General is accountable to the Home Secretary and therefore to 
Parliament.444  Its strategic priorities are related to organised and serious crime including 
 
438 Gibson (n 12) [23]. 
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440Action Plan for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist finance (Home Office and HM 
Treasury 2016). 
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its disruption.445  Unlike other strategies reviewed in this thesis, its plans are not 
concerned with confiscation or asset recovery directly, however any strategy which 
impacts on confiscation is relevant not just to those orders imposed for serious and 
organised crime offences but to all orders.  This research shows that there is a move 
away from the collection of confiscation orders as a measure of success and a need to 
measure disruption.446  A menu of tactics447 designed to support the NCA’s disruption 
strategy shows how disruption could be measured and supports the recommendations 
made in this thesis.   
The menu of tactics was praised in the 2018 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy,448 
not specifically in relation to asset recovery, but more generally as a tool to prevent and 
disrupt serious and organised crime.  The Strategy outlined aims to measure success, 
using methods to include the numbers and impacts of disruptions and assets seized from 
serious and organised criminals.449 The 2018 Strategy measured its progress from the 
2013 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy450 and maintained the ‘4Ps’ as a delivery 
framework, namely  Pursue, Prepare, Protect and Prevent.451  As in the 2013 Strategy it is 
the Pursue category which is relevant to this thesis, with asset recovery seen as a tool to 
disrupt and prevent further illegal activity. It reported improvements since the 2013 
strategy including the creation of teams which allow agencies to work together more 
effectively and improve enforcement,452 and the SCA 2015 changes with its emphasis on 
the enforcement of confiscation orders, providing further powers for the courts.453 It 
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446 in chapter 3, text to n 567. 
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promised an action plan on asset recovery which would support the Law Commission’s 
work to identify reforms to improve the confiscation regime.454 
Some of the later reviews in this chapter have relied on HMCTS Trust Statement statistics 
when reporting the amount of confiscation orders collected or outstanding.455 HMCTS has 
been producing Trust Statements since 2011456 and they account for the imposition and 
collection of financial penalties imposed by the judiciary and the police.457 The Statements 
provide background information on the collection of confiscation orders, including the 
amounts that can be seen as recoverable. They also identify that trying to seize and 
liquidate assets including houses is a lengthy and costly process which means it can take 
a long time to collect the debt.458   
There are challenges when using statistics to assess the success of the enforcement of 
confiscation orders459 and this thesis does not seek to rely on a particular set of statistics 
to support its recommendations, however the Trust Statements have been relied upon for 
information. Figures have been included in Appendix 1, and the 2017-18 Statement shows 
that as at 31 March 2018 the total debt estimated to be recoverable was £644 million 
compared with £556 million in 2016-17. In the period 2017-18 orders amounting to £195 
million were made, £14.7 million of which was for orders less than £25,000.  Of those 
lower value orders £10.3 million was collected, a rate of 70%.460  
 
 
454 Ibid 30. 
455 For example, the NAO Progress Report compared the Trust Statement figures between 2012-
2013 and 2014-2015, NAO Progress Report (n 367) 43. Wood’s research uses figures from the 
2014-2015 Trust Statement, Wood, Enforcing Criminal Confiscation Orders (n 2); Wood, The Big 
Payback (n 5). 
456 Trust statements have been produced annually since the first statement, Her Majesty’s Courts 
Service, Her Majesty’s Courts Service Trust Statement 2010-2011 (HC 1705, 2011) 3. 
457 HMCTS Trust Statement 2017-18 (n 23) 5.  
458 ibid 12-13. 
459 Text to n 592-n 599 in chapter 3. 
460 HMCTS Trust Statement 2017-18 (n 23) 12.  The high value outstanding was linked to the 
nature of the debt including the fact that orders are made in hidden assets cases, and the fact 
that interest accrues until the order is paid in full, ibid 13.  
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2.9 Conclusions of chapter 
This thesis considers the issues and analyses the information in the review documents 
since the PIU Report which led to POCA 2002, and before. It therefore takes a different 
starting point to the research which has only concentrated on POCA 2002, or the pre-
POCA 2002 legislation and complements the analysis of the legislation and case law in 
later chapters.  The review documents show the importance of confiscation orders, and 
their success, to government strategies and the policy that crime should not pay.  They 
also show that there have been issues with the enforcement of orders since the DTOA 
1986 was introduced, some of which still exist.   
The magistrates’ court has particular issues when enforcing orders because of the 
piecemeal development of the legislation and the particular characteristics of the 
confiscation order.  There are the added complications of interest and the fact that the 
default term does not wipe out the debt.  However, the limited powers of the magistrates’ 
court have received little detailed attention between the Working Group Reports and 
Wood’s reports and there have been few calls for their improvement. 
A lack of use of restraint has been identified as a particular concern and the issues will be 
analysed further in chapter 4.  Reviews have identified the lack of the use of charging 
orders by the magistrates’ court as a particular problem, although the Working Group 
Reports explain why it is difficult for them to be used in practice.  
Wider issues about the nature of confiscation orders, and the difficulties with identifying 
success criteria and the collation of statistics, also have their part to play.  The review 
documents also show a move away from collection rates as a sole sign of success and 
the consideration of the disruptive effect the confiscation regime can have as a success 
factor.461 All of these issues are analysed in this thesis. 
 
461 HAC 2016 Report (n 26) 26-27. 
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By analysing the pre-POCA 2002 review documents, this thesis shows that initially 
addressing issues experienced by magistrates’ courts and justices’ clerks using the fines 
based powers were seen as important.  Later review documents have identified the need 
for the enforcement of confiscation orders to improve but have concentrated on the use of 
restraint orders.  The documents show an agreement amongst the criminal justice 
agencies, researchers and the government that there should be an increase in the use of 
restraint orders to ensure that assets cannot be dissipated.   
The themes and issues will now be analysed in more detail.  The main recommendations 
in this thesis are for changes so that the Crown Court can make charging orders and 
payment orders as an alternative to restraint. It will be shown that the changes can 
achieve the same aims as restraint, but in a more proportionate, less draconian and less 
costly way.  The recommendations have the advantage of fitting in with government policy 
including the aim of POCA 2002 to create a one stop shop in relation to confiscation, and 
address the need for an approach which goes from the cradle to the grave to make 
confiscation order enforcement more effective462 and ‘redress the balance in favour of the 
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Chapter 3 The development of the regime  
3.1 Introduction 
The criminal process of confiscation has been described as ‘cumbersome’464 and 
‘complex’465 and this thesis will show that these descriptions also apply to the enforcement 
of confiscation orders by the magistrates’ court.  In part this is because the changes to the 
regime mean that the magistrates’ court is enforcing orders made under different 
legislative provisions with different enforcement powers.   
The judiciary has been called upon to consider the nature of a confiscation order including 
the policy behind the regime, particularly in the leading case of May where in an endnote 
the Committee recognised the complexity and difficulties in the confiscation order regime 
and concluded by:  
drawing attention to the current importance of the power to make confiscation 
orders. In the period April 2007 - February 2008 the courts in England and Wales 
made 4504 such orders in sums totalling £225.87 million. In recent years the 
number of orders and the sums confiscated have steadily risen.466 
They have had to consider the development of the law when making decisions467 and it is 
key to understanding the issues which impact on the magistrates’ court.  It is necessary, 
therefore, to consider the nature and development of the regime when analysing the 
 
464 Colin King, ‘Civil Forfeiture and Article 6 of the ECHR: due process implications for England & 
Wales and Ireland’ (2014) 34(3) Legal Studies 371, 373. 
465 Peter Alldridge, ‘The Limits of Confiscation’ [2011] (11) Crim LR 827, 829. Apart from the Joint 
Thematic Review which considered that the main principles of confiscation and restraint are not 
complicated (n 2) 8, the other review documents considered them to be complex and this was 
one of the reasons for the introduction of POCA 2002, PIU Report (n 117) 7. The Home Secretary 
Jack Straw described the draft Bill as ‘large, complex and innovative’ in Proceeds of Crime Bill: 
Publication of Draft Clauses (n 31) foreword by Home Secretary.     
466 May (n 79) [48]. 
467 See for example the leading cases of May ibid [7]-[9] and Waya (n 125) [3]-[4]. 
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effectiveness of the current enforcement provisions and also to assess whether 
improvements can be made. 
3.2 The nature of the regime 
A confiscation order is enforced as a fine but is very different in nature.  This section 
begins to examine the nature of confiscation orders and how this has caused issues with 
their enforcement including difficulties with assessing the success of the regime. 
3.2.1 Misnomer 
A confiscation order is a financial order made by the Crown Court even though assets are 
often identified as part of the confiscation order process.  The Hodgson Committee found 
that there was no accepted terminology for the type of ancillary orders they were looking 
at, so they used the terms 'forfeiture', 'compensation', 'restitution' and 'confiscation'.468  
The Committee defined confiscation in a way to differentiate it from forfeiture.469   
As a confiscation order is an order to pay a sum of money, not property470 it is an order in 
personam and not in rem, ‘the defendant is at liberty to decide to which of his assets he 
shall resort to effect payment’.471 The order has understandably been described as a 
misnomer by the judiciary472 and commentators.473   
 
468 Hodgson Report (n 123) 4-5. 
469 ibid 5.  The Report defined 'forfeiture' as ‘the power of the Court to take property that is 
immediately connected to the offence’ highlighting the fact that there were many specific powers 
of forfeiture throughout the law and noting that it was such a power that was attempted 
unsuccessfully in the Operation Julie case, as Cuthbertson was known (text to n 602); and 
'confiscation' as ‘the depriving of an offender of the proceeds or the profits of crime' again noting 
the courts inability to order confiscation in the Operation Julie case.  
470 Home Office Guide (n 4) 5. 
471 Talbot and Hinton (n 3) 515. 
472 For example, a confiscation order was described as a misnomer in Re Norris (n 3) [12]. May (n 
79) [9]; Waya (n 125) [2]. 
473 See for example Deepak Singh, ‘CRIMINAL LAW- Wages of sin…the Proceeds of Crime Act, 
designed by the home secretary to ‘send shock waves through the criminal community’ [1995] 
(42) LS Gaz 92.  Talbot and Hinton explain that ‘despite the nomenclature “confiscation order”, 
nothing is confiscated per se’ Talbot and Hinton (n 3) 515. As does Martin Hinton, ‘Enforcing 
Confiscation Orders: An Advice to Justices’ Clerks’ (1992) 156 JPN 259, 259. 
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In his article on the enforcement of confiscation orders in the magistrates’ court, Brunning 
starts by saying ‘Purists will think the title of this article is a misnomer. Confiscation orders 
represent assets already available to a defendant at the time of his conviction. They are 
not designed to be enforced but merely collected.’474  The fact that the defendant’s assets 
are not seized by the State at imposition is an issue which changes to the restraint order 
regime have not solved475 and continues to be a problem for the magistrates’ court when 
enforcing confiscation orders.  
3.2.2 The draconian nature of the legislation 
Another theme has been the description of the regime as draconian. The draconian nature 
of the legislation has been taken into account by the judiciary in deciding the interpretation 
of the statues and is relevant to the analysis of the issues in this research, and the 
recommendations for changes made. 
The adjective Draconian476 is defined as ‘of pertaining to, or characteristic of…the severe 
code of laws said to have been established by [Draco]; rigorous, harsh, severe, cruel.’477  
When the Drug Trafficking Offences Bill478 (which later became the DTOA 1986) was 
debated, some Members of the Houses of Parliament were reluctant to enact the 
legislation which was viewed as draconian.   
In the debate in the House of Commons on the Bill, Mr Corbett stated that drug trafficking 
‘demands draconian action’,479 but as the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, Mr David Mellor stated, the government decided against the American 
 
474 PD Brunning, ‘The Enforcement of Confiscation Orders in the Magistrates’ Court’ (1997) 161 
JPN 430, 430. 
475 As there are issues which prevent the use of restraint orders even where the order would be 
suitable.  
476 It is formed from the adjective draconic and the suffix ian ‘Draconian, adj’ (OED Online, OUP 
December 2018) <www.oed.com/view/Entry/57378> accessed 29 December 2018. 
477 ’Draconic, adj’ (OED Online, OUP December 2018) <www.oed.com/view/Entry/57379> 
accessed 29 December 2018. 
478 Drug Trafficking Offences HC Bill (1985-86) [54]. 
479 HC Deb 21 January 1986, vol 90, col 246. 
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system of civil proceedings because it was draconian and did not fit into the British 
system.480  
During the debate in the House of Lords on the Bill, Lord Hooson described the powers of 
the Bill as ‘draconian’.481 However, Lord Denning said ‘’I would not call [the Bill] draconian: 
I do not like that word at all.  I would like to call it a strong and determined effort to deal 
with one of the biggest menaces to our society in our time’’482 Despite the comments of 
Lord Denning it is generally agreed that the confiscation regime is draconian,483 a view 
confirmed by commentators.484  The Joint Committee on the Draft Modern Slavery Bill 
described the confiscation provisions of POCA 2002 as ‘draconian’485 and Wood 
acknowledged the draconian nature of the regime in her review of the enforcement of 
confiscation orders.486 
This nature of the legislation has not just been taken into account on imposition, but also 
when interpreting the law after a confiscation order has been made.   Therefore, it has 
been accepted that confiscation orders and the measures to enforce them are 
draconian487 but the court has to keep a sense of justice and proportion when 
administering the scheme to ensure that the defendant is not punished for a second 
time.488 
When deciding the interpretation of interest on the period to be served in default for non-
payment, judiciary found it ‘convenient to recall’ that the legislation is draconian489 and 
judges must take into account the draconian consequences of the order when exercising 
 
480 HC Deb 21 January 1986, vol 90, col 278.  
481 HL Deb 04 March 1986, vol 472, col 109.   
482 HL Deb 04 March 1986, vol 472, cols 111-112. 
483 Alldridge, ‘The Limits of Confiscation’ (n 465) 829. 
484 For example, Bullock and Lister who discuss the draconian nature of the regime, Bullock and 
Lister (n 33).  
485 Joint Committee on the Draft Modern Slavery Bill, Draft Modern Slavery Bill (2013-14, HL 166, 
HC 1019) 93. 
486 Wood Enforcing Criminal Confiscation Orders (n 2) 7, 14. 
487 Escobar v DPP [2008] EWHC 422 (Admin), [2009] 1 WLR 64. 
488 Glaves v CPS [2011] EWCA Civ 69, [2011] 4 Costs L.R. 556 [56].  
489 R (on the application of Gibson v Secretary of State for Justice [2015] EWCA Civ 1148; [2017] 1 
WLR 1115 [39]. 
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their discretion whether to make a restraint or receivership order.490  It is therefore 
unsurprising that the adjective has been used to describe the legislation concerning 
restraint as draconian.491  
It is the view of this thesis that despite the pejorative connotations of the term draconian, 
the aim of the legislation was to be severe but not excessively so.  There are balances in 
the regime and in practice the judiciary have interpreted the legislation to ensure that it is 
not excessively harsh or severe.  For example, it was noted in Escobar that although the 
enforcement provisions are draconian, the case was not being put on the basis that a 
draconian construction must be imposed where a less draconian construction would meet 
the legislative purpose equally well.492    
Although the judiciary have taken into account the draconian nature of the legislation 
when interpreting the confiscation legislation493 it has also held that the draconian nature 
should not be applied indiscriminately.494 In Waya it was held that the draconian nature 
cannot be used to abandon the traditional rule that a penal statute should be construed 
with ‘some strictness’.495  Care has also been taken to ensure that the regime does not 
violate the defendant’s human rights.  As a result, the statute must be interpreted in a fair, 
purposive way giving effect to the legislative policy.496  Further examples of this balance 
are highlighted in this thesis as they arise, and it is suggested that whilst the regime can 
be harsh, where a recommendation for a change in legislation can be made which is less 
draconian, this should be available to the courts.   
 
490 Windsor v CPS [2011] EWCA Crim 143, [2011] 1 WLR 1519 [59]-[60]. 
491 For example, Stephen Gentle, Cherie Spinks and Tim Harris, ‘Proceeds of Crime 2002: update’ 
[2016] (139) Compliance Officer Bulletin 1, 5. 
492 Escobar (n 487) [22]. 
493 There are many examples but for an instance of each piece of confiscation legislation see 
Dickens (n 124) [11]; R v Tivnan [1998] EWCA Crim 1370, (1999) 1 Cr App R (S) 92; R v David 
Cadman Smith [2001] UKHL 68, [2002] 1WLR 54 [23]; Agombar v The Queen [2009] EWCA Crim 
903 [6].  
494 Customs and Excise Commissioners v A [2002] EWCA Civ 1039; [2003] 2 WLR 210 [24]. 
495 Waya (n 125) [8]. 
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3.2.3 Compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
The application of the ECHR is one of the balances in the confiscation regime and 
although there have been some challenges, in the main the regime has been held to be 
compatible with Convention rights.  Even when a confiscation order was found to be a 
retrospective penalty for the purposes of article 7 the decision did not call into question the 
overall legitimacy of the regime.497 
The two rights key to this research are article 6(1) and Article 1 of the First Protocol 
(A1P1). Article 6 has been identified as one of the most litigated articles of ECHR,498 it is 
also one of the articles challenged the most in relation to the enforcement of confiscation 
orders.  Article 6 reads: 
1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal 
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a 
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by 
law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may 
be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public 
order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of 
juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to 
 
497 In Welch v United Kingdom [1995] ECHR 4 the applicant complained that the confiscation order 
made under the DTOA 1986 was a retrospective penalty. There was no disagreement about the 
retrospective nature of the order, the court had to decide whether a confiscation order is a 
penalty.  The court held unanimously that it was a penalty for the purposes of article 7(1) taking 
into account elements of the order indicative of a penalty even if they are necessary to the 
confiscation order.  The elements taken into account were the sweeping statutory assumptions in 
the Act, the fact that the confiscation order was directed to the proceeds involved in drug dealing 
and was not limited to actual enrichment or profit,  the discretion of the trial judge in fixing the 
amount of the order to take into account the culpability of the accused, and the possibility of 
imprisonment in lieu of payment by the offender.  However, the court stressed that it was only 
considering the retrospective nature of the regime and that it did not call into question ‘in any 
respect’ the power to make a confiscation order as a weapon in the fight against the scourge of 
drug trafficking. 
498 David Perry and Victoria Ailes, ‘Proceeds of Crime and the European Convention on Human 
rights’ [2010] (4) Proceeds of Crime Review: The Journal of Asset Forfeiture and Money 
Laundering 4, 4. 
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the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special 
circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.  
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent 
until proved guilty according to law.  
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum 
rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands 
and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to 
have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to 
defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing 
or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it 
free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have 
examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and 
examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as 
witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he 
cannot understand or speak the language used in court. 
Bell suggested that it might be supposed that the primary provision affecting defendants in 
confiscation would be A1P1 rights499 and the right has been shown to be relevant to both 
the imposition and enforcement of confiscation orders, although the case law has often 
considered both A1P1 and article 6.  An interference with the defendant’s A1P1 rights can 
be justified although the interference must be necessary and proportionate.  Article 1 of 
the First Protocol reads:    
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public 
interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general 
principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any 
 
499 Evan Bell, ‘The ECHR and the proceeds of crime legislation’ [2000] (Oct) Crim LR 783, 783.  
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way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to 
control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the 
payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties. 
In Phillips v United Kingdom500 it was held that article 6(2) had no application to 
confiscation proceedings as they were part of the sentencing process and did not in 
themselves amount to a new charge. The purpose of the confiscation procedure is not 
conviction or acquittal, but to properly assess the amount at which the order is to be fixed 
which is analogous to the determination of a fine or length of a custodial sentence.  In 
coming to this decision, the court had regard to three criteria, (i) the classification of the 
proceedings under national law; (ii) the essential nature of those proceedings; and (iii) the 
type and severity of the penalty that the defendant risked incurring.  It also held that article 
6(1) and A1P1 applied but that there had been no violation of the defendant’s article 6(1) 
rights, and that any violation of his rights to enjoy his property was not disproportionate, 
and therefore there was no violation of A1P1.  
R v Rezvi501 and R v Benjafield502 were joint appeals in which the House of Lords held that 
the CJA 1998 and the DTA 1994 were a proportionate response to the need for effective 
but fair power to confiscate the proceeds of crime and comply with article 6(1) and A1P1.  
The main judgment was in Rezvi and the court followed the Scottish decision in Her 
Majesty’s Advocate v McIntosh,503 which was heard before Phillips and followed in that 
case.  In McIntosh it was held that Article 6(2) applied only to persons charged with a 
criminal offence and although if a confiscation order is imposed, a defendant is faced with 
imprisonment in default of a financial penalty, he is not charged with another offence and 
therefore article 6(2) does not apply.  Phillips was also followed in Rezvi and as a result it 
was held that a confiscation order is a financial penalty with a default term attached which 
 
500 [2001] ECHR 437. 
501 [2002] UKHL 1, [2002] 1 ALL ER 801. 
502 [2002] UKHL 2, [2003] 1 AC 1099. 
503 [2001] UKPC D1, [2003] 1 AC 1078.   
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means that the provisions of article 6(2) do not apply and that the interference with a 
defendant’s A1P1 rights is justified.     
The previous decisions on compliance with the ECHR were reviewed in some detail in R v 
Briggs-Price.504  A slightly unusual case, the prosecution sought a confiscation order in 
respect of a specific offence with which the defendant had not been charged.  By a 
majority decision it was held that for the purposes of Article 6(2) a person against whom 
an application for a confiscation order was made was not accused of any offence other 
than the trigger offence of which he had been convicted and therefore Art 6(2) was not 
engaged.  The court also considered the case of Van Offeren v The Netherlands505 in 
which the Strasbourg court again held that article 6(2) did not apply to a confiscation order 
because there was no separate charge.  Lord Mance commented that none of the 
Strasbourg authorities to which the House had been referred on article 6(2) involved a 
Grand Chamber decision and it may be that one day the Grand Chamber will have a look 
at its application in the context of confiscation orders. However, he did not feel that this 
would lead to any revision of the basic principles established by Benjafield, Phillips, Van 
Offeren and Grayson and Barnham.506  
Bell explains that A1P1 gives a wide discretionary power to interfere with property to the 
State507 but also noted that the court must determine whether a fair balance has been 
struck between the demands of the general interest of the community and the need to 
protect an individual’s fundamental rights.508 In Grayson and Barnham v United Kingdom it 
was held following Phillips that once the confiscation order had been made properly under 
Article 6(1) there is no disproportionate violation of the right to peaceful enjoyment of 
 
504 [2009] UKHL 19, [2009] 1 AC 1026. 
505 Application no 19581/04 (ECHR, 5 July 2005). 
506 Briggs-Price (n 504) [135] (Lord Mance). 
507 Bell (n 499) 785. 
508 ibid 783. 
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possessions under A1P1 in making a defendant pay the order.509   However, the 
interference is not unlimited and that there is a proportionality test.510   
It was not until 2012 with the decision in Waya511 that proportionality was read into POCA 
2002 to ensure compliance with the defendant’s A1P1 rights when a confiscation order is 
made, and it was not until the amendments to POCA 2002 brought about by the SCA 
2015 that the principle was enshrined in domestic legislation.512  Waya was followed in 
Ahmad and Ahmed where it was held that proportionality applies to both the imposition 
and the enforcement of confiscation orders and in cases where there is joint benefit it is 
disproportionate and contrary to A1P1 for the State to take the same amount twice in 
relation to the same benefit.513 
Writing in 1999, Stewart noted that there had been very few UK applications to the 
Strasbourg court in relation to a defendant’s A1P1 rights but expected the point to be 
considered in the domestic courts. His article was about UK law generally not specifically 
about confiscation but he described A1P1 rights as the balance between the general 
interests of the community and the protection of the individual’s rights.514  In an article in 
2000 Alexander argued that the confiscation legislation at that time did conflict with the 
ECHR, especially in relation to A1P1 as a confiscation order differed from other types of 
penalty and he expected challenges suggesting that the confiscation provisions should be 
amended.515 However, this article was written before any United Kingdom cases were 
decided at the European Court of Human Rights, and although that author anticipated a 
number of challenges at that Court, the number that have been heard may be not as 
 
509 Grayson and Barnham v United Kingdom [2008] ECHR 877.  
510 Alldridge, Money Laundering Law (n 39) 115. 
511 Waya (n 125). 
512 The SCA 2015 amended POCA 2002, s 6.  
513 Ahmad and Ahmed (n 12).  
514 Nicholas Stewart, ‘Protection of Property Under the Human Rights Act’ (1999) 149(6895) NLJ 
1013, 1013. 
515 Richard Alexander, ‘Do the UK’s Provisions for Confiscation Orders Breach the European 
Convention on Human Rights?’ (2000) 3(4) JMLC 297, 299, 303. 
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many as anticipated and it has been repeatedly held that the legislation is compliant with 
the ECHR.  
However, Stewart was correct that rights have been considered in the domestic courts 
and these have impacted on both the imposition and enforcement of confiscation orders.  
The case law considering the Convention rights at various stages of the enforcement 
process shows that although the provisions are draconian, individual’s rights are 
protected.  As Stewart explains there is a balance between protecting the general 
interests of the community, in this case the imposition and enforcement of confiscation 
orders, and the protection of an individual’s rights whether the individual is a defendant or 
a receiver.     
It is therefore difficult to argue with Alldridge’s view that it is ‘beyond argument’ that there 
is no violation of article 6 or A1P1 to confiscate all receipts of crime516 which has been 
borne out by the case law.  It is also understandable that Lord Steyn described the 
confiscation legislation as being a ‘precise, fair and proportionate response to the 
important need to protect the public’.517 However, the State must act in accordance with 
these rights.  Of particular relevance to this research is the application of A1P1 and article 
6 to the enforcement of confiscation orders.   The reasonable time provisions of Article 
6(1) apply to the entirety of the confiscation proceedings as they are akin to the amount of 
fine or length of a period of imprisonment on a defendant which means that action should 
be taken promptly to make518 and enforce an order.519 This is particularly relevant to this 
research as it is important that enforcement by the magistrates’ court takes place within a 
reasonable time and there have been a number of challenges on this point.520   
Article 6(3) also applies to the enforcement of confiscation orders in the magistrates’ court 
and where a defendant was not given sufficient prior notice of an enforcement hearing 
 
516 Alldridge, ‘The Limits of Confiscation’ (n 465) 836. 
517 Rezvi (n 501) [20]. 
518 Bullen and Soneji v United Kingdom [2009] ECHR 28. 
519 Crowther v United Kingdom [2005] ECHR 45. 
520 This case law is analysed in detail in chapter 6, text to n 1328-n 1373. 
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and time to prepare his defence, and could not obtain legal advice in a complex case 
because he was in custody and had been in transit, the refusal of an adjournment by the 
magistrates’ court was held to be a breach of Article 6.521   
As well as the implications of A1P1 in joint benefit cases,522 domestic courts have also 
considered A1P1 rights holding that restraint and receivership are not contrary to A1P1 as 
there is significant public interest in ensuring criminals do not profit from their crimes and 
this extends to preventing the dissipation of assets to ensure that a confiscation order is 
paid.523  The impact of article 6 and A1P1 in the enforcement of confiscation orders are 
further considered as they arise, and it is suggested that the recommendations in this 
thesis are proportionate and comply with the ECHR. 
3.3 The purpose of enforcing confiscation orders 
As noted, the purpose of the legislation, that it is designed to ensure that crime does not 
pay, and it is designed to take away the benefit from crime, has been taken into account 
when deciding that the overall scheme complies with the ECHR.  The judiciary have 
recognised the social policy of the confiscation regime when making decisions, 
highlighting the purpose of stripping convicted defendants of the proceeds of their 
crimes.524  
The purpose of the legislation is important for the judiciary making decisions about the 
enforcement of confiscation orders.   In a case relating to the enforcement of a 
confiscation order made under the CJA 1988 Dyson LJ acknowledged that the 
 
521 R (on the application of Agogo) v North Somerset Magistrates’ Court [2011] EWHC 518 
(Admin), [2011] ACD 47. 
522 Ahmad and Ahmed (n 12). 
523 Hughes v Customs and Excise Commissioners [2002] EWCA Civ 734; [2003] 1 WLR 177 [52]. 
524 In Re Stannard [2015] EWHC 1199 (Admin); [2015] Lloyd’s Rep FC 420 it was stated that the 
underlying purpose is to show that crime does not pay by forcing criminals to disgorge the benefit 
derived from criminal activities, if they can afford to do so [46]. For examples of cases decided on 
the pre-POCA 2002 legislation and POCA 2002 see for example Dickens (n 124) [11] ; R v Harrow 
Justices, ex parte DPP [1991] 1 WLR 395 (QB), (1991) 155 JP 979; R v Ford [2008] EWCA Crim 966, 
[2009] 1 Cr App R (S) 13; Waya (n 125) [8]; R v Elsayed [2014] EWCA Crim 333, [2014] 1 WLR 3916; 
R v Nelson and others [2009] EWCA Crim 1573; [2010] 1 QB 678; Bullen and Soneji (n 518).   
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interpretation of the legislation cannot be decided in the abstract; any meaning will be 
coloured by the statutory purpose and the context in which the phrase is used.525   
The case of May526 makes it clear that the imposition of a confiscation order does not 
operate in the same way as the imposition of a fine but is a way of depriving defendants of 
the benefits of their relevant criminal conduct within the limits of their available means.527  
It has also been noted that the purpose of a confiscation order is different to the purpose 
of a fine, as the imposition of a fine is the punishment.528 As a confiscation order is 
ancillary to sentence, but is enforced as a fine, the enforcement of both must be 
effective.529   
There is also a specific purpose of the enforcement process, including the activation of the 
default term.  For both fines and confiscation, the purpose is not further punishment but is 
to see if there are alternative ways to enforce the financial penalty or encourage 
compliance.530  
Arguments about a custodial sentence and the setting of the default term breaching 
principles about the totality of sentencing have failed because the custodial sentence has 
a different purpose to the default sentence.531  The first is to punish the defendant for the 
 
525 Hansford v Southampton Magistrates’ Court and another [2008] EWHC 67 (Admin), [2008] 4 All 
ER 432 [34]. 
526 May (n 79).  
527 ibid [48]. 
528 For example, R v Norwich Magistrates’ Court, ex parte Lilly (1987) 151 JP 689 (QB). 
529 For example, in R v Hereford Magistrates’ Court, ex parte MacRae (1998) 163 JP 433 (QB) 
‘wherever possible offenders will be fined rather than imprisoned. Central to that policy is the 
need to have effective machinery for fines enforcement. If fines lose credibility, if, in other words, 
offenders so punished are regarded as 'getting away with it' in every sense, then the balance will 
inevitably shift towards custodial disposals. It is, therefore, imperative that fines should be paid 
and that the system for enforcing them is efficient, expeditious and effective.’ (Simon Brown, LJ). 
530 For fines see for example MacRae ibid. For confiscation see for example R v John Smith [2009] 
EWCA Crim 344; R v Castillo [2011] EWCA Crim 3173, [2012] 2 Cr App R (S) 36;  Johnson (n 16); R 
(on the application of Lloyd) v Bow Street Magistrates Court [2003] EWHC 2294 (Admin) [34]; 
O’Connell (n 79); R v Aspinwell [2010] EWCA Crim 1294; [2011] 1 Cr App R (S) 54. A point also 
made by Simon Whitehead ‘Dealing with unpaid confiscation orders–Part 1’ (2000) 150(6923) NLJ 
232. 
531 R v Price [2009] EWCA Crim 2918, [2010] 2 Cr App R (S) 44. 
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offence, the period in default is to ensure compliance with the confiscation order532  and 
the activation of the default sentence is not a punishment.533  As a result it is correct to say 
that the practical effect of the enforcement process for confiscation orders is to deny the 
defendant a choice between payment and serving the default term, the order must still be 
paid,534 and that a defendant cannot ‘buy’ his way out of paying by serving the default 
term.535  When hearing an application for a certificate of inadequacy where a confiscation 
order had been made under the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986, it was said, ’The 
purpose of these draconian procedures is obvious: they are intended, as has often been 
said, to make it as difficult as possible for those who traffic in drugs to get away with the 
proceeds of that traffic.’536 
For HMCTS there is an emphasis on ensuring that the order of the court is enforced and 
upheld in all cases.  The Service is committed to improving public confidence in the 
system by enforcing orders regardless of the value; although there is an 
acknowledgement that prioritising work is sometimes necessary based on the high value 
or the high profile of a case.537 This prioritisation of cases has been accepted by the High 
Court.538  
The purpose of both charging orders and restraint orders under the old legislation was 
similar namely to prevent the dissipation of assets, although in the case of restraint, the 
purpose can also be to prevent the depreciation of assets539 whereas a charging order 
has the effect of securing the Crown’s potential interest in the property.540 
 
532 John Smith (n 530). 
533 O’Connell (n 79) [36]. 
534 Talbot and Hinton (n 3) 519. 
535 Hinton (n 473) 260. 
536 R v Liverpool Magistrates' Court, ex parte Ansen [1998] 1 All ER 692 (QB) 701 (May J). 
537 MOJ and HMCTS Written Evidence to the HAC 2016 (n 25) para 22. 
538 O’Connell (n 79) [40]. 
539 Levi and Osofsky (n 162) 18-19. 
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The nature of a restraint order under POCA 2002 has the effect of freezing property 
pending a confiscation order.541 The role of a restraint order is an ancillary one and is to 
preserve property;542 to preserve realisable property to satisfy a confiscation order,543  
prevent disposal of assets544 and maximize the amounts available for recovery.545  
3.3.1 The purpose of a confiscation order: the debate 
It is clear that when the confiscation regime was introduced it was aimed at the ‘Mr Bigs’ 
in the drugs world.546  As the legislation has developed, the defendants it is aimed at have 
changed so that confiscation will be sought in all appropriate cases.547 This has been the 
subject of criticism548 and a discussion of this is outside the focus of this thesis, but the 
scope of orders is not.  The change means that orders are made in respect of all 
defendants, not just ‘Mr Bigs’.  As a result, magistrates’ courts need to be able to enforce 
all sizes of orders.     
Despite the relative certainty in the case law and the clarity about the aim of enforcement, 
there has been considerable debate about what the purpose of the confiscation scheme is 
and how any success can be measured. There is no statutory purpose for a confiscation 
order as a confiscation order is not a sentence of the court, it is an order ancillary to 
 
541 Explanatory Notes to the Proceeds of Crime 2002, para 85. 
542 Serious Fraud Office v Lexi Holdings PLC (In Administration) and another [2008] EWCA Crim 
1443, [2009] Q.B. 376 [8] (Keene LJ). 
543 For example, Sutherland Williams, Hopmeier and Jones (n 58) 15; In Re Peters [1988] 1 QB 871 
(CA) a restraint order was described as akin to a Mareva injunction. 
544 Mitchell Taylor and Talbot vol 1 para 3.023 (R5: September 2004).  
545 Bullock, ‘Enforcing Financial Penalties’ (n 44) 330.   
546 In the debate on the Drug Trafficking Offences Bill it was said that the legislation was aimed at 
the ‘‘‘Mr Bigs’ in the drug trade’’ Mr Robin Corbett HC Deb 21 January 1986 vol 90 cols 246-247.   
547 Government policy became that confiscation should be sought in “all convictions where 
criminals have profited” PIU Report (n 117) 63.  One of the recommendations was that 
’Confiscation of unlawful assets should become the norm in criminal proceedings, with 
proportionate steps taken to remove assets wherever proceeds have been derived from crime.’ 
PIU Report (n 117) 9.  The Asset Recovery Action Plan stated the ‘nobody should leave the 
[criminal justice] system still in possession of the benefits of his or her crime.’ Asset Recovery 
Action Plan (n 243) 28 (emphasis added in each example). 
548 Bullock and Lister (n 33) 66-67.  
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sentence and is part of the sentencing process.549  As such it is not subject to the statutory 
principles of sentencing in section 142 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 which for a 
defendant aged 18 or over are: 
• The punishment of offenders 
• The reduction of crime (including its reduction by deterrence) 
• The reform and rehabilitation of offenders 
• The protection of the public, and 
• The making of reparation by offenders to persons affected by their offences.   
There is a form of reparation involved in confiscation. Any reparation in the confiscation 
order is usually to the State rather than to an individual, although an order for reparation to 
an individual can be made payable out of a confiscation order if the defendant would not 
have an available amount which was sufficient to pay both the confiscation order and the 
reparative order.550 
However, an inconsistency and a lack of clarity in the objectives of the confiscation law 
has been identified.551 An analysis of the review documents and the commentaries show 
that different views have been taken of the legislation and that different aims and purpose 
have been identified. 
Hendry and King state that the purpose of ensuring defendants do not profit from their 
crime is unlikely to be controversial or cause any political dispute552 and it has been said 
that the purpose of ensuring that defendants do not profit from their crime is one which 
 
549 Phillips v United Kingdom (n 500).  In R v Guraj [2016] UKSC 65; [2017] 1 WLR 22 it was held 
that the purpose of the postponement provisions of the confiscation regime is to ensure that the 
sentencing process is effective (emphasis added) [22].   
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13(3A).  
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552 Jennifer Hendry and Colin King, ‘Expediency, Legitimacy, and the Rule of Law: A Systems 
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everyone agrees with and needs ‘no empirical verification’.553  For the reasons outlined 
below, this thesis agrees with those statements and concludes that the overall purpose of 
the confiscation regime is to ensure that crime should not pay by depriving those 
convicted of criminal offences of their benefit from crime.   
The purpose of ensuring that crime does not pay has formed part of the government 
strategies reviewed in this thesis and mentioned as an aim in the review documents which 
considers the regime. When announcing the PIU project, the then Prime Minister, Tony 
Blair, said: 
We want to ensure that crime doesn’t pay. Seizing criminal assets deprives 
criminals and criminal organisations of their financial lifeblood. The challenge for 
law enforcement will become even greater as new technologies hide the money 
trail more effectively. We must ensure that law enforcement is ready to meet the 
challenges.554 
However, an overall purpose, whilst helpful, is not sufficient to assess the effectiveness of 
the regime or any individual recommendations.  As a result there has been further debate 
over the purpose of the confiscation regime and what constitutes success.555  King 
explains that the principle that crime does not pay is a strong justification for the recovery 
of criminal assets,556 and Alldridge asserts that it is easy to say that crime does not pay 
but that the full implications of the principle need to be worked through.557 In order to 
determine the effectiveness of any policy, or indeed to assess the recommendations in 
 
553 R T Naylor, ‘Wash-out: A critique of follow-the-money methods in crime control policy’ (1999) 
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this thesis it is necessary to understand what ensuring crime does not pay means, and 
what would count as a successful policy or successful recommendations.   
An analysis of the review documents and the development of the legislation shows that 
the secondary aims of confiscation558 which have been identified since the regime began 
can be summarised as:  
• Recovery of the proceeds from crime559  
• Reassurance to the public that crime does not pay560  
• Disruption of criminality561 
• Reduction in harm562 
• Deterrence563 
• Denying criminals the use of their assets/Preventing the reinvestment from crime 
into further offending564 
• Removing negative role models565 
 
558 Some of the aims in the documents refer to ‘Asset Recovery’ which includes, but is wider than, 
confiscation, n 11. 
559 PIU Report (n 117) 5; CPS Asset Recovery Strategy (n 321) 14; NAO Report (n 71) 10; PAC 
Report (n 328) 7; NAO Progress Report (n 367) 35; PAC Progress Report (n 348) 12; HAC 2016  
Report (n 26) 5.  
560 Asset Recovery Action Plan (n 243) 42; NAO Report (n 71) 10; PAC Report (n 328) 2; NAO 
Progress Report (n 367) 35; PAC Progress Report (n 348) 12.   
561 Levi and Osofsky (n 162) 13-14; PIU Report (n 117) 6; Asset Recovery Action Plan (n 243) 42; 
PAC Report (n 328) 7; NAO Progress Report (n 367) 35; PAC Progress Report (n 348) 12; HAC 2016 
Report (n 26) 5. 
562 PIU Report (n 117) 16; Asset Recovery Action Plan (n 243) 42; NAO Progress Report (n 367) 35; 
PAC Progress Report (n 348) 12. 
563 PIU Report (n 117) 6; Asset Recovery Action Plan (n 243) 42; CPS Asset Recovery Strategy (n 
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Researchers have also identified these secondary aims.566  However, this would still not 
answer the question, what counts as success?  The review documents in chapter 2 show 
a difference of opinion between the assessment of value for money, collection rates, or 
disruption as the success factors, and this was one of the key issues for the HAC in 2016, 
when King had to ask the HAC what the purpose of confiscation is.  
As a result, the HAC considered the purpose of POCA 2002 at ‘the heart of [its] inquiry’ 
and whether the measure of success for the confiscation regime should be the amount 
collected or the disruption of criminality.567 In his written evidence King suggested that the 
Committee should consider the purpose of POCA and whether it is intended to disrupt 
criminal activity, raise money, or both; and if both which should take priority.568  The 
Committee considered this question and found that there was an element of both but that 
the emphasis of statistics had been placed on collection.  It found that if the only success 
criteria was collection rates then performance would be ‘abysmal’ but that it was only half 
of the story.  It reflected on the evidence of the CPS and Wood that there should be less 
emphasis on the collection statistics and more on disruption,569 a view supported by 
King.570 The report quotes the evidence of King who agreed that there is ‘too much 
emphasis on how much money is raised’.571  The Committee found that his comments 
‘echoed a wealth of evidence’ from others who had given evidence.572  
The Committee took into account the stated aims of the Home Office which are ‘to deny 
criminals the use of their assets, recover the proceeds of crime, and deter and disrupt 
criminality’.  It recommended that the government should publish statistics each year 
 
566 For example, King, Civil Forfeiture and Article 6 of the ECHR (n 464) 375; King and Walker (n 11) 
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including measures against each of the aims, a measure of how crime rates have been 
influenced by denying criminals of their assets, and lists of all assets seized from criminals 
over a year.  It concluded that success should be measured against both the efficient 
collection of criminal assets and the disruption of criminal activities, acknowledging the 
difficulties with quantifying the latter.573  The government agreed to publish annual asset 
recovery statistics574 which it started in 2017575 to look at ways to measure disruption.576  
The focus on disruption is not surprising.  The disruption of criminal activity has featured in 
the review documents.577  King had co-authored an article which referred to the ‘disruption 
factor’ and called for disruption to be identified and measured578 and although it reviews 
the civil regime, the arguments apply to confiscation.579  It is therefore understandable that 
he asked his key question to the HAC which was central to the report.    
As a result, the recommendations in the HAC 2016 Report about measuring disruption 
were the culmination of suggestions in previous reviews which had questioned the 
concentration of collection rates and not disruption.  It is clear then that when considering 
the policy and aims of the regime, the consideration of collection rates in themselves are 
insufficient. 
3.3.2 Measuring disruption 
Although Sproat writes about other aspects of asset recovery,580 he has identified 
difficulties in the measurement of disruption because of a lack of statistics.581  This 
supports the findings in the HAC 2016 Report which acknowledged that the disruption 
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element is difficult to quantify.  The Home Office published the first of an annual set of 
statistics in September 2017582 but this did not include a measurement of disruption. 
However, a menu of tactics583 has been designed to support the NCAs disruption 
strategy.584  This gives examples of the types of interventions that can disrupt criminality 
and includes restraint orders and compliance orders.  It is suggested that the number of 
orders made each year could be calculated, along with whether the confiscation order has 
been satisfied, which would indicate both disruption and collection rates.  It is also 
suggested that payment orders and charging orders, whether made under the confiscation 
legislation or not, would also fit into these categories to measure disruption.   
3.3.3 POCA 2002, a specific purpose? 
This section has outlined the purpose of the confiscation regime, but in addition, this 
research has identified that POCA 2002 had a specific purpose.  Chapter 2 explains that 
one of the aims of the government strategy was to have the same confiscation order 
provisions for both drugs and non-drugs offences. As part of that strategy, the PIU 
recommended that all confiscation hearings should be heard at the Crown Court, along 
with any applications previously heard in the High Court including restraint and charging 
order applications.585  This was described as creating a one stop shop in relation to the 
Crown Court.586  This thesis considers whether the aim of creating a one stop shop has in 
fact been achieved, and concludes that while it has to a certain extent, more can be done 
in this regard which would also improve the enforcement of confiscation orders in the 
magistrates’ court and provide an alternative to restraint. 
The recommendations in this thesis in relation to payment orders, and in particular 
charging orders, would meet that purpose.  They would also provide an alternative to the 
 
582 Asset Recovery Statistical Bulletin 2011/12-2016/17 (n 28). 
583 College of Policing, Menu of Tactics (n 447). 
584 Text to n 445 in chapter 2. 
585 Text to n 207-n 210 in chapter 2. 
586 Text to n 31 in chapter 1. 
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need to provide for early restraint.  As a result, this thesis will assess ‘success’ against all 
the purposes in this chapter. 
3.4 Measuring collection rates 
The HAC concluded that the figures of outstanding debt are largely artificial as they 
include interest and accounts that cannot be collected.  It therefore recommended that 
accounts should be categorised into collectable and uncollectable categories587 and the 
HMCTS Trust Statement now identifies these figures.588 
Despite the concentration on collection rates as a measure of success there have been 
difficulties both in the collation of statistics and with their interpretation.  The ability to 
collect statistics has improved since the beginning of the regime as it has now become 
easier to obtain data since the introduction of JARD in 2006.589    
Even though statistics are now more readily available, the Home Office has described the 
measurement of performance in enforcement as ’surprisingly complex’ explaining that 
practically it was difficult to measure the proportion of the value of orders made against 
the value enforced.590  Although the criminal justice agencies have monthly reports about 
what is collectable from priority orders, the NAO criticised the lack of statistics about why 
the figures are so low which it felt could be used to determine the best actions to take.591 
 
587 HAC 2016 Report (n 26) 30-31. 
588 The value of confiscation orders considered uncollectable are shown as an ‘impairment’ 
HMCTS Trust Statement 2017-18 (n 23) 38.  The figures are reproduced in Appendix 1 to this 
thesis.  
589 The review documents highlight the difficulties prior to JARD.   The HAC Seventh Report 
reported on orders made under the DTOA 1986, but there were no figures available to consider 
the effectiveness of the recovery of the approximate £11 million worth of confiscation orders 
although shortfalls had been identified by witnesses, HAC Seventh Report (n 129) xviii.  The 
Working Group Third Report considered the practical difficulties experienced by Justices’ Clerks in 
enforcing confiscation orders and examined statistics and replies by Justices’ Clerks rather than 
centrally held data, Working Group Third Report (n 126) para 2.1.  It is not surprising that Levi and 
Osofsky had difficulties in obtaining accurate data in relation to the number and value of orders 
made; and the amounts collected, noting that there was no accurate data about how much was 
recovered from defendants Levi and Osofsky (n 162) 54. 
590 Asset Recovery Action Plan (n 243) 18. 
591 The NAO Progress Report (n 367) 28. 
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This has echoed findings in the review documents which show that there are difficulties in 
evaluating the collection rates, for example, because receipts are collected often a long 
time after imposition,592 particularly if the court has granted lengthy time for payment, 
which was identified as a particular issue for high value orders.593  Figures can also be 
affected perversely very easily by a particularly high or low number or value of 
confiscation orders.594  Difficulties are also caused because of the costs of receivers, and 
the fact that confiscation orders are unrealistically high if there is an overvaluation of 
assets.595   Bullock et al found errors in the data when analysing it for their research596 and 
the lack of robust, reliable or available data is an issue identified by academics.597  
Given these difficulties, statistics are not relied on to support the recommendations in this 
thesis.  The view of the government is that the use of statistics about the volume and 
value of restraint orders is not necessarily helpful as a measure of performance or as a 
target,598 which must be correct.  Because of this t is suggested that it would not be helpful 
to use the number of charging or payment orders made as a performance measure in 
itself.  However the number of charging or payment orders made could be a useful 
indicator of disruption and would echo the tactics to measure disruption used to support 
the NCAs disruption strategy.599 It may also be a useful indicator to measure how many 





592 Payback Time (n 173) 48. 
593 Asset Recovery Action Plan (n 243) 18-19. 
594 ibid 19.    
595 Working Group Third Report (n 126) paras 2.2-2.5, 2.7. 
596 Bullock and others (n 29) 5. 
597 Bullock and Lister (n 33) 63.  Harvey also identifies issues with reconciling data from different 
data sets. Harvey (n 29) 193.  
598 Government Response to the HAC 2016 Report (n 432) 3.  
599 College of Policing, Menu of Tactics (n 447).  
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3.5 The development of the legislation to date 
3.5.1 A change in the law because of the case of Cuthbertson 
It was the inability of the judiciary to use existing legislation to confiscate the proceeds of 
producing and supplying Class A drugs, identified in Cuthbertson600 which led to the 
introduction of the DTOA 1986 and the introduction of criminal confiscation orders.  In 
Cuthbertson the defendants were charged with conspiracy at common law with other 
persons to contravene the provisions of section 4 of the MDA 1971 namely the producing 
and supplying of a Class A drug.601   
After conviction the trial judge made orders of forfeiture against the defendants pursuant 
to section 27(1) of the MDA 1971 which provides that: 
...the court by or before which a person is convicted of an offence under this 
Act...may order anything shown to the satisfaction of the court to relate to the 
offence, to be forfeited and either destroyed or dealt with in such other manner as 
the court may order. 
The defendants had been manufacturing and supplying Class A drugs for several years 
and had been arrested in an operation known as ‘Operation Julie’.602  The total amount of 
the assets representing the proceeds of the defendants’ criminal enterprise was three-
quarters of a million pounds which was forfeited by the trial judge.  Two of the defendants 
had transferred money into bank accounts abroad. 
 
600 Cuthbertson (n 5). 
601 Section 4 of the MDA 1971 provides that:‘(1) ... it shall not be lawful for a person (a) to produce 
a controlled drug; or (b) to supply or offer to supply a controlled drug to another.(2) ... it is an 
offence for a person (a) to produce a controlled drug in contravention of subsection (1) above; or 
(b) to be concerned in the production of such a drug in contravention of that subsection by 
another.’ 
602 For an overview of Operation Julie and the public interest in the case see Dick Lee and Colin 
Pratt, Operation Julie (WH Allen 1978); Lyn Ebenezer, Operation Julie The World’s Greatest LSD 
Bust (Y Lolfa Cyf 2010). 
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There were two reasons why the House of Lords held that the proceeds of the drugs 
offences could not be confiscated.  It was held that ‘an offence under this Act’ in s27(1) 
could not include a conspiracy to commit an offence under the Act and therefore a 
forfeiture order could not be made.  It was held that to decide otherwise would mean 
putting a strained construction on the wording of the legislation; and that '(f)orfeiture is a 
penalty; justice requires that it should not be imposed by a court in the absence of a 
finding, or an admission of guilt.’603  
More importantly for the scope of this research, the second reason the court concluded 
that there was no power to confiscate the proceeds of crime was because section 27 MDA 
1971 only allowed the forfeiture of tangible things to be destroyed or dealt with in another 
way as the court thinks fit, the section was never meant to be used to strip drug traffickers 
of the profits of their drug trafficking.604 In criticising the trial judge and the Court of Appeal 
for making the order for forfeiture, Lord Diplock said that they:  
appear to have been influenced by the argument of the Crown that the 
parliamentary purpose to which effect was intended to be given by section 27 was 
to strip drug traffickers of the whole of the profits of their crime whatever might be 
the way in which they had invested those profits...But this, with respect, cannot be 
right...it could not plausibly be suggested that the section authorises the court (so 
to speak) to ‘follow the assets’.605  
Lord Diplock came to this conclusion with ‘considerable regret’606 but had no other option 
as it was a matter of pure construction of section 27 that a forfeiture order could only be 
used for tangible objects and there could be no preconception that Parliament intended to 
use the section to strip professional drug dealers of all the profits of their crimes, even if 
 
603 Cuthbertson (n 5) 484 (Lord Diplock). 
604 ibid 485 (Lord Diplock). 
605 ibid 484. 




that aim is laudable.607   The case of Cuthbertson and the inability of the court to forfeit the 
money caught the imagination of the public608 and led to the Hodgson Report. 
3.5.2  The Hodgson Report 
In 1984 The Hodgson Committee reviewed the law in the light of Cuthbertson and the 
’apparent inability of the Court effectively to deprive an offender of the profits of his 
offending’ which caused real concern.609  The Committee was given the following remit:  
to consider the present law relating to the forfeiture of property associated with 
crime in the light of the House of Lords’ judgment in R v Cuthbertson and Others, 
12 June 1980; to consider the law and procedure relating to compensation and 
restitution of property to the victims of crime, and the operation of criminal 
bankruptcy; to assess how far the powers of criminal courts to impose monetary 
penalties meet the need to strip offenders of their ill-gotten gains, and whether 
further provisions are necessary to ensure that the fruits of crime are returned 
either to the innocent owners of property or to the Crown.610  
The Committee’s report, the Hodgson Report, concluded that courts should be given a 
new power to confiscate the profits of crime but became aware of problems when 
considering how confiscation orders would be enforced.611  The Report defined 
confiscation as ’the depriving of an offender of the proceeds or profits of crime’ as 
opposed to forfeiture which they defined as ’the power of the Court to take property that is 
immediately connected with an offence’612 because of a realisation at an early stage that 
 
607 ibid 480. 
608 n 602. 
609 Hodgson Report (n 123) 3. 
610 ibid 4. 
611 ibid 70. 
612 ibid 5.   
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there were no generally accepted definitions and because otherwise the terms may be 
treated as synonymous.613   
The Report recommended the introduction of confiscation orders and also made a number 
of recommendations.  It considered two matters of concern, that crime should not pay, 
and that no injustice should be done.614 The specific recommendations in relation to the 
imposition of a confiscation order fall outside the focus of this research,615 however, there 
were a number of recommendations in relation to restraint which are relevant to this 
research.   
Pre-trial restraint was recommended if there was a prima facie case that the defendant 
had committed an indictable offence and compensation or fines totalling £10,000 or more 
would be likely on conviction.  The Report recommended that a restraint order could be 
made ex parte but that on acquittal there should be discretion on the trial judge to order 
compensation.  Finally, it recommended that a receiver should be appointed under the 
Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) to supervise the property, but the police should not 
be granted powers of search for assets.616 These recommendations started the 
development of the law relating to restraint that exists today which is analysed in the next 
chapter.  
3.5.3 The introduction of the powers of confiscation 
The legislation permitting the confiscation of criminal assets has developed in a piecemeal 
fashion.617  The Act which introduced the power to make a confiscation order, the DTOA 
1986, contained a number of the recommendations from the Hodgson report.  The power 
to make a confiscation order was given to the Crown Court with enforcement powers of 
making restraint and charging orders introduced in the High Court.  As the name suggests 
 
613 ibid 4.  For a consideration of the development of forfeiture see, for example, Alldridge Money 
Laundering Law (n 39) 71-73. 
614 Hodgson Report (n 123) 79. 
615 ibid 151-152. 
616 ibid 154. 
617 Text to n 202 in chapter 2. 
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the Act only applied to drugs offences and was amended before being replaced by the 
DTA 1994. The power to make confiscation orders for general crime was introduced in a 
limited form by the CJA 1988 and came into force on 3 April 1989 where the defendant’s 
benefit was at least £10,000 but the £10,000 minimum was subsequently removed.  The 
CJA 1988 was amended and it and the DTA 1994 were brought more into line although 
some differences remain between the drugs and general crime legislation.   
POCA 2002 was a wide-ranging Act covering provisions other than confiscation, but it 
consolidated and changed the previous legislation whilst strengthening the ability of 
authorities to ‘follow the money’.  It too has been amended on many occasions, most 
recently by the Policing and Crime Act 2009, the Crime and Courts Act 2013, the Serious 
Crime Act (SCA) 2015 and the Criminal Finances Act (CFA) 2017.618 
One of the issues for the magistrates’ court is that it has to enforce confiscation orders 
made under all Acts.  To understand why it causes difficulty, it is necessary to understand 
the way the law has developed and the amendments to the legislation directly relevant to 
this research. 
3.5.4 DTOA 1986 
The ability for Crown Courts to make a confiscation order pursuant to the DTOA 1986 
came into force on 12 January 1987.  A financial order, there were powers for the High 
Court to make a restraint order or charging order, with the other enforcement provisions 
based on the fines provisions.619  As such, time for payment could be for any period set by 
the Crown Court judge620 and the Act contained provisions for the magistrates’ court to 
enforce confiscation orders in a similar way to a fine, which have continued with only 
minor amendment to the present day.  An article written by experts in the Home Office 
 
618 Changes were also made by the Modern Slavery Act 2015, but these are not directly relevant 
to the research covered by this thesis. 
619 DTOA 1986, s 6. 




explained the aim of the enforcement provisions.  They explained that ‘the burden’ of 
enforcing orders was given to magistrates’ courts using their fines based powers, and to 
the High Court in larger and more complex cases, by which they meant using restraint, 
charging and receivership orders.621  This shows how the provisions were intended to be 
used, but in reality the fines based powers of the magistrates’ court have been used in all 
types of cases, no matter how large or complex, and have changed little.  This adds 
strength to the premise in this research that more powers are needed to help the 
magistrates’ court to successfully enforce confiscation orders.  
The Act did not provide for interest to accrue on unpaid confiscation orders, or for 
enforcement to continue after the default term had been served and so amendments were 
seen as necessary.  The Criminal Justice (International Cooperation) Act 1990 provided 
for interest to be paid if a confiscation order was not paid as ordered,622 and for the 
confiscation order to be reviewed if there was an increase in the realisable property which 
proved to be of greater value than originally assessed by the court.623  
The Criminal Justice Act 1993 contained provisions to amend the DTOA 1986 including a 
provision that serving the default sentence did not wipe out the debt.  However, these 
amendments were not brought into force and instead, the DTOA 1986 was replaced by 
the DTA 1994 containing those provisions.  
3.5.5 DTA 1994 
The DTA 1994 came into force for offences on or after 3 February 1995.  It replaced the 
DTOA but also made some changes to the regime.  Like the DTOA 1986 it applied only to 
drugs offences and confiscation orders could only be made in the Crown Court.  It made 
changes to the imposition of confiscation orders, but relevant to this thesis, the Act 
continued the provisions for confiscation orders to be enforced as a fine, with the same 
 
621 'The UK Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986' (n 17) 1632. 
622 Criminal Justice (International Cooperation) Act 1990, s 15. 
623 Criminal Justice (International Cooperation) Act 1990, s 16. 
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differences.624 It provided that the serving of a default sentence did not wipe out the 
debt,625 provided for interest to accrue after time for payment expired626 (although time for 
paying the order could still be for any period) and gave powers to the Crown Court to 
reconsider or vary confiscation orders.627   
3.5.6 CJA 1988 
The DTOA 1986 only permitted confiscation orders to be made in cases involving drug 
trafficking, as the name suggests. ’Parliament was not blind to this fact and some three 
years later enacted Part VI of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.’628  The CJA 1988 introduced 
confiscation orders for general criminal conduct which could be made by the Crown Court 
or in limited circumstances by the magistrates’ court.629  It came into force for offences on 
or after 3 April 1989 and was subsequently amended.630 
When debating the confiscation provisions that became the Criminal Justice Act 1988, Mr 
Hurd, then Home Secretary, explained that although the provisions followed the DTOA 
1986, the government had used a different model. This is because drug trafficking was felt 
to be a special case, because it is so profitable and because of the revulsion the public 
rightly felt at the destruction which it wreaks.  He further explained that the provisions of 
the DTOA 1986 would be important new powers for the courts which would strengthen 
their hand in dealing with big-time criminals.631 
 
624 DTA 1994, s 9. 
625 DTA 1994, s 9(3). 
626 DTA 1994, s 10. 
627 DTA 1994, ss 13 to 16.   
628 Talbot and Hinton (n 3) 506.  
629 Schedule 4 to the Criminal Justice Act 1988 listed the offences for which the magistrates’ court 
could a make confiscation order.  
630 The Act was also amended by the Criminal Justice Act 1993, but these amendments are not 
relevant to this thesis. 
631 The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr Douglas Hurd) HC Deb 27 November 
1986, vol 106, cols 471-472. 
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Originally the CJA 1988 did not provide for the accrual of interest632 and like the DTOA 
1986 serving the default term did not wipe out the debt.  The CJA 1988 was amended by 
the Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) 1995.  The second reading of the Proceeds of Crime 
Bill633 (which became the POCA 1995), took place on 3 February 1995 the day the DTA 
1994 came into force. The Bill was a private member’s Bill presented by Sir John 
Hannam, MP for Exeter. He explained how the Bill aimed to make life more difficult for 
those who profit from crime and especially to those making a living out of the proceeds of 
crime, calling them ‘life-style criminals.’634 He explained that the assumptions in the CJA 
1988 did not go as far as the DTOA 1986 which had more far reaching assumptions, 
because the general crime differed from clearly defined drug trafficking offences. He also 
explained how closing the loophole on serving the default sentence wiping out the debt 
was necessary as it was contrary to the spirit of the confiscation legislation for defendants 
to hang on to their ill-gotten gains.635 
As a result, POCA 1995 amended the CJA 1988 so that specific provisions were inserted 
into the Act for interest to accrue on unpaid orders636 and to ensure that serving the 
default term did not wipe out the debt,637 but the time for payment period which could be 
granted by the court on imposition was still unlimited. These amendments by POCA 1995 
mean that the interest and default term not wiping out the debt were only aligned between 
the drugs and non-drugs offences from 1 November 1995 when the amendments came 
into force. The provisions of POCA 1995 which extended the provisions of drug trafficking 
confiscation legislation to cover other serious crime were welcomed by the HAC 
Organised Crime Report.638 
 
632 Until the Criminal Justice (International Cooperation) Act 1990, s 15 provided for interest to 
accrue. 
633 Proceeds of Crime HC Bill (1994-95) [10]. 
634 John Hannam HC Deb 3 February 1995, vol 253, col 1322. 
635 John Hannam HC Deb 3 February 1995, vol 253, cols 1324-1325. 
636 CJA 1988, s 75A as inserted by POCA 1995, s9.   
637 CJA 1988, s 75 as amended by POCA 1995, s8. 
638 HAC Organised Crime Report (n 63) xlviii. 
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Because of the amendments to the Criminal Justice Act 1988, different schemes apply 
under the Act depending on the date of offence and the date proceedings commenced 
against the defendant.  This impacts directly on the enforcement of confiscation orders in 
the magistrates’ court, and when checking the relevant enforcement provisions, it is not 
enough to check whether the order was made under the CJA 1988 but also whether, for 
example, the serving of the default term wipes out the debt. 
3.5.7  The road to POCA 2002 
Despite the various amendments to the legislation and the consolidating and amending 
nature of the DTA 1994, there were still difficulties identified in the legislation.  The 
Working Group Third Report considered the regime, and made recommendations for 
change, which Alldridge described as ‘some preliminary urgings from the Home Office’639 
before the PIU report was published which led to the enactment of POCA 2002.    
3.5.8  POCA 2002  
The confiscation provisions of POCA 2002640 came into force for all offences committed 
on or after 23rd March 2003 and were designed to simplify the law and provide for a one 
stop shop in relation to confiscation, whereby all matters would be heard in the Crown 
Court.  Restraint order hearings moved from the High Court, the powers were 
strengthened; applications for variation also moved to the Crown Court and there were no 
longer any powers for the magistrates’ court to make a confiscation order.641 
Changes were made to POCA 2002 by the SCA 2015 which gave effect to the 
recommendations in the 2013 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy642 and there was 
 
639 Alldridge Money Laundering Law (n 39) 81. 
640 Contained in Part 2 of POCA 2002. 
641 In the previous legislation the magistrates’ court could make confiscation orders in limited 
circumstances in the CJA 1988.   
642 2013 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy (n 62) 34-36. 
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cross party support for the Bill643 with agreement that the changes were needed.644 The 
changes came into effect on 1st June 2015645 and other changes to POCA 2002 were also 
brought into force on the same date.646  Further amendments were made by the CFA 
2017 when changes were introduced to provide new capabilities and provide powers to 
recover the proceeds of crime, and to tackle money laundering, corruption and terrorist 
financing.647 There were also amendments to POCA 2002 directly relevant to this thesis 
as the provisions for the magistrates’ court to make a payment order648 and for an 
application to be made to the Crown Court to discharge an order were amended.649   
3.5.9  Commentaries on the development of the legislation  
Wasik reviewed the Hodgson Report in its entirety with a section on confiscation.650 He 
concentrated on the proposals for making confiscation orders and thought that there was 
a need for more detail,651 but agreed with the idea of restraint as he considered that 
powers of confiscation would only be effective with powers to prevent a person accused 
transferring funds to a place where they cannot be reached, and emphasised the need for 
safeguards.652  His view was that ‘hardly anyone’ would disagree that some powers were 
 
643 Serious Crime HL Bill (2014-15) 1.  
644 For example Baroness Smith of Basildon (Lab) HL Deb 16 June 2014, vol 754, cols 648-649; 
Baroness Hamwee (LD) HL Deb 16 June 2014, vol 754, cols 652- 653; The Lord Bishop of Derby HL 
Deb 16 June 2014, vol 754, cols 658- 659; and Lord Henley (Con) HL Deb 16 June 2014, vol 754, 
cols 660-661. 
645 Relevant to this thesis, the SCA 2015 amended the powers of the Crown Court to give a 
discretion when making a confiscation order, the powers to make a compliance order or section 
10A determination and order the discharge of an order.  It changed the default terms and 
amended the payment order provisions available to the magistrates’ court. 
646 Amendments were made by the Policing and Crime Act 2009, text to n 953-n 958 in chapter 4.  
647 Explanatory Notes to the Criminal Finances Act 2015, para 1.  
648 The changes to payment orders made by the CFA 2017 are not relevant to this thesis. 
649 Text to n 1151. 
650 Martin Wasik, ‘The Hodgson Committee Report on The Profits of Crime and Their Recovery’ 
[1984] (Dec) Crim LR 708. 
651 For example he said that it was a pity that the report did not go into more detail about the 
procedural arrangements envisaged for confiscation inquiries, for example what standard of proof 
is required of the prosecution and defence in the inquiry, ibid 711. 
652 ibid 712. 
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needed,653 and concluded that the basic scheme of confiscation outlined seemed to be a 
good one.654  
With hindsight Wasik’s conclusions on what were proposed provisions were justified.  He 
was writing in 1984, and the regime became operational in 1987 when the DTOA 1986 
came into force.  Although there have been legislative changes, and more are needed, it 
is an accepted view that defendants should not profit from their crime,655 and that restraint 
orders should be used effectively.656 The basic elements of the scheme remain the same, 
and the review documents do not call for a completely new regime.   
However, as the legislation was introduced and has been changed there have been 
critics. Thomas asserted that ‘As a means of stripping drug traffickers of their profits, the 
[Drug Trafficking Offences] Act has had limited success.’657 He explained that in 1991 
confiscation orders were made in just over a quarter of cases in which the mandatory 
provisions of the Act applied and that the majority of the orders were made for relatively 
small amounts. He backed up his argument with some statistics and also commented that 
many of the small orders must cost more in court time used to make the order than the 
face value of the order itself.658  
Thomas’ comments are similar to those of Levi and Osofsky who published their report a 
year later,659 but unlike them, Thomas concentrated on the imposition of orders.  His only 
specific reference to the powers of the magistrates’ court was the explanation that the 
default term imposed by the Crown Court is the same as the periods for non-payment of a 
fine.660  Like Levi and Osofsky’s conclusions his comments appear harsh and there was 
positive feedback on the operation of the DTOA 1986 from the Working Group First 
 
653 ibid 709. 
654 ibid 710.  
655 Text to n 552-n 553 in chapter 3. 
656 Text to n 656 in chapter 4. 
657 DA Thomas, ‘The Criminal Justice Act 1993: Part 1: Confiscation orders and drug trafficking’ 
[1994] (Feb) Crim LR 93. 
658 ibid 93. 
659 Levi and Osofsky (n 162) vi; text to n 174. 
660 Thomas (n 657) 94. 
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Report661 and the Home Office Seventh Report662 although clearly there were issues with 
the regime that needed attention. 
Thomas’ article reviewed the proposed amendments to the DTOA 1986 by the CJA 1993 
and he was concerned that having the old and new versions of the Act would have 
continued to exist side-by-side possibly for a number of years with obvious scope for 
errors.663  Like later authors he was concentrating on the imposition of confiscation orders, 
but his comments could apply to the enforcement of orders in the magistrates’ court. Their 
management is complex and the powers to enforce a confiscation order depend in the 
main on the law in existence at the time of imposition which adds complexity to the 
magistrates’ court as different powers will apply to the time for payment provisions, the 
default sentence and whether or not a payment order can be made.  
The Home Office Guide explains that the original confiscation scheme in the CJA 1988 
was less robust than the drug trafficking regime but was brought more closely into line by 
the subsequent arrangements.664  Harris went further and described the provisions of the 
CJA 1988 as significantly weaker than the DTOA665 but like other commentators he was 
focusing on the imposition of the order, and from an enforcement point of view the powers 
were the same as the DTOA 1986, both in terms of the powers to make restraint and 
charging orders at the High Court, and the fines based powers of the magistrates’ court.   
Support for POCA 2002 came from Kennedy who concluded that the confiscation 
provisions are ‘well designed and fit for purpose’.666  The confiscation regime is only a part 
of Kennedy’s research, and he makes this claim despite his reflections on the problems 
 
661 It felt that the general perception was that the powers introduced in the Drug Trafficking 
Offences Act to confiscate proceeds of drug trafficking had worked reasonably well since their 
implementation, Working Group First Report (n 137) 1. 
662 The HAC Seventh Report described the DTOA 1986 as an overall success (n 129) xvi.  
663 Thomas (n 657) 100. 
664 Home Office Guide (n 4) 6. 
665 Ron Harris, 'United Kingdom Legislation: Money Laundering and Confiscation of Drugs 
Trafficking Assets and Proceeds of Other Crime' (1993) 19 Commw L Bull 1976, 1981. 
666 Anthony Kennedy, ‘An evaluation of the recovery of criminal proceeds in the United Kingdom’ 
(2007) 10(1) JMLC 33, 36. 
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with enforcing orders describing deficiencies therein including delays and the costs 
involved.  Yet there have been criticisms.  Like others, Lawrence’s criticisms are aimed at 
the provisions for imposing confiscation orders667 and some of the areas fall outside the 
scope of this research, but he was scathing about elements of POCA 2002.  He was 
critical of the fact that the defendant has to rebut the assumptions in the Act,668 but this 
has been upheld in the European Court of Human Rights.669  Some of his concerns were 
justified.  He deplored the use of targets for making confiscation orders670 which were 
eventually seen as unhelpful and no longer apply.671  Of particular relevance to this 
research, he raised issues with the operation of joint benefit cases and he was concerned 
about double recovery by the State.   
This was addressed in Ahmad and Ahmed yet in that case even the Supreme Court has 
noted the ‘fair criticism’ that the 2002 Act has often been described as ‘poorly drafted’.672 It 
balanced this criticism by explaining that the problems can in part be explained by the 
difficulties of recovering the proceeds of crime by the use of confiscation orders, which are 
particularly acute in sophisticated crime, giving examples of large scale financial frauds, 
substantial illegal drug importing operations and people trafficking.  It identified at least 
three reasons why difficulties occur, difficulties in identifying and locating assets, 
uncertainty about the extent of the involvement of individuals or the profits obtained, and 
the difficulties in applying the established legal principles in POCA 2002 to issues such as 
joint acquisition.673   
Despite this balanced view, Coltart reviewed the case and described the imposition of a 
confiscation order as a ‘Labyrinthine exercise’ and opined that in relation to POCA 2002, 
 
667 Sir Ian Lawrence, ‘Draconian and manifestly unjust: how the confiscation regime has 
developed’ (2008) 76 Amicus Curiae 22, 22. 
668 ibid 23. 
669 Grayson and Barnham (n 509); text to n 697. 
670 Lawrence (n 667) 24.   
671 Local to Global (n 224) 20.  
672 Ahmad and Ahmed (n 12) [35]. 
673 ibid [35]-[36]. 
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the time had come to ‘rip it up and start again’. 674  Notwithstanding the amendments to 
POCA 2002, Hopmeier and Mills describe the process of making a confiscation order as 
‘fraught with problems’ as there is uncertainty in applying the law and defendants try to 
avoid paying their order.675   
These are obviously strong and divergent views. The regime is clearly not perfect but 
there is an accepted need for it and even Lawrence’s criticisms, which have been 
addressed in part, are mitigated by his view that it is necessary to deprive defendants of 
the benefit from crime.676  The imposition of confiscation orders has been the sole or main 
focus of these articles and there are still practical issues, but the regime has to a large 
extent stood the test of time despite the need for a number of legislative amendments to 
both the pre-POCA and POCA 2002 legislation.  However, POCA 2002 has not solved all 
the issues on imposition and given the difficulties which still exist it seems premature for 
Kennedy to have claimed that the provisions are fit for purpose. This research considers 
the difficulties with enforcing confiscation orders in practice, including a consideration of 
the review documents which gives a more balanced view, as desired by Wood,677 and 
meets the need to review the enforcement provisions as well as the investigation and 
imposition stages.678  It shows a need for further improvement in some elements of the 
regime, however, the basic scheme is, as Wasik predicted, a good one to meet the need 
that crime should not pay.  That said, the imposition of confiscation orders should not be 
looked at in isolation, and any future changes should assess the impact on enforcement, 
especially on the powers of the magistrates’ court.   
 
 
674 Christopher Coltart, ‘Rip it up and start again’ (2014) 23 LS Gaz 10 (2). 
675 HHJ Michael Hopmeier and Alexander Mills, ‘Post-conviction Confiscation in England and 
Wales, in Colin King, Clive Walker and Jimmy Gurulé, (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of Criminal 
and Terrorism Financing Law’ (Palgrave Macmillan 2018) 447, 447. 
676 Lawrence (n 667) 22. 
677 Wood, Enforcing Criminal Confiscation Orders (n2) 4.  
678 Vettori (n 47) 20. 
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3.6  Imposing a confiscation order 
Changes to the rules on imposition can impact directly on the magistrates’ court.  When 
making a confiscation order the Crown Court fixes a financial amount, it does not 
confiscate assets. The order is made ancillary to sentence and can be made before, on or 
after sentence679 and the Crown Court must take into account the confiscation order 
before making any financial order as part of the sentence.680 There are some financial 
orders which can be ordered to be paid out of the confiscation order if the court finds that 
the defendant cannot pay both confiscation order and the other order,681 otherwise the 
confiscation order must not be taken into account when sentencing the defendant.682 
Under POCA 2002 all confiscation orders must be made at the Crown Court and 
conditions apply.683  The defendant must have been convicted of a criminal offence in the 
Crown Court or been committed for sentence from the magistrates’ court.  Following a 
guilty plea or conviction in the magistrates’ court, the prosecutor will apply to the 
magistrates’ court to commit the case to the Crown Court and if it does, the court must 
commit for sentence.684  
The Crown Court must either be invited to consider a confiscation order by the prosecutor 
or believe that it is appropriate to consider the order.685  The court will then decide whether 
the defendant has a criminal lifestyle and if so whether he had benefited from that criminal 
lifestyle. A criminal lifestyle is defined in the Act686 and is either an offence listed in 
 
679 POCA 2002, s 14.  The period of postponement can be for up to 2 years or longer if there are 
exceptional circumstances. 
680 POCA 2002, s 13. 
681 These orders are a compensation order made under the PCC(S)A 2000, s 130; a victim 
surcharge order made under the Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 161A; an unlawful profit order made 
under the Prevention of Social Housing Fraud Act 2013, s 4; and a slavery and trafficking 
reparation order made under the Modern Slavery Act 2015, s 8.  The power is contained in POCA 
2002, s 13(3A). 
682 POCA 2002, s 13(4). 
683 POCA 2002, s 6. 
684 The power to commit for sentence also applies to summary only cases and in the Youth Court.  
There is also a power to commit other offences for sentence at the same time.  POCA 2002, s 70. 
685 POCA 2002, s 6(3). 
686 POCA 2002, s 75. 
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schedule 2 to the Act or fulfils the other criteria.687   If the defendant does not have a 
criminal lifestyle, the court will decide whether he had benefited from his particular criminal 
conduct.688 If the defendant has benefited from his crime then the court will decide his 
benefit on the balance of probabilities.689  
If the court has decided that the defendant has a criminal lifestyle, it must make four 
assumptions when deciding his benefit.690  The first is that any property transferred to the 
defendant at any time after the relevant day691 was obtained by him as a result of his 
general criminal conduct and at the earliest time he appears to have held it.  The second 
is that any property held by him at any time after the date of conviction was obtained by 
him again as a result of his general criminal conduct and at the earliest time he appears to 
have held it.  The third is that any expenditure incurred by him after the relevant day was 
from property obtained by him as a result of his general criminal conduct, and the fourth 
assumption is that for the purposes of valuing his property he obtained it free of any other 
interests in it.  The court is required to make these assumptions although the defendant 
can rebut them by showing that they are incorrect or there would be a serious risk of 
injustice if the assumption is made.692  If the court does not make one or more of the 
required assumptions it must state its reasons.693   
Once the benefit figure has been arrived at, the court will determine the recoverable 
amount which is equivalent to the benefit figure.694  However, if the defendant proves that 
 
687 These are contained in section 75 and are that the offence(s) constituted part of a course of 
criminal activity which means that the defendant has been convicted of three or more offences 
from which they have benefited, or they have been convicted of at least two offences over a six 
year period from which they have benefited.  In both situations, the amount of the benefit must 
be at least £5000.  The other ground is that the offence has been committed over at least six 
months and they have benefited from their crime.     
688 Which is defined in POCA 2002, s 76. 
689 POCA 2002, s 6(7). 
690 POCA 2002, s10(1)-(5).   
691 The relevant day is the earliest of either the first day of a period of six years ending with the 
day when the proceedings, or the first of the proceedings where there are two or more offences, 
were started.  POCA 2002, s 10(8).   
692 POCA 2002, s 10(6). 
693 POCA 2002, s 10(7).   
694 POCA 2002, s 7(1). 
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the available amount is less than the benefit, the recoverable amount is the available 
amount or a nominal amount, if the available amount is nil.695 There is no minimum 
amount of an order; and no matter what the value is, the magistrates’ court is legally 
responsible for the order.  
The burden is on the defendant to establish on the balance of probabilities that the 
realisable amount is less than the assessed benefit.696  The European Court of Human 
Rights has agreed with the domestic courts that it was not incompatible with Article 6 to 
place the burden on the defendant of showing that the amount that might be realised was 
less than the amount assessed as his benefit.  Only the applicants could have the 
knowledge and the burden on them would not be difficult to meet if their accounts were 
true.  Once the confiscation order had been made properly under Article 6(1) of the ECHR 
there was no disproportionate violation of the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions 
under A1P1.697 
The law requires the prosecution to provide the court with a statement of information 
during the course of the confiscation proceedings698 and the court may order the 
defendant to provide a statement in response.699  It has been observed that a judgment 
would be defective if it did not indicate even briefly how the figures for the benefit and 
 
695 POCA 2002, s 7(2).  Nominal orders are made where there is a benefit but few or no assets 
which means that the court can increase the order at a later date, Joint Thematic Review (n 3) 37. 
The provisions apply to ‘realisable property’ which is any free property held by the defendant; or 
any free property held by the recipient of a tainted gift. POCA 2002, s 83. The tainted gift 
provisions are necessary to ensure that those who have benefited from crime do not defeat the 
confiscation order by gifting assets. R v Kim Smith [2013] EWCA Crim 502, [2014] 1 WLR. 898; 
Johnson (n 16).  A consideration of these provisions falls outside the scope of this thesis.   
696 R v Summers [2008] EWCA Crim 872, [2008] 2 Cr App R (S) 101. 
697 Grayson and Barnham (n 509).  
698 POCA 2002, s 16. 
699 POCA 2002, s 17.  If the defendant fails to comply he may be treated as accepting the 
allegations in the prosecution statement except any allegation in respect of which he has 
complied with the requirement and any allegation that he has benefited from his general or 
particular conduct.   
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realisable assets were arrived at.700  When the court decides the available amount, it must 
include a statement of the findings in the confiscation order.701 
It is common for parties to agree figures to be put before the court for a confiscation order 
to be made.702 This has been criticised when there has been no proper assessment of 
what assets are available to satisfy the order703 or where it puts pressure on the 
prosecution to accept a compromise.704  However the fact that orders were settled 
between the prosecution and the defence is seen as pragmatic by the judiciary705 and a 
legitimate way of saving time and money by financial investigators.706 In Ghulam the Court 
of Appeal has approved the practice as it can save court time and resources by identifying 
what proceeds can be recovered in practice and can also serve the wider public interest 
and prevent unsuccessful enforcement.  
The judgment emphasised that even if the parties agree an order between them, it is for 
the court to determine what the appropriate order is.707  Even though the practicalities of 
the system are that parties will agree orders to put before the judge, it is recommended 
that all agreements should also include an assessment of how the order is to be satisfied 
so the judge can make any other orders necessary.  This is necessary in practice to 
 
700 R v Summers (n 696). 
701 POCA 2002, s 7(5).  It is this provision which means that assets are identified, but also permits 
the court to determine that the defendant has ‘hidden assets’ that cannot be identified but 
should be used to satisfy the confiscation order. The expression is indicative of the fact that the 
prosecution can have no means of knowing where the assets are or how they have been disposed 
of, R v Barnham [2005] EWCA Crim 1049, 1 Cr App R (S) 16 [41]. This determination can also cause 
difficulties for the magistrates’ court when enforcing a confiscation order, Payback Time (n 173) 
12.  This is because the very nature of them means that the defendant has not demonstrated the 
availability of assets, and the Crown Court has been bound to make an order in the total 
recoverable amount. In fact, Wood suggested that the term ‘hidden assets’ was a misnomer as 
sometimes there are no assets to satisfy the order, Wood, Enforcing Criminal Confiscation Orders 
(n 2) 11-12. A good example of a misnomer, this area falls outside the scope of this thesis. 
702 R v Ghulam [2018] EWCA Crim 1691, [2018] Crim LR 926.  The fact that orders were settled 
between the prosecution and the defence was seen as pragmatic by the judiciary interviewed by 
Bullock and others (n 29) 16.  
703 Joint Thematic Review (n 3) 40-41.  
704 Bullock and others (n 29) 16. 
705 ibid 16.  
706 Bullock, ‘Criminal Benefit’ (n 53) 61.   
707 Ghulam (n 702) [21]. 
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ensure that the magistrates’ court can identify which assets are available to satisfy the 
confiscation order. 
3.6.1 Imposition: Waya  
The SCA 2015 introduced a change to section 6 POCA 2002 brought about because of 
the case of Waya708 in which the Supreme Court decided that if an order for the defendant 
to pay a confiscation order would be disproportionate then the court should make an order 
in a reduced amount or not at all. 
In Waya, the Supreme Court considered whether the amendments made by POCA 1995 
to the powers of confiscation (which were reproduced in POCA 2002), were proportionate. 
The amendment considered was the removal of almost all discretion from the Crown 
Court to make a confiscation order or on the question of quantum, if the relevant statutory 
provisions had been established. It also considered whether the calculation of benefit 
provisions could in some circumstances be a contravention of Convention rights, noting 
that this question had not arisen before in cases in the Strasbourg court.709 
In some ways, the case turned on its own facts as it concerned a mortgage fraud when 
part of the purchase was funded by legitimate funds.  The majority decision was that the 
purpose of a confiscation order was not to act as a deterrent by imposing a further 
punishment but to deprive a criminal of the proceeds of his crime.  A1P1 of the ECHR 
required that the deprivation of property as a penalty had to be proportionate to the 
legitimate aim, which was to remove from criminals the pecuniary proceeds of their crime, 
the deterrent effect was secondary. As a result, a confiscation order should not be 
disproportionate to the benefit that a criminal derived from his criminal activity, although 
this did not allow a general judicial discretion, and the judgment made it clear that a 
general discretion as existed in the CJA 1988 before it was amended by POCA 1995 was 
not being re-introduced.  The judgment and the subsequent amendment to section 6 of 
 
708 Waya (n 125). 
709 ibid [5].  
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POCA 2002 means that if an order for the defendant to pay the recoverable amount would 
be disproportionate then the court should make an order in a reduced amount or not at 
all.710  
In a number of articles Dyer and Hopmeier considered the impact of Waya on the 
imposition of confiscation orders.711  They anticipated that the fact that the judgment 
created a need to consider the defendant’s A1P1 rights when making a confiscation order 
as having ‘far-reaching significance’.712  By the third article however, they suggested that 
little has changed in the way that the POCA legislation is applied when imposing a 
confiscation order, although they identified that the more significant impact of Waya is the 
effect on the repayment of the order.713  Their comments related to the impact of the 
judgment on repayment in relation to cases where the defendant had already made full 
restoration to a victim714 however, the impact of Waya has been felt by the magistrates’ 
court as it led to the judgment of Ahmad and Ahmed which has implications for the 
enforcement of magistrates’ court. 
3.6.2 Imposition: Ahmad and Ahmed 
In a case where there is more than one defendant the Crown Court now has to determine 
whether both defendants have received the same benefit.  If so both the Crown Court and 
the magistrates’ court are bound by the decision in Ahmad and Ahmed.715  In this case 
there were two defendants and the benefit figure was £16.1 million. The question the 
Supreme Court considered was whether the confiscation order should be £16.1 million 
against each defendant or £8.05 million each.  The Supreme Court followed the existing 
case law and said that any confiscation order should be £16.1 million against each 
 
710 POCA 2002, s 6(5) was amended by SCA 2015, sch 4, para 19. 
711 Polly Dyer and Michael Hopmeier, ‘Confiscation: Waya and other recent developments’ (2013) 
1 Arch Rev 7; Polly Dyer and Michael Hopmeier, ‘Confiscation: Waya and other recent 
developments’ (2013) 2 Arch Rev 6; Polly Dyer and Michael Hopmeier, ‘Keeping “proportionality” 
in proportion: an update on Waya and confiscation’ (2014) 2 Arch Rev 6. 
712 Dyer and Hopmeier, ‘Waya and other recent developments Part 1’ ibid 7. 
713 Dyer and Hopmeier, ‘Keeping “proportionality” in proportion’ (n 711) 6. 
714 ibid 6-7. 
715 Ahmad and Ahmed (n 12). 
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defendant, but that it would be disproportionate and contrary to A1P1 for the State to take 
the same amount twice in relation to the same benefit.716 It accepted that the appropriate 
way to prevent any violation of A1P1 would be the use of a proviso in the confiscation 
order.717  Therefore, where a finding of joint obtaining is made, whether against a single 
defendant or more than one, a confiscation order should be made for the whole value of 
the benefit obtained, but should provide that it is not to be enforced to the extent that a 
sum has been recovered by way of satisfaction of another confiscation order made in 
relation to the same joint benefit.718  
The court considered the implications of the decision on the enforcement of a confiscation 
order, noting that the decision may appear to produce inequity between defendants, as 
one of them may ‘obtain a windfall’ if another pays the order.  However, the judgment 
explained that is ‘an inherent feature of joint criminality’ explaining that if joint conspirators 
were sued by a victim, and judgments obtained, then the victim would be entitled to 
enforce the judgment against whichever defendant he most easily could.  The court 
commented that: ‘The losses must lie where they fall, and there is nothing surprising, let 
alone wrong, in the criminal courts adopting that approach’.719 
Although the Lords hailed the simplicity of the decision, the implications for the enforcing 
magistrates’ court were not considered. This is the first time that joint and several liabilities 
for a confiscation order has been identified as a suitable method of enforcement of a 
confiscation order.  The method has previously been identified in relation to other financial 
penalties but discouraged because of difficulties with enforcement. 
The Court of Appeal held in 1967 that a trial court is not concerned about matters between 
defendants on the enforcement of a joint and several order for costs720 and therefore there 
is no objection to a ‘joint and several’ order against a number of defendants in relation to 
 
716 ibid [72]. 
717 ibid [71]. 
718 ibid [74]. 
719 ibid [73]. 
720 R v Simmonds and others [1969] 1 QB 685 (CA) [697] (Fenton Atkinson J). 
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an order for prosecution costs order. In 1974 the same court held that although such 
orders were permissible, and within the spirit and intention of the compensation 
provisions, they were not to be made if substantial justice could be achieved by orders 
made severally.721 The main reason given by Widgery LCJ for not making a joint and 
several order was the practical and administrative complications which might arise in the 
enforcement by one or more magistrates’ courts.  At that time, one or more justices’ 
clerks722 could be looking after the accounts who would have to liaise constantly and there 
would be a danger in obtaining a sum greater than they are jointly and severally 
responsible to pay.  Widgery LCJ held that there must be some regard to the practicability 
of making such an order work.723 
In Ahmad and Ahmed, the Supreme Court changed the enforcement of joint benefit 
cases, not only by clarifying that more than one recovery cannot be made in respect of the 
same benefit, but also by introducing the concept of joint and several orders in 
confiscation. The intention of the decision was to provide clarity and predictability in 
relation to a procedure that was ‘inherently difficult.724 The consequences for the enforcing 
magistrates’ court are not so simple, including the need to calculate and re-calculate the 
co-defendants default sentences.725 This means that in this case, which concerned two 
defendants and a confiscation order in the sum of £16.1 million, if defendant 1 paid £12.6 
million, the magistrates’ court could only enforce £3.5 million but that could be enforced 
against either defendant.   
In construing POCA 2002, the court took into account the aim of the confiscation 
legislation, which is to recover assets obtained through criminal activity both because it 
was wrong for criminals to retain the proceeds of crime but also because it was necessary 
 
721 R v Grundy [1974] 1 WLR 139 (CA).  
722 Now designated officers, n 22. 
723 Grundy (n 721) 141F. 
724 Ahmad and Ahmed (n 12) [40]. 
725 David Winch, ‘Supreme Court Caps Confiscation Enforcement’ 
<http://www.accountingevidence.com/blog/2014/06/supreme-court-caps-confiscation-
enforcement/> accessed 14 March 2016. 
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to show that crime does not pay.726 However, the Supreme Court also highlighted the 
need for practicality in ensuring that the ‘recovery process in identifying, locating and 
confiscating the relevant assets was as simple, predictable and effective as possible’727 
because of the difficulties in the process.728 
Ahmad and Ahmed confirmed that the defendant’s A1P1 rights extended beyond the 
imposition of confiscation orders as in Waya, to the enforcement of them.  Undoubtedly 
this must be the correct position and is an example of the judiciary balancing the rights of 
the defendant with the nature and purpose of the regime. It also addresses Lawrence’s 
criticism of the Act in one regard.  He opined that the fact the same amount could be 
collected more than once in joint benefit cases was draconian and contrary to A1P1.  He 
was doubtful whether the point would be argued at the ECHR or whether the court would 
come to the right decision.729  His views on the application of A1P1 were justified, but in 
fact it was sufficient for the Supreme Court to consider it and ensure compliance.  
However, Ahmad gave no consideration to the problems on enforcement for the 
magistrates’ court. The decision adds to the already complex provisions without adding to 
the powers of the magistrates’ court and adds weight to the need to review the power 
available to the magistrates’ court to enforce a confiscation order. 
Dyer and Hopmeier’s article on Ahmad and Ahmed suggested more caselaw would 
follow730 and there has been some on the impact on the imposition of a confiscation 
order.731  However, the impact of the decision on this research is on the use of the 
proviso.  This was considered in R v Dad732 which involved three co-defendants and it 
 
726 Ahmad and Ahmed (n 12) [38]. 
727 ibid [38]. 
728 ibid [36]. 
729 Lawrence (n 667) 23.  
730 Polly Dyer and Michael Hopmeier ‘Ahmad and Fields-clarification by the Supreme Court or a 
precursor to more litigation? Recent developments on restraint and confiscation’ (2014) 10 Arch 
Rev 6. 
731 Namely where there is joint benefit the order should be made in the whole amount, for 
example R v Harvey [2015] UKSC 73, [2017] AC 105.  
732 [2014] EWCA Crim 2478.  The question of apportionment considered in the case falls outside of 
the scope of this thesis. 
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considered the form of the confiscation order, and therefore the implications for 
enforcement.  It held that following Ahmad and Ahmed the Crown cannot make more than 
one full recovery in respect of the same joint benefit as a matter of law which means that 
enforcement proceedings can ‘be resisted’ on that basis.733  It also held that the 
enforcement stage is the place to decide any subsequent issues, for example, the unlikely 
scenario where one of the defendants has a lottery win.734  It was made clear that there is 
no need for a proviso in every confiscation order however if there is a need, care should 
be taken when drafting the order and the order should record the extent of any sole and 
joint benefit.735  
In a commentary on Dad, Fortson was concerned that an absence of a proviso would 
cause difficulties, as the principles in Ahmad apply whether or not the order contains a 
proviso.  The author felt a bespoke proviso would be of benefit and it would be ‘regrettable 
if the inclusion of a proviso became the exception rather than the norm.’736  It is the 
experience of the research author that orders involving joint benefit have a proviso but this 
does not make the enforcement of orders any easier.  Any difficulties with enforcing 
against an asset where there is a single defendant are merely multiplied where there is 
more than one defendant.  It is essential to the magistrates’ court that the order made at 
the Crown Court is recorded clearly and sent to the magistrates’ court along with the 
schedule of assets.     
Given the need to ensure proportionality in the regime, it is understandable that the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights enquired whether the Serious Crime Bill should be amended 
to give clear effect to the decision of Ahmad and Ahmed, which the government said it 
would review,737 but there was no relevant provision in the SCA 2015.  It is difficult to see 
 
733 ibid [56] (Davis LJ).     
734 ibid [58].  
735 ibid [56], [59]. 
736 Fortson (n 61) 359. 
737 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Legislative Scrutiny: (1) Serious Crime Bill, (2) Criminal 
Justice and Courts Bill (second Report) and (3) Armed Forces (Service Complaints and Financial 
Assistance) Bill (2014–15, HL 49, HC 746) 1.24-1.25. 
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what legislative amendment could be included, as the amendments to section 6 following 
Waya already require any confiscation order to be proportionate and the case law has 
established that the magistrates’ court can only collect the benefit once.  
Young correctly identified that the confiscation legislation in the UK contains in-built 
mechanisms of proportionality.738  In POCA 2002, proportionality is achieved by the 
amendments to section 6 following Waya.  His article concentrates on proportionality at 
the imposition stage and in the use of restraint, but when considering the impact of Ahmad 
and Ahmed he identified a specific form of proportionality namely that if all co-defendants 
were ordered to pay the full amount of the benefit then that would be disproportionate to 
the gravity of the offence reflected in the total benefit obtained.739  This is precisely the 
approach taken in the case of Dad which followed Ahmad and Ahmed and held that there 
is no multiple recovery and no breach of a defendant’s A1P1 rights until the full benefit is 
paid off.740   
The changes because of Ahmad and Ahmed and Waya along with the subsequent 
change to section 6 POCA 2002 were viewed as positive by Wood.  She hoped they 
would mean that the setting of confiscation orders would be at a more realistic level which 
should make enforcement easier although she commented that it is not the role of judges 
to consider the practicalities of the enforcement of confiscation orders but to interpret the 
law as it is intended by Parliament.741   
In practice, it would cause more difficulties for the magistrates’ court if judges do not 
consider the practicalities of enforcement.  The Court in Ahmad and Ahmed emphasised 
the need for the system for locating and seizing assets to be as simple and effective as 
 
738 Simon N M Young, ‘Disproportionality in Asset Recovery: Recent Cases in the UK and Hong 
Kong’ in Colin King, Clive Walker and Jimmy Gurulé, (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of Criminal and 
Terrorism Financing Law’ (Palgrave Macmillan 2018) 474.  He explains that a confiscation order is 
capped at the available amount even if the benefit figure is higher.    
739 ibid 478. 
740 Dad (n 732) [58]. 
741 Wood, The Big Payback (n 5) 11. 
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possible742 which, it is argued, should be a consideration for the Crown Court judge.  
Wood’s paper focuses more on the enforcement of confiscation orders using restraint and 
receivers and considered the role of the CPS rather than the practical difficulties for  the 
magistrates’ court enforcing confiscation orders.  This may explain her conclusion which is 
out of step with the views of others and is the opposite of the one stop shop approach 
envisaged by the introduction of POCA 2002.  The Working Group First Report took the 
opposite view to Wood and recommended that the Crown Court should become more 
involved in the enforcement process by identifying how a confiscation order should be 
enforced743 as did the PIU Report.744 
The Crown Court already considers the enforcement of confiscation orders when making 
orders such as restraint and compliance restraint orders, and Hopmeier and Mills with 
their practical experience in the Crown Court explain the need for the Crown Court to 
consider making an enforceable order.745  It is suggested that, contrary to Wood’s view, 
practicalities of enforcement should be considered on imposition, and it is this view which 
should be preferred.   
However, the principle in Ahmad and Ahmed adds further complications to the already 
complex provisions for the magistrates’ court.   The recommendations in this thesis for the 
Crown Court powers to be extended  to make payment orders and charging orders would 
create the change of focus needed to help the magistrates’ court where the asset is a 
house or money in a bank account, and would allow judges to ensure that their orders are 
enforced more effectively.  
3.6.3 Role of the Crown Court  
When making a confiscation order the Crown Court will grant a period of time for payment 
and fix a period in default which the defendant is liable to serve if the order is not paid 
 
742 Ahmad and Ahmed (n 12) 38. 
743 Working Group First Report (n 137) 8-9. 
744 PIU Report (n 117) 71.  
745 Hopmeier and Mills (n 675) 458.   
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within that time, and the default term will be consecutive to any custodial sentence 
imposed for the offence the confiscation order relates to.  The Crown Court can also make 
a restraint order restraining the defendant and third parties from dealing with property. 
This may all sound straightforward but there are difficulties with the process.  The 
confiscation order is made in a financial amount and sent to the magistrates’ court for 
enforcement.  Despite the fact that assets are identified, the defendant does not need to 
use those assets to satisfy the order, and unless there is a restraint order, there are 
limited ways of preventing dissipation. The enforcement of confiscation orders by the 
magistrates’ court comes at the end often with considerable delay between the start of the 
criminal proceedings and the time the magistrates’ court can enforce a confiscation 
order.746   
Over the years issues have arisen relevant to this process and it is essential that all the 
relevant information about the confiscation order is entered by the Crown Court onto a 
form called form 5050 and any assets are listed on form 5050A.  These are sent to the 
magistrates’ court to give it all the information it needs to enforce the order.  Because of 
the nature of the confiscation order there is no need for the defendant to use assets 
identified at the Crown Court to satisfy the order, and it may well be that other assets will 
be identified as available to satisfy the order during the enforcement process, but if the 
defendant does not pay as ordered, the magistrates’ court needs to know which assets 
were identified at the Crown Court.     
The use of these forms has addressed concerns in the review documents that 
magistrates’ courts were not receiving information about assets identified at the Crown 
 
746 A confiscation order can now only be made in the Crown Court.  There may have been a delay 
before charging the defendant, and the nature of criminal proceedings means there will be some 
delay before the defendant pleads guilty or is convicted after a trial.  The court can postpone for 
up to two years from the date of conviction or longer if there are exceptional circumstances, 
POCA 2002, s 14.  The length of time taken to satisfy orders has been identified as an issue by 
Payback Time (n 173) 48 and Local to Global (n 224) 19.  
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Court.747  Although there have been improvements, more can be done748 and the 
importance of filling out the forms correctly was emphasised in Ghulam749 which shows 
that there are still issues which need to be addressed.  
The case emphasised the need for forms 5050 and 5050A to be completed with care 
especially when there is a question about whether there is a need for the Crown Court to 
decide whether to make a determination in relation to a third party’s interest in property.750  
Given the nature of the proceedings and the previous issues,  it is the experience of the 
research author that it is important that they are completed in all cases including cases 
involving joint benefit like Ahmad and Ahmed and are essential for the recommendations 
in this research. 
3.6.4  Changes to POCA 2002 made by the Serious Crime Act 2015 
The amendments to POCA 2002 made by the SCA 2015 include creating new powers for 
the Crown Court to make a compliance order,751 or a determination as to the defendant’s 
share in property (a section 10A determination).752  
 
747 The Working Group Third Report also recommended that the Crown Court judge should notify 
the magistrates’ court which assets had been taken into account when identifying a defendant’s 
benefit and felt that a standard form, which should identify the prosecutor, should be introduced 
for this purpose.  They also recommended that a copy of the prosecutor’s statement should be 
sent to the enforcing court to assist with enforcement, Working Group Third Report (n 126) paras 
2.12-2.14. A report in 2010 found that issues about the quality of timeliness of paperwork from 
the Crown Court caused issues for RCU staff with enforcement, because, for example, insufficient 
information about assets, Joint Thematic Review (n 3) 43.  The NAO found that much of the 
success in enforcing confiscation orders is started during the preparation of the case, NAO Report 
(n 71) 29. 
748 By 2004 staff in magistrates’ courts and Crown Courts were working together better and 
recognised the importance of all agencies working together. Although there were still some 
examples of delays in sending paperwork from the Crown Court it was expected this would 
reduce, Payback Time (n 173) 82. By 2013 the NAO reported error rates in the North East Region 
of 6% from Financial Investigators and 15% from Crown Courts, The NAO Report (n 71) 40.  
However, the PAC also highlighted errors in the information sent to enforcement units which it 
concluded reduced enforcement rates, PAC Report (n 328) 4, 12.  
749 Ghulam (n 702) [89]. 
750 ibid [91]. 
751 The new sections 13A and 13B POCA 2002 were inserted by SCA 2015, s7. 
752 POCA 2002, s 10A. 
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A compliance order is an order which the Crown Court must consider on imposition or at a 
later date on the application of the prosecutor.753  The power echoes the pre-existing 
power for the Crown Court to make an order it considers appropriate to ensure that a 
restraint order is effective.754  It can be made against the defendant or a third party and 
can include any restrictions, prohibitions or requirements necessary to ensure compliance 
with the confiscation order, but the Crown Court must consider travel restrictions on the 
defendant which would prevent him travelling outside the UK when it is considering 
whether to make the order.755  A compliance order is defined in the Act as an order the 
Crown Court may make if it believes it is ‘appropriate for the purpose of ensuring that the 
confiscation order is effective’.756  
Only one case has been reported on the use of compliance orders,757 which was an 
appeal on the making of a compliance order with travel restrictions.  The relevant part of 
the judgment for this thesis is that it was held that the use of the word ‘appropriate’ in 
section 13A(2) is not a synonym for ‘necessary’.  The Court agreed with the Explanatory 
Notes to the SCA 2015 that section 13A POCA 2002 is akin to the restraint order 
powers758 and held that the word ‘appropriate’ required no gloss. However, a compliance 
order must be justified.759  
Fisher describes the power as a ‘potentially far-reaching innovation’ and envisages other 
uses of a compliance order and gives the example of compelling the defendant to deal 
with his property in a particular way, for example by requiring the defendant to transfer 
monies in an offshore bank account to a local bank account.760  Using compliance orders 
in this way could make a practical difference to the enforcement of confiscation orders, for 
 
753 POCA 2002, s 13A(3); emphasis added. 
754 POCA 2002, 41(7) provides that the court may make such order it believes is appropriate for 
the purpose of ensuring that a restraint order is effective; emphasis added. 
755 POCA 2002, s 13A(4). 
756 POCA 2002, s 13A(2); emphasis added.    
757 R v Pritchard [2017] EWCA Crim 1267, [2018] 1 WLR 1631. 
758 Explanatory Notes to the Serious Crime Act 2015, para 46. 
759 Pritchard (n 757) [34].  
760 Fisher (n 60) 759. 
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example, if a compliance order is used as Fisher describes it would allow a payment order 
to be made. 
There is another area where a compliance order could be used, to make a practical 
difference to enforcement, namely where a house has been identified as an asset.  It 
could be used to require a defendant to market a house for sale, for example, within a 
certain timeframe, with a requirement to provide proof to the lead agency at named 
intervals.  As a compliance order can be made against a third party the order could 
require any estate agent to provide details of whether the house is being marketed at an 
appropriate price, how many viewings have been undertaken and whether any offers have 
been made.  The estate agent could also be required to give an opinion about whether 
any offers are reasonable.  This would assist the magistrates’ court if the house has not 
been sold before time for payment has expired as it would need to make a decision about 
whether it is reasonable to adjourn the enforcement hearing to allow the property to be 
marketed further before activating the default term.  The use of compliance orders in this 
way would fit in with Wood’s conclusion that such orders could be used innovatively to 
impact on levels of payments, a view which was supported by her interviewees,761 and 
also the view of Hopmeier and Mills who see the broad discretion to make this order an 
invaluable tool to ensure enforcement of confiscation orders.762  
The other relevant amendment to POCA 2002 by SCA 2015 is the introduction of section 
10A POCA 2002 which is a new power for the Crown Court to determine a defendant’s 
share in property on the making of a confiscation order. The changes mean that now the 
Crown Court has the power to determine the amount of the defendant’s assets, including 
the extent of any interest in a house or bank account which in turn has the effect of 
determining the extent of a third party’s assets.  For example, if a defendant and spouse 
claim that the defendant only owns 20 per cent of a property and the court determines the 
 
761 Wood, The Big Payback (n 5) 7. 
762 Hopmeier and Mills (n 675) 461.   
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defendant’s share as 50 per cent; then the decision means that the third party’s share is 
50 per cent and not 80 per cent as claimed by the parties.   
Once the Crown Court has made a determination under section 10A about the 
defendant’s assets it is binding on the third party, the receiver and any future court 
determining the realisation of the property or the transfer of the interest in it with a view to 
satisfying the confiscation order.763  As a result the Crown Court must now give the third 
party the opportunity to make representations at the determination stage764 rather than 
later and can now order a third party to provide any information to decide what the 
defendant’s share in any asset is.765  If the third party does not provide the Crown Court 
with the necessary information then the Crown Court can draw an inference as to the 
share of the defendant (and the third party)766 and could hold the third party in 
contempt.767  Any information given by the third party is not admissible in criminal 
proceedings,768 and this safeguard meant that the Joint Committee on Human Rights 
found that the provision is compatible with the right against self-incrimination contained in 
Article 6 of the ECHR.769   
The introduction of section 10A of POCA 2002 is relevant for a number of reasons.  It is 
an example of a change to POCA 2002 which fits in with the one stop shop policy of the 
 
763 The rights of third parties to make representations when an enforcement receiver has been 
appointed still apply where the court has made a determination under section 10A POCA 2002 
but these rights are limited to two situations, firstly if the third party was not given a reasonable 
right to make representations and has not appealed; or if there was a serious risk of injustice if 
the court was bound by the determination,  POCA 2002, s 51(8B) as inserted by SCA 2015, s 4.  A 
third party also has the right to be heard on an appeal POCA 2002, s 10A(4). 
764 POCA 2002 s 10(2). In order for the Crown Court to make a determination under s 10A, further 
amendments were made to POCA 2002 to provide for strengthened powers for the Crown Court 
to consider information.  As a result of the amendments in sections 16 and 18; and the new 
section 18A POCA 2002, the prosecutor and defendant and now third parties must provide the 
court with the necessary information to allow a determination under section 10A to be made, 
with the power for the court to draw inferences. The powers of an enforcement receiver are 
contained in s 51 POCA 2002 and allow a third party to make representations to the court where a 
determination has been made under section 10A POCA 2002.  
765 POCA 2002, s 18(2). 
766 POCA 2002, s 18A(4). 
767 POCA 2002, s 18A(5). 
768 POCA 2002, s 18A(9). 
769 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Serious Crime Bill (n 737) paras 1.26-1.27.  
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Act by moving decisions in relation to third parties to the Crown Court on imposition.  The 
changes show that the Crown Court can make decisions in relation to assets including 
bank accounts and houses when imposing a confiscation order.  It is therefore submitted 
that it would only be a small step for the Crown Court to then make a payment order or 
confiscation charging order on imposition as well. 
Determinations under s 10A are new with no detailed guidance on its application.770  Its 
effect remains to be seen771 but there have been cases considering its use which gives 
some indication of the sort of cases that could be subject to a determination under s10A 
POCA 2002 and where necessary a confiscation charging order could be made. The 
Explanatory Notes to the SCA 2015 explained that the Crown Court would determine 
those rights in relatively straightforward cases772 which is what happened in R v Taylor.773 
The third party interests related to one property, there was only one third party (the 
spouse), and there were no disputes of primary facts. In addition, the issue was about the 
amount of the beneficial interest in the matrimonial home, the third party was not aware of 
her husband’s criminal activities and therefore her interest in the matrimonial home was 
not tainted in that way.  As there was no issue of divorce, there were no issues under the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 to consider.   
Courts have also held that the section can be used to decide if a defendant could have a 
greater or lesser share of the matrimonial property than claimed but that an estranged 
husband or lender should be given the opportunity to make representations before making 
a decision.774 It can also be used to determine whether properties were held on trust by 
sons on behalf of their father.775   
 
770 Ghulam (n 702) [90].  
771 Hopmeier and Mills (n 675) 450.   
772 Explanatory Notes to the Serious Crime Act 2015, para 21. 
773 Manchester Crown Court, 9 February 2017. 
774 R v Hilton [2017] NICA 73. This case considered section 160A POCA 2002 which applies in 
Northern Ireland and is the equivalent to s 10A. 
775 Ghulam (n 702). 
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A determination made under section 10A POCA 2002 means that if there is a later 
application in any court, for example, an application for a restraint order in the Crown 
Court, or charging order in the county court, then the court hearing the application would 
be bound by the initial determination of the Crown Court.  Again, it is submitted that this 
adds weight to the recommendations in this thesis.   As the Crown Court would be hearing 
from the defendant and the third party, or drawing inferences if the third party does not 
comply with an order to provide information to the Crown Court, determining the rights of 
the third party under section 10A POCA 2002, the Crown Court should then go on to 
make either a confiscation charging order or a payment order if relevant as an alternative 
to restraint.  However, as orders including restraint orders can be made at the Crown 
Court after imposition, it is recommended that a s 10A determination should be available 
to the Crown Court at any stage on or after imposition on the application of the prosecutor, 
like a compliance order.  
Hopmeier and Mills identify that when dealing with s 10A determinations third parties 
involved may be companies or spouses.  This means that Crown Court judges may need 
to have a detailed knowledge of company law or the provisions of the Matrimonial Causes 
Act 1973 and may have to adjourn confiscation proceedings pending the outcome of 
family proceedings.776 This research cannot cover all the issues in relation to confiscation 
and a detailed review of these areas would not impact on the recommendations made.  It 
would however be a useful topic for further research, particularly in relation to charging 
orders if the asset is the matrimonial home.777  
3.7 Conclusions of chapter 
The regime is acknowledged as draconian, but there are balances to protect the 
defendant.  A less draconian option can be chosen if there is one available, and one of the 
 
776 Hopmeier and Mills (n 675) 451. 
777 Further research should also consider similarities to contract law and applications to set aside a 
legal charge due to claims of undue influence or misrepresentation by a spouse who claims this is 
why they entered into a credit agreement using the matrimonial home as a security, Richard 
Stone and James Devenney, The Modern Law of Contract (12th edn, Routledge 2017) 369-380. 
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balances in the system is the protection of the defendant’s human rights. The principles 
that can be taken from the case law in relation to the ECHR are that Article 6(2) has no 
application to confiscation order proceedings, but the rest of the article applies, as does 
A1P1. If the confiscation order is compliant with the ECHR then its enforcement can be. 
The Supreme Court in Ahmad and Ahmed identified difficulties with locating and 
recovering assets and that the confiscation of relevant assets should be as simple, 
predictable and effective as possible.  However, the decision has added a further layer of 
complexity to the enforcement of confiscation orders.  POCA 2002 was an attempt to 
simplify the legislation but has required amendment on a number of occasions, and there 
are still issues on enforcement which the legislation has failed to address.   
Getting the order right on imposition is important for enforcement and it is recommended 
that Crown Court judges should consider the enforcement of the confiscation order when 
it is made and that all the information in the possession of the Crown Court should be put 
on the relevant forms to aid the magistrates’ court enforcing the order. However, the 
nature of a confiscation order means that it is a financial order and the defendant does not 
have to use those assets to satisfy the order without a further order of a court. 
The confiscation order legislation has developed in a piecemeal fashion over many years 
which has added to the complexity of the magistrates’ court enforcing an order.  However, 
the fines based powers have not changed and have not been used for the type of cases 
envisaged when the regime was introduced.  There is also a lack of certainty about the 
purpose of the legislation, and it is suggested this is connected to the difficulties in 
assessing the success or otherwise of confiscation orders.  As a result, the 
recommendations in this thesis have to meet a number of purposes.  There is an 
important need to ensure a court order is enforced in all cases, there is a focus on 
collection rates and now also disruption and it is suggested that the recommendations in 
this thesis should also be judged against the purpose of POCA 2002 to create a one stop 
shop in relation to confiscation at the Crown Court.    
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There are two new changes to POCA 2002 made by the SCA 2015 which can be made 
on the imposition of a confiscation order.  A compliance order could be used innovatively 
to support the recommendations in this thesis for the Crown Court to make a confiscation 
charging order, and for the extension of the payment order provisions.  The Crown Court 
can now also make a determination on the defendant’s share in property when 
determining the amount of a confiscation order.  This determination will be binding on 
future proceedings to determine the realisation of the property or the transfer of an interest 
in it with a view to satisfying the confiscation order.  If the third parties are not given the 
opportunity to make representations on a section 10A POCA 2002 determination, the 
order will be quashed.  It is recommended that as well as these new powers, the Crown 




Chapter 4 The Enforcement of Confiscation Orders: Restraint and charging 
orders made under the confiscation legislation   
4.1 Introduction  
The two questions posed by this thesis are, firstly, how has the confiscation legislation 
developed in relation to the enforcement of confiscation orders in the magistrates’ court? 
Then, secondly, what future legislative amendments might assist the enforcement of 
confiscation orders by the magistrates’ court and create an alternative to restraint? In 
order to answer the second question it is necessary to review the law of restraint, and the 
power to make a charging order in the pre-POCA 2002 legislation.   
Powers are essential to prevent defendants dealing in property so it is not hidden, 
dissipated or removed from the jurisdiction778 and both a restraint order and a charging 
order preserve property.779   Assets are not taken from the defendant without the 
appointment of a receiver, or in addition for charging orders, an application for an order for 
sale.      As a result, one of the most basic issues with restraint is that any assets which are 
restrained do not satisfy the confiscation order unless they are either released by the 
defendant, an enforcement receiver is appointed or the magistrates’ court takes an 
enforcement action.   
The power to make a restraint order existed in the pre-POCA 2002 legislation and 
continued in POCA 2002 although the power has subsequently been amended.  The 
charging order powers which existed in the pre-POCA 2002 legislation did not survive 
when POCA 2002 was enacted.  A charging order under the pre-POCA 2002 legislation is 
an alternative to restraint and a restraint order still cannot be made in relation to any 
property subject to a charging order made under the confiscation legislation.  Therefore, a 
 
778 Home Office Guide (n 4) 13.    
779 Sutherland Williams, Hopmeier and Jones only mention restraint (n 58) 69; Mitchell Taylor and 
Talbot mention both restraint and charging orders vol 1, para 3.063 (R0: February 2002). Gentle, 
Spinks and Harris (n 491) 7. 
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restraint order cannot be made under POCA 2002 on the property if there is a charge 
made under one of the pre-POCA 2002 Acts.780 
At the heart of this thesis is an analysis of the enforcement powers of the magistrates’ 
court with the aim of identifying improvements and the conclusion that there is a need for 
alternatives to restraint including the power for the Crown Court to make a charging order.  
The practical experiences of the research author meant she was aware of the power for 
the designated officer for the magistrates’ court to make an application for a charging 
order in the county court to enforce a confiscation order, and was intrigued to discover the 
power existed for the High Court to make a charging order in the pre-POCA 2002 
legislation.  In order to compare both charging order provisions it is necessary to analyse 
the powers to make a charging order within the confiscation proceedings in this chapter, 
which will later be compared to the powers available to the magistrates’ court.781   
Both the Proceeds of Crime Bill Draft Clauses and the Explanatory Notes to POCA 2002 
refer to the power for the High Court to make a charging order being ‘abolished’ when 
POCA 2002 came into force.782  In reality what happened is that POCA 2002 did not 
contain a power to make a charging order, but the power for the High Court to make a 
charging order still exists for any confiscation order made under the pre-POCA 2002 
legislation.783  A charging order could still be made as confiscation orders are being made 
and enforced under the pre-POCA legislation, although the research author is unaware of 
these applications being made by the prosecutors in practice. 
Both restraint orders and charging orders are considered as a method of enforcing 
confiscation orders in this thesis despite the fact that the term could be considered as a 
misnomer. This is due in part to the fact that like a confiscation order, a restraint order is 
 
780 POCA 2002, s 41(8). 
781 The comparison is done in chapter 7, text to n 1492-n 1501. 
782 Proceeds of Crime Bill: Publication of Draft Clauses (n 31) para 2.13.  Explanatory Notes to the 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, para 87. 
783 The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Commencement No 5, Transitional Provisions, Savings and 
Amendment) Order 2003, SI 2003/333, art 10. 
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made against the person, not the property and does not create any right in the property.784  
Put simply, the Home Office described a restraint order by explaining that ‘Property itself 
is not restrained; rather, a person is “restrained”, by order of the court from dealing with 
it.’785  A restraint order will usually name the defendant, although it will prevent ‘any other 
person’ dealing with realisable property.786  They are temporary orders787 which preserve 
property788 and the assets often stay in the possession of the defendant unless there a 
receiver is appointed.789  They can last a long time790 and are ‘essentially a means to an 
end, the end being the satisfaction of a confiscation order which may be or has been 
made’.791   
Despite the idea that a restraint order as an enforcement action is a misnomer, restraint is 
seen by the review documents and practitioners as an effective tool for enforcing 
confiscation orders which has a significant impact on the overall success of 
enforcement.792 Therefore it is considered as one of the methods of enforcement in this 
research. However, a restraint order can only be effective if it is made and this chapter will 
show that there are issues with the order and a perceived reluctance to make restraint 
orders because of the costs involved. There have been other issues with the orders since 
the power was first introduced, and not all of them have been addressed despite changes 
 
784 Mitchell Taylor and Talbot vol 2 para III.051 (R6: April 2005).  
785 Home Office Guide (n 4) 13. 
786 Sutherland Williams, Hopmeier and Jones (n 58) 25. 
787 Young (n 738) 472. 
788 Sutherland Williams, Hopmeier and Jones only mention restraint (n 58) 69; Mitchell Taylor and 
Talbot mention both restraint and charging orders vol 1, para 3.063 (R0: February 2002). Gentle, 
Spinks and Harris (n 491) 7. 
789 Bell (n 499) 785. 
790 Lexi Holdings (n 542) [83]. Months or years can elapse between the start of the investigation 
and the trial, Sutherland Williams, Hopmeier and Jones (n 58) 15.  A confiscation order can be 
postponed for up to two years or longer after conviction, POCA 2002, s 14.  The restraint order 
will stay in force until the order is paid in full or the order is discharged, POCA 2002, s 42 which 
could be years after imposition. 
791 Lexi Holdings (n 542) [8] (Keene LJ). 
792 Bullock et al found that orders with a restraint order were more likely to be paid than those 
without and this supported the views of the practitioners they interviewed that restraint was 
critical to the enforcement of confiscation orders.  Bullock and others (n 29) 20-22.  This was the 
finding of Wood based on her research, but she found that it was based on opinion not evidence.  
Wood, The Big Payback (n 5) 4.  
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in the legislation.  Because charging orders were made rarely by the High Court, most of 
the issues relate to restraint orders.  However, this chapter analyses both types of orders. 
Restraint was still seen as a major issue by the Home Affairs Committee in 2016. A review 
of the 22 written submissions published by the Committee793 shows that eleven mentioned 
restraint, with ten suggesting that there were problems with it and the recommendations of 
the Committee show that restraint was seen as a major issue which needed reform. This 
chapter will show that emphasis was placed on the number of restraint orders made.   
Instead of concentrating on the number of restraint orders, this thesis has analysed the 
nature and scope of a restraint order and the appointment of a receiver.  It considers the 
issues which have arisen and whether recent changes in the legislation have addressed 
those issues.  As a result, it makes recommendations for alternatives to restraint, rather 
than changes to the restraint order regime. 
4.2 The nature of the orders 
For a confiscation order made pre-POCA 2002 the powers available are restraint and 
charging orders which can only be made in the High Court.  Since POCA 2002 only 
restraint orders can be made, and applications are heard in the Crown Court. A restraint 
order is an order against a person preventing them from dealing with property.794  As such 
a restraint order applies to realisable property, and can apply very widely as it can prevent 
anyone dealing with realisable property owned by the defendant or that he has an interest 
in795 as it prevents a person dealing in property.796  It does not just apply to the defendant 
but to anyone else who owns a share in property with the defendant.  This means that if a 
defendant has a share in a home or a bank account a co-owner may not be able to deal 
 
793 HAC 2016 Report (n 26) 7. 
794 Sutherland Williams, Hopmeier and Jones (n 58) 15. 
795 POCA 2002, s 41(1). 
796 Home Office Guide (n 4) 13. 
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with the property.  A restraint order also applies to a bank holding an account for the 
defendant.797   
Under the pre-POCA 2002 legislation a charging order is defined as ‘an order …imposing 
on any such realisable property as may be specified in the order a charge for securing the 
payment of money to the Crown.’798 A charging order is narrower in scope as it only 
applies to the property itself subject to the charge799 and only applies to the defendant’s or 
third party’s interest in it.800  
However, the process is complex. Originally this was because there was a mix of the civil 
nature of the applications and the criminal nature of the confiscation proceedings, but also 
because the processes were unfamiliar.801 The restraint proceedings in POCA 2002 are 
still complex802 as confirmed by the High Court in the postscript to Lexi Holdings. The 
Court explained that sometimes issues in relation to restraint can be straightforward and 
heard normally in the Crown Court. However, sometimes restraint cases are complex 
involving beneficial interests, equitable charges and tracing and consideration should be 
given to listing applications to relax such restraint orders before a specialist Chancery 
Circuit judge or a High Court judge of the Chancery Division, or heard by a Crown Court 
judge with the relevant experience.803  
4.3 The development of restraint and charging pre-POCA 2002 
The DTOA 1986, which included the first restraint and charging order provisions ‘owes 
much to the Hodgson report’.804 The Hodgson Committee considered the limited case law 
on injunctions by police prior to trial and found that it was only possible to obtain an 
 
797 Sutherland Williams, Hopmeier and Jones (n 58) 25. 
798 DTOA 1986, s9(2); CJA 1988, s 78(2); DTA 1994, s 27(2). 
799 DTOA 1986, s9; CJA 1988, s 78; DTA 1994, s 27; Home Office Guide (n 4) 14. 
800 Re Norris (n 3).   
801 Levi and Osofsky (n 162) 18. 
802 The complexity of restraint orders under POCA 2002 was also identified as an issue in Bullock 
and others (n 29) iii. 
803 Lexi Holdings (n 542) [92].    
804 Alldridge, Money Laundering Law (n 39) 77. 
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injunction if the asset was arguably the property of the victim of crime.805  It also 
considered the restraint of assets in civil proceedings before recommending that pre-trial 
restraint should be available to the State to enforce a confiscation order806 totalling 
£10,000 or more, as long as the restraint was proportionate to the likely confiscation 
order.807  The Committee found that there was no logic in allowing a civil claim to be 
brought by a victim for a bank account to be restrained, but not the State enforcing a fine 
or confiscation.808  
As a result, restraint orders and charging orders were introduced in the DTOA 1986. 
These were discretionary orders that could be made in the High Court on the application 
of the prosecutor as a way of enforcing confiscation orders. Powers of the High Court to 
make restraint and charging orders continued in the CJA 1988 and the DTA 1994.  
Although powers of the High Court were widened as the legislation was amended, the 
powers of the High Court pursuant to the CJA 1988 (as amended) and the DTA 1994 
were similar.809  It was intended that these powers would be used in larger and more 
complex cases leaving other cases to be enforced in the magistrates’ court in the same 
way as a fine.810 
The restraint order prohibits any person from dealing with realisable property unless 
permitted by the restraint order.811  ‘Realisable property’ is defined in the Acts to include 
any property held by the defendant, or by anyone else if the defendant had made a gift 
covered by the Act.812  The order can be widely drafted and can apply to all realisable 
property held by a person whether or not it was described in the order and can apply to 
 
805 Hodgson Report (n 123) 106. 
806 Or fine or compensation order. 
807 Hodgson Report (n 123) 107-108. 
808 ibid 107. 
809 By the time of the amended CJA 1988 and the DTA 1994 there were powers to make a restraint 
order and charging order before charge and after a confiscation order had been made.  The 
powers to make a restraint order and charging order are contained in DTOA 1986, s 7, CJA 1988, s 
76 as amended, and DTA 1994, s 25. 
810 'The UK Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986' (n 17) 1632. 
811 DTOA 1986, s 8; CJA 1988, s 77; DTA 1994, s 26. 
812 DTOA 1986, s5; CJA 1988, s 74; DTA 1994, s 6. 
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property transferred after the making of the order.813 A restraint order is enforceable by the 
appointment of a receiver.814 The only difference between the pre-POCA 2002 legislation 
is that where a restraint order has been made under the DTA 1994 the High Court or 
county court could appoint a receiver, whereas one could only be appointed in the High 
Court where the restraint order was made under the DTOA 1986 or the CJA 1988.815 
Like restraint orders, charging orders were introduced in the DTOA 1986 and the powers 
were available to the High Court in the same circumstances, namely that the proceedings 
had started and not concluded, and there was reasonable cause to believe that the 
defendant had benefited from drug trafficking.816 The application was made in the same 
way as a restraint order.817 
The wording of the charging order provisions changed slightly as it progressed from the 
DTOA 1986, through the CJA 1988 and the DTA 1994 but the majority of the provisions 
remain the same.  Under the DTOA 1986, a charging order could be made absolutely or 
subject to conditions including notifying the person holding any interest in the property to 
which the order relates, or when the order was to become enforceable.818  Under the CJA 
1988 and the DTA 1994 the order could again be made absolutely or on conditions, but 
with the additional condition as to the time when the order came into effect.819  
A charging order can be applied for only by the prosecutor, and like a restraint order can 
only be made to the High Court; with any application to discharge or vary an order also 
made to the High Court. The court must discharge the charging order if the proceedings 
are concluded or the payment is made in full.820  The assets that could be subject to a 
 
813 DTOA 1986, s 8(2); CJA 1988, s 77(3); DTA 1994, s 26(2). 
814 DTOA 1986, s 13; CJA 1988, s 82; DTA 1994, s 31. 
815 DTOA 1986, s 11(1); CJA 1988, s80(1); DTA 1994, s 29(1). The Working Group First Report 
recommended that the county court should have jurisdiction to appoint receivers (n 137) 9. 
816 DTOA 1986, s 9. 
817 DTOA 1986, s 7, CJA 1988, s 76, and DTA 1994, s 25. 
818 DTOA 1986, s 10(1).  
819 CJA 1988, s 78(3)(d), DTA 1994, s 27(3)(d). 
820 DTOA 1986, s9(7), CJA 1988, s 78(7); DTA 1994, s 27(7). 
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charge in the pre-POCA 2002 legislation are land and certain securities;821 and a charge 
is registered in the same way as an order made under the Charging Orders Act 1979.822  
The order can be made in an amount equal to the value from time to time of the property 
charged but not exceeding the amount of the confiscation order.823  A charging order 
creates an interest in the property subject to the charge.  It does not prevent anyone 
dealing with the property but does require notice to be given to the person in whose favour 
the charge is made.   
A charging order can be enforced by the appointment of a receiver and an application for 
order for sale although the powers of the receiver in relation to charging are not as wide 
as those in relation to restraint, as the court cannot order anyone to give possession of the 
property to the receiver or to realise the property.824 This means in practical terms that the 
receiver would have to apply for an order for sale and the receiver would have his fees 
paid first.   
4.4 Procedure for applying for a charging order in the pre-POCA 2002 legislation 
The application for a restraint and charging order under the pre-POCA 2002 legislation is 
made by the prosecutor in the High Court and the process is covered by the Rules of the 
Supreme Court (RSC) Order 115.  The current process for applying for a restraint order is 
analysed when looking at POCA 2002 restraint,825 and this section concentrates on the 
process for applying for a charging order under the pre-POCA 2002 legislation.  Under 
RSC Order 115, the prosecutor has to support the application with a witness statement or 
affidavit.826  If the charging order is made then the prosecutor must serve the order and a 
copy of the witness statement or affidavit on all relevant parties.827  A charging order (and 
a restraint order) can only be made on the application of the prosecutor and can be made 
 
821 DTOA 1986, s9(5), CJA 1988, s 78(5); DTA 1994, s 27(5). 
822 DTOA 1986, 10, CJA 1988, s 79; DTA 1994, s 28. 
823 DTOA 1986, s 9(1), CJA 1988, s 78(1); DTA 1994, s 27(1). 
824 DTOA 1986, s 11(3); CJA 1988, s80(3); DTA 1994, s 29(3).  
825 Which are governed by the Criminal Procedure Rules. 
826 RSC Ord 115, r 3. 
827 RSC Ord 115, r 4(4). 
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without notice to a judge in chambers.828 The limited case law on charging orders made in 
confiscation proceedings supported the idea that an order made without notice should not 
have a return date.  Instead the order could be made with provision for the parties to apply 
to the court at short notice if there is a need for a hearing with notice.829 
Either the prosecutor or anyone affected by the charging order can apply for the charging 
order to be discharged or varied and again the application must be supported by a witness 
statement or affidavit and served in accordance with the Order.830  There is no need to 
give notice if the case is urgent or notice would cause a reasonable apprehension of the 
dissipation of assets.831  The charging order must be discharged by the court if 
proceedings for the offences have concluded, or the payment of the amount secured by 
the charge has been paid in full; and may be discharged if the prosecutor gives notice that 
it is no longer appropriate for the charging order to remain in place.832 
The terms of a charging order made under the pre-POCA 2002 legislation is left to the 
judge in chambers, including whether a condition to notify any other person with an 
interest in the property should be included.833 Mitchell et al explain that if charging orders 
were made it would be prior to a confiscation order being made, and should be in the 
following terms: 
The [defendant’s beneficial interest in the] property known as X shall be charged 
forthwith for securing payment to the Crown of an amount equal to the value from 
time to time of the said [beneficial interest in the] property (subject to any prior 
charges).834 
 
828 DTOA 1986, s 9(3); CJA 1988, s 78(3); DTA 1994, s 27(3).  The equivalent provisions for restraint 
are DTOA 1986 s 8(4); CJA 1988 s 77(5); DTA 1994 s 26(4). 
829 Ahmad v Ahmad [1999] 1 FLR 317 (CA).   
830 RSC Ord 115, r 5. 
831 RSC Ord 115, r 6. 
832 RSC Ord 115, r 5(3)-(4). 
833 Re Norris (n 3). 
834 Mitchell Taylor and Talbot vol 1, para 3.059 (R0: February 2002). 
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The discretion whether to make a charging order under the DTA 1994 has been given as 
an example of the fact that genuine property rights of third parties are respected under the 
confiscation legislation; and also that the draconian nature of the confiscation legislation is 
not to be ‘applied indiscriminately.835   
4.5 The use of charging orders in the pre-POCA 2002 legislation 
According to Levi and Osofsky, a charging order made under the pre-POCA 2002 
legislation was ‘especially well-suited’ when a defendant owns part of an asset as it 
secures the Crown’s interest in the property until the payment secured by the charge is 
made into the court.836  They also found that it was felt by some police officers and 
prosecutors that there were difficulties with these applications as they were unfamiliar, 
being civil in nature even though they related to criminal proceedings.837  
Guidance became available from the Home Office guide which included the use of 
charging orders,838 but by the time of the Working Group Third Report it was found that 
justices’ clerks had little guidance when enforcing large cases, especially those with 
restraint or charging orders.  It was therefore recommended that guidance or legislation 
should make it clear that the relevant prosecuting agency is responsible for enforcing a 
confiscation order if there is a restraint order or charging order in force.839  If the 
recommendation in this thesis to introduce a confiscation charging order is adopted then 
the lead agency would be determined at the stage when the charging order is made.840  
The Working Group Third Report also made recommendations in relation to the use of 
civil enforcement powers of the magistrates’ court (which were then undertaken by the 
justices’ clerk). The Report identified the scope for increased use of charging orders and 
 
835 Customs and Excise Commissioners v A (n 494) [24].  
836 Levi and Osofsky (n 162) 20. 
837 ibid 18. 
838 Home Office Guide (n 4) 14-15. 
839 Working Group Third Report (n 126) para 2.31. 
840 It is recommended that if there is a risk of dissipation then the prosecutor should be the lead 
agency, but if the charging order will come into effect after time for payment has expired, that is, 
it is an enforcement action, then HMCTS will be the lead agency. 
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recommended that the confiscation legislation should be amended so that a justices’ clerk 
could apply for a charging order and a receiver to enforce the order in the county or High 
Court.  Running alongside this was a recommendation that what is now the designated 
officer for the magistrates’ court841 should be able to deduct their costs from the 
confiscation order monies in the same way that a receiver does.842  However, it is 
submitted that the recommendation for the designated officer to apply for a charging order 
in the county court or High Court using the pre-POCA 2002 legislation would create the 
same practical issues as applying in those courts using Part 3 of the MCA 1980 in relation 
to costs and re-litigation.843  It is therefore recommended that a power to make a 
confiscation charging order for confiscation orders made under POCA 2002 should be 
introduced.  
There is an example of charging orders being used in confiscation order proceedings 
pursuant to the CJA 1988 where the defendant owned a number of properties including a 
share in the matrimonial home which provides judicial support for the use of charging 
orders.  Hobhouse J considered that as the confiscation legislation is there to ensure that 
people do not profit from their crimes it is necessary for strong powers, by which he meant 
charging orders, to be available to achieve that.844  He opined that as a result orders such 
as the charging order in this case have to be made in a ‘comprehensively and 
appropriately strong form’ and early in proceedings to ensure that defendants do not 
evade the consequences of the legislation.845  This adds further strength to the 
recommendations in this thesis in relation to the introduction of a power for the Crown 
Court to make charging orders under POCA 2002.846 
 
841 When the report was written the enforcement responsibility lay with the justices’ clerk, but the 
functions of the justices’ clerk and the designated officer in this regard are the same, n 22. 
842 Working Group Third Report (n 126) paras 2.33-2.37. 
843 Namely the difficult process, the re-litigation of issues and the costs involved. 
844 Ahmad v Ahmad (n 829) [324] (Hobhouse LJ).  
845 ibid [324] (Hobhouse LJ). 
846 Namely that a charging order can preserve property and can be sufficient to preserve assets so 
they are available to satisfy the confiscation order.  
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Despite this, although the Proceeds of Crime Bill was initially drafted to include charging 
orders, the view of the government was that the use of charging orders should be 
abolished. This was because it said that they were used rarely in relation to confiscation, 
as property that could be made subject to a charging order could also be made subject to 
a restraint order or enforced in some other way. On this basis the government felt that 
there was a ‘strong case to abolish the provisions on charging orders in the confiscation 
legislation’ which was its proposal.847 This view can be seen to be supported by Mitchell et 
al who comment that charging orders were ‘rarely made at all’848 and in practice only in 
the case of land.849  As a result the Explanatory Notes to POCA 2002 describe the 
abolition of charging orders as a fundamental change to the restraint order provisions and 
explain that they were abolished as ‘unnecessary’850 although in practice the power is still 
available for confiscation orders made under the pre-POCA 2002 legislation.851 
Because charging orders are not an option for the Crown Court in POCA 2002, the only 
power to apply for a charging order is by the designated officer for the magistrates’ court 
using section 87 MCA 1980 after time for payment has expired.852  It is recommended that 
the time has come to revisit the decision not to include charging orders as a power for the 
Crown Court in POCA 2002.  The re-introduction of the power would provide an 
alternative to restraint and meet some of the issues identified in relation to the restraint 
order regime outlined in this chapter.   
4.6 A restraint order under POCA 2002 
Sutherland Williams et al state that the use of civil remedies in the criminal courts to 
prevent dissipation and realise assets are one of the most striking features of the 
confiscation regime.853  Changes had been made to the restraint process but in the PIU 
 
847 Proceeds of Crime Bill: Publication of Draft Clauses (n 31) para 2.13. 
848 Mitchell Taylor and Talbot vol 1, para 3.059 (R0: February 2002). 
849 ibid vol 1, para 3.061 (R0: February 2002). 
850 Explanatory Notes to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, paras 86-87. 
851 Text to n 782-n783. 
852 Using the fines based powers.   
853 Sutherland Williams, Hopmeier and Jones (n 58) 137. 
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report it was suggested that further improvements could be made and figures produced in 
the report showed a declining number and percentage of restraint orders.854 Earlier 
reviews had raised concerns about issues because applications had to be applied for at 
the High Court in London855 and there was a recommendation in the HAC Seventh Report 
that applications for restraint orders should be able to be made at District Registries of the 
High Court to reduce delays.856  The PIU report recommended that restraint orders and 
charging orders should be made at the Crown Court (rather than at the High Court) so that 
applications were not limited to the 20 judges in the High Court authorised to hear 
restraint cases, who sat mainly in London.857 There was no other mention of charging 
orders in the report and no details of the numbers of orders made. 
A restraint order made under the pre POCA 2002 legislation is a civil order.  The order 
has to be made by the High Court, but the PIU criticised the fact that the confiscation 
order would be made in the Crown Court (or in the case of the CJA 1988 possibly the 
magistrates’ court), but any applications for a charging order or a restraint order would be 
heard in the High Court.  As a result, the PIU report recommended that both charging 
orders and restraint orders should be made available in the legislation that became POCA 
2002 but that they should be made at the Crown Court as part of what was seen as the 
creation of a one stop shop for confiscation at the Crown Court.858  The Proceeds of Crime 
Bill859 adopted many of the recommendations in the PIU report.  There was one issue not 
identified in the report, but which the government addressed in the legislation namely the 
power to make a restraint order earlier in the proceedings.  Acknowledging that this had 
not been addressed in the report, the Bill was drafted to allow restraint and charging 
orders to be made at any time after an investigation had been commenced.860  The 
Regulatory Impact Assessment to the Bill assessed that the increased use of restraint 
 
854 PIU Report (n 117) 68. 
855 HAC Seventh Report (n 129) xviii; Levi and Osofsky (n 162) 34-35. 
856 HAC Seventh Report ibid xviii. 
857 PIU Report (n 117) 69. 
858 Proceeds of Crime Bill: Publication of Draft Clauses (n 31). 
859 Proceeds of Crime HC Bill (2001-02) [31]. 
860 Proceeds of Crime Bill: Publication of Draft Clauses (n 31) para 2.11. 
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orders would lead to more effective confiscation orders861 whilst the transfer of the power 
to order restraint from the High Court to the Crown Court would simplify the law and result 
in increased efficiency.862 
Mitchell et al explain that the restraint powers in the CJA 1988 and the DTA 1994 were 
‘found to be effective’ and ‘remained untrammelled.’ It was therefore unsurprising that the 
restraint powers in POCA 2002 were similar.863  The legislation in relation to receivers 
changed slightly in POCA 2002, but only because the High Court has inherent powers to 
make orders in relation to restraint. Because the Crown Court now appoints receivers, the 
duties of a receiver are now specified in POCA 2002.864  The fact that restraint orders and 
the appointment of receivers are dealt with in the Crown Court is as a result of the aim to 
create a one stop shop for confiscation in the Crown Court. 
The current powers to make a restraint order under POCA 2002 are contained in sections 
40 to 42 of the Act.  The applicant can be a prosecutor or an accredited financial 
investigator865 and one of five conditions has to be satisfied before the Crown Court can 
make a restraint order.866 Once the order is made, the Crown Court can make any order to 
ensure that the restraint order is effective. 867 
The first condition which can trigger a restraint order applies if a criminal investigation has 
been started in England and Wales and there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the 
alleged offender has benefited from his criminal conduct.868  The second condition arises 
where proceedings have started but not been concluded and there is reasonable cause to 
believe that the defendant has benefited from his criminal conduct.869  The third condition 
 
861 ibid Annex, para 26. 
862 ibid Annex, para 27. 
863 Mitchell Taylor and Talbot vol 2, para III.001 (R3: October 2003). 
864 POCA 2002, ss 49, 51. 
865 POCA 2002, s 42(2). 
866 POCA 2002, s 40. 
867 POCA 2002, s 41(7)-(7D). 
868 POCA 2002, s 40(2). This condition was changed from reasonable grounds to suspect to 
reasonable cause to believe by the Serious Crime Act 2015. Text to n 901-n 912. 
869 POCA 2002, s 40(3). 
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applies if there is an application by the prosecutor for a re-consideration of a confiscation 
order under sections 19 or 20 POCA 2002, or an application for a confiscation order is 
made because the defendant has absconded;870 and there is reasonable cause to believe 
that the defendant has benefited from his criminal conduct.871  The fourth and fifth 
conditions apply to applications by the prosecutor for a reconsideration of benefit872 or 
available amount873 or where the court believes that an application is to be made when 
there must be reasonable cause to believe that the court will decide that the new amount 
under the new calculation of the defendant’s benefit or available amount (as the case may 
be) will exceed the relevant amount.  There are safeguards for the defendant in the Act as 
the court cannot grant the application if there has been undue delay or the prosecutor 
does not intend to proceed.874 
As can be seen a restraint order can be applied for under POCA 2002 as soon as a 
criminal investigation has been started in England and Wales as long as certain criteria 
have been met. The legislation also widened the persons who can apply for restraint.  A 
financial investigator can now apply for a restraint order under POCA 2002; under the pre-
POCA 2002 legislation only a prosecutor could apply.875  Like the previous legislation, the 
restraint order applies to realisable property876 and prevents the defendant and anyone 




870 Under sections 27 or 28 POCA 2002. 
871 POCA 2002, s 40(4). 
872 POCA 2002, s 40(5).  The application for a reconsideration of benefit is contained in section 21 
POCA 2002. 
873 POCA 2002, s 40(6). The application for a reconsideration of available amount is contained in 
section 22 POCA 2002. 
874 POCA 2002, s 40(8).   
875 DTOA 1986, s 8(4); CJA 1988, s 77(5); DTA 1994, s 26(4). 
876 Realisable property is defined as any free property held by the defendant or by the recipient of 
a tainted gift. POCA 2002, s 83.     
877 POCA 2002, s 41(1). 
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4.7 Restraint and the ECHR 
As has been noted, a restraint order is a temporary order but it can last a long time and 
prevents anyone named in the order from dealing with realisable property owned by the 
defendant or that he has an interest in to ensure that a confiscation order is satisfied.  Like 
confiscation, a restraint order is viewed as draconian,878 and it is ‘common ground’ that 
restraint and receivership orders are also compatible with A1P1 to the ECHR. 879  
It has been held that the State’s interference with a defendant’s property rights is not 
disproportionate because there is a significant public interest in ensuring that criminals do 
not profit from their crimes and that the proceeds of crime are confiscated in the event of 
conviction, which extends to preventing the dissipation of assets prior to trial to ensure 
that any confiscation order made will not be thwarted.880  
The fact that a restraint order is temporary and there are safeguards in the system 
including judicial oversight and compensation for economic loss where the restraint was 
illegitimate ensure that restraint is proportionate.881  There are also further protections in 
the regime.  The Crown Court does not have to make a restraint order even if the statutory 
criteria are satisfied; the court must be satisfied that there is a risk of the dissipation of 
assets.882  There is no statutory definition of dissipation, but the principles have been 
confirmed in case law.  In R v B883 the Court of Appeal held that it is wrong to make a 
restraint order without the prosecution establishing a real risk of the dissipation of assets.  
Otherwise there is no ground for the interference with a defendant’s A1P1 rights.  This 
case involved a restraint order made before charge and there was no dissipation even 
though there had been the opportunity to do so over a period of 6 months.   
 
878 Windsor v CPS (n 490).   
879 Hughes (n 523) relying on Raimondo v Italy [1994] ECHR 3. 
880 Hughes ibid [52]. 
881 Young (n 738) 472.   
882 Sutherland Williams, Hopmeier and Jones (n 58) 23-25. 
883 [2008] EWCA Crim 1374, [2009] 1 Cr App R 14.  
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Wood concluded that one of the reasons for a lack of restraint order applications by the 
prosecution was the dissipation test which is there must be a real rather than fanciful risk 
of dissipation.884  However, it is difficult to argue with Mitchell et al who conclude that the 
discretionary nature of the order means that restraint orders are capable of being 
exercised in a proportionate way even though A1P1 applies and if there is no risk of 
dissipation a restraint order would be unnecessary and disproportionate.885 
4.8 The legislative steer 
The pre-POCA 2002 Acts all have sections which determine how the powers of courts are 
to be exercised in relation to restraint orders and charging orders and also apply to the 
powers of a receiver.886  This is known as the ‘legislative steer’ because the provisions 
legislate for powers to be exercised ‘with a view to’ something being achieved.887  
In Re Peters it was held that the ‘legislative steer’ in section 13(2) of the DTOA 1986 
meant that the purpose of the restraint order was to preserve the value of the property to 
satisfy any confiscation order.888  The same ‘legislative steer’ was then replicated in the 
CJA 1988 and the DTA 1994.889   
The legislative steer in POCA 2002 still applies to both restraint orders and the powers of 
a receiver, but there were changes.  Any powers must be exercised with a view to making 
the value of realisable property available to satisfy any confiscation order that has or may 
be made.  This must be done without taking into account any obligation of the defendant 
or recipient of a tainted gift, if that conflicts with the satisfaction of any confiscation order.  
It applies in relation to any confiscation order that has or may be made, but if the 
 
884 Wood, The Big Payback (n 5) 5. 
885 Mitchell Taylor and Talbot vol 1, paras 3.025-3.026 (R5: September 2004). 
886 DTOA 1984, s 13; CJA 1988, s 82; DTA 1994, s 31. 
887 Lexi Holdings (n 542) [64]. 
888 Re Peters (n 428). 
889 CJA 1988 s 82; DTA 1994, s 31. 
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confiscation order has not been made, the powers must be exercised with a view to 
ensuring that there is no diminution in the value of the realisable property.890    
The change has been described as ‘of most practical importance’.891 Its effect is 
mandatory and therefore differs from the legislative steer in the legislation pre-POCA 
2002.892  If confiscation charging orders are introduced then this legislative steer will apply 
to them, as it already applies to any applications for charging orders made by the 
magistrates’ court using the fines based enforcement powers.  Under POCA 2002 there is 
also a restriction on all courts where there is a restraint order in place or an application for 
one has been made, namely any court may stay proceedings or allow them to continue as 
they see fit; and give the applicant for the restraint order and any receiver the opportunity 
to make representations.893 
4.9 Application for a restraint order under POCA 2002 
Applications for restraint and charging orders, and receivers pre-POCA 2002 are made in 
the High Court using RSC 115, supplemented by Practice Direction 115,894 whereas 
applications in relation to restraint and receivers in relation to POCA 2002 are covered by 
the Criminal Procedure Rules (CrimPRs).895  Sutherland Williams et al explain that the 
differences in the governing Rules are because the Crown Court does not have the same 
inherent power as the High Court896 and therefore the Criminal Procedure Rules are more 
extensive.  If confiscation charging orders are introduced, then the Criminal Procedure 
Rules will have to be amended to cover the orders. Under the Criminal Procedure Rules, 
the application has to be in writing and supported by a witness statement.897 Like the 
 
890 POCA 2002, s 69. 
891 Sutherland Williams, Hopmeier and Jones (n 58) 16. 
892 Lexi Holdings (n 542) [63]. 
893 POCA 2002, s 58(5)-(6). 
894 The Order does not cover applications made under the DTOA 1986 and Practice Direction 115 
does not contain any directions about charging orders. 
895 The Criminal Procedure Rules (CrimPRs) Part 33.  There is no accompanying Practice Direction. 
896 Mark Sutherland Williams, Michael Hopmeier and Rupert Jones, (eds), Millington and 
Sutherland Williams on the Proceeds of Crime (4th rev edn, Oxford University Press 2013) 134.  
897 CrimPR 33.51(3). 
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previous applications for restraint (and charging), applications for a restraint order made 
under POCA 2002 can also be made without notice but this should only be if the matter is 
urgent or there is a risk of dissipation of the assets.898  
A restraint order or an order appointing a receiver can be varied or discharged on the 
application of the person who applied for the order or anyone who is affected by the 
order.899 The process in the Rules replaces the practical procedure that applied in the pre-
POCA 2002 legislation.900 
4.10 Changes to restraint made in 2015 
Changes were made to the restraint provisions of POCA 2002 by the SCA 2015 as a 
result of the 2013 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy which identified a need to 
improve the enforcement of confiscation orders901 and a need for legislation in a number 
of areas902 including stronger powers for the restraint of assets to strengthen POCA 
2002.903  Now the first condition that will justify the court making a restraint order is if a 
criminal investigation has been started in England and Wales and there are reasonable 
grounds to suspect  that the alleged offender has benefited from his criminal conduct.904 
This was changed from reasonable cause to believe by the Serious Crime Act 2015.905  
The test was changed because it was felt that the reasonable cause to believe test was 
too high prior to charge when all the facts may not be known, and the change brought the 
test in line with the test for arresting a defendant without a warrant.906  The Joint 
 
898 CrimPR 33.51(2). 
899 CrimPR 33.53-33.55. 
900 Mitchell Taylor and Talbot vol 2, para III.079 (R6: April 2005).   
901 2013 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy (n 62) 34. 
902 namely defendants not attending court for the confiscation hearing; third party claims 
reducing the amounts available; and the fact that a prison sentence can only be used once which 
means that defendants can refuse to pay after imprisonment, 2013 Serious and Organised Crime 
Strategy, ibid 35.  
903 ibid 35. 
904 POCA 2002, s 40(2); emphasis added. 
905 POCA 2002, s 40(2)(b) was amended by SCA 2015, s 11; emphasis added. 
906 The power to arrest without a warrant is contained in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 




Committee on Human Rights’ scrutiny of the Serious Crime Bill considered the proposals 
to lower the threshold for making a restraint order under POCA 2002. It considered the 
purpose of a restraint order and agreed that the test should be lowered from reasonable 
cause to believe to reasonable grounds to suspect, in what was to become the amended 
section 40 of POCA 2002.907  
The government was aware that the amendments to the restraint provisions reduced the 
safeguards against the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions of the defendant and 
their dependants.  However, the Committee was satisfied that the change was needed to 
address a ‘real, practical risk’ that assets would be dissipated or made unavailable to 
satisfy a confiscation order.908 
In their review of the Serious Crime Act 2015, Sahota and Yeo commented that the 
amendments to the restraint order test were introduced as there were criticisms that ‘the 
bar for obtaining a restraining order early in an investigation was too high’ but the 
amendments to section 41 POCA 2002 mean that the defendant is protected as the court 
can discharge the restraint order if he is not charged within a reasonable time.909 
These and other safeguards in the Act were explained by Edwards.910  He commented 
that although the new powers to make a restraint order make it easier for the prosecutor to 
apply for an order, more safeguards were built into the legislation.  The Crown Court was 
given an increased power to control the restraint proceedings by including a requirement 
to report on the proceedings and to discharge the restraint order if confiscation 
proceedings are not started within a reasonable time.  In addition, the Crown Court was 
 
offence the test is that the constable has reasonable grounds for suspecting the person is about 
to commit an offence or to be committing an offence.  If the constable has reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that an offence has been committed, he may arrest anyone whom he has reasonable 
grounds to suspect of being guilty of it, and if an offence has been committed, anyone whom he 
has reasonable grounds for suspecting to be guilty of it, PACE 1984, s 24(1)-(3). 
907 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Serious Crime Bill (n 737) para 1.15. 
908 ibid paras 1.15-1.16. 
909 Roger Sahota and Nicholas Yeo, ‘In Practice: Criminal Justice: Serious Crime Act 2015’ [2015] 
(21) LS Gaz 22. 
910 A Edwards, ‘In Practice: Legal Update: Criminal Law: Serious Crime Act provisions’ [2015] (25) 
LS Gaz 20. 
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given more powers of control over the investigation by including a requirement to report 
on the proceedings as ordered by the court.   
It is the view of Hopmeier and Mills that these changes strengthen POCA 2002 by making 
it possible to apply for restraint earlier in the investigation, and at the same time as an 
arrest as the test is now the same.  Their view is that the courts should encourage early 
restraint and the identification of assets to ensure that confiscation orders are made that 
are effective and enforceable.911  This is supported by Levi’s opinion that the elapsed time 
between the offence or obtaining profits to stopping access to funds by pre-conviction 
restraint or post-conviction orders is critical for recovery.912  It is also the experience of the 
research author that the earlier that assets can be secured the better, otherwise there is 
nothing to stop a defendant dissipating an asset before time for payment has expired, and 
any changes that strengthen the powers of restraint are welcome.  However, as shown in 
the following sections restraint is not always applied for and therefore alternatives to 
restraint are needed where the asset is a house or bank account. 
4.11 The use of restraint orders 
In most cases a restraint order, or where applicable a charging order, would be sufficient 
to preserve property and make it available to satisfy a confiscation order913 and previous 
research shows there is a need for the use of restraint to secure assets so they are 
available to satisfy a confiscation order.  It has been asserted that ‘effective and early’ 
restraint is essential to prevent cash and other assets being transferred, including 
overseas,914 and judges, CPS and financial investigators see restraint as a useful tool, 
although orders have to be handled carefully because of their severe nature and the costs 
involved if used incorrectly.915 The best use of restraint is seen as a key part of 
 
911 Hopmeier and Mills (n 675) 458. 
912 Levi ‘Reflections on Proceeds of Crime’ (n 38) 5. 
913 Sutherland Williams, Hopmeier and Jones only mention restraint (n 58) 69; Mitchell Taylor and 
Talbot mention both restraint and charging orders vol 1, para 3.063 (R0: February 2002).  
914 PIU Report (n 117) 68.   
915 Bullock and others (n 29) 22. 
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maximizing the enforcement of confiscation orders, especially for high value serious 
organised crime cases,916 and it is easier to enforce confiscation orders if assets are 
restrained.917 Bullock et al found that confiscation orders with a restraint order were more 
likely to be paid than those without and this supported the views of the practitioners they 
interviewed that restraint was critical to the enforcement of confiscation orders.918   
The Thematic Review found that an increased use of restraint orders would result in an 
increase in the amounts collected.919  The NAO and PAC Reports found that there was a 
link between early action and successful enforcement and there is a recommendation in 
the PAC Report in 2014 for criminal justice agencies to work more closely together to 
enable the early use of restraint.920  Wood reported that the view of practitioners 
interviewed as part of her research was that restraint orders ‘have a significant effect on 
the overall success of enforcement’ of a confiscation order, noting that this was opinion 
and not based on empirical evidence and she lamented that this is a poorly understood 
area.921  These findings are supported by Hopmeier and Mills in 2019 who encourage the 
use of early restraint to ensure that confiscation orders are both efficient and 
enforceable.922    
Despite the undoubted need for restraint orders, there are difficulties which prevent their 
use in practice and reliance has been placed on the number of orders made to show that 
there is a need for improvement.  Issues have been raised since the powers were 
introduced and practitioners and reviews have said that the number of restraint orders 
made is too low.923  
 
916 Bullock and others (n 29) iii. 
917 Bullock, ‘Enforcing Financial Penalties’ (n 44) 331. 
918 Bullock and others (n 29) 21. 
919 Joint Thematic Review (n 3) 8. 
920 The NAO Progress Report (n 367) 10, 30. PAC Report (n 328) 4. 
921 Wood, The Big Payback (n 5) 4. 
922 Hopmeier and Mills (n 675) 458. 
923 As outlined in chapter 2, for example Wood, The Big Payback (n 5) 5. The NAO Progress Report 
(n 264) 30.  
171 
 
The Asset Recovery Strategy set a target for prosecuting agencies to consider applying 
for restraint orders in more cases to prevent disposal of assets prior to confiscation924 yet 
in 2013 the NAO found that the number of restraint orders was falling.  It also reported the 
views of stakeholders that the CPS was too cautious and that opportunities were being 
missed.925  The PAC used these findings to recommend that law enforcement agencies 
should work together to use restraint early and report to the Criminal Finance Board on 
priority cases, although this recommendation was focused on high value cases.926  The 
NAO Progress Report showed a 12% decrease in the use of restraint orders since its 
previous report to 1,203 orders, and a 36% reduction in restraint since 2010-2011. 
However, it reported a reverse in the trend in 2015-2016 citing the legislative changes in 
the Serious Crime Act 2015 which made it easier to apply for restraint orders as a 
potential reason, although the NAO saw the continued low use of restraint as a problem 
for future enforcement.927  
The NAO figures showing a reduction in the number of restraint orders were relied upon in 
the HAC 2016 Report.928  The Committee accepted the evidence that defendants are 
becoming more sophisticated at concealing assets and that assets should be frozen as 
early as possible, simultaneously with the defendant becoming aware of the investigation 
if possible.  It emphasised that waiting for a conviction to seize and restrain assets is too 
late, having heard that the recovery of assets was often only considered after 
conviction.929  The government agreed that assets should be restrained early if it is 
appropriate to do so, although, it was its view that the use of statistics about the volume 
and value of orders is not necessarily helpful as a measure of performance or as a 
target.930   
 
924 Asset Recovery Strategy (n 223) target (v). 
925 In 2012-13 it found that 1,368 orders were made which was a 27 percent reduction from 2011-
12 when 1,878 restraint orders were made. NAO Report (n 71) 29.  
926 PAC Report (n 328) 4.   
927 NAO Progress Report (n 367) 30. 
928 HAC 2016 Report (n 26) 3. 
929 ibid 10, 34. 
930 Government Response to the HAC 2016 Report (n 432) 3.  
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This research does not rely on the number of restraint orders made to support its 
recommendations but the figures indicate that the number of orders made is lower than 
expected and this has implications on the ability of the magistrates’ court to enforce and 
there are clearly issues preventing their use. Bullock et al expected to find restraint used 
in high value cases, they found that the average amount of a confiscation order with a 
restraint order was around £15,600 compared with £56,500 where there was no restraint 
order, which was an unexpected conclusion.931  As it was intended that restraint orders 
would be used in larger and more complex cases leaving other cases to be enforced in 
the magistrates’ court in the same way as a fine932 these figures are surprising and show 
that restraint is not being used in the types of cases envisaged. If a restraint order is not in 
place, the magistrates’ court is limited to its fines based powers and the confiscation 
specific powers.  Although the payment order provisions have been introduced where the 
asset is cash in a bank account, those powers only apply if the confiscation order is made 
under POCA 2002.933  Where the asset is a house, the fines based powers are not 
effective934 and it is the experience of the research author that without an effective power 
to secure the assets on imposition, enforcement is difficult.  
4.12 Issues with restraint orders 
POCA 2002 was an attempt to resolve the issues with restraint that had existed in the old 
legislation, but problems with the effectiveness of the order continued.  In 2012 restraint 
orders were considered not to be effective as there were difficulties in preventing those 
subject to a restraint order from selling assets and opening new bank accounts.935 
 
931 Bullock and others (n 29) 21.  
932 'The UK Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986' (n 17) 1632. 
933 As confiscation orders under the pre-POCA 2002 legislation are being made and enforced there 
is a need for an alternative to making an application for a third-party debt order.  This is the only 
option available and is not used often in practice.  
934 The only option is to apply for a charging order in the county court, again this is not used often 
in practice.  
935 Brown and others (n 173) iv. 
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The SCA 2015 amended the ground for applying for a restraint order prior to charge with 
the aim of strengthening the restraint provisions.  Because of the change the court now 
has to be satisfied that a criminal investigation has been started in England and Wales 
and there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the alleged offender has benefited from 
his criminal conduct.936 The practitioners interviewed by Wood questioned the value of this 
amendment as very few applications are turned down on the evidential threshold; instead 
she reported that applications were either not applied for or failed because of the 
perceived reluctance of the CPS due to the cost implications, or because of the view of 
the CPS that the case law on the dissipation test made applications difficult.937  As a result 
Wood reported that interviewees did not feel that the changes to restraint in the SCA 2015 
solved the issues and recommended that the Criminal Finances Board should empirically 
examine the link between restraint and successful enforcement, and whether the 
perceived reluctance of the CPS to apply is correct.938  Wood’s conclusions are contrary to 
the views of Hopmeier and Mills who see the changes to the evidential test made by the 
SCA 2015 as strengthening the regime.  They see two advantages to the change, firstly 
that the lower evidential test makes it easier to obtain a restraint order earlier in the 
investigation which increases the potential for preserving assets effectively, and secondly 
that as the new test is the same as the test for an arrest, a restraint order can be obtained 
and served on a defendant at the same time as the arrest.939   
As Wood avers there is a need for empirical evidence to see if there is a correlation 
between the use of restraint orders and the change in the evidential test,940 but nobody 
could take issue with the view of Hopmeier and Mills that early use of restraint and a focus 
on identifying assets should be encouraged to ensure that confiscation orders are 
enforceable.941  However, it is suggested that in order to secure assets it is not a restraint 
 
936 POCA 2002, s 40(2); emphasis added.  
937 Wood, The Big Payback (n 5) 4-5. The dissipation test is that there must be a real rather than 
fanciful risk of dissipation.   
938 ibid 5-6. 
939 Hopmeier and Mills (n 675) 458. 
940 Wood, The Big Payback (n 5) 4-6. 
941 Hopmeier and Mills (n 675) 458. 
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order per se that is always needed, but an order that secures the asset and makes it 
available to satisfy the confiscation order.  The recommendations in this thesis show that 
there can be other orders which could complement the restraint order regime and would 
preserve assets without the problems associated with restraint. 
4.12.1 Issues about costs 
The changes introduced by the SCA 2015 did not address the issues about the costs of 
restraint.  Levi and Osofsky published their research in 1995 and at that stage the CPS 
Central Confiscation Unit would operate a minimum threshold taking into account whether 
restraint would be worthwhile and cost-effective considering the administrative costs and 
defendant’s allowable expenses.942  The authors found that some police officers felt that 
restraint and confiscation orders should be sought even if the amount of any order would 
be less than the perceived policy minimum set by the CPS Central Confiscation Unit, as it 
was felt that any disruption to the working capital of drug dealers was of benefit, leaving 
aside any questions of cost effectiveness.943  
Bullock et al found that restraint was not seen as an effective tool for low value orders 
taking into account the cost and effort. There was no agreed lower figure but a value of 
£15,000 was ‘commonly mentioned’ by those interviewed.944  However, the Thematic 
Review found that value for money was not a factor in applying for a restraint order.945  
The prosecutor can be liable for costs, for example, if the prosecutor fails to consider the 
risk of dissipation or put relevant documentary evidence before the court. The court can 
still make a restraint order but may order the prosecutor to pay the defendant’s costs.946  
Interviews with CPS as part of Home Office research have shown that the potential risk of 
damages means that the CPS understandably wants to be sure that confiscation 
 
942 Levi and Osofsky (n 162) 11. 
943 ibid 10. 
944 Bullock and others (n 29) 21. 
945 Joint Thematic Review (n 3) 52. 
946 Jennings v CPS [2005] EWCA Civ 746, [2006] 1 WLR 182. 
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proceedings will proceed before applying for a restraint order,947 and the Thematic Review 
identified possible costs orders against the prosecution as a reason for caution in applying 
for restraint.948   
One of the reasons given by officials in interviews with Wood for a perceived reluctance 
by CPS to apply for a restraint order was cost if the application fails which can include the 
costs incurred by a receiver.949  Her findings are supported by Fisher who considers that 
the amendments in the SCA 2015 do not address the issue of legal costs which impede 
enforcement authorities from applying for restraint orders.  This is because they can 
become liable for prohibitive legal costs if a restraint order is made but subsequently 
discharged and it results in extensive litigation.950   
4.12.2 Other issues with restraint relevant to this thesis 
In 2000 the PIU report identified the fact that restrained assets could not be confiscated 
immediately and recommended that this could be a power of the judge when making an 
order to make collection more direct and efficient, especially in relation to cash, bank 
accounts and items such as cars.  The report recommended that the confiscation order 
should remain debt based rather than asset based and acknowledged that third parties 
should be given the right to make representations, but that all complicated property 
matters should be in the High Court.951 
The Asset Recovery Action Plan identified gaps in the restraint process and started with 
the premise that the appointment of a receiver is a cumbersome and expensive process if 
it is not necessary, for example to manage a business.  It suggested the automatic 
 
947 Bullock and others (n 29) 22. 
948 Joint Thematic Review (n 3) 33. 
949 Wood, The Big Payback (n 5) 5.   
950 Fisher (n 60) 762. 
951 The PIU Report (n 117) 71. 
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transfer of the title of property subject to restraint, and the power to seize property to 
satisfy a confiscation order if the defendant is convicted of acquisitive crime.952 
These issues were addressed in part when changes to POCA 2002 were made by SCA 
2015 and other changes to the Act were also brought into force.  The first change 
provided a general power, that had previously been lacking, to retain property.953  As a 
result of this change, if there is a restraint order in force the section can be used to ensure 
that items seized under another power, for example section 1 of PACE 1984, can be 
retained even after the original power has ceased, and held to satisfy a confiscation order. 
Other sections were inserted into POCA 2002 to allow for the search, seizure, detention 
and sale of property that could be disposed of or diminished in value and which could be 
used to satisfy a confiscation order that has been made or may be made in the future.954  
These changes were as a result of the recommendations in the Asset Recovery Action 
Plan.955  The idea behind the powers was the faster enforcement of orders where there 
are associated restrained assets, but the power was introduced for items not subject to 
restraint. The NAO saw these powers to seize property as a way of stopping defendants 
disposing of property, but noted that even if items are seized they could depreciate in 
value.956 However, these are powers of the magistrates’ court rather than the Crown Court 
and so are not part of the one stop shop approach envisaged in the Crown Court 957 
although they allow the magistrates’ court to deal with all matters to do with enforcement.   
As the powers do not relate to bank accounts or houses they are unable to meet the 
issues raised in this research in relation to these assets.958   
 
952 Asset Recovery Action Plan (n 243) 24-25. 
953 Section 41A POCA 2002 was inserted by the Policing and Crime Act 2009, s 52. 
954 POCA 2002, ss 47A-47S, 67A-67D inserted by Policing and Crime Act 2009, ss 55, 58 and 
amended by the Crime and Courts Act 2013, the SCA 2015 and CFA 2017. 
955 Asset Recovery Action Plan (n 243) 25. 
956 The NAO Progress Report (n 264) 27. 
957 Proceeds of Crime Bill: Publication of Draft Clauses (n 31). 
958 For example, the powers in sections 47A-47S POCA 2002 do not permit the seizure of cash or 
exempt goods and permit entry into premises but not their seizure; and sections 67A – 67D POCA 
2002 apply to personal property. 
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4.12.3 A house as an asset 
Specific concerns have been raised about restraint and houses.  Bullock et al found that 
there were different views among financial investigators about whether a house should be 
restrained with some financial investigators finding the power useful if the defendant has 
equity in the property.959  The research carried a quote from a financial investigator that:  
[A restraining order was] applied because the defendant’s main asset was a house 
which he was in the process of selling. This was restrained to prevent the 
dissipation of assets. Once his equity was in cash form it would easily have been 
dissipated.960  
Other financial investigators thought monitoring, for example through the land registry, 
was sufficient,961 a point echoed by Bullock when the difference in views was reported as 
disagreement between financial investigators over whether houses were suitable for 
restraint.962 Some financial investigators felt that houses are not a priority because they 
are difficult to sell and movement can be monitored via the land registry.963  Others have 
reported houses being sold 'from under their noses' sometimes to friends and family; or 
remortgaged without the financial investigators being able to seize the proceeds.964  
Financial investigators may be able to monitor the ownership of houses through the Land 
Registry, but this is not a role of HMCTS and even if monitoring can be done, it does not 
provide for the satisfaction of the order.  As a result, monitoring in itself is not sufficient to 
ensure that a confiscation order is paid.  Despite the issues raised, the findings in the 
report were that houses and cash in bank accounts were the most likely assets suitable 
for restraint.965  
 
959 Bullock (n 430) 332; Bullock and others (n 29) 21. 
960 Bullock and others (n 29) 21. 
961 ibid 21. 
962 Bullock, ‘Enforcing Financial Penalties’ (n 44) 332.  
963 Bullock and others (n 29) 21. 
964 Bullock, ‘Enforcing Financial Penalties’ (n 44) 332.  
965 Bullock and others (n 29) 21. 
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Over the years there have been issues with the valuation of property especially if there 
has been a downturn in property prices.  The Working Group Third Report found that 
there was a wide disparity between the amounts ordered to be confiscated by the court 
and the amounts paid.966  Their conclusions were that this was due in part to problems 
caused by what it referred to as ‘the subsequent inadequacy of realisable property’, citing 
a particular problem in the early 1990s caused by the property boom in the late 1980s and 
the subsequent slump in prices.967 
Whether or not a restraint order or charging order is available, if a house is an asset 
identified as part of the confiscation order process, a valuation will be obtained so that the 
Crown Court can establish the benefit figure, and the recoverable or available amount.   
Levi and Osofsky found that in practice the police would obtain a valuation of an asset 
rather than the defendant968 and that this would include where a house was involved. Like 
the Third Report, they also identified that a downward trend in property prices was a 
problem causing attrition.969    
The Joint Thematic Review found that the financial investigator’s initial assessment of the 
value of assets was ‘routinely higher’ than that of the defence valuation, and that the court 
often used the lower figure.970 It also reported that there was little if any evidence 
produced by the defence in advance of the court hearing to prove the reduced figures 
suggested.971   In particular interviewees expressed views that initial valuations by 
financial investigators were unrealistic or lacked a recognition of the current economic 
climate, particularly in relation to houses, and it found that financial investigators were 
often reluctant to vary their initial valuation of a house downwards if assertions were put 
 
966 Working Group Third Report (n 126) para 2.2. 
967 ibid para 2.7. 
968 Levi and Osofsky (n 162) 26. 
969 ibid viii, 51. 
970 Joint Thematic Review (n 3) 31. 
971 ibid 32. 
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forward by the defence prior to the confiscation hearing without any evidence being put 
forward.972   
This echoes the earlier findings by Levi and Osofsky about the pre-POCA 2002 legislation 
that there was a reluctance by financial investigators to value houses at a figure lower 
than the benefit from crime at imposition, causing attrition later.973  Bullock noted that the 
situation in relation to the valuation of houses is complex.  Her fieldwork did not find any 
examples of the failure to enforce orders because of falling house prices but noted that at 
the time of the fieldwork house prices were generally increasing.  By the time of her article 
house prices were falling and she was concerned that the attrition highlighted by Levi and 
Osofsky would re-appear.974  
These are issues which would need to be considered if confiscation charging orders were 
made at the Crown Court, although they are not particular to charging orders.  Wherever 
the asset is a house, valuations should be accurate in any event whether or not there is a 
restraint order or confiscation charging order as well. If there is a downturn in the property 
market, then the defendant can apply for a downward variation of the confiscation 
order.975   
It is worthy of note that property prices can increase as well as reduce.  If the defendant’s 
benefit figure is higher than the available amount, then the prosecutor can apply for an 
upward variation of an order. In R v Gunn976 the prosecutor had obtained charging orders 
in respect of two properties prior to a confiscation order being made.  The court noted that 
if the value of the properties increased, the prosecution could apply for an upward 
variation of the confiscation order pursuant to section 22 of POCA 2002.   
 
 
972 ibid 31. 
973 Levi and Osofsky (n 162) viii. 
974 Bullock, ‘Enforcing Financial Penalties’ (n 44) 334. 
975 POCA 2002, s 22.   
976 [2014] EWCA Crim 1758.  
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4.13 The purpose and role of a receiver 
The Hodgson Committee recommended the appointment of an individual, possibly called 
a receiver to administer the new powers.  It saw the functions of this receiver as 
investigating the assets of persons suspected of major crime, applying for orders freezing 
accounts, preserving assets that have been frozen including managing businesses, 
releasing assets for living or legal expenses under the supervision of the court, and 
realising and distributing assets when the case is disposed of.977 As with restraint the 
powers were introduced in the DTOA 1986 and still exist in POCA 2002.978  
There are two types of receivers which can be appointed by the court. The role of a 
management receiver is to manage property which is subject to a restraint order by 
preserving the value of property until the conclusion of the proceedings.979 The other type 
of receiver is an enforcement receiver whose role is to dispose of the property subject to a 
restraint order to satisfy the confiscation order.980 
A receiver is an officer of the court as they have been appointed by the court and 
therefore any management is done on behalf of the court,981 and the legislative steer 
applies to the appointment of a receiver under POCA 2002.982  A receiver is usually a 
private sector appointment and charges costs and fees for the work done.   
A receiver can be appointed to enforce a charging order under the pre-POCA 2002 
legislation.983  The provisions in the DTOA 1986 were introduced to ensure that the 
powers of a receiver continued even if the property changed hands as otherwise the court 
order would have been void against the purchaser in the event of a failure to register the 
 
977 Hodgson Report (n 123) 110. 
978 DTOA 1986, s 11; CJA 1988, s 80; DTA 1994, s 29; POCA 2002, ss 48, 50. 
979 POCA 2002, ss 48-49. 
980 POCA 2002, ss 50-51.  The difference is explained in the Explanatory Notes to the Policing and 
Crime Act 2009, para 279. 
981 See for example Glatt v Sinclair [2013] EWCA Civ 241, [2013] 1 WLR 3602. 
982 POCA 2002, s 69.  
983 DTOA 1986, s 11; CJA 1988, s 80; DTA 1994, s 29. 
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change of ownership.984  In the DTOA 1986 and the CJA 1988, the receiver can be 
appointed by the High Court, whereas in the DTA 1994 a receiver can also be appointed 
by the county court, but in all cases could only be appointed on the application of the 
prosecutor.985  However, the powers of a receiver in relation to charging order 
enforcement relate only to enforcing the charge; the other powers of a receiver in relation 
to restraint, for example, taking possession of property, do not apply.    
A more detailed review of the law relating to the appointment and roles of receivers falls 
outside the scope of this thesis.  It is the costs involved in the appointment of receivers 
and the perceived reluctance of the CPS to apply for receivers which are particularly 
relevant to this research.  What appears to have caused particular concern for the CPS is 
the potential for meeting the costs and expenses of a receiver if a restraint and 
receivership order should never have been made.  The Court of Appeal considered this 
point in Barnes v Eastenders Group986 and, taking into account the A1P1 rights of the 
Eastenders Group, held that it should not bear the costs and expenses.  Again, 
considering the A1P1 rights of the receiver it also held that they should not bear the costs 
and expenses and so held that the CPS had to bear them.  The sums were substantial, 
£772,547, and there has been a perceived nervousness from CPS to apply for the 
appointment of a receiver since this case987 although the case has been seen as a 
deterrence to all agencies.988  Gentle et al explain that the number of receivers appointed 
have reduced dramatically since this case because the costs have deterred the CPS from 
applying.989   
 
984 HL Deb 13 May 1986, vol 474, col 1101. 
985 DTOA 1986, s 11; CJA 1988, s 80; DTA 1994, s 29. 
986 [2014] UKSC 26, sub nom Eastenders Cash & Carry plc v Crown Prosecution Service [2015] AC 1. 
987 Wood, The Big Payback (n 5) 5. 
988 Grant Thornton UK LLP and its Proceeds of Crime Team, Written evidence to Home Affairs 
Committee, Proceeds of Crime (HC 2016-2017, 25) 
http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Home%
20Affairs/Proceeds%20of%20crime/written/29555.html> accessed 16 August 2016. 
989 They report that figures obtained by Grant Thornton LLP by way of a freedom of information 
request from HMCTS show that 18 receivership appointments were made in 2011 but only two 




Costs associated with the restraint order process have been shown to be an issue as 
outlined above, and also because when a receiver is appointed to manage or enforce a 
restraint order they can claim their expenses from the assets even after the restraint order 
has been discharged as they can claim post-discharge remuneration.990  In the pre-POCA 
2002 legislation the receiver’s remuneration and expenses in enforcing restraint and 
charging orders comes before the payment into the consolidated fund991 and the same 
provisions apply in POCA 2002.992 The legislation also sets out an order for paying out 
expenses when an enforcement receiver has been appointed.  Firstly, the receiver must 
pay certain other payments before paying any monies to satisfy the order.993  But even 
then, although the amount paid reduces the amount of the order, other fees are taken out 
before the money is allocated by the designated officer. Certain insolvency fees are paid 
first (if they have not already been paid), then the fees of an enforcement receiver, before 
the fees of the storage and realisation of seized personal property.  Only then are any 
priority orders paid.994 
The appointment of a receiver, which may involve the sale of assets at a lesser price than 
the defendant can obtain, and the fact that the defendant may be required to pay the 
receiver’s and prosecution costs of the appointment, have been described as one of the 
draconian aspects of the regime, there to encourage voluntary payment of the 
confiscation order.995  However, despite the draconian nature, there is a role for a receiver 
which has been acknowledged. The Home Office explained the important part that 
receivers play in the enforcement of confiscation orders.  Once appointed they can force 
 
the CPS and other agencies from applying for the appointment of a receiver, Gentle, Spinks and 
Harris (n 491) 11. 
990 Glatt v Sinclair (n 981). 
991  DTOA 1986, s 12; CJA 1988, s 81; DTA 1994, s 30. 
992 POCA 2002, ss 54-55. 
993 The enforcement receiver must first pay an insolvency practitioner’s expenses, then any 
payments directed by the Crown Court before paying the money to satisfy the confiscation order. 
POCA 2002, s 54(2). 
994 POCA 2002, s 55.  A priority order is any compensation, victim surcharge, unlawful profit order 
or slavery or trafficking reparation order which has been ordered to be paid out of the 
confiscation order, POCA 2002, s 13(3A). 
995 Mitchell Taylor and Talbot vol 1, para 8.002 (R0: February 2002). 
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the realisation of assets and can liquidate real estate owned jointly by the defendant and 
some other person, particularly a spouse,996 but their appointment has been described as 
‘a balancing act’ between the policy aims of removing assets from defendants and the 
implications on receipts.997 This balancing act has been acknowledged in the Court of 
Appeal, when it was held that:  
It is important that this legislation continues to be operated to strip criminals of their 
ill−gotten gains. But it is important too that the court keeps a close control over 
those it appoints to act as receivers on its behalf and that costs are not too readily 
incurred, particularly before any confiscation order is made.998  
Even if the costs of the receiver will be substantial and could diminish or extinguish 
amounts to satisfy the confiscation order, a receivership order can still be made if those 
factors are outweighed by the need to protect and preserve the property and its 
proceeds.999 The CPS choose receivers from a list and value for money is used by the 
CPS when compiling their list of receivers.1000 However, the costs of a receiver have been 
an issue since the Working Group Third Report which found that receivers’ costs were 
high.  This meant that although the figures indicated a collection rate of 37%, taking into 
account receivers costs this figure could be as much as between 45% and 50%.1001 The 
PIU report also highlighted receivers’ costs as an issue.1002  
The NAO found making a cost-effectiveness assessment of the use of receivers by CPS 
and SFO difficult because of the lack of an explicit strategy for the use of management 
and enforcement receivers, and a lack of national performance and cost data.1003 The 
figures showed that in 2012-2013 receivers were used in 112 cases costing £3.2 million 
 
996 Home Office Guide (n 4) 25. 
997 Wood, Enforcing Criminal Confiscation Orders (n 2) 10. 
998 Hughes (n 523) [60] (Simon Brown LJ). 
999 Re Smith [2017] EWHC 3332 (Comm).  
1000 Joint Thematic Review (n 3) 32. 
1001 Working Group Third Report (n 126) para 2.5. 
1002 PIU Report (n 117) 70. 
1003 NAO Report (n 71) 37. 
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and collecting £15.1 million.  The report also showed that there were 299 receiver cases 
since 1997-98 with £18 million in fees and the concern of the NAO was that there was no 
national data to show whether this was cost-effective with a lack of monitoring of private 
sector receivers.1004  By the Progress Report the NAO found an improvement in the use of 
private sector receivers as the CPS had improved its framework for their appointment and 
management.1005 
Anecdotally the Joint Thematic Review found that receivers were not appointed unless 
absolutely necessary because the fees could substantially reduce the available assets1006 
and that the costs of restraint could be, but rarely were, substantial.1007  However, the high 
costs of enforcement receivers were identified as a barrier and challenge to the 
enforcement of confiscation orders in 2012 because the fees could equal or exceed the 
recoverable assets.1008  In 2016 there was a finding by Wood that because enforcement 
receivers are often from large accountancy firms, they are expensive,1009 and interviews 
conducted by her suggested that the authorities are hesitant to use receivers because of 
the costs involved. This is even where the default sentence has been served and there is 
no other means of enforcing the order.1010 
As there are concerns with restraint and receivers, it is important for there to be an 
alternative.  The alternative should meet the concerns about the costs of receivers and 
address the difficulties for magistrates’ courts trying to enforce where the asset is a house. 
The recommendation is for the introduction of a confiscation charging order with one 
option for the order to be made in favour of the designated officer for the magistrates’ 
court, which means that any enforcement would be by them rather than a receiver. 
 
1004 ibid 39. 
1005 NAO Progress Report (n 367) 26. 
1006 Joint Thematic Review (n 3) 32. 
1007 ibid 33. 
1008 Brown and others (n 173) 13. 
1009 Wood, Enforcing Criminal Confiscation Orders (n 2) 9-10. 
1010 Wood, The Big Payback (n 5) 20. 
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4.14 Conclusions of chapter 
Despite the issues, overall restraint orders are seen as an effective form of enforcement, 
and if not used, problems with enforcement result.  Cost has been identified as an issue 
why more orders are not made, especially in relation to low value orders, and criticisms 
have been raised that orders are not made early enough in the proceedings, or at all.  
There is also a perceived reluctance by the prosecutor to apply for restraint or the 
appointment of a receiver because of the potential liability for costs. Wood concluded that 
one of the reasons for a lack of restraint order applications by the prosecution was the 
dissipation test which is there must be a real rather than fanciful risk of dissipation.1011  
A restraint order is seen as particularly suitable where the asset involved is a house or 
cash, and although the restraint order provisions of POCA 2002 meet the one stop shop 
purpose of POCA 2002, the powers can only be effective if the order is made.  The issues 
preventing restraint orders being applied for have not been addressed fully by the 
changes to POCA 2002 in 2015, and so it is recommended that alternatives are required 
where the asset is a house or cash in a bank account. 
A restraint order can apply to all realisable property owned by the defendant and will apply 
to property jointly owned by the defendant or held by another, for example a bank 
account.  A charging order applies less widely as it applies to specific property. In 
addition, although it can apply to property that is jointly owned, it does not prevent dealing 
with the property.  As such it is more proportionate and less draconian than restraint.    
The power to make a charging order in the pre-POCA 2002 legislation was not widely 
used and in practice only in relation to land (which includes a house).  The charging order 
provisions were not included in POCA 2002, even though they had been included in the 
Bill.  There are issues with the valuation of houses that have been identified by reviews.  
 
1011 Wood, The Big Payback (n 5) 5.  
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However, these are not particular to charging orders and would not prevent the 
introduction of a confiscation charging order as a power of the Crown Court.    
This chapter demonstrates that, like other aspects of the confiscation regime, the restraint 
order process is draconian and complex. However, proportionality applies and there are 
balances to protect the rights of the defendant.  If a restraint order and the appointment of 
a receiver does not infringe the Convention, neither should a charging order which is less 
draconian than a restraint order. Changes have been made to POCA 2002 to allow the 
seizure and realisation of assets, but these do not assist with the issues with houses and 





1012 Text to n 953. 
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Chapter 5 Development of the law directly relevant to the enforcement of 
confiscation orders in the magistrates’ court – the confiscation legislation  
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter starts to answer the question, how has the confiscation legislation developed 
in relation to the enforcement of confiscation orders in the magistrates’ court? It also starts 
to consider what future legislative amendments might assist the enforcement of 
confiscation orders by the magistrates’ court and create an alternative to restraint. 
The complicated nature of the confiscation regime has already been highlighted in this 
thesis and the enforcement of confiscation orders in the magistrates’ court is no different.    
The confiscation legislation has been amended on many occasions, and therefore 
HMCTS and the magistrates’ court must identify not only the relevant legislation the 
confiscation order was made under, but whether the legislation had been amended.  The 
use of fines-based enforcement powers for the enforcement of confiscation orders has 
added a further layer of complexity which is examined in the next chapter. 
As the law has developed, powers were introduced in POCA 2002 to improve the 
magistrates’ court powers of collection and enforcement of confiscation orders.   Changes 
to the powers in POCA 2002 have been made by the SCA 2015 and the CFA 2017 and 
are analysed in this chapter. In addition, there are two sanctions which are seen as the 
main ones to support the enforcement of confiscation orders, namely the accrual of 
interest, and the setting and activation of default terms, which have implications for the 
magistrates’ court. Unlike any other financial penalty, the serving of the default term for 
non-payment of a confiscation order does not wipe out the debt.1013 Therefore even if the 
default term is served, the magistrates’ court is responsible for enforcing the order after 
the defendant has been released, and interest will have accrued until the order is paid in 
 
1013 POCA 2002, s 38(5) provides that the serving of the default term does not stop enforcement 
of the confiscation order by other means.   Similar provisions exist in the previous legislation 
although when the regime was first introduced serving the default term did mean that the 
confiscation order did not have to be paid.  This is considered later in this chapter. 
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full.  Doubt has been cast on the effectiveness of these sanctions,1014 but rather than 
considering their effectiveness as a means of encouraging payment, which others have 
done, the impact on the magistrates’ court along with the introduction of other powers in 
relation to confiscation are analysed in this thesis.   
As the magistrates’ court operates at the end of the process, if assets have not been 
identified or restrained at the Crown Court, then confiscation orders are difficult to 
enforce.1015  It is therefore important that any assets which are available are realised to 
satisfy the confiscation order.  Despite the provisions in relation to interest and the default 
term being seen as the main sanctions, they only come into effect once time for payment 
set by the Crown Court has expired.  Whilst the accrual of interest is automatic once time 
for payment has expired, the activation of the default term is not, which is explored in the 
next chapter.   
With the exception of a payment order, which can only be made for confiscation orders 
made under POCA 2002, the magistrates’ court cannot make any orders to collect or 
enforce a confiscation order until time for payment has expired. However, HMCTS can 
and does contact the defendant and encourage voluntary payment.1016  The time for 
payment set by the Crown Court is therefore a vital component of the confiscation order 
for the magistrates’ court as it dictates what can be done and when.  It is therefore the first 
thing considered in this chapter. 
5.2 Time for payment 
The period that the Crown Court has fixed for payment is important as the magistrates’ 
court cannot enforce the confiscation order until time for payment has expired, and relies 
on the defendant voluntarily surrendering assets or paying the order, although since June 
 
1014 For questions about the effectiveness of the interest provisions, see n 1053; and n 1173 for 
issues raised about the effectiveness of the default term. 
1015 Evidence of Peter Handcock PAC Report (n 328) Ev 14. This is also the experience of the 
research author. 
1016 This is within the knowledge of the research author and is supported by the findings of the 
Joint Thematic Review (n 3) 44-45. 
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2015 it can make a payment order.  HMCTS must calculate interest from when time for 
payment expires which is now done on JARD.1017 The Crown Court can extend time for 
payment but only for confiscation orders made under POCA 2002.  The time for paying a 
confiscation order runs from the date of imposition and cannot be extended by an 
appeal.1018  The development of the time for payment provisions are not just of historical 
interest.  Orders are still being made under the pre-POCA 2002 legislation as the 
confiscation legislation which applies is tied to the date of the offence not of sentence, and 
magistrates’ courts are still enforcing such orders.1019 
There was no statutory limit for time for payment for confiscation orders made under the 
pre-POCA 2002 legislation1020  nor any power for the Crown Court to extend time for 
payment other than the 56 day slip rule in section 155 of the PCC(S)A 2000.1021  The fact 
that confiscation orders were made with lengthy time for payment was identified as an 
issue which led to the changes to time for payment in POCA 2002.1022 
In 1998 the Working Group Third Report, reported problems caused by time for payment 
granted at the Crown Court. There was no maximum time limit and it reported defendants 
being granted up to three years by a Crown Court to pay a confiscation order even though 
assets might be readily available. This was found to create unnecessary delays in the 
enforcement process and was contrary to the purpose of the confiscation legislation to 
deprive offenders of the proceeds of their crime. It recommended that a confiscation order 
 
1017 Since JARD was introduced in 2006 it has allowed interest to be calculated and tracked more 
easily.   
1018 R v May and Others [2005] EWCA Crim 367. 
1019 Text to n 78 in chapter 1.  This is also within the experience of the research author. 
1020 The provisions are contained in DTOA 1986, s 6, CJA 1988, s 75 and DTA 1994, s 9 and were 
based on the fines provisions so time for payment was unlimited. Reference is made in the 
original versions of the legislation to the PCCA 1973 which were the provisions in relation to the 
imposition and enforcement of Crown Court fines.  These provisions were replaced by the 
PCC(S)A 2000.   
1021  Revenue and Customs Prosecution Service v Kearney [2007] EWHC 640 (Admin). Nor can the 
magistrates’ court extend time for payment, the magistrates’ court’s role being an ancillary role to 
that of the Crown Court, namely collection and enforcement, CPS v Greenacre [2007] EWHC 1193 
(Admin), [2008] 1 WLR 438.   




should be paid forthwith with the power to grant a maximum of six months to pay which 
would be reasonable in cases where property such as houses or other high-value items 
had to be sold, although monies in bank accounts or held by the police should be paid 
immediately.  It recommended that the defendant should be able to apply for up to six 
months to pay with the prosecutor having the ability to make representations.1023   
This was echoed by the Home Office guide which stated that the Crown Court may allow 
time for payment and payment by instalments, suggesting that time for payment should be 
granted if the defendant needed to sell assets to satisfy the order, but giving a clear date 
for payment to be made,1024 and judges were encouraged to specify a time for the 
payment of a confiscation order made under the pre-POCA 2002 legislation to avoid any 
confusion about when the order was to be paid.1025 
Attempts were made to alleviate the problem by POCA 2002 and the introduction of a 
maximum period of time for payment which could be granted by the Crown Court.  When 
POCA 2002 was introduced, the defendant should have been ordered to pay the order  
‘on the making of the order’1026 although the court could allow up to six months to pay if 
the defendant showed that he needed time for the order to be paid.1027 Within that time, 
the defendant could apply to the Crown Court for the period to be extended for up to 12 
months, but the court could only grant the application if it believed there were ‘exceptional 
circumstances’.1028  There was no definition of exceptional circumstances in the Act. 
However, there were still issues. In 2009 Bullock et al found that larger orders take longer 
to pay off and the researchers thought that this was not surprising as it could be assumed 
that it would take longer to liquidate a larger number of assets and some asset types, 
 
1023 Working Group Third Report (n 126) para 2.16. 
1024 Home Office Guide (n 4) 24.  
1025 R v City of London Justices ex parte Chapman (1998) 162 JP 359 (QB), (1998) 16 LS Gaz 23, a 
case about a confiscation order made under the DTOA 1986. 
1026 The unamended POCA 2002, s 11(1).   
1027 The unamended POCA 2002, 11(2)-(3). 
1028 The unamended POCA 2002, s 11(4)-(5). 
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explaining that a house would take longer to liquidate than a car.1029  Other research 
shows that a longer time for payment is needed where a house needs to be sold to satisfy 
a confiscation order1030 and this is the practical experience of the research author.  
Bullock et al found that of orders paid in full in their research about 30 per cent were paid 
off within 30 days, 58 percent within three months and 78 per cent within six months.  
Disparity was found with larger orders.  Looking at 1,065 orders paid in full between April 
and August 2006 they found that on average that orders between £1 and £100 were paid 
within 50 days; orders between £1,000 and £10,000 were paid within 99 days and orders 
between £100,000 and £1 million were paid within 188 days. However the researchers 
found that the six month time for payment period was often exceeded and it can take 
years for orders to be settled.1031  In 2011 the Local to Global Report found that it takes 22 
months to enforce a confiscation order on average, and even longer in high value 
cases.1032  In addition the NAO Report in 2013 shows figures for confiscation orders that 
were outstanding for over 6 months to over 10 years.1033   
The provisions allowing time for payment in POCA 2002 were curtailed by the SCA 2015 
as section 11 POCA 2002 was amended to meet the concerns raised in the 2013 Serious 
and Organised Crime Strategy, and the commitment in the Strategy to strengthen POCA 
2002 by ‘significantly reducing the time that the courts can give offenders to pay 
confiscation orders.’1034  The new wording of section 11(1) POCA 2002 is different to the 
old version of section 11(1).  It now reads “Unless subsection (2) applies, the full amount 
ordered to be paid under a confiscation order must be paid on the day on which the order 
is made.’ (emphasis added) This is a subtle change of wording as the requirement to pay 
in the unamended version of section 11(1) POCA 2002 was ‘The amount…must be paid 
 
1029 Bullock and others (n 29) 12. 
1030 Wood, Enforcing Criminal Confiscation Orders (n 2) 8. Hopmeier and Mills (n 675) 459.   
1031 Bullock and others (n 29) 12.   
1032 Local to Global (n 224) 19. 
1033 NAO Report (n 71) Figure 15, 37. 
1034 2013 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy (n 62) 35. Explanatory notes to the Serious Crime 
Act 2015, para 32. Sahota and Yeo (n 909). 
192 
 
on the making of the order’.  The explanatory notes to the SCA 2015 explain that the 
change is intended to make it clear that the full amount must be paid on the day the 
confiscation order is made unless the court orders otherwise.1035 
Both versions of section 11 also allow the Crown Court to extend time for payment, but in 
the new section, the test has changed. The initial period can now only be extended for up 
to 3 months and can be extended up to 6 months in total if the defendant cannot pay 
‘despite having made all reasonable efforts’ to do so.1036  The prosecution must still be 
given the opportunity to make representations.1037 
Of particular note is the fact that different time for payment periods can now be granted for 
different amounts.  The example given in the explanatory notes to the SCA 2015 is:  
For example, if the full amount is £1 million, the court might order £500,000 to be 
paid immediately (if the defendant has that amount available in cash), £200,000 
within 28 days (if the defendant has shares worth that amount) and £300,000 
within three months (if the defendant has property worth that amount).1038 
As under the previous section 11 the defendant can apply to extend the time for payment 
during the period set by the Crown Court.  Mirroring the position on imposition the new 
section 11 allows the Crown Court to grant different periods for different sums.  Again, 
there is an example in the explanatory notes: 
for example, if the defendant had been ordered to pay £150,000 within 14 days 
and makes an application to the court for extending that time period, the court may 
order that £50,000 be paid immediately, provide a further seven days for another 
 
1035 Explanatory notes to the Serious Crime Act 2015, para 33. 
1036 POCA 2002, s 11(3)-(5). 
1037 POCA 2002, s11(8), the previous provision was sub-section (7) of the unamended section 11.  
1038 Explanatory notes to the Serious Crime Act 2015, para 34. 
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£50,000 to be paid over and a further 14 days for the remaining £50,000 to be paid 
over.1039 
As a result there are three regimes relating to time for payment that the magistrates’ court 
needs to be aware of when enforcing confiscation orders: the first for pre-POCA 2002 
orders, the second for POCA 2002 orders (pre June 1, 2015) and the third for POCA 2002 
orders (post June 1, 2015).  In addition, post June 1, 2015, the confiscation order can 
contain different time for payment periods within it. 
The unlimited time for payment in the pre-POCA 2002 legislation was introduced because 
the provisions were based on the fines-based legislation but these do not suit the 
enforcement of confiscation orders especially where the Crown Court has identified the 
assets to be used to satisfy the order.  The move to reduce time for payment makes 
sense from a policy point of view.  It meets the aims identified in this thesis by requiring 
the defendant to realise assets and pay the order more quickly.  This should mean that 
collection rates improve and that the use of those assets by the defendant are disrupted.   
It would also meet the overall aim of ensuring that crime does not pay and count as a 
success. 
Sometimes assets have been identified at the Crown Court, or it is a hidden assets case.  
Either way the defendant should be able to realise assets and pay the order quickly.  
Practically the reduction in the time allowed for payment is an improvement in the 
confiscation regime.  The unlimited time for payment in the pre-POCA 2002 legislation, 
and the lengthier period when POCA 2002 was introduced gave defendants more 
opportunities to delay payment and a lengthy time for payment leads to three problems for 
the magistrates’ court.  Firstly, enforcement cannot take place until the time for payment 
has expired, and so the magistrates’ court is helpless to enforce the order of the Crown 
Court during that period.  Secondly a lengthy time for payment can mean that the value of 
the assets identified can reduce, so by the time the magistrates’ court can act the 
 
1039 ibid para 36.  
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realisable value will not pay off the order.  This can then result in further applications to 
the High Court or Crown Court to reduce the confiscation order,1040 or leave an amount 
that is unenforceable and accruing interest.  The third practical problem is that it gives the 
defendant more time to dissipate the assets which limits the powers of the court to enforce 
the order. 
Whilst a reduction in the time for payment provisions make some sense, it adds to the 
complexity of an already complicated system.  The magistrates’ court now has to enforce 
confiscation orders made under legislation with different maximum times for payment, and 
since June 2015 can be enforcing one order with different time for payment for different 
sums as part of the total.  The reduction in the time for payment in the new section 11 of 
POCA 2002 reduces the opportunity for dissipation and for a reduction in value, but these 
can still happen within the period set for payment.   
Hopmeier and Mills see the change as a positive one as it gives tighter control over the 
defendant and coupled with consequences of the accrual of interest and the threat of the 
activation of the default term will lead to better enforcement.1041  However, in practice the 
changes in the time for payment provisions do not in themselves give the magistrates’ 
court any additional powers and the reduction in time is not enough in itself to assist the 
magistrates’ court to enforce orders.  It is unfair for the system to place further complexity 
on the ability of the magistrates’ court to enforce without helping the court with more 
effective methods of enforcement.   
The main recommendations in this thesis are for the Crown Court to make orders on 
imposition in relation to assets identified there, and the Crown Court will have all the 
necessary details to make the order.  Rather than making the confiscation order then 
stopping and sending the confiscation order to the magistrates’ court for enforcement, it is 
 
1040 An application for variation or discharge has to be made to the Crown Court for confiscation 
orders made under POCA 2002, and to the High Court for orders made under the pre-POCA 2002 
legislation. 
1041 Hopmeier and Mills (n 675) 459-460.   
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recommended that the Crown Court should identify both the appropriate time for payment 
and make any orders needed to secure the asset as well as giving the magistrates’ court 
the powers necessary to realise the asset if the defendant does not pay as ordered.  The 
Crown Court can already secure assets and give powers to a receiver if a restraint order 
is needed, but this thesis argues for alternatives to restraint.  In particular it is 
recommended that the Crown Court should be able to make payment orders1042 and 
charging orders.1043  
This would mean that time for payment in relation to a house could be linked to a 
confiscation charging order and in relation to cash in a bank account could be linked to a 
payment order. To use an example, if a confiscation order is made in the sum of £500,000 
and the Crown Court identifies £100,000 in a bank account and £400,000 equity in a 
house then it could allow time for payment of (x) days for the cash to be realised from the 
bank account with an interim payment order; and time for payment of (x) months for the 
house to be sold with an interim charging order. 
5.3 Interest 
The first thing that happens if a confiscation order is not paid as ordered is that interest 
accrues, which can now be at different times for different amounts in the same 
confiscation order made under POCA 2002. The rate of interest is the same as that for the 
time being specified in section 17 of the Judgments Act 18381044 and the current rate of 
interest is 8% per annum. In both the old and new section 11 POCA 2002 no interest is 
payable during the period of the application to extend the time for payment period, 
however, interest will now accrue on any amounts not subject to the application.1045 
 
1042 That is, for confiscation orders made under POCA 2002 and the previous legislation. 
1043 That is, for the charging order provisions in the pre-POCA 2002 legislation to be extended. 
1044 CJA 1988, s 75A(3); Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act 1990, s 15(1); DTA 1994, s 
10(3); POCA 2002, s 12(2).   
1045 POCA 2002, s 12(3) as amended by the SCA 2015. 
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Once interest accrues it must be treated as part of the confiscation order1046 which in 
practice means that the confiscation order is not satisfied until the original order and any 
interest has been paid in full, and the magistrates’ court cannot make an order that the 
defendant is not liable to pay interest.  This interpretation has been held to be compatible 
with A1P1 of the ECHR.1047  
The accrual of interest was not a part of either the DTOA 1986 or the CJA 1988 when 
enacted.  The accrual of interest on unpaid drugs offences was first introduced in the 
Criminal Justice (International Co-Operation) Act 1990 and was introduced to ensure that 
the DTOA 1986 complied with the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances,1988 (the Vienna Convention).  The 
provision that interest would accrue if a confiscation order was not paid when ordered was 
recommended as an amendment to the DTOA 1988 by the HAC Seventh Report1048 and 
was introduced1049 to bring the DTOA 1986 into line with the law of the other signatories of 
the Vienna Convention.  It provided for interest to accrue after the time for payment had 
expired and for the interest to be treated as part of the confiscation order for the purposes 
of enforcement.   
At that stage, the interest provisions were not identified as an enforcement measure but 
as necessary to rectify the drug trafficking legislation to ensure that the maximum amount 
of the proceeds and income from drug trafficking was confiscated.1050 A provision to 
provide for the accrual of interest in relation to general crime confiscation orders was 
inserted into the CJA 1988 by POCA 1995 but by then the provision was considered to be 
an enforcement measure.  The aim was to ensure that a defendant does not benefit from 
 
1046  Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act 1990, s 15(1); CJA 1988, s 75A(1)(b); DTA 
1994, s 10(1); POCA 2002, s 12(4). 
1047 Hansford (n 525). 
1048 HAC Seventh Report (n 129) xix. 
1049 by section 15 of the Criminal Justice (International Co-Operation) Act 1990. 
1050 HL Deb 22 January 1990, vol 514, cols 888-889. 
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any interest on the accrued account and was introduced to echo the drug trafficking 
legislation.1051   
The DTA 1994 was a consolidating Act and it included the amendments to the DTOA 
1986 made by the Criminal Justice (International Co-Operation) Act 1990 including the 
provisions about interest which were replicated in POCA 2002. The prosecution has the 
power to apply to the Crown Court to increase the default sentence if the increase in 
interest results in an increase in the maximum term applicable1052 but this is rarely done in 
practice. 
Others have identified that interest is ineffective as an enforcement sanction for the non-
payment of confiscation orders1053 and that there are substantial amounts in the overall 
outstanding sums attributable to interest.1054  However, this research analyses different 
issues in relation to interest, namely the problems for judges interpreting the rules in 
relation to activating the default term where interest has accrued; and the implications for 
the magistrates’ court when enforcing interest following the case of Gibson.1055 
5.3.1 Interest: Impact on the magistrates’ court 
The rules for the magistrates’ court dealing with accrued interest and activating the default 
term have changed due to Gibson.  Until 2018 interest was included in the calculation of 
 
1051 HC Deb 3 February 1995, vol 253, col 1325. 
1052 Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act 1990, s 15(2); CJA 1988, s 75A(2); DTA 1994 s 
10(2); POCA 2002, s 39(5).  
1053 For example, Hopmeier and Mills question whether it is an effective sanction, (n 675) 460-461.   
Review documents have concluded that the sanction does not work, NAO Report (n 71) 41; PAC 
Report (n 328) 5, 12; Wood’s conclusions on the default sentence also caused her to question the 
accrual of interest as an incentive to pay Wood, The Big Payback (n 5) 9. 
1054 Coupled with the interest that accrues on non-payment, amounts outstanding have increased 
substantially despite an increase in amounts recovered. The review documents show that by April 
2015 £432 million of the outstanding confiscation order figure of £1.6 billion was interest, Wood, 
Enforcing Criminal Confiscation Orders (n 2) 14.  By the time of the HAC 2016 Report the interest 
figure was £470 million which was nearly a third of the total confiscation debt of £1.61 billion, 
HAC 2016 Report (n 26) 3, 38.  The HMCTS Trust statement 2017-18 puts the outstanding interest 
figure at £657,595 million out of a total figure outstanding of over £1.9 billion, HMCTS Trust 
Statement 2017-18 (n 23) 13. 
1055 Gibson (n 12).  
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the default term by the magistrates’ court, which in itself had caused complications for the 
magistrates’ court and judges attempting to interpret the legislation. 
The issues have arisen because of the interpretation of section 79 MCA 1980 which 
requires the magistrates’ court to take part payments into account when activating a 
default term.1056  This is a provision which was introduced to deal with the non-payment of 
fines not confiscation orders and in a case on the enforcement of confiscation orders has 
been described as  ‘exceedingly badly drafted’ and not ‘easy to apply.’1057 
Prior to 2018 the rules for dealing with the interaction of part payments when interest had 
accrued were not clear.  Magistrates’ courts would calculate the default term taking both 
into account and the process had been described as working with: 
something akin to a measuring jug.  It has a fixed capacity which cannot be 
exceeded, but within it the amount of the debt may both fall as the capital sum is 
paid off and rise as interest accrues on the balance.  When [the justices] come to 
activate a default term, [they] must activate the same proportion of it as the 
amount in the jug - that is principal and interest together - bears to its capacity.1058   
In 2018 the Supreme Court in Gibson considered the rules in relation to the activation of 
the default term where the defendant had made a part payment and interest had accrued.    
The Supreme Court said that ‘it is trite, but important, to say…that the question is not what 
scheme might be thought desirable, but rather what the convoluted statutes actually 
mean’.1059  This case is important not only for the clarification it gives on how the 
magistrates’ court should deal with cases where time for payment has expired and interest 
has accrued at the time the default term is activated, but also because it means that in the 
context of this research it confirms the complexities of the rules governing the magistrates’ 
 
1056 MCA 1980, s 79. 
1057 R (on the application of Emu) v Westminster Magistrates’ Court [2016] EWHC 2561 (Admin) [8] 
(Collins J).  
1058 Crown Prosecution Service v City of London Magistrates’ Court and Hartley [2007] EWHC 1924 
(Admin) [7] (Sedley LJ). 
1059 Gibson (n 12) [3].  
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court powers of enforcement and, as a result, it is argued that this is an area where further 
research is needed. 
The court had to consider the interest provisions in section 10 DTA 1994 but explained 
that the judgment it is not just of historical interest because, although the wording of 
POCA 2002 is not identical, the same issues apply in POCA 20021060 and it is submitted 
applies to all confiscation orders made under all Acts.  The court reasoned that if the 
interest provisions in DTA 19941061 were taken in isolation, there would be a powerful 
argument for saying that interest is simply added to the original confiscation order.  
However, the court then had to consider the ‘much more complex statutory scheme’ for 
activating the default term for confiscation orders.1062 
Of particular note to this research, the court heard argument that civil enforcement of 
interest is unlikely to be effective in the case of a defendant who is in default of the 
principal sum of the confiscation order.1063  The Supreme Court gave definitive guidance 
on the interest point, namely that the interest is not taken into account when calculating 
periods of detention.  This was despite the ‘purposive’ arguments put forward on behalf of 
the Secretary of State for Justice.1064  It took into account the principle that penal 
legislation is to be construed strictly, particularly when it involves deprivation of liberty.1065  
The Supreme Court held that the correct interpretation of the rules means that section 
79(2) does not include interest as the subsection means that the magistrates’ court must 
consider the amount outstanding at the time the confiscation order was imposed, that is 
without interest, which must be the correct interpretation. The Supreme Court reasoned 
that section 79 was not drafted with confiscation orders or Crown Court fines in mind, and 
 
1060 ibid [2]. 
1061 DTA 1994, s 10. Equivalent provisions are contained in Criminal Justice (International Co-
operation) Act 1990, s 15; CJA 1988, s 75A; POCA 2002, s 12. 
1062 Gibson (n 12) [8]. 
1063 ibid [19]. 
1064 ibid [19]-[20]. 
1065 ibid [21]. 
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if it is intended that interest should be included in the calculation of the default term then 
legislative amendment is needed.1066 
In coming to this conclusion, the Supreme Court considered the way the confiscation 
legislation and the fines based powers of the magistrates’ court interact, which it 
described as a ‘process of successive referrals’.1067 It described the process under the 
DTA 1994 although the ‘referrals’ would be the same under the other confiscation Acts.1068  
The Court described how section 9 DTA 1994 refers to a confiscation order being 
enforced as if it is a fine imposed by the Crown Court by referring on to section 140(1) 
PCC(S)A 2000 and therefore enforceable by the magistrates’ court, but that the 
magistrates’ fines based powers are contained in the MCA 1980 and so there is a further 
referral to that Act.1069  The judgment explains that many of the difficulties in the case arise 
from applying statutory provisions to the enforcement of confiscation orders which were 
not designed for them.1070  
Some of the background points in the judgment are not accurate.  The judgment states 
that the fact that confiscation orders carry interest makes them unique1071 but in fact there 
is one other financial penalty which carries interest when it is not paid as ordered.1072  In 
another part of the judgment it was stated that the magistrates do not fix a default term 
when imposing a fine,1073 however a magistrates’ court can set a default term on the 
imposition of a fine if the grounds in section 82(1) MCA 1980 are made out.1074  It is also 
worthy of note that the Court had to refer to the version of section 79 MCA 1980 which 
was relevant at the time, but it too has now been amended.1075  However, it matters not to 
 
1066 ibid [23]. 
1067 ibid [11]. 
1068 Prior to section 140 PCC(S)A 00, the relevant provision was PCCA 1973, s 32. 
1069 Gibson (n 12) [11]. 
1070 ibid [12]. 
1071 ibid [5]. 
1072 An unpaid unlawful profit order made under the Prevention of Social Housing Fraud Act 2013, 
s 4 also accrues interest at the same rate as a confiscation order. It is within the knowledge of the 
research author that this is a little used order. 
1073 Gibson (n 12) [12]. 
1074 Although in the experience of the research author this does not happen very often in practice. 
1075 Gibson (n 12) 11.  
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the decision of the Supreme Court.   It does though support the finding of the Supreme 
Court that the rules are complex, and it is submitted is an area for further research. 
The interpretation of the rules in relation to activating the default term where interest had 
accrued and there had been part payment were ripe for clarification by the Supreme Court 
as there had been a lack of clarity in this area of law.  However, as the SCA 2015 altered 
the default terms as well as the time for payment, with the knock-on effect on the accrual 
of interest, the factors that the magistrates’ court must take into account when enforcing a 
confiscation order have become more complicated.  
The decision in Gibson does not stop an application by the prosecution to apply to the 
Crown Court to increase the default sentence if the increase in interest results in an 
increase in the maximum term applicable.1076  But previous research shows that this is 
rarely done1077 which is the experience of the research author. 
The magistrates’ court must enforce all elements of the confiscation order including 
interest.  It is vital that there are effective powers of enforcement available to the 
magistrates’ court for all elements of the order but as a result of Gibson, the magistrates’ 
court will be restricted to civil means of enforcement to enforce the interest, unless the 
prosecution apply for an increase in the default term to cover the amount of the interest.  
The magistrates’ court already has to consider civil means of enforcement before 
activating the default term and is restricted to civil means of enforcement for any 
outstanding part of the principal amount of the confiscation order if the defendant has 
served the default term and the order has not been satisfied in full.1078 
The application of section 79 MCA 1980 to the interest element of a confiscation order is 
another area suitable for further research and possible legislative amendment which could 
 
1076 Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act 1990, s 15(2); CJA 1988, s 75A(2); DTA 1994 s 
10(2); POCA 2002, s 39(5). 
1077 Brown and others (n 173) 13. 
1078 The civil means of enforcement are the powers of the magistrates’ court short of committal, 




include a provision in section 35 POCA 2002 to allow for the enforcement of interest by 
the use of the default term.  There would also be a need for a corresponding amendment 
to the pre-POCA 2002 legislation.  
In any event the case of Gibson adds weight to the argument that more effective civil 
enforcement powers should be available to the Crown Court including the introduction of 
confiscation charging orders and payment orders to make the magistrates’ court collection 
and enforcement more effective.  This would assist either by ensuring that assets are 
realised promptly to prevent interest accruing or, if interest does accrue, in ensuring the 
enforcement of a confiscation order including interest by means other than the default 
term.   
5.4 Cash in a bank or building society account 
This section concerns money held in a bank or building society account, but for ease will 
refer to a bank account.  There are also powers in relation to seized monies,1079 but these 
fall outside the focus of this research.  
Sometimes a defendant will sign a consent order permitting the transfer of money from a 
bank account to pay a confiscation order.1080  In the pre-POCA 2002 legislation, the only 
way that money can be taken from a bank account without the defendant’s consent is by 
way of an application in the county court by the designated officer for the magistrates’ 
court for what was known as a garnishee order and is now a third party debt order. There 
were issues with this and as a result payment orders were introduced in POCA 2002 as 
an alternative to a garnishee order1081 and have been described as a ‘unique power’ for 
the magistrates’ court1082 which they are as there is no similar power for other financial 
penalties. 
 
1079 Where the money has been seized and is being held in connection with a prosecution or 
investigation, POCA 2002, s 67(2).  
1080 Joint Thematic Review (n 3) 44. 
1081 Explanatory Notes to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, para 121. 
1082 Mitchell Taylor and Talbot vol 2, para VII.007 (R5: September 2004). 
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Financial Investigators have identified bank accounts as an asset which can be dissipated 
very quickly and therefore suitable for restraint,1083 and that restraint is particularly useful 
where the asset involved is a bank account.1084  As a result it is not surprising that Bullock 
et al found that cases where there is money in bank accounts or houses are the ‘likeliest 
candidates’ for restraint.1085  
5.4.1 Pre-POCA 2002 legislation 
A third party debt order replaced a garnishee order as an order in 2002,1086 but the nature 
of the order remains the same.1087 Any reference to a garnishee order in the review 
documents or case law applies to a third party debt order and vice versa unless 
mentioned otherwise in this thesis. 
The Home Office Guide suggested that garnishee orders are particularly effective if the 
money is held in a bank account and there is a restraint order in force1088 but there were 
criticisms of the process.  The Working Group Third Report recommended that the 
legislation should be amended to make it clear that the power to garnishee is available 
once default is made in payment,1089 and also recommended that a new power should be 
introduced for money to be paid to what is now the designated officer for the magistrates’ 
court.1090  The Hodgson Committee had already identified that it was wrong for a victim to 
be able to apply to restrain a bank account in civil proceedings to ensure that damages 
can be paid when the State does not have the same right.1091 
 
1083 Bullock, ‘Enforcing Financial Penalties’ (n 44) 332. 
1084 Bullock and others (n 29) 19. 
1085 Bullock and others (n 29) 21. 
1086 The Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) Part 72 came into force on 25 March 2002 replacing garnishee 
orders with third party debt orders. 
1087 Société Eram Shipping Co Ltd v Compagnie Internationale de Navigation and others [2003] 
UKHL 30, [2004] 1 AC 260 [12] (Lord Bingham of Cornhill). 
1088 Home Office Guide (n 4) 25. 
1089 Working Group Third Report (n 126) para 2.36. 
1090 The Working Group recommended that there should be a new power for payments in a bank 
account to be paid directly to the justices’ clerk to supplement distress warrants, Working Group 
Third Report (n 126) para 2.39. 
1091 Hodgson Report (n 123) 107. 
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The Working Group Third Report found that there was a reluctance by the magistrates’ 
court to use garnishee proceedings because of the cost.1092  It recommended that the 
costs incurred by the magistrates’ court making an application in the county court, which 
would include the county court fees and any solicitors’ costs, should be taken from monies 
paid in relation to the confiscation order before it is paid to the consolidated fund by 
modelling the legislation on the legislation in relation to receivers’ fees.1093 
The time for payment provisions have tightened over time which should lessen the ability 
of the defendant to dissipate assets and protect the value of assets to a certain extent. 
However, without a restraint order, there is no preservation of the money in the bank 
account.  The Working Group Third Report recommended in 1998 that if monies were 
held in a bank account then time for payment should be immediate.1094  This was echoing 
the recommendations in relation to garnishee already made by the Working Group First 
Report which found the ‘tortuous’ process for the justices’ clerk to apply to the county 
court for a garnishee order led to a reluctance to use the power.1095  It recommended the 
introduction of a power of the Crown Court to make an order on imposition which would 
have had the effect of a garnishee order nisi.  The ambition would be that the order would 
become absolute automatically after a set period unless the bank or whoever it was 
addressed to shows why it should not become absolute. The order would be enforced by 
the magistrates’ court.1096  The recommendation was one of those in the report aimed at 
improving the enforcement powers of the magistrates’ court, by suggesting that the Crown 
Court should give clear instructions to the magistrates’ court about how the confiscation 
order should be enforced.1097 
 
1092 Working Group Third Report (n 126) para 2.33. 
1093 ibid paras 2.33-2.36. 
1094 ibid para 2.16. 
1095 Working Group First Report (n 137) 8. 
1096 ibid 8-9. 
1097 ibid 8-9.  The second recommendation was that a similar power to a distress warrant would be 
introduced; the third was in relation to the appointment of receivers which is no longer relevant. 
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The PIU report recommended the use of an order on imposition which would have the 
effect of transferring money in a bank account where there is a restraint order, as it saw 
the inability to do this as disrupting and delaying the enforcement process and that 
restraint is not the most direct way of satisfying the order.1098   
The recommendations in the PIU report led directly to the introduction of powers for the 
magistrates’ court to make a payment order, but it is not a direct method of satisfying the 
confiscation order and, it is submitted, the order did not go far enough.  The Crown Court 
gathers enough information to make a payment order, but then passes the case to the 
magistrates’ court to make the order which in practical terms comes with inbuilt delay and 
an additional administrative burden.  Had POCA 2002 introduced powers for the Crown 
Court to make a payment order on imposition, it would have addressed a need first 
identified in the Working Group First Report to speed up payment and remove 
unnecessary administration.   
5.4.2 POCA 2002 and the introduction of payment orders: 
Payment orders were introduced in s 67 POCA 2002 as an alternative to garnishee but 
have been amended on a number of occasions since.1099  A payment order can be made 
in relation to money seized and detained by a constable or other person but only where 
the confiscation order was made under POCA 2002.  This thesis concentrates on the 
issues for the magistrates’ court when the money is held in a bank account.   
The order is made by the magistrates’ court and directs the bank to pay an amount to the 
designated officer for the magistrates’ court. If a payment order is made by the 
magistrates’ court and the bank does not comply with it then the court can order the bank 
to pay a sum of up to £5000, which is then enforced as a fine.1100  When the provision was 
 
1098 PIU Report (n 117) 71.  
1099 The payment order provisions in POCA 2002, s 67 have been amended on four occasions.  The 
changes relevant to this research were made by the SCA 2015.  
1100 POCA 2002, s 67(6). 
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first introduced, there were four conditions which had to be satisfied before a payment 
order could be made.  They were that:  
• a restraint order had been made in relation to money,  
• a confiscation order had been made,  
• an enforcement receiver has not been appointed, and  
• time for payment had expired. 
There were issues with this order which were helpfully outlined in articles by Gardner1101 
and Brunning1102 who both recommended that there should be no need for time for 
payment to have expired before a payment order could be made.1103  Brunning identified 
difficulties if the account was not in the defendant’s name;1104 and these were addressed 
by the changes brought in by the SCA 2015 so if a determination has been made about a 
defendant’s interest under section 10A POCA 2002 then the magistrates’ court can make 
a payment order in relation to an account which is not in the name of the defendant.   
Brunning estimated that at least 20 per cent of confiscation orders with monies in bank 
accounts did not have a restraint order and suggested an amendment to section 67 so 
that there was no requirement for a restraint order to be in force.1105  POCA 2002 was also 
amended by the SCA 2015 to remove the need for a restraint order to be in place before a 
payment order can be made in the magistrates’ court,1106 and since 1st June 2015 only two 
grounds have to be satisfied before the magistrates’ court can make a payment order, 
namely that:  
• a confiscation order has been made against person holding money, and 
 
1101 David C. Gardner, ‘Closing Loopholes to Take the Cash Out of Crime: Practical Changes in 
Legislation to Improve Confiscation Order Enforcement’ [2009] (2) Crim LR 90. 
1102 Brunning, ‘Payment Orders in Confiscation Order Enforcement’ (n 59). 
1103 Gardner (n 1101) 93; Brunning, ibid 685. 
1104 Brunning, ibid 685. 
1105 ibid 684-685. 
1106 POCA 2002, s 67(4) was removed by SCA 2015, s 14(1). 
207 
 
• a receiver has not been appointed.1107 
This change met the commitment in the 2013 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy to 
strengthen POCA 2002 by ‘significantly reducing the time that the courts can give 
offenders to pay confiscation orders, including rapid confiscation of cash held in bank 
accounts’.1108  These changes addressed some of the problems with payment orders that 
Gardner and Brunning had identified, but do not address the issues raised with the pre-
POCA 2002 legislation.  In addition they do not meet the purpose of POCA 2002 to create 
a one stop shop at the Crown Court in relation to confiscation orders, nor do they stop the 
ability to move the money out of the bank account before the payment order is made.  
Finally, they do not meet the need to make an order on imposition first suggested in 1991 
by the Working group First Report and then again in 2000 by the PIU.   
One of the issues identified by Gardner in relation to payment orders is that if a 
confiscation order is being made at the Crown Court and a bank account has been 
identified as an asset, that court would have all the information required for a payment 
order.  That information is then passed to the magistrates’ court for a payment order to be 
made.1109  In 2009 when Gardner was writing he identified that the grounds a county court 
would consider in relation to a third party debt order would already have been identified by 
the Crown Court in relation to restraint as a restraint order was a pre-requisite for a 
payment order under the legislation at that stage.  He argued that when making a 
confiscation order a third party debt order application would be unnecessary work for the 
courts.1110  
Before making a payment order the magistrates’ court must have received the 
confiscation order from the Crown Court and then it gives the bank notice. Even though 
time for payment no longer has to expire before an application for a payment order can be 
 
1107 POCA 2002, s 67(5) as amended.  
1108 2013 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy (n 62) 35. 
1109 Gardner (n 1101) 93.   
1110 ibid 93. 
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made, there is an in-built delay in the process.  If there is no restraint order, then there is 
the opportunity for the defendant or a third party to dissipate the money in the bank 
account.  As a confiscation order is an order against the person and not the asset, there is 
nothing to stop the dissipation, neither is there a sanction if dissipation takes place unless 
there is a restraint order. 
If a payment order is made, then the order will contain information1111 which will be in the 
knowledge of the Crown Court if the bank account has been identified as an asset when 
the confiscation order is made.  The order requires the bank to pay the money within 7 
days unless the magistrates’ court fixes a different period of time.1112  
5.4.3 Payment order v third party debt order 
One of the recommendations in this thesis is for changing the payment order provisions 
which replaced applications for third party debt orders.1113  In chapter 7 applications made 
by the designated officer for charging orders made in the county court are analysed, which 
are similar in nature to applications for third party debt.  Because of this, it is necessary to 
analyse applications for a third party debt order by the designated officer in the county 
court.  In addition, the review documents identified problems with the process for applying 
for a third party debt order which led to the introduction of the payment order provisions, 
and this thesis shows that not all the issues have been addressed.  The analysis of the 
third party debt applications is not just of historical importance because an application for 
an order to the county court is the only option available to the magistrates’ court where the 
 
1111 The information which must be contained in the order is a requirement of CrimPR 33.24 and 
includes the name of the person against whom the confiscation order has been made, the 
amount outstanding, details of the branch and sort code and the account details (if known), the 
amount to be paid.   
1112 CrimPR 33.24(1)(h). 
1113 The payment order provisions are only available for confiscation orders made under POCA 
2002.  For bank accounts identified under the pre-POCA 2002, the only application which can be 
made by the designated officer is for a third party debt order in the county court.  
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confiscation order has been made under the pre-POCA 2002 legislation.  Like the rest of 
this section, the analysis concentrates on applications in relation to bank accounts.1114   
It has been said that applications for third party debt orders are likely to be sought less 
frequently because of the payment order provisions,1115 and while this is undoubtedly 
correct, the experiences of the research author are that applications are still necessary in 
relation to pre-POCA 2002 bank accounts.  This is because confiscation orders are still 
being made under the pre-POCA 2002 legislation, and others are still being enforced.1116 
However, there have always been deterrents to the magistrates’ court applying, namely 
the costs involved and the difficult process.1117 
The designated officer for the magistrates’ court cannot apply for a third party debt order 
in relation to an outstanding confiscation order until the time for payment granted by the 
Crown Court has expired.1118  This is an inbuilt delay and therefore there is a risk of 
dissipation.  As the debt is a confiscation order, there is no need for the magistrates’ court 
to conduct a means inquiry before the designated officer makes an application for a third 
party debt order.1119  This is a benefit within the context of the magistrates’ court 
procedure, but once the application is made, the procedure in the county court is far from 
straightforward and the designated officer is treated like any other judgment creditor.   
The confiscation order can be enforced in the county court, but the debt must first be 
registered at the county court1120 before the application for an interim third party debt order 
can be made1121 and the designated officer must pay of a fee of £110.1122 As Gardner 
 
1114 There is a separate procedure for an application for money in court in CPR 72.10 which falls 
outside the scope of this thesis. 
1115 Sutherland Williams, Hopmeier and Jones (n 58) 284. 
1116 text to n 78 in chapter 1. 
1117 Working Group Third Report (n 126) para 2.33. 
1118 DTOA 1986, s 6; CJA 1988, s 75; DTA 1994, s 9; POCA 2002, s 11 (n 849).  
1119 DTOA 1986, s 6(4)(b); CJA 1988, s 75(5)(b); DTA 1994, s 9(4)(b); and POCA 2002, s35(3)(c) 
disapply the MCA 1980, s 87(3) which means that there is no need for the magistrates’ court to 
conduct a means inquiry before making an application to the High Court or county court.   
1120 using form N322B, 70 PD 4.1. 
1121 using form N349, 72 PD 1.1. 
1122 The Civil Proceedings Order 2008, SI 2008/1053 sch 1 Fee 7.3(a). 
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identified, the designated officer must provide information to the county court1123 which the 
Crown Court would have been in possession of when the confiscation order was made if 
the bank account had been identified as an asset.1124 
When an application for a third party debt order is made, it will be dealt with by a judge 
without a hearing who may make an interim order, which prevents the bank from making 
any payments which would reduce the amount in the account to below the amount of the 
order.1125  Interim orders are made without notice and are usually listed the day they are 
received as urgent business.1126  The case will be adjourned for a hearing not less than 28 
days after the interim third party debt order is made.1127 
In order for an application to be made the third party must be within the jurisdiction.1128 In 
relation to a payment order, the bank must have its head office or a branch in the United 
Kingdom.1129  The third party debt order is discretionary1130 and if an interim order is made 
it must be served on the defendant and the bank1131 which must then carry out a search of 
the accounts and disclose relevant information including how much is in the account(s) 
with the account number(s), or if there are no accounts. Like a payment order the time 
limit for the bank to respond is 7 days.1132   
 
1123 The information the designated officer must provide is required by Practice Direction 72 (72 
PD 1.2) and includes: the name and address of the defendant, the details of the confiscation order 
including the amount outstanding, the name and the address of the bank branch where it is 
believed the account is held, the account number (or to state if it is not known), confirmation that 
to the best of their knowledge or belief the third party is within the jurisdiction; and owes the 
money to or holds money to their credit.  In addition, the application must include the details of 
any other person with a claim to the money and any other applications for third party debt orders 
for the same debt. 
1124 Working Group First Report (n 137) 8; Gardner (n 1101) 93; text to n 1109. 
1125 CPR 72.4(2)(b). 




1129 POCA 2002, s 67(8)(b); Building Societies Act 1986, s 5. 
1130 Vos (n 1126) vol 1, 2185. 
1131 CPR 72.5(1). 
1132 CPR 72.6. 
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Both the defendant or the bank can then make objections at the final hearing.1133 Although 
in most cases the hearing is straightforward,1134 if the designated officer loses the case 
they will be liable for costs.1135  The designated officer can be awarded the costs of the 
application out of the money in the account.1136   
Once an interim third party debt order has been made the defendant can apply for a 
hardship payment order,1137 which has been described as an ‘innovation’ of the Civil 
Procedure Rules and an attempt to balance the rights of the judgment debtor and the 
judgment creditor.1138  The power exists in relation to third party debt order applications 
made in relation to unpaid confiscation orders even though the Crown Court has already 
assessed that the defendant has benefited from crime in the amount of the confiscation 
order and, if the money in the bank account was identified as an asset at the Crown Court, 
has already determined it can be paid to satisfy the confiscation order.  The application for 
a third party debt order can be transferred to another court.1139  Given this process and the 
costs involved, it is understandable that the Working Groups found a reluctance by 
justices’ clerks to make such applications, and in practice applications for third party debt 
orders are rarely made.  
A review of both payment orders and third party debt order processes show that without a 
restraint order there is nothing to prevent the dissipation of the money in a bank account 
before an order is made.  In both situations the Crown Court would have the information 
needed to make an order if the account has been identified as an asset at the Crown 
Court.  A bank account has also been identified as an asset particularly suitable for 
restraint.1140 
 
1133 CPR 72.8. 
1134 Vos (n 1126) vol 1, 2184. 
1135 ibid Vol 1, 2184. 
1136 CPR 72.2. and 72.11. 
1137 CPR 72.7. 
1138 Vos (n 1126) vol 1, 2183. 
1139 72 PD 4. 
1140 Bullock and others (n 29) 21; Bullock, ‘Enforcing Financial Penalties’ (n 44) 332.  
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Therefore, it is suggested that passing the responsibility for making a payment order or an 
application for a third party debt order to the magistrates’ court leaves the money in the 
account at risk of dissipation.  For payment orders, this appears to be an unintended 
consequence of removing the requirement for there to be a restraint order before a 
payment order can be made.  It also, especially in the case of an application for a third 
party debt order, costs time, resources and money in fees and representation, and is the 
opposite of the one stop shop approach envisaged by the introduction of POCA 2002.  If 
the account has been identified as an asset at the Crown Court, that court will have all of 
this information and would be in a position to make an interim order, rather than passing it 
to the magistrates’ court to consider. 
Of course, the bank account could be identified as an asset at a later date so there would 
need to be a mechanism for a payment order to be made at a later date, not just on 
imposition.  This could be an order available to the Crown Court who may also need to 
make other orders in relation to the confiscation order at the same time, for example a 
compliance order,1141 with the retention of the power for the magistrates’ court on 
enforcement. 
It is therefore recommended that consideration should be given to amending the payment 
order provisions to avoid any risk of dissipation and provide a real alternative to restraint.  
This would strengthen the powers of collection of the magistrates’ court for confiscation 
orders made pre and post POCA 2002.  As a result, three recommendations are made in 
relation to bank accounts.   
Firstly, that payment orders should be extended to the pre-POCA 2002 legislation in the 
same way as discharge under section 25A POCA 2002 has been.1142  Secondly, that the 
 
1141 Fisher suggests that a compliance order would be a useful tool if an order is made to transfer 
money held in an offshore bank account into a local bank account, Fisher (n 60) 759. 
1142 The Crown Court can now discharge a confiscation order made under any legislation where 
the defendant has died and the order cannot be satisfied out of the estate. 
213 
 
Crown Court should be given the power to make a payment order on imposition.1143 
Thirdly the Crown Court and the magistrates’ court should also have the power to make a 
payment order subsequent to the confiscation order being made.  These 
recommendations to amend the payment order provisions would mitigate the cost 
considerations of restraint orders (and other issues) and it is suggested that Crown Court 
payment order powers should permit the court to make an interim payment order.  
Gardner recommended that the Crown Court could be given the power to make a 
payment order as well as a magistrates’ court, but that would in effect be an absolute 
order.1144 The recommendations in this thesis build on the recommendations of the First 
and Third Working Group Reports.  To bring these recommendations up to date, it would 
mean giving the power to make a payment order to the Crown Court.  The Working Group 
First Report recommended an order nisi.  In a similar way, it is recommended that on the 
imposition of a confiscation order where the bank account has been identified as an asset, 
the Crown Court could make an interim payment order with notice to the bank which, if 
nothing is heard, becomes absolute on a given date.  If an objection is received a hearing 
could be arranged in the magistrates’ court and until then the interim payment order would 
remain in place.1145  
A recommendation is also made that the magistrates’ court should retain its power to 
make a payment order for bank accounts which are identified after the confiscation order 
has been made.  This would allow the magistrates’ court to make a payment order when 
 
1143 Or on any other application in relation to the confiscation order, for example an application to 
vary.  
1144 Gardner (n 1101) 94. 
1145 These changes could echo the changes to the forfeiture of cash provisions brought into force 
on 1st June 2015.  The Policing and Crime Act 2009 amended POCA 2002 by inserting new sections 
297A to 297G.  As a result, where cash has been detained, a forfeiture notice can be served 
instead of making an application to the magistrates’ court for the forfeiture of the cash.  If the 
notice is served and there is no objection, the cash is forfeited.  If an objection is received, then a 
court hearing would be arranged.  These provisions were brought into force because a 
considerable number of forfeiture applications are uncontested, Home Office Amendments to the 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Home Office Circular 020/2015) para 80.  The author is not aware of 
any applications for payment orders being contested by a bank in the magistrates’ court. 
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considering other aspects of the enforcement of the order where necessary and retain in 
effect a one stop shop for the enforcement powers of the magistrates’ court. 
These proposals would mean that the risk of dissipation would be removed where the 
account is identified as an asset at the Crown Court, without the need for a restraint order.    
It is more proportionate than a restraint order which would prevent the defendant dealing 
with the account and the payment order would only take the amount assessed as an asset 
by the Crown Court.  This meets the purposes of the regime including ensuring that crime 
does not pay, and disruption.  It would also assist HMCTS which must ensure that all 
orders are enforced, whatever the amount of the order, or the legislation the confiscation 
order is made under. It also fits in with the one stop shop ideal of POCA 20021146 and is a 
proportionate answer to the issues identified. 
5.5 Discharge 
The amendments to the powers to discharge a confiscation order are an example of how 
issues identified in the pre-POCA 2002 have been addressed to create the one stop shop 
at the Crown Court envisaged by POCA 2002, even if those changes have come about in 
stages. 
Slowly but surely the powers of the magistrates’ court to apply to the Crown Court to 
discharge confiscation orders in limited circumstances have been extended, including by 
extending some of the powers to the pre-POCA 2002 legislation.  It is suggested that the 
amendments are more in line with the one stop shop purpose of POCA 2002 and could be 
echoed in other parts of the regime.  
There had been calls for the magistrates’ court to be able to obtain a review of the order if 
it was unenforceable, and the Working Party Third Report recommended provisions that 
 
1146 The PIU report envisaged the Crown Court making orders in relation to restrained bank 
accounts, PIU Report (n 117) 71. 
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were enacted in POCA 2002.1147  These powers only applied to confiscation orders made 
under POCA 2002 and when they were introduced the rules allowed an application by the 
designated officer to the Crown Court for a discharge of an unenforceable order if the 
amount remaining on the order is less than £1000 and this is because of exchange rate 
fluctuations,1148 or is less than £50.1149  A new section 25A was introduced into POCA 
2002 by the SCA 2015, so now an application can be made if the defendant has died and 
it is not possible to recover anything from the estate of the deceased, or it would not be 
reasonable to make any attempt to recover anything.1150  This new power also applied to 
orders made under the DTA 1994 and CJA 1998, but not the DTOA 1986.1151 The CFA 
2017 amended section 8 of the SCA 2015 which means that the powers in section 25A 
POCA 2002 to discharge a confiscation order where the defendant is deceased are 
extended to orders made under the DTOA 1986.   
The powers to apply for a discharge make a real practical difference.  They allow the 
orders to be completed when otherwise they would be showing as outstanding, accruing 
interest and increasing the overall debt unnecessarily.  It also allows other collectable 
orders to be prioritised.  Wood welcomed this measure as a practical response but 
questioned whether the increase in the ability to write-off confiscation orders went far 
enough.1152  There have been calls to consider the ability to write-off unenforceable 
 
1147 Levi and Osofsky had mentioned the lack of an ability to write-off confiscation orders. Levi and 
Osofsky (n 162) viii. The Working Group Third Report recommended that the magistrates’ court 
should be able to apply the Crown Court for a review of the amount to be paid under a 
confiscation order that was obviously unenforceable; and to be able to apply to remit confiscation 
orders in the case of fluctuations in exchange rates where the offender was subsequently 
deported, Working Group Third Report (n 126) paras 240-244. 
1148 POCA 2002, s 24. 
1149 POCA 2002, s 25. 
1150 POCA 2002, s 25A as inserted by SCA 2015, s 8(3). This was introduced because of the inability 
of the designated officer to apply to discharge the order if the defendant had died, Explanatory 
Notes to the Serious Crime Act 2015, para 49. 
1151 SCA 2015, s 8(3) as enacted. 
1152 Wood, The Big Payback (n 5) 12-13. 
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accounts1153 and Wood called for this area to be the subject of further research1154 
although the HAC Report recommended that accounts should not be written off.1155  This 
thesis supports the need for further research, which should consider extending all the 
powers to discharge in POCA 2002 to orders made under the pre-POCA 2002 legislation 
but this falls outside the scope of this thesis. 
5.6 Applications for a Certificate of Inadequacy or Downward Variation 
There is no power for the magistrates’ court to remit a confiscation order1156 although 
there has always been the power for the defendant to apply for the order to be reduced if 
there is a shortfall in the available amount.  Levi and Osofsky described the helplessness 
of the magistrates’ court to do anything if the defendant’s solicitors failed to make an 
application1157 and without the power for anyone else to apply orders remained 
outstanding which could have been reduced, often to a nil amount.   
Like other provisions the process varies depending on whether the confiscation order was 
made under POCA 2002 or the pre-POCA 2002 legislation.1158 This thesis concentrates 
on the parties who can make the application rather than the detailed process or the 
principles to be taken into account when reviewing the available amount. 
 
1153 For example, the evidence of Peter Handcock PAC Report Ministry of Justice Financial 
Management 2010-12 (n 350) Ev 12; HAC 2016 Report (n 26) 28.  Levi suggests that writing off 
these sums would be a sensible policy, Levi ‘Reflections on Proceeds of Crime’ (n 38) 5. 
1154 Wood acknowledged that politically it may be difficult to allow more categories of orders to 
be written off but wondered if a system could be developed to ‘park’ orders, for example if 
defendants have been deported. The majority of the practitioners she interviewed gave removing 
uncollectable orders from the overall figures as the one change they would like to see in the 
enforcement process, Wood, The Big Payback (n 5) 12-13. 
1155 HAC 2016 Report (n 26) 30-31.  
1156 POCA 2002, s 35(3)(b). 
1157 Levi and Osofsky (n 162) 52. 
1158 When the power was first introduced only the defendant could apply to the High Court, DTOA 
1986, s 14; CJA 1988, s83.  When the DTA 1994 was introduced a receiver could also make an 
application, DTA 1994, s 17. CJA 1988 s 83 was amended by POCA 1995, s 10 so that both can 
apply.  The power of the receiver and defendant to apply was continued in POCA 2002 but the 
application is made to the Crown Court. 
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If an application is made under POCA 2002, and the Crown Court finds that the available 
amount is inadequate, it ‘may’ vary the order the order by substituting ‘such smaller 
amount as the court believes is just’.1159   The use of the word ‘may’ in POCA 2002 
abolishes the difficulty encountered under the old legislation.1160 
When the power to make an application for a downward variation to the Crown Court was 
introduced in POCA 2002 the application could only be made by the defendant or a 
receiver, but section 23 POCA 2003 was extended by SCA 2015 so that the prosecutor 
can apply in addition to the defendant or receiver.1161  The changes to the discharge and 
variation powers have been described as ‘small’ but ‘eminently sensible.’1162  However, 
since the changes in the SCA 2015, the NAO report found that although the prosecutor 
and defendant can apply for a variation, this does not always happen, for example if the 
defendant refuses to co-operate or has absconded.1163  
The amendments to the variation powers did not go as far as those suggested by Gardner 
in 2009.1164  Gardner outlined the difficulties that are experienced when the Crown Court 
makes a confiscation order in an amount based on a valuation of a particular item which is 
subsequently sold for a lesser amount.1165  He suggested in his article that s23(1) should 
be amended to read: 
(1) this section applies if 
(a) the court has made a confiscation order, and 
 
1159 POCA 2002, s 23(3). 
1160 Where there is a pre-POCA 2002 confiscation order, an application for a Certificate of 
Inadequacy is made to the High Court.  If successful, the Crown Court ‘shall’ then reduce the order 
by the amount it thinks ‘just in all the circumstances of the case’ DTOA 1986, s 14; CJA 1988, s 83; 
DTA 1994, s 17.  In R v James Briggs [2003] EWCA Crim 3298, [2004] 2 Cr App R (S) a confiscation 
order originally made in the sum of £40,586 was reduced by £1 after the defendant had £36,850 
seized from him on arrest, which was subsequently returned to him.  He then gave £36,000 to his 
three sons.  The DTA requires a reduction to be made in the order, but the Court of Appeal felt 
the facts of the case only justified a nominal reduction. 
1161 POCA 2002, s 23(1) as amended by SCA 2015, s 8. 
1162 Fisher (n 60) 760. 
1163 NAO Progress Report (n 367) 27. 
1164 Gardner (n 1101). 
1165 ibid 95-96. 
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(b) the defendant, prosecutor, designated officer of the enforcement 
authority, or a receiver appointed under section 50 or 52, applies to the Crown 
Court to vary the order under this section.1166  
He explained that this was necessary as either defendants do not understand the 
complicated nature of the legislation which means that they either think that if the asset 
identified at the Crown Court has been sold, even for a lesser amount, then that will 
satisfy the order; or the application process is too complicated.  He argued that it would be 
wrong for a defendant or the taxpayer, if the defendant is legally aided, to pay for a 
variation, especially if any shortfall is not his fault, and that getting a defendant to apply for 
a variation can take more resources than making the application.1167 
It is suggested that Gardner’s recommendations are particularly relevant to the 
recommendation in this thesis for the Crown Court to be able to make a charging order.  
In chapter 4 of this thesis on restraint, concerns by researchers were identified about the 
effect a fall in property prices could have on the amount that could be obtained from a 
share in a property.1168  If a power by the designated officer to apply for a variation or 
certificate of inadequacy was introduced, it would be relevant here if the house is sold for 
less than the valuation set at the confiscation hearing.   
In Re Callinan1169 a confiscation order had been made under the DTA 1994 on the basis 
of the defendant’s share in various properties.  When the properties were subsequently 
sold in negative equity or had been repossessed, the High Court held that the defendant’s 
realisable property was inadequate to satisfy the confiscation order, although the decision 
whether or not to reduce the order was one for the Crown Court under the legislation.  
Although this case concerned property in Spain, it is suggested that it supports the 
 
1166 ibid 96. Gardner’s suggested amendments are in bold. 
1167 ibid 94-96. 
1168 Text to n 966-n 975 in chapter 4.  If there is a downturn in the property market or a property is 
sold for less than its valuation as part of the confiscation order after a charging order is made then 
the defendant can apply for a downward variation of the confiscation order.   These issues are not 
particular to charging orders, they would apply in all cases where the asset is a house. 
1169 [2018] EWHC 230 (Admin). 
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premise that the defendant can subsequently apply to vary an order if a house is sold for 
less than its valuation for the purposes of the confiscation order. 
The experience of the research author is that the issues identified by Gardiner still exist 
and it is recommended that the designated officer should be given the power in section 23 
POCA 2002 to apply to the Crown Court for a confiscation order to be varied.  These 
could mirror the power to apply for the discharge of a confiscation order under both POCA 
2002 and the pre-POCA 2002 legislation.1170  Then as soon as an item is sold the case 
could be referred to the Crown Court.  The prosecution and the defendant would be put on 
notice, but if the variation is agreed it could mirror the process for an application to 
discharge an order and be decided without a hearing.1171  This would be of practical 
benefit and would allow the designated officer to apply for a variation without the 
sometimes lengthy delays and costs currently incurred.  Defendants are often unaware 
that, despite an item being sold, the confiscation order has not been satisfied, or have to 
incur the expense of a defence solicitor being appointed.  It would also support the 
recommendation for legislative amendments to allow the Crown Court to make a 
confiscation charging order. 
5.7 Default Terms 
In some ways the history of the default term provisions that apply to the enforcement of 
confiscation orders have had a similar history to the interest provisions.  In the same way 
that interest did not accrue when the DTOA 1986 was introduced, neither did the default 
term wipe out the debt.  Like the interest provisions, the default term is seen as one of the 
main sanctions for non-payment of a confiscation order1172 and its effectiveness has also 
been called into question.1173  The Law Commission has identified that in 2012 only 2% of 
 
1170 POCA 2002, s 25A and SCA 2015, s8. 
1171 CrimPR 33.18(4). 
1172 For example, Brown and others (n 173) 13; NAO Report (n 71) 41; Wood, Enforcing Criminal 
Confiscation Orders (n 2) 8-9; Wood, The Big Payback (n 5) 6. 
1173 For example Levi and Osofsky concluded that the extent to which defendants would serve the 




orders were paid in full after the activation of default,1174 but there is no research into why 
this is the case.1175  Again, as with interest, that debate is not considered, instead the 
issues for the magistrates’ court dealing with the default term are reviewed.  In practice 
the interpretation of the rules for activating the default term are not straightforward for the 
magistrates’ court and some consideration of the development of the provisions is 
necessary to explain why. 
A confiscation order is a financial penalty and is dealt with as a fine.1176  As such it is 
governed by the provisions which apply to all fines, so until an exemption was introduced 
in the confiscation legislation, the serving of the default term for non-payment of a 
confiscation order wiped out the debt in the same way as wiping out a fine.  This appears 
to have been a deliberate step, as in a House of Lords debate it was envisaged that 
although in some cases a defendant would choose to serve the period in default instead 
of paying as ordered, the government hoped that “not too many” would choose that option 
 
legislation, although at that stage serving the default term wiped out the debt, Levi and Osofsky 
(n 162) viii. The PIU reported that default sentences were not always effective as defendants are 
sometimes content to serve the additional time and  recommended that these powers should be 
used more effectively and that confiscation orders should be pursued even after the default term 
has been served, PIU Report (n 117) 72.  In 2012 the default sentence was seen by some 
contributors to be an effective tool to make defendants pay, Brown and others (n 173) 13, 
although the interviews conducted by the NAO in their 2013 report found ‘unanimous agreement’ 
that the default sentence and the accrual of interest were ineffective sanctions, NAO Report (n 
71) 41.  Wood reported that the changes to default sentences in the SCA 2015 where to 
encourage payment. Wood doubted this quoting previous research that questioned the 
effectiveness of the sanction as an incentive to pay but acknowledged that it is too soon to assess 
the effectiveness of the changes, Wood, The Big Payback (n 5) 8-9. The NAO also determined that 
it was too soon to evaluate the success of the changes, NAO Progress Report (n 367) 11.  The HAC 
heard evidence which called into question the effectiveness of the sanction, HAC 2016 Report (n 
26) 28-29. 
1174 Law Commission (n 69) 23-24. 
1175 Levi ‘Reflections on Proceeds of Crime’ (n 38) 21. 
1176 DTOA 1986 s 6(1); CJA 1988 s 75(1); DTA 1994, s 9(1); POCA 2002, s 35(2).  All financial 
penalties are sent to the magistrates’ court to be enforced as if it had been ordered to be paid ‘on 
a conviction by a magistrates’ court’, PCC(S)A 2000, ss 139-140. Even if it were not treated as a 
fine, a confiscation order is still a financial penalty imposed by the Crown Court and as such it is 
submitted that it would have been included in the list of ancillary orders in the Administration of 
Justice Act 1970, sch 9, part 1 to be enforced alongside any other financial penalty imposed as 
part of the same sentencing process.    
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and the government view was that once the default term had been served the order must 
end.1177 
When they were writing, Levi and Osofsky doubted that there would be a change in the 
legislation so that serving a default sentence would not expunge the debt.  They 
commented that if it did, a failure to collect may become a greater administrative problem 
in the future.1178  Their views were prophetic as, coupled with the interest that accrues on 
non-payment, amounts outstanding have increased substantially despite an increase in 
amounts recovered.1179  This supports the need for more effective civil enforcement 
powers to enforce confiscation orders after the default term has been served.1180 
The Working Group First Report recommended that the setting of the default term should 
not expunge the defendant's liability to pay to ensure that defendants who did not comply 
would not only face a further period of imprisonment but also know that their property 
would be ‘perpetually vulnerable’ to confiscation.1181  By the time of the Working Group 
Third Report the amount of money collected had increased and it was felt that the fact that 
the activation of the default term did not expunge the debt was a relevant factor but that it 
was too soon to say.1182 
The First Report also recommended that the existing link between the default periods for 
fines and confiscation order defaulters should be broken because it was felt that the 
criminal backgrounds and economic circumstances of confiscation and fine defaulters 
were likely to be very different and the considerations which might indicate an increased 
period of imprisonment for the one, may well not apply to the other.  The Group suggested 
 
1177 HL Deb 24 March 1986, vol 472, col 1200, Lord Glenarthur, then Under-Secretary of State for 
Home Affairs. 
1178 Levi and Osofsky (n 162) 51. 
1179 The interest figures are shown in Appendix 1, table B, Confiscation Order Debt 2017-2018. 
1180 The Supreme Court heard that the civil enforcement powers of a magistrates’ court, namely 
the fines based powers short of committal, are unlikely to be effective to enforce interest, Gibson 
(n 12) [19].  Brown also found that the magistrates’ court’s powers were limited post default, 
Brown and others (n 173) 13. 
1181 Working Group First Report (n 137) 10. 
1182 Working Group Third Report (n 126) para 2.9. 
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that the default sentence applicable to confiscation orders should remain as they were, 
but the court should be able to make the periods more severe if needed in the future.1183 
However, it took until the changes in the SCA 2015 for the link to be broken. 
The default term will always be served consecutively to a prison sentence for the 
offence1184 and case law confirms that the purpose of the default sentence for not paying a 
confiscation order is to encourage compliance, and not further punishment.1185  Until the 
case of RCPO v Taylor1186 it was unclear what the position was if the defendant was 
serving a custodial sentence at the time of enforcement but not for the offence for which 
the confiscation order was made. This point was clarified when it was held that the 
magistrates’ court has the power to postpone the issue of a warrant of commitment in 
respect of a confiscation order made by the Crown Court until after the expiry of a term of 
imprisonment imposed for an offence other than the offence for which the confiscation 
order was imposed.   The term running consecutively ‘avoids the default term in respect of 
the confiscation order being rendered futile by being served out concurrently with the 
sentence for the index offence.’1187 This postponement is pursuant to s 77(2) of the MCA 
1980 and permits the magistrates’ court to deal with the default term in the same manner 
whether the period being served by the defendant is for the predicate offence or not, and if 
the judgment had decided otherwise, it would have meant in practice that activating the 
default term would have no consequence for the defendant. 
The PAC concluded that the sanction did not work, and since the Home Office gave 
evidence that it would strengthen the default sentence, the PAC recommended that the 
Home Office and MOJ must identify how the sanction would be strengthened as it 
concluded that many defendants would rather serve prison sentences than pay the 
confiscation order. The PAC also suggested that the Joint Committee on the draft Modern 
 
1183 Working Group First Report (n 137) 10. 
1184 POCA 2002, s 38. In the previous legislation the provisions are contained in DTOA 1986, s6; 
CJA 1988, s75; DTA 1994, s9. 
1185 O’Connell (n 79) [36]. 
1186 [2010] EWHC 715 (Admin). 
1187 ibid [16] (Blair J). 
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Slavery Bill might deliberate on this.1188 Changes to the default sentences for confiscation 
orders made under POCA 2002 were introduced in the SCA 2015 which split the 
maximum terms in default for non-payment of confiscation orders from the periods for 
non-payment of fines.  For confiscation orders governed by the new default terms there 
are four bands, ranging from a maximum of 6 months imprisonment in default of paying a 
confiscation order of up to £10,000 up to a maximum of 14 years for a confiscation order 
of over £1 million.1189  For fines, and confiscation orders governed by the old rules, there 
are 12 bands ranging from a maximum of 7 days in default of paying an order of £200 up 
to a maximum of 10 years for an order for over £1 million.1190   
The changes to the default sentences were also introduced because of a commitment in 
the 2013 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy to ‘substantially strengthen the prison 
sentences for failing to pay confiscation orders so as to prevent offenders choosing to 
serve prison sentences rather than pay confiscation orders’.1191  Sahota and Yeo note that 
the default terms now included in POCA 2002 as a result of the SCA 2015 have been 
‘substantially increased’ but comment that it remains to be seen if the amendments will 
have the desired effect.1192  However, the authors do not make mention of one of the 
amendments which may have the biggest impact on a defendant.  In line with other 
custodial sentences, the defendant will normally serve half of the default term activated by 
the magistrates’ court. Confiscation orders made for more than £10 million under POCA 
2002 on or after 1 June 2015 will not be eligible for that reduction and the defendant is 
liable to serve the full term of the order which is up to fourteen years. This change has 
been described as ‘dramatic’1193 but as Sahota and Yeo suggest it is still too soon to 
 
1188 PAC Report (n 328) 5, 12.  
1189 POCA 2002, 35(2A). 
1190 PCC(S)A 2000, s 139(4). This applies to confiscation orders by virtue of POCA 2002, s 35(2). In 
the pre-POCA 2002 legislation the provisions are DTOA 1986 s 6 (1); CJA 1988 s 75 (1); DTA 1994, s 
9(1). PCC(S)A 2000 replaced the PCCA 1973, s 31(3A).  When the PCCA 1973 was first introduced, 
the maximum default term in PCCA 1973, s31 for non-payment of a fine was 12 months.  As a 
result the DTOA 1986, s 6 introduced a new table for default terms for confiscation orders.  The 
new PCCA 1973 s 31(3A) for fines was introduced by CJA 1988, s 60.   
1191 2013 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy (n 62) 35.  
1192 Sahota and Yeo (n 909). 
1193 Hopmeier and Mills (n 675) 460.   
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assess the effectiveness of the changes to the default term.  The changes to POCA 2002 
brought about by the SCA 2015 came into force for confiscation orders made on or after 1 
June 2015.  Practically this means that as the default term will be anything up to 14 years 
and will be ordered consecutively to a sentence for the predicate offence, it will be some 
time before meaningful research can be conducted.1194   
5.8 Conclusions of chapter 
The confiscation legislation has introduced powers which impact on the ability of the 
magistrates’ court to enforce an order.  The changes in the legislation and the different 
powers in relation to time for payment, interest, bank accounts, variations and discharge, 
and the default terms have added further complexity to an already complicated system. 
Changes to shorten the time for payment are welcome, and meet the issues raised since 
the Working Group Third Report.  However, HMCTS now has to manage different periods 
within the same order.  As a result, interest accrues at different stages and the case of 
Gibson means that the methods of enforcing unpaid interest are limited.  If the prosecutor 
cannot or does not apply to increase the default term to take account of the unpaid 
interest, then the magistrates’ court can only enforce the interest by non-custodial 
methods.  It is therefore vital that effective options are available.  
It is suggested that the enforcement of interest post Gibson is an area suitable for further 
research and possible legislative amendment to allow for the enforcement of interest by 
the use of the default term.  This case also highlights the complexities of using the fines 
based legislation for the enforcement of confiscation orders and this too is an area for 
future research. 
 
1194 The changes to POCA 2002 brought about by the SCA 2015 came into force in June 2015 for 
confiscation orders made on or after 1 June 2015, The Serious Crime Act 2015 (Commencement 
No 1) Regulations 2015, SI 2015/820. Either way the maximum of 14 years will be imposed in 
default of paying the confiscation order.  If a custodial sentence has been imposed for the offence 
which resulted in the confiscation order, it will be served before the default term. 
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The case of Gibson also adds weight to the argument that more effective powers should 
be available to the Crown Court including the introduction of confiscation charging orders 
and payment orders to make the magistrates’ court collection and enforcement powers 
more effective.  This would assist either by ensuring that assets are realised promptly to 
prevent interest accruing, or if interest does accrue in ensuring there are more effective 
powers available.   
It is recommended that the time for payment should be linked to the asset, for example a 
longer period should be given if a property has to be sold, but also that time for payment 
should also be linked to orders made at the Crown Court directly relevant to the assets 
identified.  For example, time for payment in relation to a house would be linked to a 
confiscation charging order and cash in a bank account would be linked to a payment 
order. This is because the changes to the time for payment provisions are not enough in 
themselves to ensure that confiscation orders are paid promptly.  The last chapter 
established that restraint (and charging orders in the pre-POCA 2002 legislation) are often 
enough to ensure that the order is satisfied.  However, issues with the orders mean that 
they are not always used.    
Previous research has shown that bank accounts are an asset which can be dissipated 
quickly and suitable for restraint.  Third party debt orders are a difficult and costly method 
of enforcing an order where the asset is a bank account and so payment orders were 
introduced in POCA 2002.  Yet without a restraint order the money in a bank account can 
be dissipated before an application can be made.  The removal of the criteria that a 
confiscation order must also have a restraint order before a payment order means that 
dissipation can occur, and this appears to be an unintended consequence.  
It is therefore recommended that the changes suggested by the Working Group Third 
Report are re-visited and that changes to the payment order provisions are introduced.  
The payment order provisions met a need to remove the complexities for the designated 
officer for the magistrates’ court when applying to the county court for a third party debt 
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order when the defendant has money in a bank account, but only apply to confiscation 
orders made under POCA 2002.   
The recommendations are that the payment order provisions should be extended to the 
pre-POCA 2002 legislation in the same way that the powers of discharge have been 
extended.  Secondly, the Crown Court should be able to make an order on imposition to 
ensure there is no dissipation of money in a bank account before the case is sent to the 
magistrates’ court for an application to be made as in the current system. Finally, that the 
Crown Court and the magistrates’ court could also have the power to make a payment 
order subsequent to the confiscation order being made.  The Crown Court power could be 
an interim payment order with notice to the bank, which if nothing is heard, becomes 
absolute on a given date.  If an objection is received a hearing could be arranged in the 
magistrates’ court and until then the interim payment order would remain in place. 
Introducing payment orders as a Crown Court power would prevent the dissipation of cash 
in a bank account, it would also achieve other purposes in the regime, namely achieving 
disruption and improving collection whilst retaining the nature of confiscation as an order 
against the person.  It would also be in line with the purpose of a one stop shop for 
confiscation in the Crown Court. 
The introduction and then extension of the powers to discharge a confiscation order is a 
welcome addition to the powers of the magistrates’ court where there are small amounts 
outstanding.  There have been calls for further research into the powers to ‘write off’ 
confiscation orders1195 which is an area suitable for further analysis. 
This chapter also analysed the issues and complexities the magistrates’ court experiences 
with its specific powers of enforcement in the confiscation legislation, ending with the 
analysis of the default term provisions as they apply specifically to confiscation orders.  
Activating the default term is not a punishment and there are specific issues for the 
 
1195 Text to n 1153-n 1154. 
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magistrates’ court when dealing with the rules for activating the default term. These are 




Chapter 6 Enforcement: Fines based powers of the magistrates’ court  
6.1 Introduction 
There are two strands of enforcement relevant to this thesis.  One is the power of restraint 
(and the power in the pre-POCA 2002 legislation for the Crown Court to make a charging 
order) to preserve property to ensure that it is available to satisfy the confiscation order, 
using a receiver where necessary; and the other is the power of the magistrates’ court to 
enforce.  
This chapter continues to answer the research questions by explaining further how the 
legislation has developed.  A review of the history of the enforcement of confiscation 
orders in the magistrates’ court shows that the way the confiscation legislation has 
developed means that the fines based powers are the main powers available.  There have 
been relatively few changes specifically for confiscation to supplement those powers.   
At the heart of the thesis are the recommendations in relation to payment orders made in 
the last chapter, and for the introduction of the power for the Crown Court to be able to 
make a confiscation charging order which is analysed in the next chapter.  These would 
simplify the processes for the magistrates’ court where the asset identified is a house or a 
bank account and would counter the difficulties inherent elsewhere in the system.   
Previous chapters have already identified some of the complexities for the magistrates’ 
court enforcing confiscation orders and this chapter shows the complex nature of the use 
of fines based powers for the enforcement of confiscation orders.  It is argued that this 
should be addressed by the Crown Court making orders which will assist with 
enforcement in the magistrates’ court.  It is also recommended that further research is 
needed to consider simplifying the rules which apply in the magistrates’ court.   
The last chapter explained how there are different factors for the magistrates’ court to be 
aware of when enforcing a confiscation order, as issues such as time for payment and 
interest will vary depending on when the offence was committed and the relevant version 
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of the Act in force at the time. Whether the default term is activated or not, interest 
accrues and the sum (including interest) must be enforced if not paid in full. 
This chapter considers how the fines based enforcement provisions of the magistrates’ 
court apply, with modification, to the activation of the default term, and the other powers 
available to the magistrates’ court. The activation of the default term is not a punishment, 
it is there to encourage compliance.1196  The case law on fines makes it clear that there 
must be an effective method of enforcement1197 and as a confiscation order is enforced as 
a fine, there is a similar need for effective enforcement.  However, regardless of the 
obligation on the courts, the onus is on the defendant to satisfy the order.1198  
There are difficulties for the magistrates’ court enforcing a confiscation order after the 
default term has been served as there are fewer options available, as Brown et al found 
when conducting their research.1199 The activation of the default term is not automatic; a 
magistrates’ court must consider whether there are any methods short of issuing the 
warrant of commitment, known as the civil means of enforcement, and the next chapter 
will analyse the appropriateness of the alternatives to committal.             
Although it has been claimed that the biggest changes to the confiscation regime in 2015 
were in relation to enforcement,1200 this chapter will show that there has been little 
substantial change to the fines based powers of magistrates’ court to collect and enforce 
confiscation orders. There have been criticisms of the limited powers of the magistrates’ 
court since the Working Group First Report1201 and although HMCTS performs relatively 
well1202 there are still difficulties for magistrates’ courts when enforcing confiscation orders.  
 
1196 O’Connell (n 79) [36]. 
1197 MacRae (n 529). 
1198 R v Chichester Justices ex parte Crowther (Div, 14 October 1998); R (on the application of 
Popoola) v Westminster Magistrates’ Court [2015] EWHC 3476 (Admin); R (on the application of 
Johnson) v Birmingham Magistrates’ Court [2012] EWHC 596 (Admin); (2012) 176 JP 298; R 
(Natural England) v Day [2014] EWCA Crim 2683, [2015] 1 Cr App R (S) 53; R (on the application of 
Marsden and McIntosh) v Leicester Magistrates’ Court [2013] EWHC 919 (Admin).    
1199 Brown and others (n 173) 13. 
1200 Gentle, Spinks and Harris (n 491) 6. 
1201 Working Group First Report (n 137). 
1202 text to n 336, n 351 and n 355 in chapter 2. 
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Mitchell et al identified issues with the delay between making the confiscation order and 
the payment, and a duplication in work in relation to the powers of the magistrates’ court 
to enforce, as the defendant’s assets have been assessed when the order is made.1203  
HMCTS operate at the end of the process, and if assets have not been identified or 
restrained it is difficult to enforce.1204     
All of these issues are within the practical knowledge of the research author who is also 
aware of the limited options available where the asset involved is a house or bank 
account, and a need to enforce against these assets exists.  As noted the payment order 
provisions in POCA 2002 do not apply where the confiscation order is made under the 
pre-POCA 2002 legislation, and so the only option is for the designated officer to apply for 
a third party debt order where there is cash in a bank account.  Similarly, the next chapter 
will show that if the asset identified is a house the only option is to apply for a charging 
order.  A recommendation is made that the power to make a confiscation charging order 
should be introduced to the Crown Court, by introducing an amendment to POCA 2002.   
If cash in a bank account or house has been identified at the Crown Court, then it will 
have all the information to make an order to preserve the asset yet the legislation requires 
the Crown Court to go so far in the process and then send the confiscation order over to 
the magistrates’ court to enforce.  This places the magistrates’ court at an unfair 
disadvantage, and HMCTS in a different position to the other agencies, especially as time 
for payment must expire before enforcement actions (other than making a payment order) 
can be taken. 
When confiscation orders were introduced, an article written by experts in the Home 
Office explained the aim of the enforcement provisions.  They explained that ‘the burden’ 
of enforcing orders was given to magistrates’ courts using their fines based powers, and 
to the High Court in larger and more complex cases, using restraint, charging and 
 
1203 Mitchell Taylor and Talbot vol 1, para 8.001 (R0: February 2002). 
1204 Evidence of Peter Handcock PAC Report (n 328) Ev 14.  
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receivership orders.1205  The practical situation is that restraint orders are not applied for in 
all cases where they may be suitable because of the issues involved.1206  This means that 
the magistrates’ court has to use its fines based powers in cases for which they were not 
designed, nor intended to be used.  This is particularly so where the asset is a house or 
cash in a bank account.   
The idea of enforcing a confiscation order can be thought of as a misnomer,1207 as the 
assets should have been identified at the Crown Court.  Even though the regime has been 
described as draconian,1208 there are balances in the system.  It is clear that the purpose 
of the enforcement process is to obtain the money not to punish the defendant a second 
time.1209   In addition A1P1 of the ECHR applies to the enforcement of orders and the 
means used by the magistrates’ court to enforce the order and deprive the defendant of 
his property must be proportionate, balancing the legitimate aim of enforcing the order 
against the rights of the defendant.1210  The principles in article 6(1) and (3) also apply and 
enforcement proceedings must be conducted within a reasonable time1211 and must take 
into account the defendant’s rights to have legal representation.1212   
6.2 The fines based powers of the magistrates’ court to enforce a confiscation 
order 
Despite the fact that the confiscation order is made under the confiscation legislation, the 
majority of the powers that the magistrates’ court has to enforce are contained in the MCA 
1980, and were not designed for the enforcement of confiscation orders but for the 
 
1205 'The UK Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986' (n 17) 1632. 
1206  Neither are charging orders under the pre-POCA 2002 legislation. 
1207  Brunning, ‘The Enforcement of Confiscation Orders in the Magistrates’ Court’ (n 474) 430. 
1208 Text to n 470-n 473 in chapter 3. 
1209 Text to n 530 in chapter 3. 
1210 Ahmad and Ahmed (n 12). 
1211 Crowther v United Kingdom (n 519). 
1212 Agogo (n 521). 
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enforcement of other financial penalties, including fines.  This has given rise to difficulties 
in application and interpretation.1213 
When the Crown Court makes a confiscation order, it will impose a period in default which 
is to be served if the defendant does not pay as ordered, but even if this is served it does 
not wipe out the debt. The Crown Court will also set time for payment, and if the order is 
not paid as ordered, interest accrues. The confiscation order is then enforced in the same 
way as a fine but with some differences.1214  
The rules governing the powers of the magistrates’ court to impose a default term for a 
fine are complicated in themselves and the provisions have been described as a ‘labyrinth 
of statutory provisions’ which are ‘scattered across’ different legislation.1215   It is therefore 
not surprising that adding more provisions to that system in order to enforce confiscation 
orders has caused issues. 
Confiscation orders have always been enforced as if they were fines.1216 The DTOA 1986 
introduced the power of the Crown Court to make a confiscation order and was therefore 
the first one to outline the powers of enforcement of the magistrates’ court.  Section 6 of 
the DTOA 1986 provided that a confiscation order made under the Act was treated as if it 
were a fine imposed by the Crown Court.  It was also the first time that exclusions to Part 
3 of the MCA 1980 were applied to the enforcement of confiscation orders in the 
magistrates’ court. 
Despite the changes in the confiscation regime through the CJA 1988, the DTA 1994 and 
POCA 2002, including the changes introduced in 2015, the powers of the magistrates’ 
court to enforce a confiscation order have remained remarkably unchanged.  A 
comparison of section 6(4) DTOA 1986, section 75(5) CJA 1988, section 9(4) DTA 1994 
 
1213 Gibson (n 12) [12]. 
1214 DTOA 1986, s 6; CJA 1988, s 75; DTA 1994, s 9; POCA 2002, s 35.   See also PCC (S)A 00, ss 139 
and 140 (which replaced the PCCA  1973). 
1215 R v St Helens Justices, ex parte Jones [1999] 2 ALL ER 73 (QB), 163 JP 369. 
1216 DTOA 1986, s 6; CJA 1988, s 75; DTA 1994, s 9 and POCA 2002, s 35.  
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and s 35(3) POCA 2002 shows that the only difference in the application of Part 3 of the 
MCA 1980 which contains the magistrates’ court powers of enforcement, is slight.  Section 
6(4) of the DTOA 1986 reads:  
In the application of Part III of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 to amounts 
payable under confiscation orders (a) such an amount is not a sum adjudged to be 
paid by a conviction for the purposes of section 81 (enforcement of fines imposed 
on young offenders) or a fine for the purposes of section 85 (remission of fines), 
and (b) in section 87 (enforcement by High Court or county court), subsection (3) 
shall be omitted. 
The corresponding provisions in section 75(5) CJA 1988, and section 9(4) DTA 1994, 
remained unchanged.  There was a slight amendment in section 35 of POCA 2002 so that 
s 35(3) reads: 
In the application of Part 3 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 to amounts payable 
under confiscation orders (a) ignore section 75 of that Act (power to dispense with 
immediate payment); (b) such an amount is not a sum adjudged to be paid by a 
conviction for the purposes of section 81 (enforcement of fines imposed on young 
offenders) or a fine for the purposes of section 85 (remission of fines), and (c) in 
section 87 (enforcement by High Court or county court), ignore subsection (3) 
(inquiry into means)1217  
All the legislation excludes section 81 of the MCA 1980 from the powers of the 
magistrates’ court, which contains the powers specifically relating to the enforcement of 
other financial penalties where the defendant is a youth, a group of defendants that fall 
outside the scope of this research.  Also excluded in all the legislation is the power of the 
magistrates’ court to remit a confiscation order.1218  The exclusion of s 87(3) in all versions 
means that in practice there is no need for the magistrates’ court to conduct a means 
 
1217 Emphasis added to highlight the difference.   
1218 Contained in s 85 MCA 1980.   
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inquiry before the designated officer applies for a payment order or charging order in the 
county court.  This is directly relevant to this research as it cuts out a step before the 
application is made which is a benefit to the magistrates’ court.1219     
The additional provision in POCA 2002 is the instruction to ignore section 75 MCA 1980 
which does not appear to have any real practical impact on the magistrates’ court.  The 
section allows the magistrates’ court to give time for payment on imposition, or payment 
by instalments, which can then be extended.  Even though this power is not available to 
the magistrates’ court when enforcing a confiscation order made under POCA 2002, the 
court can still further postpone the period of default set by the Crown Court,1220 and can 
adjourn the enforcement proceedings,1221 although in both scenarios interest will continue 
to accrue.  Case law has also established that section 75 MCA 1980 does not apply to 
confiscation orders made under the pre-POCA 2002 legislation in any event.1222 It is 
therefore submitted that the fact that section 35 POCA 2002 requires the magistrates’ 
court to ignore section 75 MCA 1980 is a technical amendment only, does not add to the 
powers of the magistrates’ court, and that there has been little change to the fines based 
powers of the magistrates’ court to enforce confiscation orders.   
As explained in the case of Ahmad and Ahmed, there is no material difference in the 
enforcement provisions of POCA 2002 and the legislation pre-POCA 2002.1223  As a 
result, the provisions of POCA 2002 will continue to be used to explain the law in this 
thesis unless there is a difference that requires explanation. 1224   
 
1219 If section 87 (3) MCA 1980 applied then the magistrates’ court would have to make a finding 
that the defendant has the means to pay forthwith.  The Crown Court has already determined this 
when making a confiscation order.   
1220 MCA 1980, s 77(2). 
1221 For example, applications to adjourn a confiscation enforcement hearing to apply for a 
certificate of inadequacy or variation are common, Sutherland Williams, Hopmeier and Jones (n 
58) 254; Mitchell Taylor and Talbot vol 1, para 8.004 (R5: September 2004). 
1222 Greenacre (n 1021). 
1223 Ahmad and Ahmed (n 12) [28]. 
1224 Although the magistrates’ court is still enforcing confiscation orders made under POCA 2002 
and the pre-POCA 2002 legislation.  
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The powers of magistrates’ court to enforce confiscation orders is based on the law for 
financial penalties with some limitations and also depend on the legislation under which 
the confiscation order was made.  This dictates whether interest accrues once time for 
payment has expired, and whether imprisonment in default expunges the debt. This 
means the enforcement of confiscation orders can be complicated and has led to 
difficulties for the judiciary trying to follow the rules that apply to the magistrates’ court in 
any given case.  In North Kent Magistrates’ Court v Reid1225 the judge hearing a case 
relating to a confiscation order made under the DTOA 1986 described the statutory 
provisions in different Acts as a ‘labyrinth’ commenting that even with the help of counsel 
he was not sure that he had a complete clear grasp of the precise statutory thread.1226  In 
Anscombe the confiscation order was made under the CJA 1988 and the judge 
commented that:  
Solving the problems before the Court requires a formidable trail through the 
Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973, the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 and the 
Criminal Justice Act 1988 each of which has been amended at various different 
times.1227 
In Gibson the Supreme Court considered the way the confiscation legislation and the fines 
based powers of the magistrates’ court interact which it described as a ‘process of 
successive referrals.’1228  Although the case concerned a confiscation order made under 
the DTA 1994, the case is not just of historical interest as the issues arise in a similar way 
in POCA 2002.1229  The referrals for fine enforcement described in Gibson start with the 
provision which permits the Crown Court to impose a period in default if a fine is not paid 
as ordered.   There are maximum periods of imprisonment which can be imposed in 
 
1225 North Kent Magistrates’ Court v Reid (n 19). 
1226 The judge also commented that even with the help of counsel he was not sure that he had a 
complete clear grasp of the precise statutory thread, ibid (Park J).  
1227 Anscombe (n 20) (Schiemann LJ).  
1228 Gibson (n 12) [11]. 
1229 ibid [2]. 
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default1230 and the conditions which must apply before the Crown Court can impose a 
period in default are that: 
• The offence is punishable with imprisonment and the defendant appears to the 
magistrates’ court to have the means to pay forthwith, or 
• It appears to the court that the defendant is unlikely to remain at a place of abode in 
the UK to allow enforcement by any other means, or 
• The defendant is sent to prison or detention for the offence, or they are already 
serving a term of imprisonment or detention.1231 
All fines imposed by the Crown Court are, ‘treated for the purposes of collection, 
enforcement and remission… as having been imposed … on a conviction by a 
magistrates’ court.’1232  The fine is passed to the magistrates’ court for enforcement, and 
for the purposes of this thesis, the main powers of enforcement are contained in Part 3 of 
the MCA 1980.  The Crown Court retains some control so if a magistrates’ court wants to 
remit a fine it would need to seek the permission of the Crown Court first.1233  Interest 
does not accrue on an unpaid fine.1234 
For the enforcement of confiscation orders, the same basic provisions apply because of 
section 35(2) POCA 2002 although as noted there are exceptions, the magistrates’ court 
cannot remit a confiscation order, and a means inquiry is not required before an 
application is made for enforcement in the High Court or county court.1235  
There is now a further difference to take into account for confiscation orders made under 
POCA 2002 since 1 June 2015.  Prior to this date the periods in default imposed at the 
 
1230 PCC(S)A 2000, ss 139(2)-(4). 
1231 PCC(S)A 2000, s 139(3).  These grounds are similar to those which must exist before the 
magistrates’ court can impose a default term on imposition in MCA 1980, s 82(1).  
1232 PCC(S)A 2000, s 140(1). 
1233 PCC(S)A 2000, s 140(5).  
1234 An unpaid unlawful profit order will accrue interest at the same rate as a confiscation order, 
but these are enforced as a compensation order not a fine, the Prevention of Social Housing Fraud 
Act 2013, s 4(10), (12). 
1235  POCA 2002, s 35(3).  
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Crown Court mirrored the periods imposed for fines.1236  Since the changes in SCA 2015, 
the periods have changed for confiscation orders made on or after 1 June 2015 and there 
are only four bands for periods in custody, instead of twelve.  They range from a 
maximum of 6 months imprisonment in default of paying a confiscation order of up to 
£10,000 up to a maximum of 14 years for a confiscation order of over £1 million.1237  The 
final difference between a fine and a confiscation order is that when a confiscation order is 
not paid within the time for payment set by the Crown Court interest accrues.1238 
6.3 The powers available when time for payment has expired 
The first thing the magistrates’ court will do when it receives a confiscation order from the 
Crown Court is try to get the defendant to pay voluntarily.  If enforcement is necessary it is 
undertaken by the magistrates’ court, but this is not limited to the actual courtroom, 
payments are due to the designated officer for the magistrates’ court1239 who, for example, 
makes applications for enforcement in the High Court or county court,1240 or applies to the 
Crown Court for the discharge of a confiscation order.1241  
6.3.1 Collection orders 
The powers of fine enforcement have been extended because of the introduction of the 
Courts Act 2003.  The Act introduced collection orders which if made creates the role of a 
fines officer who is authorised to take enforcement steps specified in the Act.  Case law 
has now clarified that a collection order can be made in relation to a confiscation order, 
but they are rarely used in relation to such orders1242 and it is the experience of the 
 
1236 When the DTOA 1986 was introduced it had its own default table, DTOA 1986, s 6(1).  The 
table was later replicated in PCCA, s 31(31A) which meant that the same default periods applied 
to confiscation orders and fines imposed at the Crown Court. 
1237 POCA 2002, 35(2A).   
1238 POCA 2002, s 11.  
1239 POCA 2002, s 55.    
1240 MCA 1980, s 87 and Designated Officer for Sunderland Magistrates’ Court v Krager and 
another [2011] EWHC 3283 (Ch), [2012] 1 WLR 1291.   
1241 POCA 2002, ss 24-25A.  
1242 R (on the application of Lawson) v Westminster Magistrates’ Court [2013] EWHC 2434 
(Admin), [2014] 1 WLR 2085. 
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research author that they are usually only used after the default term has been served and 
there are no other options available.   The main powers of a fines officer are contained in 
Schedule 5, and the Act allows a fines officer to take these steps without a further court 
hearing if the defendant is in default and a notice has been served on the defendant giving 
the defendant the opportunity to appeal to the magistrates’ court.1243  
The process has inbuilt oversight by the magistrates’ court over the actions of the fines 
officer. Some of the powers replicate those taken in the magistrates’ courtroom, namely 
the power to make an attachment of earnings order, an application for a deduction from 
benefits order, issue a warrant of control or take enforcement in the High Court or county 
court.  However, some new powers of enforcement were introduced by the Act. Those 
applicable to confiscation orders are fine registration and the making of a clamping 
order.1244  These new powers are available in the courtroom only if there is a collection 
order and the case has been referred back to the court for enforcement by the fines 
officer.1245 
If a clamping order1246 is made it means a vehicle can be clamped.  Like most of the 
enforcement actions available for non-payment of a confiscation order, it is only available 
if the defendant is in default and there are conditions which apply before an order can be 
made, including a finding that the defendant has the means to pay, which will already 
have been established by the Crown Court.  There are also exceptions to the type of 
vehicle that can be clamped. For example, a vehicle that is not in the defendant’s name 
cannot be clamped.  Once a vehicle has been clamped, the defendant can obtain its 
release by paying the sum due and any fees and charges; but the magistrates’ court can 
also order the sale of the vehicle to pay the amount outstanding.   
 
1243 Courts Act 2003, sch 5 para 37. 
1244 Courts Act 2003, sch 5 para 38. 
1245 Courts Act 2003, sch 5 paras 37, 42.  
1246 Courts Act 2003, sch 5.   
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The nature of the order is very similar to a warrant of control, in that a vehicle is seized 
and can be sold, although for clamping there must be a subsequent order by the 
magistrates’ court permitting the sale.1247  Like a warrant of control, time for payment must 
have expired before a clamping order can be made and therefore, if the vehicle was 
identified as an available asset, it could be dissipated by the expiry of the time for 
payment period.  If a vehicle is identified as an asset there may be a place for clamping 
orders in the enforcement of confiscation orders, but it should be noted that a warrant of 
control is sufficient to seize and sell a vehicle without a further court order. Clamping 
orders are not used in practice for the enforcement of confiscation orders, and given the 
hurdles that need to be gone through before a vehicle can be clamped, and the fact that 
there is a direct alternative in the form of a warrant of control, this is not surprising.    
The power to register the debt on the Register of Judgments, Orders and Fines is also 
available to the fines officer or the magistrates’ court in the same circumstances as a 
clamping order1248 and like clamping orders are not used in practice.  The impact on the 
defendant of having a debt on the register is that searches can be made of it which would 
show the defendant has an outstanding debt to the magistrates’ court, which could impact 
on their ability to apply for credit.  The defendant must be in default before the registration 
can take place, and if the confiscation order is registered then the defendant has one 
calendar month to pay in full to get the amount removed.  After a calendar month, if the 
confiscation order is paid in full, the register will show that the amount is satisfied but it 
remains on the register.  The confiscation order can only be registered within five years 
from the date of conviction for the offence and must be removed five years from the date 
of conviction, so its application is limited for confiscation orders.  A confiscation order can 
be made up to two years after the conviction date, so in many cases, the debt could only 
remain on the register for a maximum of three years, and for older orders made where the 
conviction is more than five years old, the power to register is not available.     
 
1247 The Fines Collection Regulations 2006, SI 2006/501, reg 26. 
1248 Courts Act 2003, sch 5 Part 9.   
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Wood recommended that the Criminal Finances Board should consider a central public 
register of unpaid confiscation orders which can be accessed and searched by private-
sector institutions.1249  She felt that this was important so that private sector institutions 
including banks could monitor the progress of the case, which can take years; and that it 
would be particularly useful if there is a restraint order. She used as a comparator the use 
of the public register of County Court Judgments established by The Register of 
Judgments, Orders and Fines Regulations 2005.1250  Evidence was given to the PAC 
Progress Review that a county court judgment affects a person’s credit reference, but that 
a confiscation order does not.1251  The existence of a collection order gives the 
magistrates’ court or fines officer the power to register the debt and so, in theory, the 
Register is available to a confiscation order if a collection order is in force.1252  However, to 
be used in practice it is suggested that the Regulations would need amendment to make 
them more applicable to confiscation orders and the five year limit should be reviewed.  
Confiscation orders often take a long time to be satisfied1253 and it is unlikely that a five 
year limit would be effective.   
The use of a collection order also addresses an issue raised by Brown et al in 2012.  At 
that stage they reported the fact that a magistrates’ court could not issue a warrant of 
arrest if the defendant failed to attend court after the default sentence has been 
served.1254  Whilst that is still the case in the majority of cases,1255 a warrant of arrest can 
be issued after a default sentence has been served if a collection order has been made 
and the fines officer has issued a summons.1256   
 
1249 Wood, The Big Payback (n 5) 21. 
1250 The Register of Judgments, Orders and Fines Regulations 2005, SI 2005/3595.   
1251 PAC Progress Report (n 348) Ev 36. 
1252 The Register of Judgments, Orders and Fines Regulations 2005, SI 2005/3595, reg 8. 
1253 It can take years for an order to be satisfied, text to n 1031-n 1033. 
1254 Brown and others (n 173) 13. 
1255 R (on the application of Necip) v City of London Magistrates’ Court & RCPO [2009] EWHC 755 
(Admin), [2010] 1 WLR 1827.   
1256 MCA 1980, s 83(2) and Lawson (n 1242). 
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In practice collection orders are not widely used for the enforcement of confiscation 
orders.  This is due to the fact that the powers of the fines officer are similar to that of the 
court, and in order for a fines officer to take a step there is a need for a further notice to be 
served on the defendant with an in built delay.  There may be a function for collection 
orders and the added sanctions they bring in the enforcement of confiscation orders.  A 
detailed analysis falls outside the focus of this thesis, but it is recommended as an area 
suitable for further research which should include a review of The Register of Judgments, 
Orders and Fines Regulations 2005. 
6.4 The enforcement hearing 
If the powers of the designated officer and fines officer are not sufficient, then an 
enforcement hearing will be listed once time for payment has expired, all enforcement 
actions have been exhausted and there is still an amount outstanding on the confiscation 
order.  
The magistrates’ court may be faced with an application for a payment order1257 or an 
application for the sale of goods.1258  The designated officer for the magistrates’ court may 
also make an application to the Crown Court for the discharge of a confiscation order if 
the limited grounds apply1259 or an application for enforcement in the High Court or county 
court without a further hearing in the magistrates’ court.1260 
If there is a restraint order and no receiver, the magistrates’ court can still enforce the 
confiscation order, including activating the default term but must give notice to the 
prosecutor.  If there is a receiver, the court can still enforce and there is an onus on the 
defendant to pay the order, not to wait for others to enforce1261 because there may be 
good reasons why enforcement by a receiver would not be appropriate, for example the 
 
1257 POCA 2002, s 67.   
1258 POCA 2002, s 67A. 
1259 POCA 2002, ss 24-25A. 
1260 POCA 2002, s 35(3), MCA 1980, s87. 
1261 Popoola (n 1198). 
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costs involved.  However, if the court is informed that the prosecutor recommends the 
appointment of a receiver, an adjournment should be considered.1262  It is not necessary 
for the court to try other means of enforcement before activating the default term, but only 
to consider them.1263  It is suggested that these principles would apply if there is a 
charging order in force, and that the designated officer for the magistrates’ court would not 
have to enforce a charging order by way of an order for sale before the court could 
activate the default term.  The decision of the magistrates’ court would depend on the 
facts of each case.  
6.5 The role of the prosecution 
The magistrates’ court is responsible for the enforcement of confiscation orders, although 
in some cases the prosecution is the lead agency. The CPS will be the lead agency if it 
can add to the enforcement process and the arrangements are covered in a service level 
agreement with HMCTS.1264  In practice if there is a restraint order, the prosecution will be 
the lead agency; and if a receiver is appointed then the prosecution will act to satisfy the 
order, if not the powers of the magistrates’ court will apply. That still leaves a large 
number of accounts where either HMCTS is the lead agency,1265 or the lead agency, 
whether HMCTS or not, has not been able to realise assets and an enforcement hearing 
is necessary. 
Even if the prosecution is not the lead agency, the prosecutor and financial investigators 
will have a part to play in the enforcement process1266 liaising with the confiscation units 
and having the right to attend the enforcement hearing. If they do not attend, they can 
inform the court in writing of the enforcement history of the case. 
 
1262 R (on the application of Beach) v Folkstone Magistrates’ Court [2018] EWHC 2843 (Admin). 
1263 For example, On the application of Johnson (n 1198) [38]-[39].   
1264 CPS Asset Recovery Strategy (n 321) 6. 
1265 Figure 4.1 reproduced in Appendix 1. 
1266 Hinton (n 473) 260-261. 
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This is an example of the criminal justice agencies working together which is particular to 
the enforcement of confiscation order as opposed to other financial penalties.  Issues with 
a lack of communication between many of the leading agencies were first raised in the 
HAC Seventh Report1267 which became a theme over many years. In 2016 the HAC heard 
that there were still issues preventing agencies working together1268 however, the review 
documents not only show the importance of working together, they also highlight the 
improvements which have been made in this regard.1269  As the magistrates’ court does 
not have access to the information that prosecutors and financial investigators have, their 
help is needed to identify assets that defendants have including bank accounts and 
houses. 
6.6 Activating the default term 
A focus of case law about the powers of the magistrates’ court to enforce confiscation 
orders has been on the activation of the default sentence, and case law and 
commentators explain that when setting the default term to be served in default of paying 
a confiscation order, the Crown Court is not seeking to provide additional punishment but 
to secure compliance, as the purpose of the legislation is to recover the maximum sums 
towards paying the order.1270  As recently as 2017, the case of O’Connell confirmed that a 
 
1267 HAC Seventh Report (n 129) xx. 
1268 HAC 2016 Report (n 26) 31-32.   
1269 Working together and good communication between agencies has been identified as essential 
and vital to successful enforcement, for example Levi and Osofsky (n 162) 58-59; Payback Time (n 
173) 81. The PIU Report found that better joint working between criminal justice agencies have 
helped to improve collection rates, PIU Report (n 117) 7-8. The NAO Progress Report also 
reflected positively on the work of the ACE (Asset Confiscation Enforcement) teams which it 
reported began in November 2014.  They were set up by the Home Office to provide financial 
investigator support to enforcement criminal justice agencies.  By the time of the report they had 
cost £3 million and helped to collect £18 million, NAO Progress Report (n 367) 22-23. Wood 
welcomed the attempts to improve strategic co-ordination amongst the large number of bodies 
involved in the confiscation process and also commented favourably about the ACE Teams, Wood, 
The Big Payback (n 5) 14-15. 
1270 n 530. 
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warrant of commitment is not a punishment for non-payment or for not paying the 
confiscation order sooner, it is a means of enforcement.1271 
Case law also shows that when time for payment expires for the payment of a confiscation 
order, the activation of the default sentence is not automatic. In fact, the court must be 
sure that there is no other alternative available and there are principles from the case law 
governing what the magistrates’ court must take into account before activating the default 
term.  In a commentary about Harrow Justices,1272 it was said that the magistrates’ court 
must not act too precipitately in activating the default term, and that the purpose of the 
default term is to divest the offender of his proceeds of the offence, not to activate it.1273 At 
that stage the serving of the default term wiped out the debt, but the principles still apply 
and in practice the default term will only be activated if there is no alternative. 
As there have been difficulties in interpreting the fines based legislation as it applies to 
confiscation orders, it is necessary to consider the fines based provisions first as the rules 
which apply to imposing and activating the default term for non-payment differ when 
applying them to the non-payment of confiscation orders.  This shows the differences to 
be taken into account by the magistrates’ court.    
6.6.1 Enforcing a fine using the default term 
For the enforcement of a financial penalty other than a confiscation order, the magistrates’ 
court has the power to impose imprisonment or detention in default of paying, either on 
imposition or subsequently, if the sum is not paid as ordered.1274  There are restrictions on 
the magistrates’ court which differ depending on whether the period in default is imposed 
 
1271 O’Connell (n 79) [36]. 
1272 Harrow Justices (n 524). 
1273 R v Harrow JJ, ex p Desai (1992) 56 J Crim L122 (note).  
1274 MCA 1980, ss 76, 82. 
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on imposition or subsequently.1275  In either event, the period can be suspended on 
whatever terms the court deems fit.1276  
If the magistrates’ court wants to impose a period of default on the imposition of a financial 
penalty, then one of three grounds must exist: 
• The offence is punishable with imprisonment and the defendant appears to the 
magistrates’ court to have the means to pay forthwith, or 
• It appears to the court that the defendant is unlikely to remain at a place of abode in 
the UK to allow enforcement by any other means, or 
• The defendant is sent to prison or detention for the offence, or they are already 
serving a term of imprisonment or detention.1277 
Any fine imposed by the Crown Court is treated as if it was made by a magistrates’ court 
and it is the magistrates’ court which enforces the order.1278 The grounds for imposing a 
default term on imposition in the Crown Court are in effect the same as those in the 
magistrates’ court.1279   
If the magistrates’ court (or a Crown Court) has not imposed a period of detention or 
imprisonment in default on imposition, then the magistrates’ court cannot impose a period 
in default unless it complies with section 82(3) MCA 1980 namely that: 
• the defendant is already serving a period of imprisonment or detention; or  
 
1275 MCA, s 82. 
1276 MCA, s 77. 
1277 MCA 1980, s 82(1).  The third ground cannot apply to the victim surcharge or criminal courts 
charge, MCA 1980, s 82(1A).  
1278 PCC(S)A 2000, s 140(1).   
1279 PCC(S)A 2000, s 139(3). The only difference between the grounds in the Crown Court and the 
magistrates’ court is in the type of imprisonment or detention that is available in the Crown 
Court.  For example, the powers to impose a period of default are available in the Crown Court 
when the defendant is sentenced to custody for life, a sentence that is not available in the 
magistrates’ court.  
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• the court has conducted a means inquiry in the defendant’s presence on at least 
one occasion since their conviction.1280   
The powers of the magistrates’ court are then further restricted as there are then two 
further hurdles in section 82(4).  If the court is conducting a means inquiry, then the court 
must be satisfied that:  
• the offence is punishable with imprisonment and the defendant has the means to 
pay forthwith; or  
• the defendant has not paid as ordered because of his wilful refusal and culpable 
neglect and the court has considered or tried all other methods of enforcing payment 
and it appears that they are inappropriate or unsuccessful.1281   
Section 82(4A) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 then lists the methods of enforcing 
payments that the court must consider, which are a warrant of control, an application to 
the High Court or County Court; an order that the defendant is supervised pending 
payment; an attachment of earnings order; and an attendance centre order.1282 
In effect, section 82(3) MCA 1980 asks a question, which is, was a term of imprisonment 
in default of payment set on imposition?  If the answer is yes, then the magistrates’ court 
does not have to consider the factors in sections 82(3)–(4A).  If the answer is no, then 
before issuing a warrant of commitment for non-payment those sub sections must be 
complied with. This is an essential step in the application of the rules but, as can be seen 
in the next section, the judiciary have not always considered it.  It is submitted that if the 




1280 MCA 1980, s 82(3); emphasis added. 
1281 MCA 1980, s 82(4). 
1282 MCA 1980, s 82(4A). 
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6.6.2 Enforcing a confiscation order using the default term 
A confiscation order is made in the Crown Court, and is treated as a fine which means 
that in the case of an adult the Crown Court will impose the days in default which are to be 
served if the defendant does not pay as ordered.1283 The confiscation order is then treated 
as if it were a fine imposed by the magistrates’ court and that court had imposed the 
period of default on the day the confiscation order was imposed.1284  
As a result, following the legislation through, there is no requirement for the magistrates’ 
court to jump over all the hurdles in section 82(3) to (4A) of the MCA 1980 outlined above, 
and so it does not have to conduct a means inquiry and find wilful refusal or culpable 
neglect before activating the default term for non-payment of a confiscation order.  The 
means (realisable assets) have been established by the Crown Court in the confiscation 
hearing.1285  However, the magistrates’ court does have to be satisfied that there is no 
other means of enforcing the order short of committal. 
There was a line of cases confirming the steps that the magistrates’ court had to take 
starting with R v Liverpool Magistrates’ Court ex p Ansen.1286 In Ansen the High Court held 
that there was no statutory need under section 82(3) MCA 1980 for the magistrates’ court 
to hold a means inquiry, although in that case the court relied on the fact that the 
defendant was serving a period of imprisonment.  The court accepted that despite the fact 
there was no statutory need for a means inquiry, it is good practice to hold one before 
activating the default term, as there may be other means of enforcing the order short of 
committal. 
The statute was considered in the correct order in R v Hastings and Rother Magistrates’ 
Court ex parte Anscombe,1287 in which it was held that the magistrates’ court had the 
 
1283 POCA 2002, s 35(2A).   
1284 PCC(S)A 2000, s 140(1).  
1285 In Gibson the court noted that a confiscation order is premised on the means to pay (n 12) 
[19]. 
1286 Ansen (n 536). 
1287 Anscombe (n 20). 
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power to commit a defaulter to prison without a means inquiry as the requirement in 
section 82(4) only applied if the court was bound by section 82(3), which it was not here 
as the period of imprisonment in default had been set on imposition.   
Ansen and Anscombe considered the case of Harrow Justices1288 which turned on slightly 
different facts given that it concerned a confiscation imposed under the DTOA 1986 and 
the result of the magistrates imposing a default sentence was that the defendant no longer 
needed to pay the confiscation order.  Amongst other findings, it was held that the 
magistrates’ court was wrong to issue a warrant of commitment without enquiring into the 
defendant’s means.  Committal would have had the same result in R (on the application of 
Garrote) v City of London Magistrates’ Court,1289 when again the court held that the 
magistrates’ court must consider all methods of enforcement short of issuing the 
committal warrant, as the confiscation order had been made under the CJA 1988 before it 
was amended, so that serving the default sentence wiped out the debt. 
Although the magistrates’ court does not have to hold a statutory means inquiry, it does 
have to take the means of the defendant into consideration and ensure that there are no 
other ways of enforcing the order short of committal.1290 It has been made clear that the 
court must consider all other enforcement options before issuing the warrant even if it is 
difficult to see what other options are available, and can adjourn for payment to be 
made.1291 However, the defendant must produce ‘hard evidence’ before the court should 
adjourn in such circumstances.1292 
The cases of Harrow Justices and Garotte were followed in Barnett v DPP1293 when the 
court confirmed that although there is no statutory requirement, the magistrates’ court 
should be satisfied that there is no alternative method of enforcement before activating the 
 
1288 Harrow Justices (n 524). 
1289 [2002] EWHC 2909 (QB). 
1290 Ansen (n 536).  
1291 R (on the application of Coram) v South Bedfordshire Justices [2004] EWHC 3023 (Admin). 
1292 John Smith (n 530) [5] (Thomas LJ). 
1293 [2009] EWHC 2004 (Admin). 
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default term.  It considered it unnecessary to consider whether a finding of wilful refusal or 
culpable neglect was required before activating the default term but noted that counsel 
agreed that there is no statutory need for such a finding.1294 
More recently there has been a second line of judicial decisions in which it has been held 
that the magistrates’ court must find wilful refusal or culpable neglect before activating the 
default term.1295  In Munir the High Court correctly identified that the magistrates’ court did 
not need to conduct a means inquiry as required by section 82(3) MCA 1980. However, 
the judgment then went on to say that sections 82(4) and (4A) had to be complied with 
and the magistrates’ court must find wilful refusal or culpable neglect before imposing the 
default term.  It is suggested that the Court was in error as section 82(4) and (4A) only 
have to be considered if the magistrates’ court is acting under section 82(3) and that sub-
section is only considered if the court did not impose a default term on imposition. 
In Johnson the Court reviewed the decision of the district judge to find wilful refusal but did 
not review the legislation in detail, although Irwin J did say that the requirements of 
section 82(4) must be applied practically in every case, that is, it is enough for the court to 
have regard to the other methods, not that they must be tried and have failed before the 
default term can be imposed.1296  In Cooper the Court considered the decision of the 
district judge in the magistrates’ court to find culpable neglect citing section 82(4) MCA 
1980.  Again, there was no detailed consideration of the legislation, but the Court followed 
Munir and Johnson by holding that there was a need for wilful refusal or culpable neglect 
to be found.   
These cases were followed in Sanghera and the Court held that the district judge in the 
magistrates’ court had not followed the statute and should have found wilful refusal or 
 
1294 ibid [19].  
1295 Munir v Bolton Magistrates’ Court [2010] EWHC 3794 (Admin); On the application of Johnson 
(n 1198); Cooper v Birmingham Magistrates’ Court [2015] EWHC 2341 (Admin); R (on the 
application of Sanghera) v Birmingham Magistrates’ Court) [2017] EWHC 3323 (Admin); Beach (n 
1262). 
1296 On the application of Johnson (n 1198) [38]-[39].   
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culpable neglect.  In this case the Administrative Court considered the legislation but 
started by looking at section 82(4).  In Beach the decision in Johnson was referred to, 
along with Harrow Justices, and again the High Court started its considerations with 
section 82(3) and (4) and therefore found that the magistrates’ court should have found 
either wilful refusal or culpable neglect.  O’Connell is a case on a different point but 
outlines the powers of the magistrates’ court in relation to activating the default term for 
non-payment of a confiscation order, and it too begins with the premise that the starting 
point of the magistrates’ court decision is section 82(4) MCA 1980.1297  
For the reasons given above it is submitted that the starting point in the second line of 
authorities is not correct, and the first line of authorities are to be preferred.  In the second 
line of authorities the Court should have started with the question posed by section 82(3), 
namely was a period of default for non-payment set on imposition?  If that question had 
been asked, the answer would have been yes, and the rest of section 82 would not have 
been considered.  These conclusions are supported by Sutherland Williams et al who 
conclude that Munir should not be followed and that there is no need to prove wilful 
refusal or culpable neglect, although the court must be satisfied that there are no 
alternative methods of enforcement.1298   
Until there is an appeal to a higher court, or there is a change in the legislation it would 
seem that these issues will continue to be raised in practice and would appear to be 
another area of the law in which clarity is needed.  Despite that, the principles established 
by the case law mean that the claim that ‘means enquiries may now be a thing of the past 
in this regard’1299 cannot be right.  Although no ‘means inquiry’ as required by s 82 MCA 
1980 is necessary, an inquiry into means is. 
 
 
1297 O’Connell (n 79) [4]. 
1298 Sutherland Williams, Hopmeier and Jones (n 58) 293-294.  




There are other factors which in practice the magistrates’ court has to deal with.  Either 
before the hearing, or as part of the hearing, the court may be asked to consider an 
application to adjourn the hearing.  Applications to adjourn enforcement hearings in a 
magistrates’ court for an application for a certificate of inadequacy or downward variation 
are common.1300 There have been a number of cases where arguments have been put 
forward on behalf of defendants that their enforcement proceedings should be adjourned 
to allow an application for a certificate of inadequacy,1301 but there can be other types of 
appeal, for example, against sentence or the confiscation order. 
Although a magistrates’ court can adjourn enforcement proceedings, and can further 
postpone the issue of a warrant of commitment,1302 it cannot extend the time for payment 
of a confiscation order.1303  As a result interest will accrue during the period of the 
adjournment at the rate of 8% per annum until the order is satisfied. Therefore, it may not 
always be in the defendant’s interest to delay matters especially as the prosecution can 
apply to increase the default sentence in certain circumstances if interest accrues.  
Following Gibson, it may now be more difficult to enforce interest1304 which is another 
reason why in practice enforcement should not be delayed. 
The Working Group Third Report blamed delays in enforcement in part on the fact that a 
confiscation order cannot be enforced while an appeal is outstanding against conviction or 
sentence, which meant that enforcement is suspended pending appeal.1305  However, the 
approach has now changed.  In 2014 case law clarified the principles that the magistrates’ 
court should adopt when enforcing a confiscation order which is subject to an appeal by 
 
1300 Sutherland Williams, Hopmeier and Jones (n 58) 254; Mitchell Taylor and Talbot vol 1, para 
8.004 (R5: September 2004). This would include an application for a certificate of inadequacy 
under the pre-POCA 2002 legislation, and an application for a downward variation under section 
23 POCA 2002 due to inadequacy.  
1301 For example Ansen (n 536); Anscombe (n 20). 
1302 MCA 1980, s 77. 
1303 Greenacre (n 1021).  
1304 As the default term does not apply to outstanding interest, Gibson (n 12). 
1305 Working Group Third Report (n 126) para 2.6. 
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the defendant.  Prior to the case of Day1306 there was no clear direction from the case law, 
and there was nothing to say that a fine or confiscation order must be enforced while there 
is an appeal pending. In some cases, case law has allowed enforcement to be suspended 
pending appeal;1307 whereas in others the decision of the magistrates’ court not to adjourn 
was upheld.1308 
Adjournments had been granted, despite the case of May and Others,1309 which confirmed 
that the time for paying a confiscation order runs from the date of imposition and not from 
the determination of an appeal against it.  It was held that the proposition that the time for 
paying a confiscation order runs from the date of determination of an appeal against it is 
unsound in law.1310 
In Day1311 the Lord Chief Justice criticised the practice by HMCTS of suspending the 
enforcement of accounts pending an appeal.  Although this case involved the enforcement 
of fines and costs and not a confiscation order, the same principles apply, and it was held 
that any general practice of ‘suspending’ enforcement must cease. 
In one of the footnotes to the judgment the Court gave guidance on the principles to be 
applied if a defendant appealed against sentence.1312  These principles include points 
directly relevant to the enforcement of confiscation orders.  The court stated that in future, 
the fact that a defendant has been told by HMCTS that an account has been suspended 
will not be sufficient to prevent criticism of a defendant for not paying as ordered by the 
 
1306 Day (n 1018). 
1307 In R v Soneji and another [2006] EWCA Crim 1125 [11] it was said ‘in passing’ that the 
convention of not automatically enforcing fines pending appeal is a matter of practice, not 
founded on statute or regulation and has never been held to extend to confiscation orders. In R 
(on the application of Shahid) v Birmingham Magistrates’ Court [2010] EWHC 2969 (Admin) there 
was no criticism of the district judge for issuing the commitment warrant when he did as the 
defendant had not applied for a certificate of inadequacy, even though the decision to commit 
could not stand as the circumstances had been transformed by the certificate of inadequacy.  
1308 See Anscombe (n 20); Hamed v City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court [2010] EWHC 665 
(Admin); R (on the application of P) v Bolton Magistrates’ Court [2010] EWHC 1812 (Admin). 
1309 May and others (n 1018). 
1310 ibid [5] (Keene LJ). 
1311 Day (n 1018). 
1312 ibid [52]-[58].  
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court.  This changes the position taken in the case of Minshull v Marylebone Magistrates’ 
Court1313 where a letter from the clerk to the justices led Pitchford J to opine that:  
[the] letter…had the effect of securing the postponement of any enforcement of the 
confiscation order.  It seems to me that it was virtually inevitable that no 
proceedings for enforcement would, in any event, have taken place pending the 
appeal against the order itself.1314 
The case of Day confirmed that the fact that an appeal is pending does not suspend the 
operation of any sentence or order of the Crown Court including imprisonment, payment 
of a fine, costs or confiscation order.  The footnote sets out that this is because any order 
is enforceable in accordance with its terms in the absence of the exercise by a court of 
any power to the contrary and explains that this is why an applicant sentenced to 
imprisonment who seeks leave to appeal goes at once into custody and has to apply for 
bail under the statutory powers given to the Court of Appeal and the Crown Court. In the 
same way an appellant given community service has to carry the sentence out.1315   
The court acknowledged that there may be occasions for specified reasons applicable to 
the particular circumstances of a given case or type of case where the Executive Branch 
of the State, namely HMCTS, may decide not to enforce a type of case pending an 
appeal. However, it was made clear that decision cannot and does not suspend the order 
of the court. The decision does not in any way discharge the offender from the obligation 
to obey the order of the court and pay the order within the time specified by the court or be 
at risk of the penalty in default of payment.1316  
The judgment was critical of the fact that the decision to suspend enforcement was taken 
without reference to the Crown Court or the prosecution especially as the prosecution 
 
1313 [2008] EWHC 2800 (Admin), [2010] 1 WLR 590.   
1314 Ibid [36] (Pitchford J).    
1315 Day (n 1018) [55].  
1316 ibid [57]. 
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were of the view that the order should be paid as quickly as possible.1317 The case 
concerns non-payment of fine and costs, an area where in practice agencies do not work 
closely together as they do in the enforcement of confiscation orders.  Given the closer 
working relationship,1318 it is unlikely that HMCTS or the court would take a decision to 
suspend the enforcement of a confiscation order without putting the prosecution on notice, 
and given the accrual of interest, it will rarely be in the defendant’s best interests to delay 
enforcement. 
The court in Day followed other cases.  In West Midlands Probation Board v Sutton 
Coldfield Magistrates’ Court1319 the court held that an appeal against sentence did not 
suspend the enforcement of a community order.  This decision followed May and 
others1320  and Manchester Probation Committee v Bent.1321  Bent was another case in 
which it was held that an appeal did not suspend the enforcement of a community order.  
This was on the basis that a sentence is enforceable in the absence of specific provisions 
to the contrary, although the judgment acknowledged that a fine may not be enforced but 
that would be for practical reasons and not because of any principle of law.  
May and others concerned the enforcement of a confiscation order pending appeal and 
followed Bent by deciding that an appeal does not suspend the operation of the 
confiscation order.  However, the judgment in May does not go as far as that in Day.  In 
May the court did not say that the confiscation order should be enforced while the appeal 
was pending but that the defendant should have taken ‘steps preparatory to the raising of 
the money specified in the confiscation order… [as he] was not entitled to assume that his 
appeal would be successful’1322  
 
1317 ibid [54]. 
1318 In practice HMCTS works closely with other agencies, especially the prosecution and financial 
investigators who can provide information about the Crown Court hearing. 
1319 [2008] EWHC 15 (Admin), [2008] 1 WLR 918.   
1320 May and others (n 1018).  Relied upon in Day.  
1321 [1996] 160 JP 297 (QB). 
1322 May and others (n 1018) [7] (Keene, LJ). 
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Now, following Day the principles to be followed by the magistrates’ court when deciding 
whether or not to adjourn pending appeal in confiscation cases are clear.  Decisions 
should be based on the premise that the starting point is to continue with the enforcement 
of the order. In addition, reference to the prosecution, and if appropriate, the Crown Court, 
should be made before a decision is made to adjourn. 
There are other principles in the case law to guide the magistrates’ court when there is a 
request from the defendant for an adjournment. If the defendant either himself or through 
his advocate asks for an adjournment to satisfy the order, the magistrates must ensure 
that steps have been taken to satisfy the order.  In John Smith Thomas LJ stated: 
It is self-evident and important to note that no leeway whatsoever should be given 
to anyone subject to a confiscation order unless there is hard evidence in the form 
of money deposited or properties secured that show that the sums are being 
realised.  A simple assurance from a lawyer is totally worthless and should not be 
acted on in the absence of hard evidence of the kind we have described.1323 
Cases where the asset available is a house are particularly relevant to this research.  
Where a defendant had done all he could to sell his house and the sale fell through just 
before the court hearing, a district judge was criticised for issuing a warrant of 
commitment.  It was held that the court should have adjourned the proceedings to allow a 
further sale to be attempted.  In this case, there was no reason to believe that the property 
could not be sold and there was no suggestion that the defendant would block or refuse to 
co-operate with the sale.  The fact that an application to adjourn had been made with the 
agreement of the CPS was not determinative of the issue but was another matter to be 
taken into account.1324 
However, when the defendant had not made genuine efforts to sell his property, the 
magistrates’ decision to refuse an adjournment and commit the defendant to prison was 
 
1323 John Smith (n 530) [5]. 
1324 Barnett v DPP (n 1293).  
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upheld as the only method of enforcing the confiscation order.1325   The defendant had 
sufficient equity in the property to meet the value of the confiscation order and the interest 
but had failed to place the house for sale on the open market.  He asked for an 
adjournment to sell the house to his son at an undervalue which would not have satisfied 
the order.  The magistrates were wholly unpersuaded that the defendant was making 
genuine efforts to meet his obligations under the confiscation order, or that he was serious 
in looking after the public interest before his own. This was shown by his attempt to keep 
the property within his family by selling it to his son, which was an unsubstantiated offer.  
The defendant had been disadvantaged because the enforcement hearing had been 
brought forward, but he had had 10 days to prepare. He had also had nine months prior to 
the hearing to sell the property but had failed to do so.  
In Popoola1326 the decision of the district judge not to adjourn the enforcement 
proceedings in the magistrates’ court for property to be sold was upheld.  In this case no 
steps had been taken to realise two of three properties and it was held that the judge did 
not err in refusing to allow a further adjournment when nothing had been paid and nothing 
done since the confiscation order was made.  The decision to commit the defendant to 
prison for non-payment was upheld.  In this case there was a restraint order in force and it 
is argued that this is authority for the proposition that even if there is a charging order on a 
property, the onus would still be on the defendant to take steps to sell the property and it 
would not prevent further enforcement action.  It would be for the magistrates’ court to 
make a decision on the facts of each case. 
It is submitted that the making of a compliance order by the Crown Court where the asset 
is a house would also assist the magistrates’ court when faced with an application by the 
defendant to adjourn enforcement proceedings and would be seen as an innovative use of 
 
1325 R (on the application of Jestin) v Dover Magistrates’ Court [2013] EWHC 1040 (Admin). 
1326 Popoola (n 1198). 
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the order.1327  A compliance order could be used to require a defendant to market a house 
for sale.  Conditions could be imposed to market the property within a set timescale with a 
requirement to provide written proof to the lead agency.  As a compliance order can be 
made against a third party the order could require any estate agent to provide details of 
whether the house is being marketed at an appropriate price, how many viewings have 
been undertaken and whether any offers have been made.  The estate agent could also 
be required to give an opinion about whether any offers are reasonable.  A failure to 
comply with the requirements of the compliance order would then be a matter that the 
magistrates’ court could take into account when deciding whether the defendant was 
making genuine efforts to sell the property.  This would allow a decision to be made about 
whether it is reasonable to adjourn the enforcement hearing to allow the property to be 
marketed further before activating the default term.   
6.8 The right of a defaulter to have proceedings concluded within a reasonable 
time 
Although the onus is on the defendant to satisfy the order, the court must take care to 
ensure that there is no unnecessary delay in enforcing a confiscation order, even if the 
defendant has applied for an adjournment or has caused the delay in another way, 
otherwise methods of enforcement may not be available.  The ECHR applies to the 
enforcement of confiscation orders, nowhere more so than with the issues of delay.  The 
European Court of Human Rights has determined that the reasonable time provisions of 
Article 6(1) apply to the entirety of the confiscation proceedings and that orders must be 
made1328 and enforced1329 within a reasonable time.  This applies to enforcement actions 
 
1327 The power to make a compliance order is contained in POCA 2002, s13A and it gives the 
Crown Court the power to make any order to ensure a confiscation order is effective.  The 
innovative use of compliance orders has been suggested by Fisher (n 60) 759; and Wood, The Big 
Payback (n 5) 7. 
1328 Bullen and Soneji v United Kingdom (n 518). 
1329 Crowther v United Kingdom (n 519). 
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taken outside the courtroom, and to the enforcement powers of the magistrates’ court at 
the enforcement hearing. 
It is necessary to consider the rights of the defendant lest it appears that there is no 
balance in the system.  Article 6 of the ECHR and the principles of natural justice apply to 
confiscation enforcement hearings in the magistrates’ court. The defendant must be given 
sufficient prior notice of an enforcement hearing and time to prepare his defence.  Where 
a defendant could not instruct his own solicitor in advance of the hearing, because he was 
in custody and had been in transit; he could not avail himself of the duty solicitor and the 
case was complex, the refusal of an adjournment by the magistrates’ court was held to be 
a breach of Article 6 of the ECHR.1330  
In ex parte Crowther1331 which was decided prior to the HRA 1998, there was a delay in 
the enforcement of a confiscation order made under the DTOA 1986 including an 
unexplained three year delay on behalf of the enforcement authorities.  It was held that a 
delay was not an abuse of process on the basis that there is a duty on the defendant to 
satisfy the order, although the situation may be different if there was fault by the 
prosecution.  
The first United Kingdom case to consider the application of article 6(1) on the decision to 
commit a defendant to prison for non-payment of a confiscation order was Lloyd.1332 The 
court specifically considered whether a defendant’s article 6(1) rights to have a case dealt 
with within a reasonable time can be violated by a delay in proceedings to commit a 
defendant to prison for non-payment of a confiscation order.  The confiscation order had 
been made under the CJA 1988 and the defendant was ordered to pay within 12 months 
or be liable to serve 18 months in default and the court heard that there had been delays 
in enforcing the order by both the prosecution and the magistrates’ court.  The prosecution 
had delayed the application to appoint a receiver, and once appointed, no action was 
 
1330 Agogo (n 521). 
1331 ex parte Crowther (n 1198) 1019.  The facts are also contained in Lloyd (n 530). 
1332 Lloyd (n 530). 
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taken to enforce the order.  The magistrates’ court had delayed both the issue of a 
summons and the listing of the enforcement hearing, so by the time the the defendant was 
committed to prison for non-payment of the confiscation order it was five years from when 
the time for payment date had expired.    
By the time of the hearing in Lloyd Mr Crowther’s complaint to the European Court of 
Human Rights had been declared admissible, however the High Court did not feel it was 
appropriate to wait for his case to be decided as it was felt that it would take too long for 
the European Court of Human Rights to determine the matter.  Nor did it feel bound to 
follow ex parte Crowther as the court in that case had not heard an argument on whether 
a breach of article 6(1) had occurred, but whether a committal to prison for non-payment 
of a confiscation order after a considerable delay was an abuse of process.1333 
In Lloyd the court held that a defendant enjoys the full benefit of all the rights conferred by 
Article 6(1) in all aspects of confiscation proceedings including an application to commit in 
the magistrates’ court.  This is because it forms part of the sentencing process as outlined 
in Rezvi,1334 Benjafield1335 and Phillips.1336  In Lloyd there had been a five-year delay in 
enforcing the order, during which time the defendant had rebuilt his home life, and 
accordingly there had been a breach of Article 6(1).  The original order to commit the 
defendant to prison was stayed and the court held that the proportionate response to such 
a breach is to say that imprisonment in default is no longer available.  However, the court 
acknowledged that other methods of enforcement, what Dyson LJ referred to as ‘the civil 
means of enforcement’,1337 remained.  This term refers to the other methods of 
enforcement available to the magistrates’ court short of committal such as a warrant of 
control.  The court heard no argument about whether article 6(1) applied to the 
enforcement of a confiscation order using the civil methods of enforcement.   
 
1333 ibid [21]. 
1334 Rezvi (n 501). 
1335 Benjafield (n 502). 
1336 Phillips v United Kingdom (n 500). 
1337 Lloyd (n 530) [17]. 
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The judgment highlighted the fact that defendants subject to a confiscation order do not 
attract sympathy nor are they entitled to favoured treatment but if the prosecutor or 
magistrates’ court wants to enforce a confiscation order, they should do so within a 
reasonable time.  Otherwise it is potentially very unfair for a defendant to be committed to 
prison in default many years after the time for payment has expired and after having been 
released from custody and resumed work and family life.1338 
The court acknowledged that the threshold of proving a breach of the reasonable time 
requirement is a high one following Dyer v Watson,1339 and regard should be had to the 
efforts made to extract the money by other methods.  The example given in Lloyd was that 
if a receiver has been appointed within a reasonable time and acted with reasonable 
expedition then even if that had taken time it will not prevent the court finding that there 
has been no violation of the defendant’s article 6(1) rights.  Regard should be had to the 
efforts made to extract the money by other methods and if the defendant has been 
evasive and avoided diligent attempts to extract the money from him, he will be unable to 
rely on the delay to support an argument that his rights have been violated.1340  
In Lloyd the delay amounted to approximately five years and was caused by the 
prosecution and the magistrates’ court.  As a result, the High Court held that the correct 
remedy for the breach of article 6(1) was to stay the committal proceedings. This is 
because of the time that had elapsed since the defendant was released from prison on 
licence after serving one half of the original sentence, and he had rebuilt his home life and 
obtained employment.  The court held that it would be inhuman to subject the claimant to 
a further term of imprisonment arising out of the original offence.1341  In the final paragraph 
of his judgment, Dyson LJ stated: 
 
1338 ibid [25]. 
1339 [2002] UKPC D1, [2004] 1 AC 379. 
1340 Lloyd (n 530) [27]. 
1341 Ibid [34]. 
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If the authorities whose task it is to enforce confiscation orders are so slow in 
communicating with one another or in activating enforcement mechanisms that 
they become in breach of Article 6(1), then the appropriate remedy may well be 
(as in this case) that the weapon of imprisonment in default is lost.  The sooner 
this is appreciated by all agencies of the criminal justice system, the better.1342 
It has been said that the decision in Lloyd ‘is a bold decision but, it is submitted, a correct 
one’ as although the reasonable time guarantee applies throughout the criminal process 
including appeals, this case applied the guarantee to the enforcement of confiscation 
orders.1343  It was a brave decision by the High Court because Mr Crowther’s application 
had been declared admissible in the European Court of Human Rights on the same point.  
The High Court acknowledged that the decision would probably be decisive on the point 
before it, however the decision would not be known for one or two years and the parties 
were keen to proceed, which it did.1344  History has shown that the decision was right, as 
is shown in the analysis of the case law which followed, and in 2017 Edis J described the 
decision in Lloyd  as being ‘vindicated’ by the decision in Crowther v United Kingdom.1345   
This application of the reasonable time guarantee to the enforcement of confiscation 
orders adds further balance to the draconian nature of the confiscation legislation.  
The European Court of Human Rights heard the case of Crowther v United Kingdom1346 in 
2005 and considered the judgment in Lloyd.  It held that article 6(1) of the Convention 
applied to the enforcement of confiscation orders and that four years of almost total 
inactivity on behalf of the prosecution was a violation of article 6(1) of the Convention.  It 
found that the prosecution’s inertia during that time ’was both inexcusable and, given that 
somebody's liberty was involved, unconscionable’.1347  It held that the reasonableness of 
the length of the proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the 
 
1342 ibid [36]. 
1343 Dilys Tausz, ‘Confiscation Orders’ [2004] (Feb) Crim LR 136, 137.  
1344 Lloyd (n 530) [12]. 
1345 O’Connell (n 79) [22].    
1346 Crowther v United Kingdom (n 519). 
1347 ibid [28]. 
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case including the complexity of the case, the conduct of the defendant and the 
authorities, and the importance of what was at stake for the defendant.1348  The domestic 
court had found that the defendant had a duty to pay the order, which gave weight to the 
fact that there was no abuse of process, but the European Court of Human Rights held 
that the fact that the defendant was under a duty to pay did not absolve the authorities 
from ensuring that the proceedings were completed in a reasonable time.1349 
These principles were confirmed in Minshull v United Kingdom which also considered the 
decision in Lloyd.   Notwithstanding the complexities of the proceedings, the court held 
that a period of delay attributable to the State of four years and 7 months for the domestic 
courts to consider an appeal was unreasonable and there was a breach of the reasonable 
time requirement of Article 6 as the defendant had been committed to prison for non-
payment of the confiscation order.1350  
The principles in Lloyd, Crowther v United Kingdom and Minshall v United Kingdom were 
followed in Marsden and McIntosh1351 which also held that it was right to take into account 
the fact that a defendant is aware of the Crown’s continuing intention to enforce the order.  
It was held that the fact that the defendant is under an obligation to pay does not in itself 
mean that the State does not have to act within a reasonable time.1352  The court will also 
take into account that the result of the enforcement proceedings may be that a released 
prisoner will be returned to jail.1353  In this case, however, it was not perverse to refuse to 
stay enforcement proceedings, even though there had been significant delays, as the 
offenders had known about the prosecution’s intention to enforce the orders.  Looking at 
the whole of the circumstances the offenders’ rights under Article 6 had not been 
breached. 
 
1348 ibid [27]. 
1349 ibid [29]. 
1350 (2012) 55 EHRR 36; (emphasis added). 
1351 Marsden and McIntosh (n 1198) 1019. 
1352 ibid [7], [16]. 
1353 ibid [7]. 
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Lloyd and Crowther v United Kingdom were also followed in R (on the application of Syed 
and another) v City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court.1354 In this case it was held that if 
the defendant is responsible for the delay, or if his financial affairs take an unusually long 
time to sort out, for example because of their complexity, article 6(1) will not help him.1355 
Secondly, if the delay is found to have infringed article 6(1), the appropriate remedy is for 
the enforcing court to stay the proceedings to the extent that the prosecuting authority is 
seeking an order requiring the defendant to serve the sentence of imprisonment imposed 
in default of payment.1356  The case did confirm that culpable delay in enforcing a 
confiscation order could constitute a breach of a defendant's right under article 6(1) of the 
Convention to a fair trial within a reasonable time.1357 
There are other cases which considered the delay principles but did not add further to the 
factors to be taken into account when deciding the issue.  Where there was ‘an 
inexcusable delay of over two years’ by the enforcement authority, it would be an abuse to 
continue to enforce the order by way of committal to prison.1358  A delay of 13 years in 
enforcement meant that the defendant’s Article 6(1) rights had been breached and the 
decision to commit the defendant was quashed.1359  On the other hand, in Deamer v 
Southampton Magistrates’ Court1360 a delay of 6 years was not unreasonable when the 
defendant delayed proceedings and failed to apply for a certificate of inadequacy, with 
correspondence between prosecution and defence throughout the period making it clear 
that if the funds were not forthcoming the prosecution would take enforcement 
proceedings.   
However, the decision in Deamer should not be interpreted by prosecution authorities as 
justification for delaying enforcement.  Apart from the practical advantages of enforcing 
 
1354 [2010] EWHC 1617 (Admin). 
1355 ibid [14]. 
1356 ibid [15]. 
1357 ibid [12]. 
1358 Flaherty v City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court [2008] EWHC 2589 (Admin) [22] (Moses LJ). 
1359 R (on the application of Stone) v Clerk to the Justices of Plymouth Magistrates’ Court [2007] 
EWHC 2519 (Admin). 
1360 [2006] EWHC 2221 (Admin).  
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confiscation orders quickly, namely that any assets will be more likely to be available and 
to have retained their value, future judgments may not allow as much leeway. In addition, 
there is now the additional issue in enforcing the interest after the default term has been 
imposed following the case of Gibson.1361 
In a judicial review it has been held that where human rights are involved the court must 
conduct a review that is more intense than the Wednesbury test of irrationality.1362 The 
Wednesbury reasonableness test is whether a decision taken is beyond the furthest 
reaches of objective reasonableness.1363  This question was considered in R (on the 
Application of Derek Joyce) v Dover Magistrates' Court and Revenue and Customs 
Prosecutions Office.1364 In Joyce the court decided the delay question on the common law 
abuse of process law but took into account the decision in Lloyd. The court held that the 
decision of the magistrates’ court to refuse to stay proceedings was not Wednesbury 
unreasonable even though there was a 14 year delay in enforcing the order because a 
significant part of the delay was caused by the defendant as he was unlawfully at large for 
3 years and 1 month.  However, it was held in this case that the court could not enforce 
the order by way of committal, but it could enforce the order by any other methods of 
enforcement available.   
By deciding the case on the abuse of process point, Joyce is the exception to the long line 
of cases starting with Lloyd in 2003 which have decided the question of delay taking into 
account the principles in article 6(1) of the ECHR.  In 2017 the case of O’Connell 
confirmed that it is the article 6 rights which should be considered because article 6 and 
the reasonable time guarantee is part of domestic law, and there is no need to decide 
cases concerning the enforcement of confiscation orders in any other way.1365 This 
 
1361 Gibson (n 12).  
1362 R (on the application of E) v DPP [2011] EWHC 1465 (Admin), [2012] 1 Cr App R 6. 
1363 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 (CA), 
[1947] 2 All ER 680. 
1364 [2008] EWHC 1448 (Admin). 
1365 O’Connell (n 79) [36]. 
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decision reviewed a number of previous key authorities in some detail,1366 and it appears 
the law is now settled and any arguments that a court or prosecutor has delayed the 
enforcement of confiscation orders should be considered taking into account the 
defendant’s article 6 rights. 
In O’Connell there had been just over 11 years between the dismissal of an appeal 
against the making of the confiscation order and the issue of the warrant of commitment.  
The claim was that instead of activating the default term, the magistrates’ court should 
have stayed the proceedings as an abuse of process relying on the power of the court to 
stay and his article 6 rights to have the proceedings heard within a reasonable time.  It 
was held that it is only necessary to consider whether the imposition of a default sentence 
for non-payment of a confiscation order violated the reasonable time Convention right, 
and not whether there has been an abuse of process.  In addition, the High Court 
considered the principles to be taken into account when considering the application of a 
defendant’s article 6 rights. 
Edis J agreed with the interpretation of Lloyd by Laws LJ in Marsden and McIntosh that 
the conduct of the defendant is irrelevant to the existence of his Article 6 right, but highly 
relevant as to whether there had been a breach, and if so, what the remedy should be.1367  
But in this case Edis J said that it was not helpful to consider previous decisions which 
turn on their own facts.  Something more is needed other than the fact that a court has 
decided that a warrant of commitment should not be issued because the CPS had 
delayed for a particular couple of years.  He concluded that consideration should be given 
to those cases which concern the principles of delay in the context of confiscation 
enforcement by imprisonment in default of payment.1368  He also found it was wrong to cite 
Lloyd as authority for propositions that a court will always stay enforcement proceedings 
where there has been unreasonable delay, or that the conduct of the defendant is not 
 
1366 Although it did not consider Minshall v United Kingdom. 
1367 O’Connell (n 79) [27] (Edis J).   
1368 ibid [19]. 
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relevant to the decision about whether there has been a breach of the reasonable time 
requirement, or what order to make if there has been a breach.1369 
The approach set out by Lord Bingham in Dyer v Watson1370 was held to be relevant in 
O’Connell when deciding if there has been a breach of the reasonable time requirement in 
Article 6 in confiscation order enforcement.1371 The steps identified were first to look at the 
period of time which has elapsed, as unless there are grounds for real concern, the 
argument is unlikely to go further.  Three factors are then to be taken into account.  Firstly, 
the complexity of the case, as the more complex the case the longer the time needed to 
prepare, although the passage of time can become excessive and unacceptable even in a 
complex case.  Secondly the court should have regard to the conduct of the defendant, if 
he has caused delay for example by making spurious applications, changing legal 
advisers and absenting himself.  Thirdly unacceptable delays cannot be blamed on lack of 
availability of courthouses or judges or chronic underfunding of the legal system.  
However, this does not mean that the ‘practical realities’ of the legal system should not be 
considered, and it is reasonable, for example, for a prosecutor to prioritise cases.  Any 
unjustified delay will point to a breach of the reasonable time requirement. 1372 
In O’Connell the fact that the prosecution did not apply for a European Arrest Warrant or 
prioritise the case because the defendant was not in the jurisdiction was not 
unreasonable.  When deciding whether it would be unjust or disproportionate to impose 
the warrant of commitment in default, the court must look at the facts and circumstances 
of the particular case.1373  Also taken into account was the fact that the defendant had 
done nothing to pay the order since the dismissal of his appeal 10 years ago; and was 
living abroad, which was his choice.  It was therefore held that it was not unjust or 
 
1369 ibid [29]. 
1370 Dyer v Watson (n 1339).  
1371 O’Connell (n 79) [33]. 
1372 ibid [31]. 
1373 ibid [43], [47]. 
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disproportionate to issue the warrant of commitment and not grant a stay to remove the 
possibility of imprisonment for non-payment.  
Considering the cases of Lloyd, Crowther v United Kingdom and Marsden and McIntosh 
the principles established in O’Connell are: 
• The question to be decided is whether in the circumstances of the case, would the 
issue of a warrant of commitment after a period of delay be so unjust and 
disproportionate? 
• The application should be heard and considered on its merits 
• Each case will be fact specific and a period of delay may result in a stay in one 
case, where a shorter delay may result in a stay in another case 
• Misconduct by the prosecution is one factor to be taken into account  
• The prosecution is entitled to prioritise its cases 
• Conduct by the defendant is another factor 
• Just because there has been a delay does not mean that a committal warrant 
cannot be issued 
• Where a defaulter is out of the jurisdiction and his whereabouts are unknown, delay 
caused by a decision not to proceed in their absence will rarely be capable of 
amounting to a stay 
• It should not be assumed that there will be a greater hardship in imprisoning a 
defendant for default after a period of delay.   
The Court in O’Connell did not find it useful to consider the other cases on delay, finding 
that the application of the principles to a set of facts without something more was not 
helpful.  However, the other cases are useful in the context of this research to show that if 
a defendant’s article 6 rights are infringed in a way that is disproportionate, either all 




6.9 Civil means of enforcement  
In Lloyd the court did not consider the point whether civil means of enforcement (powers 
of the court short of imprisonment in default) were available1374 but that has been 
considered in other cases. Where domestic law or practice requires the parties to take the 
initiative with regard to the progress of the proceedings, the State is obliged to ensure 
compliance with the reasonable time guarantee under Article 6(1).1375 Where the 
defendant remained at a fixed address known to the authorities and attended court 
whenever required and did not attempt to prolong the proceedings unnecessarily it was 
unlikely that any enforcement would be permitted if there has been an unjustified 
delay.1376 
There is some guidance from the case law on when civil enforcement is still an option 
available to the magistrates’ court even if delay in enforcement means that the imposition 
of the default term is no longer an option. It was held in CPS v Derby and South 
Derbyshire Magistrates’ Court that preventing repayment by the defendant was not a 
proportionate response to the delay in the prosecution seeking to enforce by way of 
criminal sanction.1377 In that case it was held that while an unreasonable six-year delay 
amounted to a breach of article 6, it was inappropriate and disproportionate to prevent 
enforcement by civil means of enforcement.  It was unreasonable for a defendant to be at 
risk of imprisonment after a delay of six years when the defendant was by then an elderly 
man where the conviction was well spent, the sentence had been served, and he was now 
living his life as a pensioner.1378  In addition the defendant had been paying minimal 
amounts and then for no apparent change of circumstances the prosecutor sought a 
 
1374 Lloyd (n 530) [24].  
1375 Crowther v United Kingdom (n 519). 
1376 ibid [23], [29]. 
1377 [2010] EWHC 370 (Admin) [26]. 
1378 ibid [23]-[24]. 
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hearing which could have resulted in committal to prison for non-payment.1379  However, 
civil methods of enforcement were available.  
In certain circumstances all enforcement of a confiscation order by the magistrates’ court 
including committal and civil means of enforcement can be stayed.  In Flaherty the 
defendant had served the term in default after a significant delay, and there was then a 
further delay of two years where the court could have found the address for the defendant. 
The fact that HMCS had set up a new unit to deal with confiscation orders was not 
accepted as an excuse for only writing one letter to the defendant in over two years, and 
the enforcement proceedings were stayed.1380  Similarly, where the prosecution had 
caused an unexplained delay of six and a half years and had failed to respond to the 
defendant’s correspondence, all enforcement was stayed, although this did not affect 
monies already paid by the defendant.1381  
As a result, the principles that can be gleaned are that if the court or the prosecution could 
have done something but either chose not to or neglected to do so, then all enforcement 
can be stayed. Otherwise, civil means of enforcement will be available, and these are 
analysed in the next chapter. 
6.10 Conclusions of chapter 
Previous chapters have already identified some of the complexities in the confiscation 
legislation for magistrates’ courts enforcing confiscation orders.  This chapter shows the 
complex nature of the use of fines based powers for the enforcement of confiscation 
orders.  The changes to the confiscation legislation have resulted in the magistrates’ court 
enforcing orders with different sanctions and the use of fines based powers has caused 
more issues.  A review of section 35 POCA 2002 is recommended to ensure that the 
individual fines based powers are suitable for enforcing confiscation orders. 
 
1379 ibid [22]. 
1380 Flaherty (n 1358). 
1381 Malik v Crown Prosecution Service [2013] EWHC 4591 (Admin). 
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Some suggestions have been made to improve the enforcement powers of the 
magistrates’ court, for example the use of fine registration.  A limited form of these powers 
is available if a collection order is made and there may be a function for collection orders 
and the added sanctions they bring in the enforcement of confiscation orders.   A detailed 
analysis falls outside the focus of this thesis but is recommended as an area suitable for 
further research. 
By the time the case is listed in the magistrates’ court for enforcement, it is at the end of 
the confiscation order process, interest will be accruing and there is a duplication of effort 
for the court when trying to enforce using the civil means of enforcement which is 
examined in the next chapter. It is recommended that the enforcement of interest following 
the case of Gibson is an area that would benefit from further research. 
The activation of the default term is not automatic nor is it a punishment.  The court must 
ensure that it considers all other methods of enforcement before issuing a warrant of 
commitment but it does not have to try them all.  It would appear that further clarity is 
needed in relation to whether a finding of wilful refusal or culpable neglect is needed 
before activating the default term for non-payment.  In addition, there are difficulties in 
enforcing confiscation orders after the default term has been served, and it is unlikely that 
the current civil means of enforcement would be successful if the defendant is in default of 
the principal sum. There is a need for effective alternatives.   
The onus is on the defendant to pay a confiscation order, even if there is a restraint order 
and a receiver or an appeal pending. As a result, if there is a charging order, there would 
be no need for an order for sale in all cases before the default term is activated, each 
case would turn on its own merits. 
There is a role for other agencies in the process, as they can identify assets available to 
satisfy the order including bank accounts and houses.   A detailed review falls outside the 
scope of this research, but they can play a part in ensuring that the Crown Court has all 
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the relevant information to make the correct decisions to aid enforcement once the case is 
sent to the magistrates’ court for enforcement.   
There are particular issues in relation to marketing a house which has been considered in 
the case law.  It is suggested that if the asset identified at the Crown Court is a house, 
then a compliance order could be made setting requirements that the defendant and any 
third party must comply with to ensure the confiscation order is satisfied.  
An unacceptable delay in the enforcement of a confiscation order can amount to a breach 
of the defendant’s article 6(1) rights which can lead to a stay of all enforcement actions or 
just prevent the activation of the default term.  If other enforcement actions short of 
committal are available, these are known as ‘civil means of enforcement.’ These are 





Chapter 7 Enforcement: The use of Civil Means of Enforcement in the 
magistrates’ court  
7.1 Introduction 
The last two chapters have critically analysed the powers of the magistrates’ court to 
enforce confiscation orders, with the exception of the civil means of enforcement 
available.  Civil means of enforcement are not to be confused with applications made in 
the civil courts, namely enforcement in the High Court or county court.   In confiscation, 
the powers of the magistrates’ court short of committal, which somewhat confusingly can 
include enforcement in the High Court or county court, have become known as civil 
means of enforcement.  This is because of the case of Lloyd in which the court had to 
consider the options available to the magistrates’ court when enforcing a confiscation 
order  It considered the non-custodial options which could be taken by the court of its own 
volition without an application by the prosecutor and Dyson LJ said they would refer to the 
powers short of committal collectively as ‘the civil means of enforcement’.1382  These can 
either be ordered by the magistrates’ court, or when enforcing a confiscation order by 
application to the High Court or county court by the designated officer.1383  They can be 
used before or after the default term is activated.1384  
Assets including houses or money in a bank account may have been identified as part of 
the confiscation order hearing at the Crown Court or can be identified at a later date and it 
is vital that there are practical enforcement options available to the magistrates’ court to 
deal with them.   This chapter examines the use of the non-custodial options available to 
the magistrates’ court and in particular the use of charging orders. As a result of the 
issues involved, a recommendation is made that POCA 2002 is amended so that the 
 
1382 Lloyd (n 530) [17]. 
1383 Some of the powers are available to the fines officer if there is a collection order in force.   
1384 The civil means of enforcement in the magistrates’ court are also different to the civil recovery 
of the proceeds etc of unlawful conduct in Part 5 of POCA 2002.  King and Walker highlighted the 
confusing terminology as in some jurisdictions civil recovery means following a criminal 
conviction, whereas in others it means recovery without a criminal conviction (n 11) 6-7. A review 
of the civil recovery provisions falls outside the scope of this thesis. 
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Crown Court can make a confiscation charging order, either as a direct alternative to 
restraint, or if there is no risk of dissipation as an order suspended until time for payment 
has expired.  
The review documents highlight difficulties for the designated officer when applying for 
enforcement in the High Court and county court,1385 and the limited options available to 
the magistrates’ court once the default term has been activated.1386  In order to examine 
why it is important for improvements to be made in these areas, it is necessary to consider 
the other non-custodial options available to the magistrates’ court.  These non-custodial 
powers are insufficient where the asset is a house.  The only option is to apply to the 
county court for a charging order and subsequently an application for an order for sale in 
the High Court or county court, and this can only be done once time for payment has 
expired.  The only powers that the magistrates’ court has in relation to a bank account is 
to make a payment order, if the confiscation order is made under POCA 2002; or an 
application for a third party debt order to the county court, for confiscation orders made 
under the pre-POCA 2002 legislation.1387  Applications to the county court have an in built 
delay and cost, and are complicated.   The only other powers in relation to houses and 
bank accounts exist if the prosecution applies for a restraint order and a receiver but these 
orders are not always applied for1388 and are not powers available to the magistrates’ 
court.   
7.2 Civil Means of Enforcement 
Civil means of enforcement can be used by the magistrates’ court in a number of 
scenarios.  They can be used prior to the default term being activated as activation should 
be the last resort.  However, it is submitted that not all of them would be suitable prior to 
 
1385 These were first raised in 1991 in the Working Group First Report (n 137) 8. 
1386 Bullock and others (n 29) 20; Brown and others (n 173) 13. 
1387 The only other way money in a bank account can be seized is if there is an application for a 
restraint and receivership order, but these are not options available to the magistrates’ court.   
1388 There are a number of issues which appear to prevent the effective use of restraint, but there 
have been calls for empirical research into why this is the case, Wood, The Big Payback (n 5) 5-6. 
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such activation either because of the amount of the confiscation order, or because it 
would cause delay if they subsequently fail, or because they are simply not suitable for the 
asset involved.  Civil means of enforcement are often the only option available after the 
default term has been served because the powers of the magistrates’ court are limited.  
They may be the only option available if the reasonable time rights of the defendant in 
article 6(1) have been breached.1389  Following Gibson they are the only way the 
magistrates’ court can enforce interest unless the prosecution can apply to the Crown 
Court for an increase in the default term.1390 
In relation to the non-payment of a fine, the alternatives that the magistrates’ court must 
consider (but not necessarily try) before issuing a default sentence subsequent to 
imposition are a warrant of control (formerly known as a distress warrant), an attachment 
of earnings order, an attendance centre order, a money payment supervision order, or 
enforcement in the High Court or county court which includes an application for a third 
party debt order, a charging order or an order for sale.1391 Although not specifically 
mentioned in section 82(4A) MCA 1980, an application for deductions from benefits 
should be considered.1392  If these fail or are not suitable then the ultimate sanction of the 
magistrates’ court is to activate the default sentence.   
It is submitted that not all of these are suitable for the enforcement of confiscation orders.  
For example, an attendance centre order requires a defendant to attend at a centre for a 
number of hours set by the magistrates’ court.  If the defendant completes some or all of 
the hours, the financial penalty is reduced accordingly.1393 This is an alternative to a 
default sentence for fines based enforcement which is not suitable for a confiscation order 
as the only way a confiscation order can be satisfied is by payment.1394 Even if the 
 
1389 For example, Flaherty (n 1358). 
1390 Gibson (n 12). 
1391 MCA 1980, s 82(4A).   
1392 R v Northampton Justices ex parte Ferguson (Div, 2 December 1999). It is suggested that if 
there is a collection order in place a clamping order and fine registration should be considered.  If 
available a payment order should also be considered.  
1393 PCC(S)A 2000, s 60(12). 
1394 POCA 2002, s 38(5). 
275 
 
defendant completes the attendance centre order, he would still need to pay the 
confiscation order and any interest, and would still be liable to be sent to prison for non-
payment of the confiscation order.  The fact that an attendance centre order is specifically 
excluded for youths in the confiscation legislation1395 adds further weight to the argument 
that it is not a suitable alternative.   
7.3 Civil means of enforcement and confiscation orders 
There was a recommendation in the Working Group First Report that the Crown Court 
should elect the method by which a confiscation order should be enforced.1396  This 
chapter analyses the alternatives to the default term which are suitable for the 
enforcement of a confiscation order and makes recommendations in relation to charging 
orders. 
7.3.1 An attachment of earnings order and an application for a deduction from benefits  
The magistrates’ court has the power to make an attachment of earnings order (AEO).1397  
Although there are limited powers to make an order before default1398 normally the court 
will make the order when the defendant is in default. The information about the 
defendant’s employment can come from him directly, or information can be requested 
from Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs in order for the court to make a decision 
whether or not to make the AEO.1399  
The amount which can be deducted from a defendant’s salary is set by legislation.1400  
The defendant has to earn a minimum amount before a deduction can be made,  which is 
set as a percentage which rises with the amount of income.  For example, a defendant 
with a monthly salary exceeding £1,040 but not exceeding £1480 a month, would have 17 
 
1395 POCA 2002, s 35 (3)(b). 
1396 Working Group First Report (n 137) 8-9. 
1397 The powers to make an attachment of earnings order are contained in the Courts Act 2003, 
sch 5 and the fines officer has the power to make the application if there is a collection order. 
1398 If there is a collection order and the defendant requests it, Courts Act 2003, sch 5 parts 3, 6. 
1399 Courts Act 2003, sch 5 para 9A. 
1400 The Fines Collection Regulations 2006, SI 2006/501, part 3.  
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per cent of their salary deducted, and 17 per cent of £1400 is £238 a month.  For an 
income of more than £1480, the percentage deduction is 17 percent for the first £1480 
and then 50% for the remaining income.   
Confiscation orders are usually for relatively large sums and interest accrues once time for 
payment has expired and would continue to accrue whilst the AEO is in force. The 
magistrates’ court would therefore have to determine what would be a reasonable period 
to receive the full payment of the confiscation order including interest. It is the experience 
of the research author that an AEO is only suitable prior to the default sentence being 
served if the defendant has received a non-custodial sentence for the offence which 
attracted the confiscation order and the order is for a small amount.  However, in practice 
this is not usually a suitable alternative to the default term as it would take an 
unreasonably long time to pay the order and the interest accruing can be higher than the 
amount paid.  Not only would interest accrue while the AEO is in force, which on a large 
confiscation order can be substantial, if the attachment of earnings order fails then there 
may be a delay in the enforcement of the order.  Any assets identified at the Crown Court 
could be dissipated and a lengthy delay may preclude further enforcement.   Based on the 
practical experience of the research author this is more likely to be an option for the court 
after the default sentence has been served if there are no other means of enforcement. 
Similar issues apply to applications for a deduction from benefit order.  The application is 
made to the Secretary of State for the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) for a 
deduction from the defendant’s benefits. The grounds for making an application for a 
deduction from benefits are very similar to an attachment of earnings order1401 Deductions 
can be made from income support, universal credit, state pension credit, jobseeker’s 
allowance or employment and support allowance1402 and the rates of deductions are 
governed by statute but if there are already deductions being taken from the benefit by the 
 
1401 The court and the fines officer have the same powers under the Courts Act 2003, sch 5 but the 
court also has a power in the Criminal Justice Act 1991, s 24. 
1402 The Fines (Deductions from Income Support) Regulations 1992, SI 1992/2182, reg 2. 
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DWP, the court may receive a very small amount relative to the amount of the confiscation 
order.  For example, if the defendant is receiving Universal Credit, the maximum amount 
which can be deducted is £108.35 per month,1403 but this depends on the amount 
received by the defendant in benefit, in practice it could be a lot less.  If the court applies 
for a deduction from benefit order, interest will still accrue and will be paid over a lengthy 
period of time.  It is likely to be even less suitable for the enforcement of a confiscation 
order prior to the default term than an AEO and in practice tends to be used after the 
default term has been served and there are no other means of enforcing the order. Even 
then it will take a long time to satisfy the order and given the interest rate of 8% per 
annum, may not even cover the interest which is accruing.     
7.3.2 Warrant of control (formerly known as a distress warrant) 
There are limited powers for the magistrates’ court to make an order for a defendant’s 
assets to be seized and sold to pay a confiscation order.  The main one is the power to 
issue a warrant of control which until 6 April 2014 was known as a distress warrant.1404   
There are references in case law and commentaries to distress warrants and any 
references to warrants of control in this research also apply to distress warrants and vice 
versa.   
The law in relation to a warrant of control is governed by Part 3 and Schedule 12 of the 
TCEA 2007, along with the associated Regulations,1405 and the Criminal Procedure 
Rules.1406 A warrant of control gives an enforcement agent1407 rights to enter property and 
seize and sell goods to pay the confiscation order, or enter into a controlled goods 
agreement which allows the defendant to keep the goods but subject to agreeing not to 
 
1403 Fines (Deductions from Income Support) Regulations 1992, SI 1992/2182, reg 4(1B). 
1404 The name was changed with the introduction of the relevant provisions of the Tribunals, 
Courts and Enforcement Act (TCEA) 2007, s 62. 
1405 The Taking Control of Goods Regulations 2013, SI 2013/1894 and The Taking Control of Goods 
(Fees) Regulations 2014, SI 2014/1. 
1406 CrimPR Part 30. 
1407 Formerly known as a bailiff. 
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dispose of or sell the goods until the debt is paid.1408  Certain goods are exempt and 
cannot be taken and sold, for example goods needed for the defendant’s employment or 
business up to a value of £1350, and goods to meet the basic domestic needs of the 
defendant and their family.1409 Goods that are taken can be sold by the Enforcement 
Agent by public auction, or another method authorised by the magistrates’ court.1410 There 
are fees and disbursements which can apply, which the defendant must pay before 
anything is paid towards the confiscation order, and the fees are set by the 
Regulations.1411 
Key frustrations amongst police and CPS in 2012 were the fact that defendants were not 
obliged to sign consent forms to allow assets to be sold to satisfy the confiscation order1412 
and that the legislation does not require assets to be identified or allow them to be sold to 
satisfy the confiscation order.  These concerns were met in part by the only other option 
for selling assets available to the magistrates’ court which were brought about by changes 
to POCA 2002 brought into force in 2015. The new provisions provide that if there is a 
restraint order in force items seized under another power can be retained even after the 
original power has ceased to exist.1413  In addition, changes were made to allow for the 
search, seizure, detention and sale of property that could be disposed of or diminished in 
value and which could be used to satisfy a confiscation order that has been made or may 
be made in the future.1414   
However, these new powers depend on an application to the court, for example by the 
prosecutor or financial investigator1415 whereas a warrant of control can be issued by the 
court of its own volition.  Therefore, a warrant of control is an essential power of the 
 
1408 TCEA 2007, sch 12 para 13. 
1409 The Taking Control of Goods Regulations 2013, SI 2013/1894, reg 4. 
1410 The Taking Control of Goods Regulations 2013, SI 2013/1894, reg 41. 
1411 The Taking Control of Goods (Fees) Regulations 2014, SI 2014/1. 
1412 Brown and others (n 173) 13. 
1413 POCA 2002 s 41A. 
1414 POCA 2002, ss 47A-47S, 67A-67D.  
1415 POCA 2002, ss 47M(3), 67A. 
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magistrates’ court, although one can only be issued by the magistrates’ court once time 
for payment has expired.1416   
A warrant of control is issued by the magistrates’ court using their standard enforcement 
powers under section 76 MCA 1980, which can take effect immediately; or it can be 
postponed for the defendant to pay as ordered by the court.1417 If the warrant is 
suspended it is similar to a suspended warrant of commitment (or default term) as the 
warrant of control could be suspended to pay in full by a certain date, or by instalments.  
For example, the issue of the warrant could be postponed for the defendant to pay in full 
within 14 days.  If the defendant does not pay as ordered then the warrant of control will 
be issued.  Unlike the activation of the default term, there is no requirement for a further 
appearance by the defendant or a further inquiry into means before the warrant of control 
is issued.  However, in practice a suspended warrant of control is rarely ordered, and 
usually a warrant of control takes effect immediately. 
In practice, warrants of control are used frequently for the enforcement of confiscation 
orders, but time for payment has to expire before a warrant can be issued, meaning there 
is a delay between the confiscation order being made at the Crown Court and the warrant 
issued in the magistrates’ court.  Because time for payment has expired interest accrues 
until the goods are sold so the sale will need to cover the interest as well.  
The use of warrants of control has been identified in previous research as useful for items 
suitable for quick and inexpensive means of realisation such as motor vehicles and 
jewellery1418 and in practice, if the defendant has realisable assets then the warrant is a 
useful tool for the magistrates’ court.  It is often a suitable alternative for the court to 
consider prior to the default term being activated, depending on the amount of the 
 
1416 MCA 1980, s 76. 
1417 MCA 1980, s77. 
1418 Sutherland Williams, Hopmeier and Jones (n 58) 284. If there is a collection order in force, a 
clamping order gives the right of the clamping contractor to apply to the magistrates’ court for an 
order to sell the vehicle but this power is rarely used in practice.   
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confiscation order and the value of the available assets. However, the court can also issue 
a warrant after the default term has been activated.   
The enforcement agent can seize and sell any goods that are not exempt, whether they 
have been identified as an asset at the Crown Court or not.  If the asset has been 
identified at the Crown Court it will have had a value put on it, but because of any delay in 
selling the item, it may not be sold for the value placed on it when the confiscation order 
was made.  If the defendant does not have any other assets, then it can lead to an 
application by the defendant to vary the confiscation order downwards.1419  Despite any 
limitations, a warrant of control is a useful enforcement action for the magistrates’ court 
and can be used as an alternative to activating the default term, although it cannot be 
used for monies in bank accounts or where the asset is a house.   
7.3.3 Enforcement in the High Court or County Court which includes an application for a 
third party debt order, a charging order or an order for sale. 
In order for a confiscation order to be enforced in the High Court or county court the 
confiscation order is treated as if it is due to the designated officer for the magistrates’ 
court1420 and an application cannot be made until the time for payment granted by the 
Crown Court has expired.1421  
The powers to make an application to the High Court or county court to enforce a 
confiscation order (and any other financial penalty enforced in the magistrates’ court) are 
contained in section 87 of the MCA 1980 but not all of the enforcement powers in the High 
Court or county court are available as an enforcement action to the magistrates’ court.1422   
Where a confiscation order is not paid as ordered, the designated officer can make an 
application to the county court without any further reference to the magistrates’ court.  
 
1419 POCA 2002, s 23.   
1420 MCA 1980, s 87(1). 
1421 POCA 2002 s11. 




There is no requirement for a means inquiry by the magistrates’ court to see if the 
defendant has the means to pay forthwith before an application to the county court can be 
made in relation to a confiscation order, because section 87(3) MCA 1980 is disapplied in 
relation to confiscation enforcement.1423  The effect of this is that if there is no collection 
order in force a means inquiry is not required before the designated officer applies to the 
county court.1424  This takes out a step in the enforcement process in the magistrates’ 
court internal process, but does not assist when the application is made by the designated 
officer in the county court.  The designated officer is the office holder who makes the 
application1425 and is treated like every other judgment creditor. 
The common applications made by the designated officer are third party debt order, 
charging order and order for sale applications, although they are not widely used because 
of the issues involved.1426  Third party debt orders have already been analysed and 
compared to payment orders1427 and applications for charging orders are considered next. 
7.4 Applications for Charging Orders by the designated officer-the legislative 
background 
There is a power in the pre-POCA 2002 legislation for charging orders to be made in the 
High Court1428 but there is no power for the Crown Court to make a charging order in 
POCA 2002.  The power to apply for a charging order in relation to a confiscation order is 
by the designated officer1429 making an application to the High Court or county court. 
 
1423 DTOA 1986, s 6(4); CJA 1988 s 75(5); DTA 1994, s 9(4); POCA 2002, s 35(3). 
1424 If a collection order is in force then the fines officer would need to conduct a means inquiry 
and find that the defendant has the means to pay forthwith, MCA 1980, s 87(3A).  However, as 
collection orders are not used widely in relation to confiscation orders, Lawson (n 1242), the 
applicant is likely to be the designated officer for the magistrates’ court and this thesis 
concentrates on applications made without a collection order. 
1425 Krager (n 1240). 
1426 Brown and others (n 173) 13; Joint Thematic Review (n 3) 44. 
1427 In chapter 5, text to n 1026-n 1146.   
1428 DTOA 1986, s 7, CJA 1988, s 76 as amended, and DTA 1994, s 25. 
1429 MCA 1980, s 87. 
282 
 
Unless otherwise noted, this chapter analyses the process for applying for a charging 
order in relation to land which includes a house.  This is because an application in relation 
to land is the most common form of charging order generally1430 and, in relation to 
confiscation orders under the pre-POCA 2002 legislation, if charging orders were made at 
all, they were made in relation to land.1431  In addition, applications for charging orders in 
relation to houses have been made by HMCTS and are reviewed in this chapter.  As in 
the rest of the thesis, the process will describe the relevant provisions of POCA 2002 
unless other information is relevant. 
7.4.1 Charging orders: the background 
The Charging Orders Act 1979 makes provision for imposing charges (a charging order) 
to secure payment of monies under judgments or orders of court, to restrain and prohibit 
dealings with certain securities and for making payments in respect of those securities.1432 
A charging order can be made in relation to land, certain securities1433 and funds in court 
and the charge can be extended to any interest or dividend in relation to the asset.1434  
The appropriate court to hear the application in relation to financial penalties enforced by 
the designated officer using powers given under section 87 of the MCA 1980 will be the 
High Court or county court.  The designated officer is deemed to be a judgment creditor 
and the defendant a judgment debtor, as a result the designated officer is in the same 
position as any other judgment creditor with the same rights and responsibilities.1435  This 
means that the designated officer for the magistrates’ court must first complete the same 
forms as anyone else in the same position.  They must apply to register the debt1436 and 
 
1430 Vos (n 1126) vol 1, 2190. 
1431 Mitchell Taylor and Talbot vol 1, para 3.061 (R0: February 2002). 
1432 Charging Orders Act 1979, preamble and s1. 
1433 Government stock, stock of an incorporated body in England and Wales other than a building 
society, stock registered in England and Wales even if the body is incorporated outside of England 
and Wales, and unit trusts if the register is kept within England and Wales Charging Orders Act 
1979, s 2(2)(b). 
1434 Charging Orders Act 1979, ss 2(2)(c), 3. 
1435 Gooch v Ewing (Allied Irish Bank Ltd., Garnishee) [1986] QB 791 (CA). 
1436 using form N322B, 70 PD 4.1. 
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apply for an interim charging order.1437 They must also do all the relevant land registry 
checks paying the necessary fees to them as well as paying the relevant fees to the 
county court.  
Most applications for charging orders are made to the county court1438 and the 
applications are governed by the Civil Procedure Rules and associated Practice 
Direction.1439  An official copy from the Land Registry is often used as evidence of 
ownership of the property1440 which can be obtained from the land registry for a fee.  
Unlike a charging order in the pre-POCA 2002 legislation, the charging order is not made 
in the value of the property from time to time, subject to the value of the confiscation 
order, but the value of the confiscation order plus interest.  In practice this means that the 
charge secures the value of the debt even if the amount recoverable will be less than that.  
For example, there could be a £1 million confiscation order, and the charging order will be 
made in that amount, even if the property is only worth £250,000.  A charging order in 
relation to land gives the judgment creditor security equivalent to a mortgage over the land 
but is subject to any prior mortgage or charge.1441  It does not stop the person subject to 
the charge taking steps to sell the property but it does mean that the designated officer 
must be notified of the sale as there will be a restriction or notice registered at the Land 
Registry.  As such it has been described as an ‘indirect method of enforcement’1442 
because it merely secures the debt it does not satisfy it.  Therefore, like a restraint order 
its description as an enforcement power could be seen as a misnomer.1443 
When an application is made, the county court will consider the personal circumstances of 
the debtor, and whether any other creditor of the debtor would be likely to be unduly 
 
1437 using form N379, 73 PD 1.1. 
1438 Lord Neuberger and others, (eds), The Civil Court Practice 2018 (LexisNexis Butterworths 
2018) Procedural Tables, Table 30 para 3. 
1439 CPR Part 73 and Practice Direction 73. 
1440 Lord Neuberger and others (n 1438) Procedural Tables, Table 30, para 5. 
1441 ibid vol 1, 2362. 
1442 ibid vol 1, 2362. 
1443 Confiscation is often described as a misnomer, text to n 470-n 473.   
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prejudiced by the making of the order, before deciding whether to make a charging 
order.1444  There is no right to a charging order as it is discretionary,1445 but the court will 
take into account all the relevant circumstances1446 and a judgment creditor should expect 
that an order will be made unless the judgment debtor can persuade the court that in all 
the circumstances of the case an order should not be made.1447  Because the debt is a 
confiscation order the county court must take into account the legislative steer contained 
in section 69 POCA 2002 which applies to charging order applications made by the 
designated officer to the magistrates’ court.1448  If there is a restraint order in force, the 
county court must give the person who applied for the restraint order and any receiver the 
opportunity to be heard before staying the proceedings or allowing them to continue.1449 
There are also general principles about charging orders that are relevant to applications 
made in relation to unpaid confiscation orders.  There are no rules or presumptions in 
relation to the amount of the debt as compared to the value of the property subject to an 
application for enforcement in the High Court or county court.1450 When an argument was 
advanced that an order for sale should not be made because the size of the debt was 
small compared to the value of the property (the debt was £35,000 and the value of the 
property was more than £15 million) it was held that the disparity in itself was not a reason 
for not granting the order and these are only two factors to be taken into account along 
with the absence of enforcement actions and the conduct of the parties.1451 The argument 
 
1444 Charging Orders Act 1979, s 1(5)(a)-(b). 
1445 Vos (n 1126) vol 1, 2194. 
1446 Charging Orders Act 1979, s 1(5). 
1447 First National Securities Ltd v Hegerty and another [1985] QB 850 (HL).  
1448 The legislative steer means that any powers must be exercised with a view to making the 
value of realisable property available to satisfy any confiscation order that has or may be made.   
1449 POCA 2002, s 58(5)-(6). Since the changes to POCA 2002 made by the SCA 2015, the county 
court is also bound by any determination made by the Crown Court under s10A POCA 2002.  The 
rights of third parties will be taken into account and if there was no determination under section 
10A this could involve the re-litigation of issues already subject to hearings at the Crown Court in 
either the confiscation order hearing or any hearings in relation to restraint.   
1450 Vos (n 1126) vol 1, 2202. 
1451 Packman Lucas Limited v Mentmore Towers Limited and Charles Street Holdings Limited 
[2010] EWHC 1037 (TCC). 
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that the greater the value of the property, the greater the chance that the defendant would 
avoid a charging order or order for sale ‘offends common sense’.1452 
7.4.2 Discharge or variation 
A charging order can be varied or discharged, but the application must be made to the 
court which made the charging order.1453   
7.4.3 Enforcement of a charging order 
A charging order made in the county court or High Court is enforced by an application for 
an order for sale.1454  If the charging order has been made in favour of the designated 
officer for the magistrates’ court then they will be the applicant for the order for sale. 
However, a charging order is a security of the debt and like any other asset, the defendant 
does not have to sell the property to satisfy the confiscation order.  Nor does the 
designated officer have to apply for an order for sale before the magistrates’ court can 
consider whether or not to activate the default term.  This will depend on the facts of each 
case as the onus is on the defendant to satisfy the order, even where there is a restraint 
order in force.1455  When the confiscation order plus interest and costs are paid in full, the 




1452 ibid [26] (Coulson J). 
1453 CPR 73.10B.  
1454 CPR 73.10C. The enforcement of a charging order is by a claim for an order for sale of the 
property subject to the charging order.  If the charging order was made at the County Court 
Money Claims Centre the claim must be made to the judgment debtor’s home court or if it was 
not made at the CCMCC, the court which made the charging order, unless the court does not have 
jurisdiction to hear it CPR 73.10C(2)-(3).  The court has a discretion whether or not to order the 
sale and an order for sale is viewed as a draconian step, Vos (n 1126), vol 1, 2203.    
1455 Popoola (n 1198). 
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7.5 Applications for Charging Orders by the designated officer-in practice  
Some of the review documents have considered the powers of the magistrates’ court to 
make an application for a charging order, or third party debt order1456 which is similar in 
practice. The Working Group Third Report saw scope for the increased use of charging 
orders in the pre-POCA 2002 legislation by making a recommendation that would give 
what is now the designated officer1457 the power to apply for a charging order and a 
receiver to enforce the order in the county or High Court.  The power to apply was seen as 
necessary otherwise the magistrates’ court had no power to enforce a confiscation order 
against a property.1458  Running alongside this was a recommendation that they should be 
able to deduct their costs from the confiscation order monies in the same way that a 
receiver does.1459   
The Working Group Third Report also made recommendations to improve the way in 
which applications for garnishee orders were made, in part because it found that 
applications are not made in practice because of the costs involved.1460  The 
recommendations in the Third Report do not address the difficulties in the county court 
identified by the Working Group First Report that justices’ clerks were reluctant to apply 
for those orders because the process is ‘tortuous’ and costly.1461  The process for a 
charging order is similar to the process for applying for a third party debt order, and it is 
the experience of the research author that the findings of the Working Group First Report 
still apply to both types of application.   
There was a recommendation in the Third Report for the designated officer to apply for a 
charging order in the county court or High Court using the pre-POCA 2002 legislation, 
 
1456 Third party debt orders replaced garnishee orders on 25 March 2002.  Some of the review 
documents refer to garnishee orders.  
1457 Some of the review documents refer to applications made by the justices’ clerk.  This role is 
now undertaken by the designated officer, n 22. 
1458 Working Group Third Report (n 126) 2.37. 
1459 ibid 2.33-2.37. 
1460 ibid 2.33-2.36. 
1461 Working Group First Report (n 137) 8.  
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however it is submitted that would create the same practical issues as applying in those 
courts using Part 3 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 in relation to costs and re-
litigation.  Instead it is recommended that a change in the legislation should be introduced 
to allow the Crown Court to make a confiscation charging order, if necessary to be 
enforced by the designated officer, which would better meet the issues involved. The 
process for applying for a charging order using the magistrates’ court’s fines based 
powers has not changed, and although a review of applications made by HMCTS show 
that although the difficulties still exist, the benefits of the charging order process should be 
considered further. 
7.5.1 Support for the use of charging orders 
The use of charging orders was not only suggested by the Working Group Third Report 
but is supported by other review documents that have considered the issue since 2002.  
In 2010, it was reported that the use of what was referred to as ‘civil enforcement powers’, 
for example charging orders and orders for sale, had not been taken up universally.  Cost 
was seen as a barrier and lessons learned were being shared.1462 
In 2012 Brown et al reported that the use of charging orders, such as those applied for by 
HMCTS, were seen by interviewees as an effective means of enforcement that had not 
been ‘satisfied through the standard enforcement process’.1463 They also identified that the 
use of what were referred to as ‘civil enforcement powers’ which included ‘charging orders 
against the home’ sent out a powerful message to communities and could improve 
community confidence.1464  The NAO Report recommended that the current enforcement 
options should be reviewed and the introduction of wider powers such as charging orders 
should be considered.1465  However, none of these review documents considered the 
difficulties encountered by the designated officer when applying to the county court.  It is 
 
1462 Joint Thematic Review (n 3) 44. 
1463 Brown and others (n 173) 13. 
1464 ibid 13. 
1465 NAO Report (n 71) 9. 
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within the knowledge of the research author that HMCTS does have some experience of 
making such applications and that the difficulties highlighted in the First and Third Working 
Group Reports still exist. 
Charging orders were not included in POCA 2002 because they were used rarely in 
relation to confiscation, and if at all, in relation to land, which includes a house.1466  It was 
felt that the property that could be made subject to a charging order could also be made 
subject to a restraint order or enforced in some other way and so they were not 
needed.1467  Given the analysis of charging orders in this chapter, the analysis of charging 
orders under the pre-POCA 2002 legislation, and the use of restraint with associated 
issues, it is recommended that the time has come to revisit the decision made when 
POCA 2002 was introduced.1468   This would help to ‘redress the balance in favour of the 
authorities’.1469 
7.5.2 A review of applications made for charging orders made by HMCTS in 2012 
The experience of the research author supports the findings of the review documents that 
the magistrates’ court does not have a lot of experience in applying for charging orders 
but expertise is needed.1470  However, in 2012 HMCTS obtained a number of charging 
orders in relation to unpaid confiscation orders which was based on work by the North 
East Regional Confiscation Unit which had led the way in making these applications.1471 
These cases have been chosen for analysis in this thesis because they formed a discreet 
group of applications for which data was available and are within the knowledge of the 
research author through her employment. 
 
1466 Mitchell Taylor and Talbot vol 1, para 3.061 (R0: February 2002). 
1467 Proceeds of Crime Bill: Publication of Draft Clauses (n 31) para 2.13. 
1468 The provisions were included in the original draft of the Bill, but subsequently removed. 
1469 NAO Progress Report (n 367) 30. 
1470 Brown and others (n 173) 14. 
1471 Saieed Kazi ‘Civil Enforcement of Confiscation Orders-The North East Regional Confiscation 
Unit Pilot’ [2011] (6) Proceeds of Crime Review: The Journal of Asset Forfeiture and Money 
Laundering 10, 10.   
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In all cases, HMCTS was the lead agency; the asset was a house which had been 
identified as an asset when the confiscation order was made at the Crown Court; and the 
defendant was named as the sole or a joint owner.  Even though the asset had been 
identified as belonging to the defendant at the Crown Court, HMCTS had to in effect start 
again by making an enquiry with the Land Registry.  As the designated officer for the 
magistrates’ court is treated as a judgment creditor, the matter had to be re-litigated in the 
county court.  This means that the debt had to be registered with the county court and the 
application made for the charging order.  The forms had to be completed and submitted 
along with the appropriate fee; and the Land Registry and land title fees had to be paid. 
All the applications were initially made at Leeds County Court and the total number of final 
charging order applications made as part of this process was 95, including those dealt 
with on a contested basis.  However, in some cases there was more than one order per 
defendant because the defendant owned more than one property.  
The amount of the debt (including interest) covered by the charging orders was 
£3,724,269.51 and the total costs awarded in favour of the designated officer for the 
magistrates’ court was £28,753.00. HMCTS legal and administrative teams worked on the 
applications, but there were further costs involved as HMCTS paid for external 
representation for cases which were transferred to another court or contested. 
The financial costs to HMCTS can be quantified, but there were other costs.  Resources 
were used by HMCTS and it estimates that the average case took 1¼ hours of legal 
adviser time and 2½ hours of administrative time up to the point when the order was 
granted.  This does not include the time taken to review the case on JARD to identify 
whether the case was suitable for a charging order, or any work undertaken after the 
charging order was granted.1472  Nor does it include the time taken by those representing 
HMCTS on cases which were transferred or contested. 
 
1472 Which includes registering the charging order at the Land Registry. 
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The financial costs to HMCTS were as follows: the cost of each application to the county 
court was £100, the cost of the official copy of the Land Registry was £4.00, and the fee 
for the registration of the interim order at the Land Registry was £50.00; a total of an 
additional £154.00 per property. The costs to HMCTS of obtaining external representation 
at the transferred or contested hearings including fees, disbursements and VAT were 
£7,782.00. 
HMCTS has not applied for orders for sale in relation to any of these charging orders to 
enforce them.  Either the properties have been sold or the orders satisfied and the 
charging orders removed and as a result, substantial amounts have been collected.  By 
February 2013, the amount collected as a result of the charging orders was £357,996 in 
relation to the outstanding confiscation orders and £2,038.00 in relation to the costs 
awarded.  By 31 March 2015 this had increased to £928,680.68 in relation to the 
confiscation orders, and £8,699.00 in relation to the costs.  On 20 April 2017 this had 
increased again to £1,794,167.91 paid in relation to the confiscation orders and £9,013.00 
in relation to the costs. 
In practice the difficulties involved in applying for charging orders in the county court first 
identified in 1991 in the Working Group First Report still exist and the financial and 
resource costs involved are not the only issue.  The applications in 2012 involved a re-
litigation and generated queries and objections from defendants and third parties,1473 
which it is submitted are best placed to be decided within the confiscation order 
proceedings in the Crown Court.   The applications show a need for experience of the 
county court law, practice and procedure1474 which is different to that of the magistrates’ 
court. The process is complex and it is argued, puts the magistrates’ court at a 
disadvantage.  The designated officer has to apply to the county court for enforcement, 
rather than to the Crown Court as the prosecutor now does when the confiscation order is 
made under POCA 2002 and so is the opposite of the one stop shop envisaged when 
 
1473 Kazi (n 1471) 13. 
1474 ibid 13-14; Brown and others (n 173) 14. 
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POCA 2002 was introduced.  If the prosecutor wants to apply for a restraint order or a 
receiver where the asset is a house, they apply to the Crown Court which has already 
determined the confiscation issues.  There is no re-litigation on those points, nor does the 
prosecutor have to pay a fee to apply or prove the debt before the application can be 
heard.   
When the applications were made, the county court had to hear information already put 
before the Crown Court.  This involved a re-litigation of the issues in the county court.  At 
the county court the designated officer is treated as any other judgment creditor and had 
to pay the relevant fees and prove the debt before the application can be made.  If the 
house has been identified as an asset in the Crown Court then the judge would have all 
the information needed to make a charging order, a point Gardner made in relation to 
payment orders in 2009.1475 
Like other aspects of the confiscation regime, it does not seem fair that the legislation 
allows the Crown Court to identify assets and determine shares in property and requires it 
to hand over the enforcement of the order to the magistrates’ court without the powers to 
enforce against the asset. The magistrates’ court has to use fines based powers when it 
was envisaged that applications for charging orders would be dealt with in the confiscation 
proceedings, leaving the fines based powers for less complex cases.1476 The applications 
for charging orders in 2012 show that the orders can be effective, but in practice the 
process is as ‘tortuous’ now as when the Working Group Reports were written despite 
changes to the Civil Procedure Rules.  There is therefore a need for an effective 
alternative.  
7.5.3 Changes in procedure since 2012 
Since applications were made on behalf of the magistrates’ court in 2012, the Civil 
Procedure Rules have changed and applications for a charging order in these 
 
1475 Gardner (n 1101) 93.   
1476 'The UK Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986' (n 17) 1632. 
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circumstances must be made to the County Court Money Claims Centre.1477  However, 
HMCTS would still have to register the judgment debt in a county court before using the 
expedited process for the charging order application and pay all the appropriate fees 
which in 2012 were £100 and are now £110 per application.1478  
An application for an interim charging order now will be dealt with without a hearing1479 
and if the application is over an interest in land, may be dealt with by a court officer1480 
unless the court officer decides that it should be dealt with by the judge or unless any of 
the other criteria in Civil Procedure Rule 73.4(4) apply.1481 An application can be made for 
the decision to be reconsidered by a district judge, although again this would be without a 
hearing.1482  The court officer can make the interim charging order or a judge can make 
the interim order and transfer the decision whether to make a final charging order to the 
home court of the judgment debtor.1483 On 1 August 2018 a pilot was started which applies 
to charging orders made at the County Court Money Claims Centre (CCMCC).  In the pilot 
any unopposed charging order made at the CCMCC can be made by a legal adviser.1484 
Whether or not there is a decision to transfer the final hearing, or a legal adviser makes an 
uncontested final order, HMCTS would still have to take steps which have already been 
taken for the confiscation order.  For example, the designated officer has to serve the 
interim order and any documents for the final hearing on the judgment debtor and anyone 
else covered by the Rules, which includes any co-owner of the land; the spouse or civil 
 
1477 CPR 73.3(2). 
1478 Civil Proceedings Order 2008, sch 1 Fee 7.3(b). 
1479 CPR 73.4(2). 
1480 CPR 73.4(3). 
1481 The order may be made by the court officer unless any of the following apply: ‘(a) an 
application under section 2(1)(b)(i) of the 1979 Act; (b) an application for a charging order on the 
interest of a partner in the partnership property under section 23 of the Partnership Act 1890; (c) 
where an instalment order has been made before 1 October 2012; (d) where the court officer 
otherwise considers that the application should be dealt with by a judge.’ CPR 73.4(3)-(4). 
1482 CPR 73.5. 
1483 CPR 73.4. 
1484  51T PD.  This pilot will run from 1 August 2018 until 1 April 2020. 
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partner of the judgment debtor if those details are known; or anyone else as directed by 
the court, and provide a certificate of service to the court in accordance with the Rules.1485 
7.5.4 Would the use of charging orders improve the enforcement of confiscation orders 
and meet the purposes of the regime? 
Figures have been obtained from HMCTS about the number of houses that may be 
available for a charging order in HMCTS led cases.1486 This has been taken from JARD 
which is dependent on law enforcement agencies updating results.1487  Therefore, 
information may be out of date and the property may no longer be owned by the 
defendant.1488  As a result, the information must be viewed with caution but shows a large 
number of orders where buildings or land are available as an asset on imposition where 
HMCTS is the lead agency.  The figures would need more in-depth analysis to see if a 
charging order would be appropriate but do identify cases where a charging order could 
be considered at the Crown Court in HMCTS led cases. 
Like applications for third party debt and payment orders1489  the Crown Court would have 
the information required for a charging order if the asset identified is a house.  As a result, 
any applications for a charging order by the designated officer involves a re-litigation.  The 
designated officer must also pay the same fees to the High Court and county court as any 
other applicant.  The fee for a charging order application is now £110.1490  
The fact that the designated officer has to apply to the county court for a charging order is 
the opposite of the one stop shop for confiscation at the Crown Court envisaged by the 
 
1485 CPR 73.7. 
1486 Figures obtained from HMCTS show that there were 1006 confiscation orders made between 
2013 and 2017 which were outstanding as at 13 April 2017 in which HMCTS is the lead agency and 
a building or land was identified as an asset at the Crown Court.  The value of these orders, 
including interest, is £190,948,722.56.  As outlined this is the value of the confiscation order, not 
necessarily the property so even if charging orders were obtained it does not mean that they 
would satisfy the whole amount of the confiscation order. 
1487 Asset Recovery Statistical Bulletin 2011/12-2016/17 (n 28) 11. 
1488 HMCTS has to make its own enquiries and over and above the information on JARD. 
1489 Gardner (n 1101) 93.   
1490 Civil Proceedings Order 2008, sch 1 Fee 7.3(b). 
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introduction of POCA 2002.  The confiscation process, including enforcement should be 
as ‘simple, predictable and effective as possible’.1491 The use of the fines based powers of 
the magistrates’ court to apply for charging orders is anything but simple.  However, the 
benefits of the applications made in 2012 show an increase in collection rates.  If charging 
orders could be applied for more easily by the designated officer, their use would improve 
the enforcement of confiscation orders and meet the purposes of the regime including 
ensuring that all confiscation orders are enforced, as well as increasing collections and 
allowing disruption to be measured.   
The applications made by HMCTS in 2012 show that charging orders do bring in monies 
owed but the process for the designated officer making applications in the county court or 
High Court are as difficult now as they were when the Working Group Reports were 
written.  It is recommended that the pre-POCA 2002 powers to make a charging order in 
the Crown Court are reconsidered and updated.  They are compared with the powers for 
the designated officer to apply for a charging order in the next section. 
7.6 A comparison of the charging order provisions 
Before the magistrates’ court can apply for a charging order in the county court, time for 
payment has to expire which means that the asset can be dissipated.   This is unlike the 
charging order made in the High Court under the pre-POCA 2002 legislation which could 
be made at the same stages in the confiscation proceedings that a restraint order could, 
that is proceedings have started.1492  When applying to the High Court or county court for 
a charging order, the designated officer does not have to prove dissipation before 
applying as it is an enforcement action.  The order can be enforced by the designated 
officer making an application for an order for sale. 
A charging order in the pre-POCA 2002 legislation is a direct alternative to a restraint 
order and so there has to be a risk of dissipation of assets before an order can be made.  
 
1491 Ahmad and Ahmed (n 12) [38]. 
1492 DTOA 1986, s 7, CJA 1988, s 76, and DTA 1994, s 25.  Although grounds have to be satisfied.    
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The legislative steer would apply in the same way as it does to a restraint order. A house 
has been found as particularly suitable for restraint1493 but there is a perceived reluctance 
to use restraint orders.1494  Therefore, it is suggested that an alternative enforcement 
power is required in the case of a house. 
A charging order made at the High Court under the pre-POCA 2002 legislation can be 
enforced by a receiver by an order for sale.  A receiver would be able to take fees and 
costs in the same way as one appointed to enforce a restraint order.  A charging order 
under the pre-POCA 2002 legislation is made to the value of the property from time to 
time, subject to the value of the confiscation order. It could be made absolutely or subject 
to conditions including notifying the person holding any interest in the property to which 
the order relates, or when the order was to come into effect or become enforceable.  
When applying to the High Court or county court for a charging order, the designated 
officer does not have to prove dissipation before applying as it is an enforcement action.  
The order can be enforced by the designated officer making an application for an order for 
sale. 
The advantage of reviewing the applications made by HMCTS in 2012 historically is that it 
shows how much has been collected without the need for any further enforcement action.  
A charging order is limited to the particular asset and is an indirect enforcement action.  
Therefore, it is suggested that it is less draconian and more proportionate than a restraint 
order.  Sutherland Williams et al and Mitchell et al considered that a charging order or 
restraint order would be sufficient to preserve the property and make it available to satisfy 
the confiscation order.1495  The fact that HMCTS did not need to apply for orders for sale 
 
1493 Bullock and others (n 29) 21. 
1494 Wood has called for empirical research into why this is the case, Wood, The Big Payback (n 5) 
5-6.  Even if restraint can be used, it is argued that there is still a need for an alternative where 
the asset is a house especially as an enforcement action after time for payment has expired and 
there is no risk of dissipation. 
1495 Sutherland Williams, Hopmeier and Jones only mention restraint (n 58) 69; Mitchell Taylor and 
Talbot mention both restraint and charging orders vol 1, para 3.063 (R0: February 2002).  
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to collect substantial sums of money shows that they were right and shows the 
effectiveness of the charging orders. 
Bringing these pre-POCA 2002 powers and the county court applications together, a 
recommendation is made that the Crown Court should be able to make a confiscation 
charging order under POCA 2002 in two scenarios.  One, as a direct alternative to 
restraint in the same situations as in POCA 2002, where there is a risk of dissipation.  This 
could be in the same terms as in the pre-POCA 2002 legislation.  The order should be 
capable of being suspended with the same powers of enforcement by a receiver by an 
order for sale. 
However, if there is no risk of dissipation, the Crown Court should be given the option of 
making a suspended confiscation charging order in favour of the designated officer.  This 
would be suspended until time for payment has expired when it would come into force 
unless the order is satisfied.  This echoes the recommendation in the Working Group First 
Report that the Crown Court should elect the method by which a confiscation order should 
be enforced1496 and would be akin to a compliance order which must be considered in 
every case.1497  It would also fit in with the one stop shop nature of the confiscation regime 
and would mean that if the order is not satisfied that the magistrates’ court has an indirect 
method of enforcing the order which will secure the property, and given the experiences of 
HMCTS will result in payment. The order should be capable of being enforced by the 
designated officer making an application for an order for sale which could be to the county 
court, as at the moment.  Given the experiences of the HMCTS applications made in 
2012, it is likely that the costs and fees will be less than that of a receiver.  Any 
applications to vary or discharge would be made to the Crown Court. 
A further recommendation is made that there could be a role for a compliance order if a 
suspended charging order is made.  The views of the prosecution should be sought to 
 
1496 Working Group First Report (n 137) 8-9. 
1497 A compliance order can be made in the Crown Court to ensure that a confiscation order is 
effective, POCA 2002, s 13A. 
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enquire whether a compliance order is needed at the Crown Court if there is a need to sell 
the property to satisfy the confiscation order as a compliance order could be made with a 
condition that the property is not to be sold without giving notice to the prosecution.  This 
could apply to third parties where there has been a determination under section 10A 
POCA 2002.  
If there is a restraint order and no receiver, the magistrates’ court can still enforce the 
confiscation order, including activating the default term but must give notice to the 
prosecutor.  Even if a receiver has been appointed, the court can still enforce and there is 
an onus on the defendant to pay the order, not to wait for others to enforce.1498 This is 
because there may be good reasons why enforcement by a receiver would not be 
appropriate, for example the costs of a receiver.  In addition, it is not necessary for the 
court to try other means of enforcement before activating the default term, but only to 
consider them,1499 although the appointment of a receiver is a consideration to be taken 
into account especially if the prosecutor is suggesting the appointment.1500  It is suggested 
that the same principles would apply if there is a charging order in force, and that the 
designated officer for the magistrates’ court would not necessarily have to enforce a 
charging order by way of an order for sale before the court could activate the default term.  
It would depend on the facts of each case. 
The proposals would also fit in with and support the new provisions introduced by the SCA 
2015 for different amounts to be given different time for payment. The amendments to the 
time for payment are not in themselves enough to ensure the confiscation order is paid 
and if the order is not paid within the time set by the Crown Court further enforcement is 
necessary.  In addition to setting the time for payment for the amount equivalent to the 
house as an asset, the Crown Court could make an immediate or suspended charging 
 
1498 Popoola (n 1198). 
1499 For example, On the application of Johnson (n 1198) [38]-[39].   
1500 Beach (n 1262). 
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order.  This would allow enforcement to begin as soon as an individual time for payment 
has expired where a house is an asset. 
A house could be identified as an asset after imposition and as part of the confiscation 
order process.  In this case the prosecutor could have the power to apply to the Crown 
Court for an order which would be enforceable by a receiver or designated officer 
depending on whether there is a risk of dissipation of assets.  In either case the charge 
could be made in favour of the Crown where there is a risk of dissipation, as under the 
pre-POCA 2002 legislation. The Crown Court could then appoint a receiver to enforce the 
order. But in other cases, it could be made in favour of the designated officer who would 
then have the authority to enforce the order.   
The importance of the role of the prosecutor in the enforcement of an order with a 
charging order (and a restraint order) was identified in the Third Report which 
recommended that in such cases the prosecutor would be the lead agency. Therefore, if 
the recommendation to introduce a confiscation charging order is adopted then the lead 
agency would be determined at the stage when the charging order is made.  It would be 
the prosecutor if there is a risk of dissipation, or HMCTS if the charging order is to come 
into force when time for payment expires.   
These proposals would mean that the agencies would have to work together, which 
should happen in any event.  Like restraint a charging order is not a direct method of 
enforcement, it secures the debt.  Unlike a restraint order, a charge does not prevent a 
defendant or third party from dealing with the property, but it requires them to notify the 
person who has the charge of the sale in accordance with any restriction or notice.  As 
such it is less draconian and more proportionate than a restraint order and would be an 
effective alternative to restraint. 
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The Crown Court would have to put all the orders on the Forms 5050 and 5050A so that 
the magistrates’ court is aware of the orders and the assets.1501  In the case of a charging 
order, this means that the charging order can be registered at the Land Registry as soon 
as time for payment expires. 
7.7 Conclusions of chapter 
Earlier chapters have established that civil means of enforcement are the only means of 
enforcing a confiscation order after the default sentence has been served, and need to be 
used to enforce interest which is no longer included in the calculation of the default term.  
The only alternative is if the prosecution can apply to the Crown Court for an increase in 
the default term1502 but this happens rarely in practice.1503 
The default term should only be activated if there are no other options available and there 
is therefore a need for effective civil means of enforcement.  This chapter has analysed 
the alternatives to the default term which are suitable for the enforcement of a confiscation 
order.  Out of the current options a warrant of control is likely to be the most effective 
option.  However, this does not help if the asset identified is a house. In 1998 the Working 
Group Third Report recommended powers for the magistrates’ court to apply for charging 
orders, otherwise there are issues if the prosecution decide not to apply for a restraint or 
charging order1504 and it is the practical experience of the research author that a need for 
improvement still exists.   
There was a recommendation in the Working Group First Report that the Crown Court 
should elect the method by which a confiscation order should be enforced.1505  The 
 
1501 There is a need for these forms to be completed with care, Ghulam (n 702) [91]. 
1502 Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act 1990, s 15(2); CJA 1988, s 75A(2); DTA 1994 s 
10(2); POCA 2002, s 39(5).  
1503 Brown and others (n 173) 13. 
1504 Working Group Third Report (n 126) 2.37. 
1505 Working Group First Report (n 137) 8-9.  
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analysis in this chapter leads to the conclusion that the Crown Court should have that 
option available if the asset is a house. 
Although it involves a limited number of orders, the charging order applications made by 
HMCTS in 2012 gives some evidence to support a review of the law in relation to charging 
orders. The collection rates for confiscation orders where the charging orders were 
obtained by HMCTS are impressive but the process is tortuous and costly, is the opposite 
of the one stop shop envisaged when POCA 2002 was enacted.   
Therefore, it is recommended that the benefits of charging orders can be achieved without 
the burden falling on the designated officer for the magistrates’ court to make the 
application in the county court. Judges in the Crown Court are already used to making 
restraint orders and now have powers to make compliance orders and determinations 
under s 10A POCA 2002 and it is suggested that the power to make a confiscation 
charging order should also be added to their portfolio of orders.  This would require a 
change in the legislation including a change to the Criminal Procedure Rules but would fit 
in with the purposes of the regime including the specific purpose in POCA 2002 to create 




Chapter 8 Conclusions and Recommendations  
8.1 The research questions 
This thesis asks and answers two questions.  Firstly, how has the confiscation legislation 
developed in relation to the enforcement of confiscation orders in the magistrates’ court? 
Secondly, what future legislative amendments might assist the enforcement of 
confiscation orders by the magistrates’ court and create an alternative to restraint? 
In order to answer the questions, it has been necessary to review the nature and 
development of the confiscation legislation and its impact on the magistrates’ court.  It has 
also been necessary to analyse the enforcement provisions in the POCA 2002 and pre-
POCA 2002 legislation.  This coupled with the critical and doctrinal analysis of the 
confiscation and fines based powers of enforcement available to the magistrates’ court 
and the law of restraint, demonstrates the complex and cumbersome nature of the regime.  
The limited options available to the magistrates’ court where the order is not satisfied, and 
the asset identified is a house or a bank account have also been analysed. 
8.1.1 The development and nature of the regime 
If the first thing to be aware of when describing a confiscation order is that the term is a 
misnomer1506 then the second thing to be aware of is its complex nature.  The regime is 
acknowledged to be draconian although the overall scheme is ECHR compliant. However, 
any order must be proportionate, and the defendant’s article 6 and A1P1 rights must be 
considered on imposition and enforcement.1507     
Enforcement cannot be looked at in isolation and therefore the imposition of orders has 
been considered.  A confiscation order is made at the Crown Court, ancillary to sentence.  
It is a financial order made in the lesser of two figures, either the amount of the 
defendant’s benefit from crime, or the available amount.  The court will also set a default 
 
1506 Wood, Enforcing Criminal Confiscation Orders (n 2) 4. 
1507 These points are analysed in chapter 3, text to n 497-n 515. 
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term which the defendant is liable to serve if he does not pay in full.  Assets available to 
satisfy the order will be identified by the Crown Court in most cases and that information 
will be passed to the magistrates’ court which enforces the order.  Because of the nature 
of the order, other criminal agencies assist with the enforcement of orders, and will take 
the lead in some cases until the order is paid in full, or there is no further assistance they 
can give. 
The confiscation legislation has tightened the periods of time given to the defendant 
before the order has to be paid and interest accrues.  There have also been recent 
developments which means the Crown Court can also now make a compliance order, and 
a determination under s 10A POCA 2002 to determine a defendant’s share in an asset.   
8.1.2 The purpose of enforcing confiscation orders 
Despite the fact that the scheme has been in existence for over 30 years, there is still a 
lack of clarity about its purpose and aims.  This research found agreement about the main 
purpose, which is to ensure that crime does not pay, but a lack of agreement on other 
aims.  As a result, agencies and the government have found it difficult to assess the 
success of confiscation orders.  Great store has been set in the past in the collection 
rates, but these are difficult to assess.1508  The HAC 2016 Report concluded that both 
collection rates and disruption should be measures of success, acknowledging that the 
latter is difficult to measure.1509 
The success of any enforcement power must be measured against all the aims and 
purposes identified in this research.  All court orders must be enforced1510 and there must 
be efficient and effective methods of enforcement.1511  The purpose of activating the 
default term is not to punish the defendant but to ensure the order is paid.1512 This 
 
1508 Text to n 580-n 584 in chapter 3. 
1509 Text to n 590-n 597 in chapter 3. 
1510 MOJ and HMCTS, Written evidence to the HAC 2016 (n 25) para 22. This is within the 
knowledge of the research author.   
1511 Ahmad and Ahmed (n 12).  
1512 O’Connell (n 79) [36]. 
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research has identified a specific purpose in POCA 2002.   The legislation has developed 
in a piecemeal fashion1513 and one of the aims of POCA 2002 was to simplify the regime 
and move the making of all confiscation, restraint, charging and receivership orders to the 
Crown Court.  This was described as creating a one stop shop for confiscation at the 
Crown Court.1514   
This aim has been met in some areas.  The Crown Court does indeed make all 
confiscation orders and restraint orders, appoints receivers and hears applications made 
by the designated officer for the magistrates’ court for discharge in POCA 2002. It can 
also now make a compliance order, and a determination under section 10A POCA 2002 
which add to the portfolio of orders available to the Crown Court. However, the High Court 
still deals with applications in the pre-POCA 2002 legislation and all other enforcement still 
takes place in the magistrates’ court.  It does not seem right that the legislation requires 
the Crown Court to identify all the information available to assess that an asset is 
available, which would allow it to make a payment order or charging order, but then has to 
send the order to the magistrates’ court to enforce.  
8.1.3 Restraint orders 
In the same way that enforcement generally cannot be looked at in isolation, neither can 
the enforcement of confiscation orders in the magistrates’ court and the critical analysis of 
the use of restraint orders and of receivers concludes that there is a place for these 
orders.  Restraint orders are usually sufficient to ensure that an asset is available to 
satisfy a confiscation order,1515 but there are issues.1516  As a result, there is a perceived 
reluctance to use them and they can have costs implications which changes to the 
legislation have not addressed.1517    
 
1513 Text to n 202 in chapter 2. 
1514 Proceeds of Crime Bill: Publication of Draft Clauses (n 31). 
1515 Sutherland Williams, Hopmeier and Jones only mention restraint (n 58) 69; Mitchell Taylor and 
Talbot mention both restraint and charging orders vol 1, para 3.063 (R0: February 2002). 
1516 These are considered in chapter 4, text to n 935-n 974. 
1517 Text to n 949-n 950 in chapter 4. 
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The analysis revealed the existence of a little used alternative to a restraint order in the 
pre-POCA 2002 legislation, namely a charging order.  These orders have also been 
critically analysed1518 and compared with the power of the designated officer for the 
magistrates’ court to apply for a charging order.1519  This has led to the recommendations 
for the Crown Court to have the power to make charging orders which retain the spirit of a 
restraint order, which is to ensure the asset is available to satisfy the confiscation order, 
and would give the courts more proportionate and less draconian alternatives to restraint. 
8.1.4 The enforcement of confiscation orders in the magistrates’ court 
The magistrates’ court has to enforce all confiscation orders regardless of value or the 
type of offence which led to the conviction.  There are two elements which govern the 
enforcement of confiscation orders in the magistrates’ court, namely the provisions in the 
confiscation legislation, and the application of the fines based powers. 
Like the rest of the regime, the confiscation based powers have developed in a piecemeal 
fashion which means the powers available are dependent on when the confiscation order 
was made.  The use of the fines based powers of enforcement then adds a further level of 
complexity.  It also causes difficulties for the judiciary trying to understand the various 
referrals in the legislation1520 and interpret provisions which were designed for the 
enforcement of fines, not for the enforcement of confiscation orders.1521 
The main sanctions for non-payment of a confiscation order are seen as the accrual of 
interest and the default term, but in themselves these can cause issues for the 
magistrates’ court.  Subsequent changes to the regime have made some improvements, 
particularly where the asset is cash in a bank account.  Otherwise little has changed to the 
 
1518 Text to n 836-n 851 in chapter 4. 
1519 Text to n 1492-n 1501 in chapter 7. 
1520 Text to n 1225-n 1228 in chapter 6. 
1521 Gibson (n 12) [12]. 
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powers of the magistrates’ court to enforce the order and ensure that houses and bank 
accounts are available to satisfy the confiscation order.   
Before activating the default term, the magistrates’ court must consider whether there are 
any other options short of committal, known as civil means of enforcement.1522  After the 
default term has been served, these are the only options available to the magistrates’ 
court.  Following Gibson1523 they are also the only way the magistrates’ court can enforce 
interest unless the prosecution can apply to the Crown Court for an increase in the default 
term.1524 Previous research shows that this is rarely done in practice1525 which is the 
experience of the research author.  The Supreme Court heard that the civil means of 
enforcement are unlikely to be effective if the defendant has defaulted on the principal 
sum.1526  
The analysis of the current civil means of enforcement shows that the main power likely to 
be suitable prior to the default sentence being activated is a warrant of control but it is not 
applicable if the asset is a house or money in a bank account.  In those circumstances, 
the designated officer can apply for enforcement in the High Court or county court.  The 
orders analysed in this research are a third party debt order where the asset is cash in a 
bank account; and a charging order where the asset is a house.  The analysis shows that 
the processes are costly in time and fees.  They are also cumbersome and are a 
duplication of effort.   
Payment orders were introduced in POCA 2002 as an alternative to making applications 
for third party debt orders.  There have been changes to these orders but there appears to 
be an unintended consequence that there is now an increased risk of dissipation if there is 
no restraint order in force.  They have gone some way to reduce the complexities in the 
 
1522 Lloyd (n 530) [17].   
1523 Gibson (n 12).  The Supreme Court held that activating the default term does not apply to the 
accrued interest. 
1524 Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act 1990, s 15(2); CJA 1988, s 75A(2); DTA 1994 s 
10(2); POCA 2002, s 39(5).  
1525 Brown and others (n 173) 13. 
1526 Gibson (n 12) [19]. 
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system and reduce the cumbersome nature of obtaining cash identified in bank accounts, 
but they are orders which can only be made in the magistrates’ court if the confiscation 
order has been made under POCA 2002.  
Without any power for the Crown Court to make specific orders in relation to houses to 
assist the magistrates’ court, the only option for the magistrates’ court is to use the power 
to apply for a charging order in the county court when time for payment has expired.  Not 
only does this increase the risk of dissipation, it again adds to the complex and 
cumbersome nature of the powers of the magistrates’ court.   
The power of the High Court to make a charging order as an alternative to restraint in the 
pre-POCA 2002 legislation1527 was rarely used.1528  As a result, the provision was not 
included in POCA 2002.1529  However, the use of charging orders by the magistrates’ court 
examined in chapter 7 has proved to be of benefit.  The fact that HMCTS collected 
substantial sums of money where the designated officer had obtained a charging order in 
the county court without further enforcement action shows that these orders can be as 
effective as restraint in ensuring that the confiscation order is paid, and the asset is not 
dissipated.1530  Unfortunately, the tortuous nature of the process outweighs those 
benefits.1531   
8.2 Recommendations 
The title of this thesis is ‘Improving the Collection and Enforcement of Confiscation Orders 
in the Magistrates’ Court’ but could be subtitled ‘getting it right on imposition’ because the 
recommendations are that the Crown Court is given more powers to make orders which 
will assist the magistrates’ court when enforcing a confiscation order.  They are 
 
1527 The powers to make a restraint order and charging order are contained in DTOA 1986, s 7, CJA 
1988, s 76 as amended, and DTA 1994, s 25. 
1528 Mitchell Taylor and Talbot vol 1, para 3.061 (R0: February 2002). 
1529 Proceeds of Crime Bill: Publication of Draft Clauses (n 31) para 2.13. 
1530 Text to n 1471-n 1473 in chapter 7. 
1531 Text to n 1473-n 1476 in chapter 7. 
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recommendations which would simplify the law and make the enforcement of orders more 
efficient and reduce the complexities in the system.  
The main recommendations are for the Crown Court to be able to make charging orders 
where the defendant has a house, and payment orders where they have a bank account 
identified as an asset.  These recommendations would meet the purposes and aims of the 
regime to improve collection, meet the need for disruption and ensure that court orders 
are enforced in a timely way. In addition, they would add to the portfolio of orders 
available to the Crown Court in line with the purpose of a one stop shop for confiscation.   
They would address the need for an approach which goes from the cradle to the grave to 
make confiscation order enforcement more effective,1532 and ‘redress the balance in 
favour of the authorities’.1533  Finally, they would provide additional non-custodial or civil 
means of enforcement and provide a cost effective and proportionate alternative to 
restraint.  Changing the legislation would make the magistrates’ court collection and 
enforcement more effective either by ensuring that assets are realised promptly to prevent 
interest accruing, or if interest does accrue in ensuring there are more effective powers 
available.   
As well as providing that the time for payment should be linked to the asset, for example a 
longer period should be given if a property has to be sold, a recommendation is made that 
time for payment should also be linked to orders made at the Crown Court directly 
relevant to the assets identified.  For example, time for payment in relation to a house 
would be linked to a confiscation charging order and cash in a bank account would be 
linked to a payment order.  This is because the changes to the time for payment 
provisions are not enough in themselves to ensure that confiscation orders are paid 
promptly.1534  
 
1532 Wood, The Big Payback (n 5) 14; Levi and Osofsky (n 162) 59; Brown and others (n 173) 13.  
1533 NAO Progress Report (n 367) 30. 
1534 Text to n 1039-n 1043 in chapter 5. 
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There was a recommendation in the Working Group First Report that the Crown Court 
should elect the method by which a confiscation order should be enforced,1535 and the 
Crown Court has an important role in ensuring that orders are enforceable.1536  It is 
recommended that the new powers introduced by the SCA 2015 for the Crown Court to 
make compliance orders or a section 10A determination could be used more widely to 
support the main recommendations.  A section 10A determination could be made 
available to the Crown Court at any stage where there is an application by the prosecutor.  
As judges in the Crown Court can make these orders, restraint orders and appoint 
receivers, it would be reasonable for them to also have the additional powers to make a 
payment order or confiscation charging order. 
8.2.1 Recommendations for the Crown Court to make payment orders  
It is recommended that the changes suggested by the First and Third Working Group 
Third Reports1537 are revisited and that changes to the payment order provisions are 
introduced. The first recommendation is that the payment order provisions are extended 
and available in relation to confiscation orders made under the pre-POCA 2002 legislation 
as the powers of discharge have already been extended to pre-POCA 2002 orders.  
Secondly there is a recommendation that the Crown Court should be able to make a 
payment order on imposition to ensure there is no dissipation of money in a bank account 
before the case is sent to the magistrates’ court for enforcement.   If the account has been 
identified as an asset at the Crown Court, it will have all of this information and would be 
in a position to make an interim order, rather than passing it to the magistrates’ court to 
consider. The legislation, including the Criminal Procedure Rules, could be drafted so that 
the Crown Court could make an interim payment order with notice to the bank which, if 
 
1535 Working Group First Report (n 137) 8-9. 
1536 Both when making confiscation orders, for example Ahmad and Ahmed (n 12) and Hopmeier 
and Mills (n 675) 458;  and ensuring the magistrates’ court gets all the relevant information it 
needs to enforce an order by ensuring the forms 5050 and 5050A are completed carefully, 
Ghulam (n 702).  
1537 Text to n 1143 in chapter 5. 
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nothing is heard, becomes absolute on a given date.  If an objection is received a hearing 
could be arranged in the magistrates’ court and until then the interim payment order would 
remain in place. 
If the bank account becomes known at a later date, the Crown Court and the magistrates’ 
court should both have the power to make a payment order subsequently to the 
confiscation order being made.  This means that either court could make an order 
alongside other orders it is considering. 
Fisher suggests using a compliance order to require a defendant to transfer monies in an 
offshore bank account to a local bank account.1538  If a compliance order is made in these 
terms, it would allow a payment order to be made and is a way of using compliance orders 
innovatively.1539  
8.2.2 Recommendations for the Crown Court to make charging orders 
A recommendation is also made that the pre-POCA 2002 power to make a charging order 
should be available, but as a power of the Crown Court with additional features.  This 
charging order could be made in two circumstances.  The first scenario would be as a 
direct alternative to restraint in the same situations as in POCA 2002, where there is a risk 
of dissipation.  This means that a prosecutor or accredited financial investigator could 
apply where one of the five conditions which currently must be satisfied before a restraint 
order can be made applies.1540 The charging order should be in the same terms as the 
CJA 1988 or DTA 1994, capable of being suspended and with the same powers of 
enforcement by a receiver and an order for sale.1541 
If there is no risk of dissipation, it is recommended that the Crown Court should be given 
the option of making a suspended confiscation charging order in favour of the designated 
 
1538 Fisher (n 60) 759. 
1539 The innovative use of compliance orders has been suggested by Fisher, ibid 759; and Wood, 
The Big Payback (n 5) 7. 
1540 POCA 2002, s 40.  
1541 DTOA 1986, s 7, CJA 1988, s 76 as amended, and DTA 1994, s 25. 
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officer.  The order would be suspended until time for payment has expired and would then 
come into force unless the order is satisfied.  These recommendations echo those in the 
Working Group First Report that the Crown Court should elect the method by which a 
confiscation order should be enforced1542 and could be seen as akin to a compliance order 
which must be considered in every case.1543  
It is recommended that the legislation should allow for the order to be enforced by the 
designated officer applying for an order for sale which could be to the county court, as at 
the moment.  Any applications to vary or discharge should be made to the Crown Court. 
There could be a wider use of a compliance order if a suspended charging order is made.  
Consideration should also be given to making a compliance order with a condition that the 
property is not to be sold without giving notice to the prosecution or HMCTS.  This would 
provide additional protection to prevent dissipation and could apply to third parties where 
there has been a determination under section 10A POCA 2002.  
There would also be scope to use compliance orders innovatively where the Crown Court 
expects an asset to be sold to satisfy the confiscation order.  When making a restraint 
order, the Crown Court can also make any orders to ensure that the order is effective.1544  
Either a similar provision could be introduced to accompany a confiscation charging order, 
or a compliance order could be used.   It could require a defendant to market a house for 
sale, for example, within a certain timeframe, with a requirement to provide proof to the 
lead agency at named intervals.  The order could also have requirements directed at an 
estate agent as it can be made against a third party.  This could require them to provide 
details of whether the house is being marketed at an appropriate price and how many 
viewings have been undertaken.  If offers have been made, they could also be required to 
give an opinion about whether any offers are reasonable.   
 
1542 Working Group First Report (n 137) 8-9. 
1543 A compliance order can be made in the Crown Court to ensure that a confiscation order is 
effective, POCA 2002, s 13A. 
1544 POCA 2002, s 41(7). 
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A house could be identified as an asset after imposition.  In this case the recommendation 
is that the legislation should allow for the prosecutor to apply to the Crown Court for a 
charging order which would be enforceable by a receiver or designated officer depending 
on whether there is a risk of dissipation of assets.   
The proposals would also fit in with and support the new provisions introduced by the SCA 
2015 for different amounts to be given different time for payment.  This would allow 
enforcement to begin as soon as an individual time for payment has expired where a 
house is an asset.1545  As the order is limited to the particular asset and is an indirect 
enforcement action which does not prevent anyone dealing with the property,1546  it is less 
draconian and more proportionate than a restraint order whilst achieving the same result.   
In order for these recommendations to work, it is suggested that the Criminal Procedure 
Rules should be amended.  It is recommended that the power to apply for a variation in 
section 23 POCA 2002 should be extended to the designated officer for the magistrates’ 
court to mirror the power to apply to discharge.  This would allow an application to be 
made if the house is sold for a sum less than the valuation at the Crown Court without the 
lengthy delays which can occur if the defendant is unaware that the order has not been 
satisfied or the expense of a defence solicitor being appointed.  The legislation should 
ensure that the prosecution and defence are put on notice of the applications being made. 
8.2.3 Recommendation for areas for further research  
In addition to the main conclusions and recommendations, this thesis has identified areas 
suitable for further research. The Supreme Court has held that if the default term is 
activated, it does not cover any accrued interest1547 and suggested that if it is intended 
that interest should be included in the calculation of the default term then legislative 
 
1545 Text to n 1039-n 1043 in chapter 5. 
1546 Lord Neuberger and others (n 1438), vol 1, 2362. 
1547 Gibson (n 12). 
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amendment is needed.1548  It is recommended that this is an area suitable for further 
research. 
Case law also highlights the complexities of using the fines based legislation for the 
enforcement of confiscation orders1549 and it is suggested that this too is an area suitable 
for future research which should include the application of section 35 POCA 2002.  This 
dictates which of the fines based enforcement powers are available to the magistrates’ 
court when dealing with confiscation orders. 
This research has also identified that there may be a role for the increased use of 
collection orders to enforce confiscation orders and the sanctions they bring.  Future 
research should include an assessment of whether the use of registering the debt on the 
register of judgments, orders and fines is appropriate for the enforcement of confiscation 
orders.1550   There have been calls for an increased ability to write off unenforceable 
accounts.1551  This area of further research should also include the possibility of extending 
the current powers to discharge confiscation orders in POCA 2002 to the pre-POCA 2002 
legislation. 
A detailed analysis of the issues where a third party involved in confiscation proceedings 
is a company or a spouse falls outside the scope of this thesis, but it is suggested as an 
area suitable for future research, especially in the use of charging orders where the asset 
is the matrimonial home.  This should also consider similarities to contract law and 
applications to set aside a legal charge due to claims of undue influence or 
misrepresentation by a spouse,1552 and would supplement further research into the use of 
section 10A determinations in the Crown Court.   
 
1548 ibid [23]. 
1549 North Kent Magistrates’ Court v Reid (n 19), Anscombe (n 20) (Schiemann LJ); Gibson (n 12) 
[11]. 
1550 Text to n 1242-n 1256 in chapter 6. 
1551 Text to n 1153-n 1154 in chapter 5. 
1552 n 777. 
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8.3 An Original Contribution to Academic Study 
There is a twofold need for this research. In 2006 Vettori reported an almost complete lack 
of a review of the provisions to enforce confiscation orders from beginning to end.1553 
Although there has been research into the enforcement of confiscation orders since then, 
this has often concentrated on the provisions of POCA 2002, and the use of restraint.1554  
This thesis considers the enforcement powers generally, and specifically those of the 
magistrates’ court for orders made under both POCA 2002 and the pre-POCA 2002 
legislation, and meets the need first identified by Vettori. 
There is also a need to improve the enforcement of confiscation orders and this research 
shows that when the regime was introduced ‘the burden’ of enforcing orders was given to 
magistrates’ courts using their fines based powers, with larger and more complex cases 
being enforced in the High Court using restraint, charging and receivership orders.1555  
This shows how provisions are not used as intended because restraint is not used in all 
suitable cases, and charging orders did not survive in POCA 2002.1556  This means in 
practice that fines based powers of the magistrates’ court have been used in all types of 
cases.  The fines based powers have not changed a great deal,1557 and the introduction of 
payment orders only exists for confiscation orders made under POCA 2002.  Coupled with 
the practical experience of the research author, the doctrinal and critical analysis in this 
thesis shows that there is a need for new powers where the asset is a house or cash in a 
bank account.  
There are key aspects of this research which have made an original contribution to 
academic study.  The methodology of critically analysing the review documents in chapter 
2 of this thesis gives a wide perspective of the regime and the issues with the 
 
1553 Vettori (n 47) 20. 
1554 For example, Bullock and others (n 29).  
1555 'The UK Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986' (n 17) 1632. 
1556 Proceeds of Crime Bill: Publication of Draft Clauses (n 31) para 2.13. 
1557 A comparison of the provisions which mean that a confiscation order is enforced as a fine 
shows little difference, DTOA 1986, s 6(4); CJA 1988 s 75(5); DTA 1994, s 9(4); POCA 2002, s 35(3).  
Text to n 1216-n 1223 in chapter 6. 
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enforcement of confiscation orders since its inception.  This has supplemented the 
doctrinal and critical analysis of the rules which apply to the magistrates’ court when 
enforcing confiscation orders, an area which has received little academic attention.1558  
The critical analysis of the rules relating to restraint and charging orders both under the 
pre-POCA 2002 legislation and as an order made in the county court is a novel approach 
and adds to the previous research on the use of restraint orders.   
The use of ‘insider research’ also adds a unique perspective.  The experience of the 
research author has added to the scope and findings of the research.1559  This means that 
she can comment from both an objective and subjective viewpoint as well as commenting 
on the practical implications of the regime.  It also means that she was able to give 
importance to aspects which may not have been as easily identified by someone who did 
not have her practical experience.   
This led to the analysis of the review documents in chapter 2 of this thesis.  It also led to 
the analysis of the charging order provisions in the pre-POCA 2002 legislation in chapter 4 
before being compared with the powers of the magistrates’ court to apply for charging 
orders in chapter 7.  As her starting point was the powers of enforcement available to the 
magistrates’ court, it also led to the desire to find an alternative to restraint to assist the 
magistrates’ court rather than just focus on the effectiveness of the powers of the Crown 
Court.   
There is an historical aspect to this research which is still relevant as confiscation orders 
are still being made under the pre-POCA 2002 legislation and the magistrates’ court is still 
enforcing such orders.  Because of the subject covered, and the approach taken, this 
research offers a new perspective to the enforcement of confiscation orders and makes 
 
1558 Text to n 47-n 49 in chapter 1. 
1559 The research author is a solicitor employed within Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service 
(HMCTS) with an interest in the enforcement of confiscation orders in the magistrates’ court.  She 
is writing in her personal capacity, the work is her own and the views contained in this thesis are 
that of the research author and do not necessarily represent the views of HMCTS, the Ministry of 
Justice (MOJ) or any of its employees. 
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recommendations for future legislative change.  It also answers the call by Kruisbergen et 
all for more insight into the enforcement of confiscation orders to enhance understanding 
and ‘point to possibilities to improve them.’1560 
This research is topical.  It reviews the law up to and including 31 December 2018 and 
analyses the changes to POCA 2002 introduced by the SCA 2015.  There is 
parliamentary and inter agency interest in the enforcement of confiscation orders, and the 
Law Commission is undertaking a project to consider the effectiveness of confiscation 
orders, including their enforcement. As such this thesis will be of interest to lawyers, policy 




1560 Kruisbergen, Kleemans and Kouwenberg (n 54) 692. 
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B Confiscation Order Debt 2017-2018 
Confiscation Order debt as broken down in the HMCTS Trust Statement 2017-20181562 
 
 
1562 Extract from HMCTS Trust Statement 2017-18 (n 23) 13. 
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C Confiscation Order debt – value banding by lead agency1563
 
 
1563 Extract from HMCTS Trust Statement 2017-18 (n 23) 43 figure 4.1. 
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D Confiscation Order Debt-aged debt profile by lead agency1564
 
1564 Extract from HMCTS Trust Statement 2017-18 (n 23) 44 figure 4.2. 
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